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SYNOPSIS 
Law and State, especially forms of landed property and contract, have played an 
important mediatory role in the internationalisation of agricultural capital in Ghana. 
The establishment of cocoa production in Ghana in the late nineteenth and the early 
part of the twentieth century established the predominance of small holder peasant 
production in Ghanaian agriculture. The production and export of cocoa also 
established a specific form of internationalisation of agricultural capital in Ghana. 
This involved the subsumption of peasant commodity producers within the circuit of 
international capital. Because capital did not directly control production its relations 
with the peasantry centred around struggles over both the conditions of labour. in the 
sphere of production and over the realisation of the value of the peasants' product, in 
the sphere of circulation. These struggles were moulded by legal forms of landed 
property controlled by the direct producer and the character of the contractual 
relationship between peasant and the representatives of capital. 
The transformation induced by cocoa production included changes in forms of landed 
property, a process in which the colonial state played an important role. These 
changes have been a significant influence on the subsequent forms of 
internationalisation of agricultural capital in the post colonial period. The thesis shows 
through an analysis of the post colonial sugar and oil palm industries the nature of this 
influence. It also shows ho«- the shift in the proclaimed objectives of the state from 
the colonial concern with export agriculture to the "nationalist" post colonial goal of 
seif reliance came to be co-opted by new forms of international capital and the 
mediatory role of legal forms, especially contract, in this process of co-optation. 
This work is based mainly on written primary and secondary sources, complemented 
by intcrviews with some officials of the some of the institutions covered in the thesis. 
My secondary sources include unpublished essays and thesis, books, articles, reports, 
studies by companies, government bodies and similar such published material. Most 
of the primary material used in the parts of the work that deal with the colonial period 
conic from the British Public Records Office and the Ghana National Archives in 
Accra. For the post colonial period a substantial part of the primary information was 
gathered using personal contacts in various state institutions, particularly the Ministry 
of finance and Economic Planning, the Attorney General Department and the Ghana 
Investment Centre. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
This thesis analyses how law and state have mediated the internationalisation of 
agricultural capital in colonial and post colonial Ghana, particularly the role of contract 
and forms of landed property in this process. For the colonial period the discussion 
centres around the relationship between smallholder peasant cocoa production and 
merchant and industrial capital up to the creation of a state marketing board at the 
beginning of the Second World War. For the post colonial period the work, on the 
basis of four case studies, analyses the involvement of various types of capital - 
industrial, finance and state capital - in the oil palm and sugar sub-sectors. Three oil 
palm plantations and the sugar industry constitute the case studies. An important 
thread running through and linking the selected crops and historical periods is the 
evolution of the forms of agricultural production and subsumption of labour by capital. 
As we show subsequently this runs from failed attempts, in the early colonial period 
to create the conditions for plantation agriculture, through the rise and dominance of 
smallholder peasant cocoa production to the establishment of nucleus plantations with 
outgrowers in the 1970s. 
As in most of sub-Saharan Africa the agrarian transition effected in Ghana by the 
more systematic penetration of capital that followed the "qualitative historical leap" 
(Bernstein, 1979,42 3) of formal colonisation took the form of the deepening 
subsumption of the peasantry through the further commoditisation of elements of their 
reproduction rather than their expropriation and transformation into wage labourers. 
Because capital does not directly control production its relations with the peasantry 
1) 
centre around struggles over the conditions of labour, in the sphere of production and 
over the realisation of the value of the peasants' product, in the sphere of circulation. 
These struggles were moulded by legal forms of landed property controlled by the 
direct producer and the character of the contractual relationship between peasant and 
the representatives of capital. The mechanisms of subsumption of the "independent' 
producer are central to the discussion of the crops focused on in this work. 
This work argues that the initial phase of subsumption of Ghanaian agricultural 
producers, during the colonial period, involved changes in forms of landed property, 
a process in which the colonial state played an important role, and that these changes 
have been a significant influence on the subsequent forms of internationalisation of 
agricultural capital in the post colonial period. I seek to show how the shift in the 
proclaimed objectives of the state from the colonial concern with export agriculture 
to the "nationalist" post colonial goal of self reliance came to be co-opted by new 
forms of international capital and the mediatory role of legal forms, especially 
contract, in this process of co-optation. 
The analysis in the thesis proceeds from the premise that the nature of "law and state" 
cannot be understood outside concrete historical context and determinate social 
relations. Law, legal relations and forms of state are rooted in the material conditions 
of social life'. This broader social totality includes both the nation-state and the 
global political economy. In his Nvork on law and state in Papua New Guinea. 
1 This point is persuasively illustrated from different theoretical standpoints by the selection of material 
in Section I of a useful reader compilation by Ghai, Luckham and Snyder (1987). 
-, J 
Fitzpatrick (1980,28) defines law as "a type of state action, distinctive in certain 
operational ways, but sharing its functions with other types of state action. " He 
confesses to finding it impossible to give even the most superficial descriptive content 
to laws without seeing them as integral parts of various sets of state action (See also 
Fitzpatrick, 1983,160). Shivji (1986,1) follows Marx and Engels (1976,92) and asserts 
in the very opening sentence of his study of law, state and the working class in 
Tanzania that "Law does not have a history of its own" (See also Ghai, et al., 1987, xiii; 
Snyder, 1981,10). The analysis of law in a broader social totality must therefore 
involve "a multi-disciplinary methodology encompassing other social scientific 
disciplines as well as law" (Adelman and Paliwala, 1993,14). 
The conception of law in this work is linked with the existence of a state. The 
historical starting off point for this study is the imposition of formal colonial rule, a 
central aspect of which was the creation of the colonial state. In the Gold Coast as 
in other colonies law and state played a crucial role in the destruction of "natural 
economy' and the emergence of agricultural commodity production supplying raw 
materials to Western capitalist industry (Alavi, 1975; Banaji, 1977; Bernstein, 1979; 
Goodman and Redclift, 1981, ch. 2). Szereszewski's classic study (1965) has shown 
how within a twenty year period, 1891-1911, the Gold Coast was transformed into a 
dependent colonial economy aiding the accumulation of capital in the advanced 
capitalist countries through the production and export of raw materials, primarily 
agricultural commodities. Central to this process of fundamental transformation 
analysed by tizcreszewski was the development of smallholder peasant cocoa 
production. B 191 1 the Gold Coast was the world largest producer of cocoa and in 
1920Y27 accounted for a phenomenal 45 per cent of world supply. 
4 
The development of Gold Coast cocoa production was at once a process of 
transformation of agrarian relations and also of internationalisation of capital. Cocoa 
production which was the spearhead of the penetration and expansion of capitalism in 
Ghanaian agriculture was an aspect of the phase of internationalisation of capital that 
followed the capitalist crisis of the 1870s. The development in the Gold Coast was 
more than a domestic revolution. It was also a leading edge of an international one 
which had two major aspects. Firstly it was part of the geographical shift of the main 
sources of the world's supply of cocoa from Latin America and the Caribbean to 
mainland Africa. The other aspect of the international revolution was the new pre- 
eminence of smallholder peasant production over the hitherto dominant plantation 
cocoa production (Wickizer, 1951,262-268; Gunnarson, 1978,4-6). 
The creation of the colonial state and the intertwined process of establishing the 
conditions for the spread of commodity relations are the subject matter of Chapter 2 
of the thesis. The creation of the colonial state combined a process of destruction and 
co-optation of local states, involving the well known methods of military campaigns, 
intrigue and intimidation and bribery. It is argued that the colonial state, based on 
indirect rule, was inherently unstable and weak and that this factor was to remain a 
constraint on its activity throughout the colonial period. The facilitation of the spread 
of' commodity relations combined administrative and legal intervention: forced labour 
legislation to secure unpaid labour for building roads that opened up the country 
coexisted with an investigation into the prospects for commodity agriculture and the 
establishment of a Department of Agriculture. The forced labour legislation provide 
early examples of the colonial manipulation of customary law forms. The chapter 
reviews the debate about the factors behind the emergence of smallholder rather than 
plantation agriculture in the Gold Coast. It also discusses the related issue of the 
reasons for the spread of cocoa production and the failure of attempts by Lever 
Brothers to revive palm oil production for export. 
The emergence of widespread export agricultural production had a revolutionary 
impact on land relations in the cocoa growing areas and moulded the basic principles 
of "customary land law" in conditions of commodity production. Chapter 3 discusses 
this issue of transformation of land relations. The analysis starts with an attempt to 
re-construct pre-colonial land relations in the cocoa growing areas. This lays a basis 
for an understanding of the objectives of two important, failed legislative attempts by 
the colonial state to effect a radical transformation of property relations, how and why 
the particular changes in landed property relations caused by cocoa production 
occurred. Snyder's study (1981) of the effect of subsumption within the world 
capitalist economy on legal forms among the Banjal of Senegal found not only a 
pattern of uneven changes in legal forms but also that while the appearance of these 
forms were only partially altered as concrete concepts they were radically transformed. 
A similar pattern of uneven rupturing of pre-colonial landed property relations. 
transformation of legal forms and divergence between appearance and content of legal 
forms has occurred in concepts related to transactions in and use of land as a result 
of cocoa farming. The most important of these related to the customary law usufruct, 
the status of 'strangers' and the transformation of pre-colonial tribute/rent. 
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We have already noted that because capital did not directly control peasant cocoa 
production its relations with the producers centred around struggles over the conditions 
of labour, in the sphere of production and over the realisation of the value of the 
peasants' product, in the sphere of circulation. The thesis argues that while the central 
conflict over quantity, quality and price of cocoa was between the peasantry and 
capital, i. e merchant and industrial capital there was an important subsidiary conflict 
between the two types of capital. Just as it had previously controlled the international 
trade in petty commodities, European merchant capital became the main intermediary 
between the Gold Coast cocoa producers and the industrial users of the crop. Kay 
(1975,94) has noted that in every society, capitalist or non-capitalist, merchant capital 
has no direct control over the labour process and is always dependent on the 
class which does, even where it dominates this class... it must always engage 
in unequal exchange to appropriate part of the surplus product of society... 
as capital is always driven to accumulate and in this way as a medium 
through which the law of value is brought to bear on all parts of the 
economy, particularly the sphere of production. The repercussions of those 
features, however differ with the nature of society. 
In non-capitalist societies an important effect of merchant capital is that "it subjects 
production more and more to exchange value, by making consumption and existence 
more dependent on sale than on the direct use of the product" (Marx, 1981,448). The 
dramatic growth of cocoa production in the first decades of the 20th century testifies 
to the growing commoditisation of the reproduction of the cocoa peasantry. While the 
intensification of cocoa production makes more cocoa available it does not guarantee 
the quality of what is produced. For the cocoa farmer the concern is to sell cocoa 
produced with the least exertion at the highest possible price. For the industrial user 
of cocoa the commodity is a raw material of which not only certain quantities but also 
7 
particular quality is required, whereas for the merchant whose profit comes from the 
difference between prices at which goods are bought and sold the main concern is 
whether there is a profitable market for any type of cocoa. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with 
the legal implications and the role of the state in the struggles engendered by these 
conflicting interests. 
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship and struggles between capital and the cocoa 
peasantry in the sphere of exchange in the period up to the creation of the marketing 
boards at the beginning of the Second World War. The cut off point is based on the 
argument that the 1937 cocoa hold up and the subsequent establishment of the cocoa 
marketing board marked the end of merchant capital's dominance of the local cocoa 
industry. We show the pattern of peasant resistance to capital which culminated in the 
historic 1937 hold up of cocoa. The analysis in this chapter highlights the role of 
contract in mediating the relationship between capital and the peasantry. Formally 
speaking the contractual relationship between the parties for the sale of goods: 
exchange between the farmer as owner of goods and a buyer offering money. The 
discussion shows that historical evolution of the relationship, as the farmers became 
more and more specialist commodity producers the real content of the contractual 
relationship extended the influence of capital over the production process though 
formal control over that sphere remained in the hands of the farmer. 
Chapter 4 tries to show how the growing real subsumption of the peasant was directly 
linked to both his formal independence from capital and increasing dependence on 
commodity production which therefore makes him vulnerable to cyclical price 
8 
movements resulting in indebtedness. The analysis shows that precisely because of 
the formal legal relationship between farmer and cocoa buying firms usurious 
transactions, of buyers lending to farmers against future deliveries, are not 
characterised as money lending transactions. We discuss the debilitating impact of 
peasant indebtedness on the quantity and quality of cocoa production and the different 
attitudes of the colonial state, merchant and industrial capital to the issue. 
Chapter 5 discusses how the colonial state allied with industrial capital sought to 
overtly intervene in and influence the production process of the cocoa peasantry, 
primarily to secure improvements in the quality of cocoa. Legal measures, including 
a manipulation of "customary law", formed an important part of this exercise. The 
analysis shows how in spite of its sympathy for the demands of industrial capital the 
effectiveness of state activity was constrained not only by the peasants' control of the 
labour process but by also the local dominance of merchant capital and the threat 
aggressive intervention posed to the fragile legitimacy of the colonial state. This 
chapter is the last on the colonial period. 
The role created for the Gold Coast in the international division of labour had 
produced an economy with acute structural dislocations, with the following key 
features: a backward agrarian sector dominated by a single export raw material crop - 
cocoa - the fortunes of which exercise a decisive influence on the country's political 
economy; a dominant presence of foreign capital, especially monopoly capital, in key 
areas such as banking, mining, timber production and large scale commerce; and a 
disproportionately large commercial and service sector with hundreds of thousands of 
9 
unstable and insecure petty traders and other participants (Graham. 1984). A very 
high proportion of production and consumption in the Gold Coast was integrated 
through international trade rather than within the country, which had very little modern 
manufacturing industry. (Metcalfe, 1964; Seidman, 1978). The popular explosion of 
anger in the 1948 riots highlighted the fragility and structural imbalance of the 
economy of the acknowledged African 'model colony' of the British Empire, thereby 
shattering many imperial illusions' and accelerating the pace of decolonisation. 
The Watson Commission, which investigated the 1948 disturbances found that 
discontent about economic conditions in the Colony had been an important point of 
unity for the broad coalition of social strata that participated in the upheavals. It 
reported being "at every turn.. . pressed with the cry of 
industrialisation", though it 
doubted very much "if the authors of this cry really understood more than their vague 
desire for something that promised wealth and higher standards of life" (para. 298). 
Although not directly articulated by the anti-colonial movement, the findings of the 
Watson Commission about dissatisfaction with shortages of consumer goods and the 
calls for industrialisation represent facets of the same phenomenon: unfulfilled demand 
in the home market3. 
'Barely two years before the riots a writer on constitutional affairs had celebrated the introduction of 
a new Gold Coast Constitution, which for the first time gave unofficial members an elected majority 
in the legislative Council, with the declaration that "the Gold Coast people find themselves the pioneers 
of political advance and the touchstone of political competence in Africa" (Wight, 1946,207). 
See Austin (1970, ch 11) for an account of the anti-colonial protests and political developments in the 
Gold Coast between 1946-191. 
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Despite the fact that the especial post war situation of the world and British economies 
was the immediate cause of the shortage of consumer goods in the Gold Coast the 
fundamental causes lay in the export-oriented agriculture which had developed under 
colonial rule and defined the political economy and social structure of the 'model' 
colony'. In drawing attention to this dimension of the colonial economy the 1948 
riots, and the resultant comments of the Watson Commission, presaged a key problem 
of the post-colonial era and intractable pre-occupation of all its governments: the need 
to expand domestic production of basic agricultural staples and wider range of raw 
materials as well as basic manufactured commodities. 
Sugar and soap, for which palm oil is a basic raw material, were among the 
commodities whose political importance had been highlighted in the 1948 consumer 
boycott and riots. Figures in the Watson Commission Report (1948,37, table 3) 
indicate that 1947 sugar imports were only 54 per cent that of 1937-38. In the 
quinquennium before the Second World War the average annual consumption of sugar, 
all imported, was 6,100 tons. Imports of soap had reached a peak of over 4,000 tons 
in 1937. During the War annual imports of soap had been less that half the pre-War 
levels. The only local modern soap factory, the Accra Chemical Works, which was 
set up in 19 34 and used coconut oil, had an annual output of only 585 tons. The two 
items were among the "small number of important commodities" in respect of which 
the Watson Commission thought the colonial government should work out "some 
s\'titem of rationing and of allocation and distribution.. . 
in the event of supply 
4 The \\'atson Commission remarked on the Agriculture Department's "excessive attention to the 
problems of export crops in comparison with crops for home consumption... and the absence of plans 
for the future" (para 323). 
conditions deteriorating" (para 243). The two commodities were to retain their 
political importance in the post-colonial years, featuring prominently in the volume 
and cost of imports that have produced balance of payments crises which then 
undermined successive regimes. 
Periodic shortages of food and non-durable consumer goods have been a torch paper 
in the politics of the post-colonial period. In 1965/66 shortages and high prices of 
food and consumer goods provided a cover for the February 1966 coup against the 
government of the Convention People's Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah. In 
1968/69 the National Liberation Council (NLC) regime set up by the coup faced 
strikes on account of poor food supplies and inflation. The factors that undermined 
the Progress Party government, setting it up for the January 1972 coup, included 
popular discontent over food prices. The chain of events that led to the downfall of 
the National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) regime was 
triggered by student protests in 1977 against poor and inadequate food, a protest that 
found wide resonance (Kraus, 1988: 75-78). Typically, inadequate imports and a 
balance of payments crisis, usually linked with poor world prices for cocoa, have 
caused the food related unrest. The policies of Ghana's governments on sugar and 
oil palm (the main raw material for soap) broadly touch on the main elements of post- 
colonial agro-industrial policy, which sought to respond to the cyclical crisis, and new 
orientations in the role on international capital in Ghanaian agriculture. 
Chapter 6 discusses the development of the post colonial sugar and oil palm industries 
up to the mid 1970s. It charts the history and problems of efforts to develop national 
1? 
sufficiency in sugar and oil palm, the role of international capital in this process and 
the factors that affected the outcome of the efforts. The developments took place 
amidst the differing economic strategies of successive regimes from the neo-classical 
liberalism of the first decade (1951-61) of the Nkrumah regime, through the years 
after its "Left Turn" (1961-66) when the public sector was given a central role in 
economic development, to the swing back to a faith in private capital during the 
NLC/Busia years (1966-72) which again swung back towards a compromise between 
the private and public sectors during the NRC/SMC regime (1972-79). 
As the first independent country in sub-Saharan Africa, whose leadership was 
impatient to "modernise", the early years of Ghana's post-colonial history fully partook 
of the contemporary optimism about the use of law an instrument for development and 
modernisation. In Ghana, more than in most newly independent countries there was 
not an area of social life, from the family to the market, from the criminal justice 
system to urban administration that was not seen as susceptible to being transformed 
by and through law (Adelman and Paliwala, 1993,11). It must be noted however that 
the interventionism of the post-colonial state was in part a continuation of the practices 
of the colonial state, part of the legacy of colonialism. 
State intervention to meet demand for food and agro-industrial products has taken five 
main forms: 
a) expanding direct state involvement in agricultural 
production. largely of a`, ro-industrial crops. 
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b) attempts to transform peasant agriculture through a 
variety of methods, but mainly by seeking to introduce 
new technologies; 
C) encouraging the development of large-scale farms by 
both local and foreign capital; 
d) interventions in the markets for agricultural inputs and 
produce, linked to efforts to regulate the prices of and to 
ensure urban food supplies; and 
e) state creation of or encouragement for the creation of 
agro-industrial manufacturing enterprises by private 
capital either alone or in cooperation with the state. 
Each of these broad strategies have produced a range of specific policies. These 
include the passage of laws to help overcome perceived problems in the path of these 
strategies: - enhanced powers of compulsory acquisition of land, investment incentives 
specifically directed at large scale agriculture, the production of specific crops or the 
setting up of particular manufacturing enterprises; the creation of parastatal 
organisations for marketing agricultural inputs and produce, and also to deliver 
extension services; the setting up of credit institutions; loan/project agreements with 
bilateral and multilateral institutions such as USAID and the World Bank; joint 
venture/management contracts between the state and TNCs and so on. The different 
post-colonial regimes, dominated by different elements of the petty-bourgeoisie, have 
emphasised different permutations of the five broad strategies indicated. The specific 
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policy shifts have been distinguished by shifts in the relationship between the state and 
private capital and also influenced by processes in the world economy. 
During the 1960s there was a notable growth in direct foreign private investment in 
plants that undertook the last stage processing and assembling of imported components 
into goods for the domestic market of the ex-colonies, developing on a trend which 
had started under colonialism (Arrighi, 1969; Seidman, 1970; Szentes, 1983; 
Green, 1981). The types and origins, national and institutional, of foreign capital in 
the ex-colonies however underwent a change. Arrighi (1969,110) has correctly noted 
"decolonisation was among other things the result of a conflict between the dynamic 
elements (big companies) and the backward elements (marginal enterprises, small 
planters, small trading houses, small semi-artisanal workshops) of colonial capitalism" 
Generally, decolonisation caused a flight of small scale foreign capital. The TNC 
became the typical foreign firm operating in African economies; local enterprises in 
mining and manufacturing usually becoming part of its international vertical 
integration. 
The rise of the TNC was accompanied by rise in productive foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and a relative decline in the importance of rentier capital such as merchant 
capital. In many countries big foreign merchant capital moved into manufacturing. 
For example in Ghana, from the late 1950s, the Unilever subsidiary the United Africa 
Company (UAC) which had dominated the internal cocoa trade during the colonial 
period moved into manufacturing of either the simple processing of export raw 
materials or local manufacture of an import substituting type from the late 1950s. 
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The movement of foreign firms into import substituting manufacturing and simple 
processing of raw material exports is illustrative of how the types, sectoral distribution 
and end uses of foreign capital in post colonial Africa was not only the result of the 
pursuit of predetermined aims but also an adaptation to the development strategies of 
Africa's governments and economic constraints that emerged in the post-colonial era. 
Many African countries, following the dominant orthodoxy. saw import substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) as a key element in economic transformation and established 
policy regimes to facilitate it. New investment codes created incentive schemes to 
induce private capital, especially foreign, to invest in specified areas. These included 
free repatriation of profits and capital, complete or partial exemption from profits, 
customs and income taxes, accelerated depreciation concessions, tax stabilisation 
guarantees and against expropriation or full, prompt and adequate compensation in 
such an eventuality, etc. (Dixon-Fyle, 1967). In some countries import and exchange 
controls and protective tariff were additionally used to influence the composition of 
imports in a manner that discriminated against consumer goods and protect emergent 
ISI enterprises. 
For firms with a presence long established through importing and distributing goods, 
the setting up of an ISI enterprise, essentially a last stage processing plant using 
imported inputs and vertically integrated into world wide production, served a number 
of purposes. A loss of established markets was avoided while the company 
pronounced itself in tune with national aspirations. International intra-firm trade and 
transfer pricing provides an invisible avenue for the export of capital N hich bypasses 
exchange regulations where they exist. "As opposed to the Latin American 
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experience, where initial import substitution manufacturing was largely domestic and 
was dominated by foreign firms only two or three decades later. African 
manufacturing grew up on a "branch plant' basis" (Green, 1981,341). 
Another important change was the replacement of private portfolio investment as a 
source of funding for public infrastructural development by bilateral and multilateral 
loans and "aid". The Cold War influenced the levels and purposes of official capital 
flows. (Morgan, 1980, Vol 3,89-91). Though the countries of the Soviet Bloc also 
provided some loans and grants Western countries and allied institutions were by far 
the principal sources of official capital inflows. Like the portfolio investment that it 
replaced these inflows went largely into the creation of public overhead capital: roads, 
power plants, ports and telecommunications facilities, which then served to enhance 
the conditions for profitable private investment (Mason & Asher, 1973; Williams, 1981; 
Ravenhill, 1985). 
From the late sixties international development finance institutions- the World Bank, 
the European Development Fund (EDF), USAID, ODA, etc. - began to pay more 
attention to areas outside infrastructural development in the Third World countries. 
More lending began to go to other areas of agriculture other than irrigation, industry, 
health and other social services and there emerged a concern with "rural development". 
By the mid scvvnties this new interest had become a full blown, but somewhat fuzzy 
ideology of a concern with "basic needs" and alleviating poverty with a proclaimed 
stress on agriculture and rural development (Mason & t\sher, l97): Williams; Paver. 
1982, World Bank, 1975: ILO, 1975: Ravenhill, 1985 ). 
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A numbers of factors combined to produce some changes in the underlying ideology 
of the international development finance institutions. These included disappointment 
among Latin American and the newly independent Africa and Asian countries about 
the success of their efforts at national development. Alongside this were their 
increasing protests and efforts to unite in the face of deteriorating terms of trade, and 
growing structural imbalances and demand a more "just" international economic order. 
These calls became even more strident with the onset of the world crisis in the mid 
1970s, becoming formalised in the demand for a New International Economic Order- 
NIEO (Murphy, 1984). The severe drought and famine which devastated the parts of 
the Indian subcontinent in the second half of the 1960s, the "green revolution", the 
self-reliance shown by the Vietnamese peasantry in the face of American high 
technology firepower, the experience of discovering the weakness of private capital 
and the extent of poverty (hence the weak bases of dependent regimes in Africa and 
other parts of the Third World) are also cited as factors that influenced the new 
interests of the lending institutions. In Africa the new willingness of these 
organisations to fund directly productive projects in Third World countries, was 
accompanied by a growth in State-foreign private joint ventures in agriculture and 
manufacturing even as the pattern of an overall preference for the extractive sectors 
continued (Kirkpatrick & Nixon, 1981). 
Our case study projects: the World Bank-funded Ghana Sugar Estate Limited 
(GH ASI: L) project, and the Kwae Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation 
(CG()PDC). Benso Oil Palm Plantation (BOPP) and T«-ifo Oil Palm Plantation (TOPP) 
represent Ghanaian instances of the important 
form 
of internationalisation of 
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agriculture in the Third World which gained ground in the 1970s. TOPP. GOPDC and 
GHASEL typify the new form of internationalisation of agricultural capital that Glover 
(1990,5) has termed "multipartite arrangements". A multipartite arrangement is a form 
of contract farming which has two main features. Firstly production, usually of a 
single crop, is centred around a nucleus plantation and processing complex with 
satellite smallholder/outgrower contract farmers. The nature of the 
smallholder/outgrower's legal and organisational tie to the nucleus estate varies but is 
usually strongly subordinate and dependent. Secondly the funding, ownership and 
management of the nuclear enterprise normally involves various permutations of an 
alliance of the local state, IDFIs such as the World Bank and agribusiness TNCs. 
BOPP and TOPP, the most significant instances of FDI in Ghanaian agriculture since 
independence, were initiated within the Special Agricultural Scheme (SAS) which was 
launched by the NRC in the 1974/75 Budget. SAS was a response to the country's 
balance of payments problems. As of the end of 1975 the Bank of Ghana was holding 
('133m ($115.6m at the then prevailing rate of exchange) of income (profits and 
dividends) which foreign firms had been unable to take out because of exchange 
controls and the foreign exchange crisis. SAS offered a special priority profits 
repatriation regime to affected firms that, in partnership with indigenous capital, 
invested part of these in agriculture and agro-industry. 
TOPP and TOPP however differ in important regards. Unlike TOPP the state is a 
direct shareholder in BOPP without the mediation of a public corporation as 
shareholder. Also no IDFI is involved in BOPP, much of the role they serve being 
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taken by the main foreign investor. The determining relationship in BOPP was 
between the Ghanaian state and Unilever'. The World Bank was the key partner in 
the cases of GHASEL and GOPDC and for TOPP it was the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) and the European Development Fund (EDF). All 
the projects had management contracts with agribusiness TNCs. They also imported 
seedlings, seeds and related inputs from established agribusiness operations outside the 
country thereby becoming locked into the technological domination established by 
these firms. 
Chapter 7 examines the cluster of legal, and political economic issues centred around 
the alliance of state, agribusiness and the international development finance institutions 
(IDFIs) represented in our case study projects. The issues relate to a) the negotiation 
of the contracts which defined the projects, what one might term "the politics of 
gestation ", and b) the relationship between IDFIs and agribusiness firms. The chapter 
argues that the establishment of the four projects must be seen as the product of a 
unity of internal and international factors. The internal factors being the persistent 
pressure of domestic demand, the shortage of capital and technology, including 
management skills and balance of payment pressures. The projects also reflected 
changes taking place in the internationalisation of capital and new relations between 
IDFIs and transnational capital. 
For a profile of Lnilever and its corporate network in Africa as of 1981, see Dinham and Hines 
198 1,16 3-169). 
20 
Chapters 8,9 and 10 return to the role of contract in the process of 
internationalisation of capital. In Chapter 8. on the basis of an analysis of the terms 
of the project and loan agreements for the projects it is argued that among the three 
allies in the projects, i. e the Ghanaian state, IDFIs and TNCs, the Ghanaian state bore 
a disproportionate share of the financial and political risks relative to economic 
returns. The terms of these agreements and the treatment of the peasantry whose lands 
were expropriated to make way for the enterprises point to how the participation of 
the state served as a source of some legitimation for new forms of subsumption of 
agricultural production by international capital. 
Chapter 9 examines the terms and operations of the contract farming arrangements that 
were attached to TOPP, GOPDC and GHASEL. These arrangements provide an 
interesting comparison with the relationship that obtained between the cocoa peasantry, 
capital and the state during the colonial period. The chapter argues that the formal 
contractual arrangement unlike that between cocoa peasant and capital more closely 
approximates the real terms of subsumption of the producer. If there was a tendency 
towards a greater intervention of capital in the production process of the cocoa peasant 
the contract farming arrangement provides a formal basis for that intervention. Here 
also we find that the forms of state intervention through by-laws, etc. that the cocoa 
peasantry experienced are now incorporated into the formal relationship between 
producer and capital. The analysis shows that despite the differences between the 
contract farmer and the cocoa peasant the same issues of struggle between capital and 
peasant are present. These are rooted in the fact that despite the near total 
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subsumption of the contract farmer the contractual relationship is still not one between 
wage labourer and capital. 
Chapter 10 analyses the terms of the management contracts signed with TNCs for each 
of the projects. Like has been experienced in other context the management contracts 
served to undermine the formal ownership and control of the enterprises, in three of 
the four cases by the state. It is argued that not only did these contracts result in a 
transfer of control of the firms to transnational agribusiness and their integration into 
the corporate network of these firms, but also show that key objectives of the 
contracts, including training Ghanaians to take over management of the enterprises 
were not fulfilled. 
Chapter 11 is the concluding chapter. 
)T) 
CHAPTER TWO 
Colonial State and Agriculture 
2.1 The Colonial State 
The establishment of the colonial state and the creation of the general conditions for 
the exploitation of the resources of the Gold Coast with the accompanying spread of 
commodity relations were very much intertwined in the early years of colonial rule. 
The institutionalisation of colonial rule combined processes of destruction and creation. 
The records of laws passed and measures initiated by the British in the first years of 
colonial rule in the Gold Coast are replete with laws authorising the political detention 
or deportation of chiefs for either resisting or being less than cooperative with the 
colonial power. Such harsh displays of British power were intended more to break 
and subordinate than eliminate chiefly power (Kimble, 1963; Bening, 1977; 
Plange, 1984). Thus the establishment of colonial political authority entailed the 
incorporation of indigenous rulers. 
In 1932 the system of government in the Gold Coast was officially described as "a 
mixture of direct and indirect rule with a steady bias to the latter" (Wight, 1946,36). 
hay, (1975,105) has argued that "indirect rule" was: 
the clear political counterpart of capital as it existed in the u ii derdeve loped 
\\ orld. For this form of political administration reproduced at the level of the 
state all the ambiguities that merchant capital created in the economic sphere. 
It established ceiitralised political authority upholding private property and 
nioiicv, but resicd its po\\er, iii part at least, on local groups whose own 
power originated m non-capitalist forms of society. 
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Phillips (1989,11) has described the colonial state in British West Africa as "in many 
ways a mere facsimile of a state. Colonial rule could be sustained only through a 
complex of shifting alliances with local rulers, and colonial officials were acutely 
aware of the limitations of their control. " Thus the colonial state represented an 
alliance of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and subordinate indigenous rulers. In the 
Gold Coast, as in many other colonies, the subordinate collaboration of indigenous 
rulers enabled a small corp of colonial administrators to enforce the writ of the 
coloniser (Kay, 1972,8-10). As important as their role as instruments of colonial 
coercion was the legitimacy they lent to colonialism; these functions of coercion and 
consent were sharply exemplified by forced labour legislation discussed below. 
The breaking and subordination of the power of the local states to the emergent 
colonial state also disrupted existing social relations. The first laws passed by the new 
state, four months after the Colony was proclaimed, abolished domestic slavery'. 
There is much debate about the nature of domestic slavery in the Gold Coast and the 
broad economic consequences of abolition (Howard, 1978,32; Dumett & 
Johnson, 1988,106). There is no dispute however about the fact that abolition 
undermined the power and prestige of chiefs who had large corps of slaves for 
ceremonial and economic purposes. (Dumett and Johnson. 1988,106-107). The spread 
of commodity relations was also facilitated by some other measures. Chiefs were I 
encouraged to pass bye-laws against customs that were seen as impeding the 
production of potential export commodities. For example, the enforcement of fetishes 
' Slave Dealin- Abolition Ordinance, No. I and Emancipation of Slaves Ordinance, No. 2 of 1874. 
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against the cracking of palm nuts for kernels was made punishable by a fine in 
Akwapim in 1902 and Prampram in 1904. 
The policy of weakening and incorporating chiefs was dominant till roughly the eve 
of the First World War. From around that time the emergent state faced new 
challenges. The economic transformations that had occurred in the period, notably the 
establishment of peasant cocoa production as the central feature of the Gold Coast 
economy, and the complex of other socio-economic relations that were built on it 
engendered new social forces. These posed a threat to the colonial order. 
The challenge had three main elements. On one side chiefly power, weakened by the 
process of establishing colonialism, was further threatened by new strata of indigenous 
property owners (merchants and farmers) with more economic power than many 
chiefs, and by petty bourgeois educated and professional strata who saw the chiefs as 
collaborators. On the other hand there was the conflict between British capital and 
indigenous capital. Then there was the challenge posed by the new working class in 
town and country, in the farms and in the mines. The character and role of the 
colonial state was defined by the interplay of these forces, especially the first two 
challenges as well as contradictions between sections of British capital. These 
relationships and conflicts are vividly reflected in the chapters that discuss the cocoa 
industry during the colonial period. 
As in other colonies the most important fractions of British capital in the Colony had 
an institutionaliscd place undcr the colonial constitution. The political economy of 
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the Gold Coast was dominated by a coalition of representatives of different sectors of 
mainly British capital. Merchant, mining, shipping and financial interests were the 
most influential, with the merchants and miners dominant. In the home country close 
ties existed between these sections of the British bourgeoisie and the political 
establishment, especially Parliament and the Colonial Office which were subjected to 
intense lobbying as and when it was deemed necessary. In 1904 the London, 
Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of Commerce formed a Joint West Africa 
Committee (JWAC) as a common organ for dealing with the Colonial Office. There 
was also the facility of direct communication with the Governor of the Colony 
(Howard, 1978: ch 4&5). Though united as colonial exploiters of the Gold Coast 
important divergences in their interests, especially between merchant and mining 
capital had important consequences for the colony's development. (Kay, 1972,21). 
Representatives of these groups had places in the Legislative Council (Kimble, 1963, 
404-407). The numbers and breadth of this representation increased with various 
reforms of the colonial constitution. 
The merchants had the oldest representation, in keeping with their history in the area, 
with places being given to mining and financial/shipping interests later. By the 1930s 
t1iis representation had a settled pattern reflecting the power relations within the British 
business community: 
The mercantile member is by custom a representative of tile United Africa 
Cornpariv. Of tile three nominated European unofficials, one is a 
representative of a firm other than U. A. C., usually John Holt; one is a 
shipping representative usually Elder Dempster; one is a banking 
representatiN e from either BarclaN s or the Bank of British West Africa. The 
U. A. C. representative is normally their spokesman .... The mercantile and 
minino members have been among the seniorunofficials. (Wi-Ilt, 1946,75-76) : 7ý 
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Though the Council had little power it was important as a sounding board for colonial 
government and a vehicle for co-opting some influential sections of the local 
population. The first African unofficial member of the Legislative Council was 
appointed in 1888 and the numbers increased in succeeding years with reforms of the 
constitution. (Wight, 1946; Kimble, 1963, Chp XI). 
The first indirect rule legislation of the Gold Coast Colony was passed in 1878 but 
was never formally implemented before being repealed and replaced in 1883. 
According to Hailey (1951,201) the doctrine underlying the Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance, 1883: 
was dominated by the tradition which had treated the [local] States as 
independent authorities over whom control could only be secured by their 
individual agreement. Moreover the terms of the Order in Council of 1874 
left sorne legitimate grounds for doubt as to the extent of jurisdiction it 
conferred on the government. 
The law confirmed the innovation of the 1878 law under which, for the first time local 
"Kings" were called "Head Chiefs". The 1883 Ordinance, among other things, 
empowered the Governor to suspend those chiefs who abused their power 2. In 1904 
the Chiefs Ordinance gave the Governor power to suspend, depose or confirm a chief, 
but the 1883 Ordinance remained in force without substantial modification till it was 
replaced in 1927 with the Native Administration Ordinance (NAO). In Ashanti, a 
conquered territory, the dependent status of chiefs was unambiguously laid down in 
2 I'ven before formal colonisation of the Colon\ a tussle in 1865-7 between the British and Kin- A, ---, cr\ 
of Cape Coast, then the main site of British presence, over the KIII-"s attempts to assert his sovereh"rity 
had led to his deposition and deportation. Kimble (1963), 193) correcth, notes that the incident clearly 
showed "ho\\ in the last resort it was impossible for British jurisdiction to co-exist with the unfettered 
authorltv of chict'S". 
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legislation from the very beginning. unlike in the Colony'. Until the restoration of 
the Asante Confederacy Council in 1935 the kingdom was subjected to the direct rule 
of the Chief Commissioner and his officers. The Northern Territories had the most 
authoritarian experience of colonial rule. De jure the Northern Territories (NT) were 
"a Protectorate" but it took British troops to impose this "protection" in sizeable parts 
of the area 4. Until the introduction of reforms in 1932, the NT was subjected to direct 
rule by a quasi-military administration. The colonial government created chiefs among 
people who did not have them before and in other cases vested them with powers 
which had no roots in local history or tradition, rendering such persons pliant 
instruments who had little standing with the local population (Plange, 1984; 
Bening, 1975). 
After the First World War part of the colonial state's response to the challenge posed 
by new social forces involved some constitutional re-organisation of the state and a 
change in official policy towards chiefs. In the Colony a major reform of the 
composition of the Legislative council was effected in 1925 most notably providing 
for the membership of six head chiefs, two from each Province. A more limited 
reform had been carried out in 1916. From seeking to weaken chiefs,, the official 
policy was now to strengthen them at least against their own people. The return of 
exiled Asante chiefs including the Asantehene in 1924 and the 1932 reforms in the NT 
' Section 25 of the Ashanti Administration Ordinance. 1902 provided that: "It shall not be laýNful for 
an% headchief to exercise any powers as a headchief until lie shall have been recognised as such by the 
Governor". 
See the evidence of Captain C. H. Arrilitage, Chief Commissioner of the NT (questions 12,502-507) 
jor R. A. Irvine, a Pro\ incial Commissioner in the NT (questions 4,298; 4,3 mid Nla 35 1 and 4,395-98) to 
the West Aftican I ands Committee (IINISO, 1916). Also Benning (1977). 
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were all part of the attempt to foster a closer alliance of indigenous rulers and the 
colonialist against the new social forces. The passage of the Native Administration 
Ordinance 1927 represented the most important shift in local administration policy. 
The Ordinance has been described as "marking the high water-mark of the policy of 
indirect rule and the position of chiefs in the Gold Coast" (Allott, 1960,107). It 
extended the Governor's powers over the election, deposition and exercise of powers 
by chiefs in the Colony. The powers of Provincial and District Commissioners over 
native tribunals was also enhanced. At the same time, in some respects, the Ordinance 
strengthened the position of chiefs. It set up Provincial Councils of Chiefs, recognised 
State Councils as judicial and executive bodies and created penalties for undermining 
the authority of chiefs (Hailey, 1951,194-208; Kimble, ch ll; Metcalfe, 1964, passim; 
Phillips, 1989,9-14; Wight, 1946, chp 11). 
2.2. The Evolution of Colonial Agricultural Policy 
The eventual centrality of agriculture in the political economy of the Gold Coast was 
not reflected in the attitude of the emergent colonial state which turned its attention 
to the sector only in the second decade of colonialism. The Department of Agriculture 
was established in 1889. In the ensuing fifty years the agricultural policy of the 
colonial state had two main strands: a) developing the production of crops with proven 
or potential export value, and b) seeking to regulate the production and quality of 
these'. Throughout the period many crops native to or seen as suitable for cultivation 
-' Aniong, tile bye-laws that chiefs were empowered to pass under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 
1883, were rules "for tile proper cultivation. collection and curing of agricultural and economic products 
and the eradicat ion of diseases affecting such products". See section I of Schedule to NJO, 1881). 
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in various parts of the Gold Coast received some attention from the Department of 
Agriculture. The most important of these were cocoa, rubber, coffee, coconut, sisal, 
shea nuts, cotton and oil palm. These developments were centred in the Colony and 
Ashanti, with the Northern Territories serving as a labour reserve. 
Pre-colonial Gold Coast was a "natural economy", composed of social formations of 
varying levels of development of productive forces and social relations 
(Wilks, 1975,666; HMSO, 1890). These ranged from near communalistic social 
formations in parts of the Northern Territories to the class-stratified Asante Empire, 
actively involved in international commerce, with extensive domestic slavery and 
proto-feudal features. "Natural economy" refers to social formations in which there 
is some production for barter or trade but most production is for immediate 
consumption (Bernstein, 1979; Lenin, 1956,6; Reynolds, 1974); Kimble, 1963); 
Kay, 1972,6). 
In the Gold Coast the process of destruction of natural economy, went through three 
stages: contacts with merchant capital, the triangular trade and direct colonialism 
(Clarid(. 1c, 1915). Colonial control created political conditions and structures for a more 
systematic and re-organisation of local production and its integration into the 
intemational capitalist economy (Hopkins, 1973: 124-127; Wallerstein, 1989: 23). The 
Proclamation of the Colony listed the "protection and encouragement of trade and 
traders, including the construction maintenance and improvement of roads ... and 
other public works which benefit trade" among the reasons for imposition of British 
rule (I loward, 1978,34). 
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2.2.1. Laying the Basis for "Economic Agriculture" 
The setting up of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast in 1887 
constituted the first effort of the new colonial power at an analysis of the prospects for 
a systematic development of agriculture in the colony. The Commission presented its 
main Report in 1889', which is striking in its unambiguous equation of "economic 
agriculture" with export commodity production. Against the background of the 
frenzied gold rush and speculation which had gripped the colony, it took the prophetic 
view that the "future of the colony lay not in its gold bearing rocks but in its fertile 
soil". It listed the principal plants and crops of the colony, especially those that could 
provide raw material for capitalist industry: oil palm, coffee, rubber, coconut, cotton, 
silk cotton, sugar cane, cocoa, etc. 
The Commission identified what it considered the main impediments to Ileconomic 
agriculture" which the state should remedy. These were: 
a) poor transport infrastructure; b) "Ignorance" of the "natives" about the "economic 
\, ýilue" (Le exchange value) of many plants and crops; and c) the fabled and much 
lamented "laziness of the natives" (HMS0,1890,31-333). Though the Report described 
land relations in the Colony as "peculiar" it did not discuss the economic implications 
in any detail. It was more exercised by the quality of agricultural exports, especially 
palm oil and rubber. It however acknowledged the difficulty of policing quality 
standards and took the line that the matter was best left to the mercy of market forces. 
The Report also noted the presence and effects of usurer's capital on sections of the 
I IN I SO, (1890) Report on EconomicAgriculture of Ilic GoLl Coast. C. 5897. 
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peasantry, remarking, "In the Gold Coast as in all poor agricultural communities the 
money lender is the tyrant of his neighbourhood". 
2.2.2. Forced Labour and Road Construction 
The Commission's concern about the poor state of roads merely emphasised one of 
the main concerns of the government at the time. Like in so many colonies road 
building was the impulse for the introduction of forced labour. The coercion was 
entwined with the creation of the colonial chief and a new "customary law" 
(Fitzpatrick, 1980,77; Snyder, 1981,120-124; Shivji, 1986,8). In 1883 the Public Labour 
Ordinance, the first of a series of forced labour laws was passed. All able bodied men 
between 16-60 years old who had lived in the Gold Coast for at least 6 months were 
liable to public labour for 3 days a year on ordinary public roads designated by the 
Governor in Council; those covered could pay Is 6d in lieu of actual labour. The 
adminstration of the scheme was placed in the hands of the chiefs and district 
commissioners. 
Fhe Roads Ordinance of 1894 increased the exaction. It gave the governor power to 
proclaim that certain roads shall be maintained by chiefs. The chief was empowered 
to call upon all able bodied men within their jurisdiction to work on such days as lie 
thought necessary without exceeding 6 days in a quarter. Any person who refused to 
Nvoi-k Nvas liable "under native customary law" or before the District Commissioner 
(D. C) to a maximum fine of El or one month's imprisonment in default. The chief 
rcceived 10s per mile of road frorn the colonial state. Howcver where he failed to 
ensure that work is undertaken within the periods specified by the law lie was liable 
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to a maximum fine of L50. The D. C at his discretion may recover the fine by selling 
stool lands or the chief s movable or immovable property. 
The provision for the disobedient to be punished "under native customary law", as the 
scope of forced labour expanded, represented an attempt to claim a spurious 
indigenous legitimacy for the exactions. An even more explicit claim of being derived 
from "customary law" was made for the extremely unpopular Compulsory Labour 
Ordinance of 1895, which provided for the making of unpredictable demands on cl-iiefs 
to call out their subjects to act as carriers for the government were preceded by the 
following preamble- 
Whereas by native custom it is obligatory on persons of the labouring class 
to give labour for public purposes on being called upon their chiefs or other 
native superiors. 
Under the Ordinance, any member of the "labouring class" who failed to respond 
"without lawful excuse" to a call for unpaid work was liable to punishment "under 
native customary law", or before the D. C. by a fine not exceeding f 10 or 
imprisonment not exceeding 3 months with or without hard labour. Chiefs and their 
elders who did not carry out their duties under the Ordinance were liable on conviction 
before the D. C's court to a fine not exceeding E250 or six months imprisonment with 
or without hard labour. 
Bv the end of 1920 there Nvere 1,500 miles of motorable roads constructed with forced 
labour compared with 8 12 miles constructed by the Public Works Department. In 
19228 the lenoth ot'desionated roads in the Colony alone was just under 2,300 miles. 
I'lic immense contribution roads built with forced labour made to the opening , up of 
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the country and the penetration of foreign merchant capital was publicly acknowledged 
in 1921 by Governor Sir Gordon Guggisberg. He told the Legislative Council that no 
praise could be too much for the political officers, the Chiefs and people of the 
Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories "for their road making during 1920": 
Indifferent as many of the roads are, they serve the purpose for xvhich they 
were built, and it would have been a sheer impossibility for the Public Works 
Department to have produced anything approaching the present amount of 
mileage even had the staff and funds been sufficient'. 
This material achievement carried a high political price. The extreme unpopularity of 
forced labour was intensified by the stiff fines and possible imprisonment that ordinary 
people faced. The true burden of the fines can only be appreciated by remembering 
that money was in very short supply in those early days of generalised commodity 
production. This unpopularity and the accompanying creation of a punitive 
"customary law" contributed to the erosion of the authority of chiefs throughout the 
colony. The chiefs did not like it either since they also risked punishment and 
humiliation if they failed to meet the demands of the various forced labour laws. One 
chief of Cape Coast was imprisoned, prison clothes, shaved head and all, for failing 
to provide labour under Compulsory Labour Ordinance (Kimble, 1963,466). 
2.2.3. Estate Plantation or Small-holder Production? 
The Commission on Economic Aoriculture made no explicit choice between plantation 
and peasant production'. Its Report implied a co-existence of the two. On one hand 
' Quoted in Kay (1972), 57. 
8 Reyno I ds (1974,633-69) discusses the aborti\e attempts to establ I sh plantations in the Gold Coast after 
the abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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it talked about training youth to manage plantations for European owners. with local 
people learning to work for wages "under proper superintendence". On the other hand 
it argued that "contact with the European merchant and the discovery that pure clean 
[palm oil] pays better than bad and dirty oil will effect a revolution in oil making" and 
that coconut cultivation "should recommend itself to the natives ... as the capital 
required is small, and the labour of cultivating the trees and collecting the nuts need 
not interfere with the cultivation of his food crops". 
It proposed measures such as the education of the "natives" about the economic value 
of crops and how to cultivate new ones the government might introduce'. This effort 
was to be backed by the setting up of experimental agricultural stations, staffed by 
trained botanists, for research, training of local personnel and seed distribution. 
Governor Sir Brandford Griffith considered the Aburi Botanical Gardens, opened in 
1888, as a model for the proposed research, crop diffusion and personnel training 
ceiitre. Aburi was to serve as the main station of the Department of Agriculture for 
most of the colonial period". 
Various views have been expressed about the factors that established the dominance 
of peasant agriculture in the Gold Coast. Rhoda Howard (1978,37) argues that the 
' The Commission did not seem to have been aware of the revolutionary spread of peasant cocoa 
production that was under way when it carried out its study. This can be taken as a loud statement of 
tile weakness of tile colonial state at the time. Tile crop is mentioned as "another product worthy of 
every attention and that "attempts on a small scale have been made to introduce it into tile country, but 
no information is obtainable about the results"(p29). It saw coffee as "undoubtedl\ the first crop to 
which intending cultivators should tum their attention". 
"' I, etter to Lord Knutsford, Secretary for Colonies. JuIN 10,1890 in Further Report on Economic 
Agriculture Cnid 6270 (IINIS0,1891). 
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critical factor for the dominance of peasant agriculture under colonialism was the 
inability of the colonial government to pass two land bills in 1894 and 1897. The bills 
are discussed in the next chapter. Hopkins (1973,209-216) however argues that state 
policy on the "plantation versus peasant" issue in British West Africa was far from 
settled by 1900. He dismisses claims that an unhealthy climate and British 
commitment to "trusteeship" over African land rights prevented the development of 
plantations. His general hypothesis is that expatriate plantations were more likely in 
those parts of the tropics where opposition from merchant capital was weak or absent 
and peasant production was slow to respond to external demand. 
Hopkins contends that five factors impeded the progress of the "planters frontier" 
throughout colonial West Africa. These were: 1) the opposition of established 
merchant capital; 2) a lack of knowledge about tropical conditions among many 
potential European planters, aggravated in many cases by; 3) lack of capital to sustain 
iiiitiatives; 4) the impact of shifts in world supply on specialist plantations; and 5) the 
fact that by the time controversy over land concessions for plantations was at its 
height (during the second decade of the 20th century) "peasant production had proved 
itself'. For Phillips (1989,13) the lack of a settled policy as noted by Hopkins was 
an aspect of the general "makeshift" nature of British colonial policy in West Africa. 
I'his she attributes to the inability of colonialism to implement its original design of 
Cacilitating, direct foreign investment in all sectors due to the weakness of the colonial t, 
state. Central to the collapse of this project which included plantation agi-iculture, was 
the state's inability to create free labour. 
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Philips and Howard are agreed on the shortage of free labour as a factor in the 
marginalisation of plantation culture in British West Africa. It must be noted that 
Howard's arguments not entirely correct. Access to land was obviously a necessary 
requirement for the emergence of colonial settler agriculture and the passage of the 
1894 and 1897 land bills would have had significant consequences. The withdrawal 
of the Land Bills did not create legal impediment to settlers acquiring land for 
plantations. In fact throughout the colonial period there were continued efforts at 
setting up plantations especially for cocoa, oil palm and rubber, not all of which 
failed''. The survival of indigenous land rights meant that the local people needed 
especial economic incentives to provide wage labour or had to be coerced. 
Throughout the colonial period capitalist enterprises in the Gold Coast faced labour 
scarcity and high wages. The mining industry for example had a tremendous problem 
with labour supply until the forced recruitment of labour from the NT with the 
complicity of the colonial state eased the situation (Thomas, 1973; Plange, 1979,1984). 
The influence of mining capital was a further factor peculiar to the Gold Coast which 
militated against the development of plantations. In the early colonial period the State 
devoted a lot of energy to securing conditions for the profitable operation of mining 
capital such as such as cheap labour and adequate transport infrastructure 
(Kay, I 9722, passim -, Gould, 1960) The spread of cocoa had to struggle against the lack 
of transport, e. g. at the turn of the century when the peasant producer in Kxvahu 
received 5 shillings pcr load, it cost 10 shillings to transport the produce to the port. 
11 See evidence of A. C. Goff (a British national who had cocoa and rubber plantations in Ashanti and 
the Western Province) to tile West Africa Land Committee (1916_399-404). 
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In this situation an embryonic agricultural settler community would have been in a 
singularly weak position in the competition for state support". 
A discussion by Graham and Floering (1984,14-19,33-47) about the relationship 
between the characteristics of crops and their suitability for cultivation under the 
f1modern" plantation culture, which has evolved since the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, offers an interesting new angle for understanding the emergence of the Gold 
Coast as colony of peasant cultivation of cocoa. They argue that the modern 
plantation unlike the old plantation of the Americas and Caribbean is little different 
from a factory with workers "formally organised groups of workers along normal 
, industrial production' lines, whose job all year round is in the same place and within 
the same institution" (p. 24). The ideal crops for this type of factory production, which 
was emerging just about when cocoa was spreading in the Gold Coast are those which 
involve all year round work with a division of labour just like on a factory production 
line. The ideal type crops for this are oil palm, coconut and rubber which can be 
harvested all year round, with sugar cane and cocoa both of which have definite 
annual ripening peaks at the other end of the scale. Tea with definite seasonal 
ripening peaks occupies something of a middle position. 
The difference between oil palm and cocoa means that comparatively an oil palm 
plantation Nvould havc a lower unit cost of labour since it will be engaged on tasks all 
year round. By contrast cocoa cultivation involves periods of considerably reduced 
'2 The relative failure of a scheme by the powerful Lever Brothers to set up oil palm processing 
facilitics (discussed below) sharp]%- illUstrates how weak the position of a typical small capital European 
settler would have been in the Gold Coast. 
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need for labour making a permanent workforce relatively more expensive. In the 
context of the Gold Coast of the turn of the century without an army of landless 
labour this meant that an oil palm plantation had to offer very attractive terms to 
attract labour or use some form of coercion to ensure a labour force that stabilises 
while a cocoa plantation based on wage labour faces a near certain losing battle 
against peasant producers who deployed their labour on other tasks during the times 
they did not have to attend to their cocoa. 
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2.3. The Promotion of Export Crops 
In European countries and America, one of the aims of an Agricultural 
Department is to experiment, to educate and to advise farmers, thus assisting 
them to produce large and good crops which for the most part are grown for 
home consumption. The aims of a tropical Agricultural Department are 
similar with this difference, that to be economically successful those crops 
which produce articles for export receive most attention"". 
An official review of the first forty years of the Department of Agriculture divided 
four policy phases in its work, covering: 1889-1905,1905-1915,1915-22 and 1922 
onwards (Gold Coast, 1928). According to the review during the infancy of the 
Department, set up in 1889, policy was "limited to the importation of plants and the 
study of their behaviour under local conditions". In the second period instructional 
and demonstrational work was added, the structure of the staff of the Department of 
Agriculture changed, and agricultural stations and sub-stations were opened. In the 
third phase (1915-22) there were marked changes in organisation and function: 
instructional work was organised on a provincial basis and specialist staff recruited. 
From 1922 the colonial government moved from "a limited policy of protecting 
existing industry" to a "full acceptance of responsibility for a policy of development 
of local agricultural resources". The Department of Agriculture was to become the 
rccognised machine by which a "policy of progressive development" was to be 
"formulated and put in place". 
" \V. S. D Tudhope, Gold Coast Director of Agriculture (1907-24) quoted in La 
, 73-74) who correctly 
describes Tudhope, who headed the Department Anyane (19631 1 
of Agriculture during 17 critical years, as "the man whose name became important 
in the reshaping of the agricultural structure Ghana". 
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Considering the importance of agriculture to the economy of the colony, the state's 
attention to agricultural development was woefully inadequate. For example in 19233 
that the sector only belatedly added to Guggisberg's Ten year Development Plan of 
1920 and accounted for a little more than one per cent of expenditure under the Plan. 
Successive official and semi-official surveys criticised the limited work and poor 
relation status of the Agriculture Department (Kay, I 972, passim). Some four decades 
after Tudhope boldly pronounced his colonial vision, the policies it engendered found 
their nemesis in the 1948 riots against shortages and high prices of goods in the Gold 
Coast. Sitting amidst the consequent political wreckage of the event, the Watson 
Commission (1948, para 323) received many complaints about the colonial state's 
"excessive attention to the problems of export crops in comparison with crops for 
home consumption". 
Cocoa was the overwhelming focus of the work of Department of Agriculture. As 
discussed below from when the crop established its pre-eminence in the first decade 
of this century the Department devoted a considerable part of its limited resources to 
schemes for "Improving" the cultivation, quality and marketing of the crop. Sporadic 
efforts were made to promote other export crops so as to diversify the sources of state 
revciltic away from cocoa and fulfil the raw material needs of sections of British 
industry. Among the "secondary" export crops oil palm received the most sustained 
attention. There was also a notable effort to develop export cotton production but the 
efforts to dcvclop cotton, as part of an Empire-wide effort. instl(, ated by the British 
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Cotton Growers Association (BCGA), did not come to much (Dickson; Nworah, 197 1; La 
Anyane, I 963, ch 6; Phillips, 1989,7 1)". 
The attention given to oil palm was due to three main factors: the natural profusion 
of the crop in the colony, its significance in the history of raw material export and the 
enduring interest of British capital in its fortunes. The Committee on Economic 
Agriculture had decried the under-exploitation of the colony's oil palm resources. 
despite the fact that its products (oil and kernels) were the most important exports 
(HMSO, 1890,34). Palm oil and kernels were the export commodities most directly 
replaced by cocoa. This process included oil palms being destroyed to make way for 
cocoa, something the colonial government made a doomed attempt, down the years, 
to stop. As early as 1892 the Konor of Manya Krobo, Nene Azu Mate Kole I passed 
a bye-law criminalising the damaging or destruction of oil palms. In the following 
years many other chiefs passed similar laws as palm trees were uprooted or neglected 
in favour of cocoa. 
The palm products that cocoa displaced were however of poor quality for the purposes 
Of 1"Uropean industry due to the technology and methods of preparation and also 
adulteration. The Committee on Economic Agriculture discounted a state organised 
system of inspection and grading palm oil according to quality on grounds of cost and 
difficulty of enforcement (HMSO, 1 8W 17). It however took a different line on the 
adulteration of palm kernels. Merchants bou(Iht palm kernels by weight and 
complained that sellers fraudulently increased the Nwight. hence value. of the kernels 
''See Africa (West) No 745. CO 879/84 
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by soaking them in water. In 1898 the Palm Kernels Adulteration Ordinance (No. 13. 
1898) made adulteration of palm kernels a criminal offence. The absence of 
independent records on the application of the law make it difficult to assess its impact 
or the extent of enforcement. La Anyane (1963,3 1) implies that it was not of much 
effect with "only four prosecutions at Pramprarn and some elsewhere in the country 
in 1898" 
2.3.1. Lever's Abortive Oil Palm Scheme 
Even before the passage of the law against adulteration of kernels, the dominant view 
within official circles was that only the introduction of modern processing machinery 
and methods could save and turn out oil of industrial quality. In July 1913 the 
Legislative Council passed an "Ordinance to make provision as to the grant of 
exclusive rights for the extraction of oil from palm fruit". The law empowered the 
Governor to grant, for a period of not more than 21 years, "the exclusive right to 
construct and work mills to be operated by electrical power for expressing or 
extracting oil from the pericarp of palm fruits", in respect of an area not exceeding a 
circle with a ten mile radius to any person who has properly acquired a grant under 
customary land law. A grant was renewable but did not confer any rights or interest 
over the land or the products of the soil. It was solely for the exclusive right to 
extract palm oil using "mechanical power" which the law defined as "machinery 
Nvorked by steam, electricity, water power, internal combustion engines, and does not 
mcan machinei-v worked hi, hand' (emphasIs added). An affected area could include 
settlements with population of not more than 10.000 persons. (In the entire colony in 
1921 only Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast had populations of more than 10,000. ) The 
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government could seek a declaration for the forfeiture of a grant if it is not 
satisfactorily utilised within two years of being made. 
The Palm Oil Ordinance (No 13 of 1913) is a good example of abstract "equality 
before the law" disguising the material bases and objective effects of a legal norm. 
The Gold Coast law was a local version of an ordinance drafted by the Colonial Office 
in 1912 for Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Gold Coast. It was the product of 
protracted negotiations with Lever Brothers (forerunner of Unilever). Anxious to 
ensure reliable supplies of palm and kernel oil for his fast expanding industrial empire 
Sir W. H. Lever pressured the British govermnent to give his company a privileged 
regime for palm fruit processing factories in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Goid Coast. 
The expectation was that peasants would be attracted by the prices offered to sell fresh 
palm fruit to the factories instead of processing it themselves. 
Lever's first proposal envisaged the setting up of a processing plants and the 
acquisition of land for the establishment of oil palm plantations. He sought exemption 
from payment of any rent in respect of land and a waiver of all duties on material and 
machinery brought in for the project. The processing mills were to have a monopoly 
ovcr land within a 20 mile radius for a 99 year period. The exclusion of all others, 
with the exception of the government, from constructing railways within the grant area 
was also sought. Lever Brothers made it clear that without the general recognition, 
assistance and encouraocrnent of the government, they could not "entertain the venture 
at all" and "without protection against possible competition in the matter of the area" 
it \výis not "sound business to embark upon so extensive an undertaking, necessitatim-, 
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great outlay of capital in an undeveloped country". (HMSO, 1915). The Palm Oil 
Ordinance reflected compromises reached between the Colonial Office and Lever to 
take account of expressed and feared opposition to the scheme but not all the 
opposition was mollified by its provisions. 
There were four main strands of opposition which all derived from the de facto 
monopoly being granted to Lever (HMSO, 1915,1916a, 1916b; Nworah, 1972, 
Phillips, 1989,91-93; Howard, 1978,76-78; Kimble, 1963,46-47). In the British 
Parliament the Liberal government was accused by the Tory opposition of giving in 
to the Lever scheme because of his influence in the Liberal Party". The scheme was 
opposed by other British industrialists who feared their supplies of raw material would 
be interfered with by Lever's project. Palm kernel crushers in Britain were 
particularly worried. The success of Lever's processing mills would affect the export 
of kernels which was a by-product of indigenous palm oil production. British 
merchants involved in the West Africa trade denounced the threat to free trade and 
iiative enterprise but they were basically responding to the potential loss of revenue 
from the long established export of palm oil and kernels from West Africa. 
Representatives of indigenous opinion more honestly articulated the threat Lever's 
scheme posed to a long established local industry. In the Legislative Council British 
merchant and indigenous opposition united against the passage of the Palm Oil 
Ordinance, even some members of government were uncomfortable about it. The 
official majority however ensured its passage (Metcalfe, 1964,540-544). 
" Sir William Lever was an influential member of the Liberal Party and at the time lie contacted the 
Colonial office over his project lie was the Liberal member of Parliament for the Wirral Division of 
Cheshire. 
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According to Dickson (1969,149) a number of expatriate owned oil palm estates were 
set up following the passage of the Ordinance". In 1912 West African Oil Mills Ltd 
(a Lever subsidiary) set up a mill at Sese in the Western Province. The scheme 
however failed to revive the oil palm industry in the Gold Coast. The expectation that 
peasants would keep the mills adequately supplied with fresh fruit turned out to be 
over optimistic. The Sese mill operated well below installed capacity it was only in 
1928 that it showed a profit. Even this was due to it being kept going by a 
combination of fruit bought from peasants and what was harvested by wage laboia- 
from the exclusive milling zone. 
A number of related reasons explain the problems faced by the processing scheme and 
the poor response of the peasantry. Phillips (1989,93) argues that the scheme 
stumbled at the obstacle of the traditional sexual division of labour in the palm oil 
industry and the resultant distribution of income. Men gathered the fruit, while 
women made the oil and also cracked the nut for kernels. It has also been argued that 
the prices offered for the fresh fruit were too low to induce a shift from other 
economic activities. Certainly the alternative represented by cocoa proved 
overwhelming in areas where the crop had taken hold. This is illustrated by the fate 
of subsequent schemes which were basically variations on the concept of a core inill 
dependent on supplies from free producers. includin(-T one which involved the thinlý, 
disguised use of' chict's to compel peasants to deliver fruit to a mill set up by a 
Unilcvcr subsidiary, the United Africa Company (UAC), and subsidised by the state. 
" Kimble (1963,46) niistakenly claims that Lever did not take advantage of the Gold Coast km. 
Howard ( 1978,78) also implies the same with her claim that dLie to thc strength of local opposition the 
law rcrnaincd don-nant and was first inipiciliented in 1930. 
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In 1930 UAC initiated an ultimately doomed project at Bukunor in the cocoa 
producing Krobo district of the Eastern Province. The setting up of the 3.000 ton mill 
was part of renewed British efforts after the First World War to boost West African 
production to meet competition from new Dutch oil palm plantations in the Dutch East 
Indies. In 1925 a Colonial Office Committee on which the Joint West African 
Committee was substantially represented made proposals for a new attempt to establish 
industrial processing of palm fruit in West Africa. Perhaps in the light of the 
experience of Lever Brothers, its report recognised that dependence on supplies from 
free peasants was unviable. Interestingly its recommendations included some of the 
key monopolistic elements of Lever's scheme which elements the JWAC had bitterly 
opposed. It also recommended the establishment of plantations and the institution of 
legally binding contracts with peasants for the supply of fruit. 
The government undertook to subsidise the Bukunor mill if the fruit delivered to it fell 
below 5/6th of its capacity. To ensure deliveries the government offered bonus 
payments to the Krobo chiefs in respect of what they could get their people to supply 
to the factory. The scheme failed. Oil palm plantations and mills fared better in the 
Western Province, an area to which cocoa did not spread till the 1930s, fared better. 
It possible though that Lever's Sese mill might have closed down but for state 
involvciiient in labour recruitment (La Anyane: 112-124)". 
" The failure of Lever's scherne in British West Africa stands in sharp contrast to the firm's success 
in the Belgian Congo. The important difference between the two being the willingness ot-the Congolese 
colonial state to facilitate forced labour deliveriesto Lc\ er's mills b,, Africans (FIcldhouse. 1978, ch 9). 
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2.2.2. The Spread of Cocoa 
The clear cut role of the colonial state in persistently supporting the efforts of 
international capital to develop the oil palm industry of the Gold Coast contrasts 
sharply with the controversy over who is spearheaded the spread of cocoa cultivation. 
The question of who is responsible for the commercial diffusion of cocoa has been 
extensively debated. Cocoa had long been present in the Gold Coast before its 
commercial cultivation,, having been introduced according to some sources by the 
Portuguese in the 18th century. In the critical last quarter of the 19th century various 
institutions and persons took an interest in the crop. These include the Basel 
Missionaries, who as part of their "civilising" activities encouraged their converts to 
engage in export agriculture and experimented with cocoa. Nationalist history ascribes 
a large role to one man, Tete Quarshie, who started a farm in the 1870s upon his 
return from Sao Tome (then the leading African producer). Tete Quarshie's 
cultivation of cocoa is now accepted as a historical fact. Colonial officials have 
sought to credit the colonial state with spread of cocoa" 
The available evidence points to a combination of the three influences on the 
beginnings of the cocoa story but their historical contributions did not take place in 
a vacuum (Hill, 19633,170-176, Nowell, 1938,46; Howard, 1978,73; Green & Hymer. 
1966,310 1 -3102). The explanation of the phenomenal spread of cocoa has to be sought 
in the local and international. historical and material context, within which these 
" See for example letter from (lovernor Nathan to Chamberlain, April 8,1902, in Colonial Rc, /)Ort, 
11)03, - CO ý79169, 
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alleged innovators - Tetteh Quarshie, Basel Missionaries and agencies and officials of 
the colonial state operated. 
The spectacular development of the Gold Coast cocoa industry was bound up with the 
emergence of chocolate and related products as items of mass consumption in the 
advanced capitalist countries. From when it was introduced from its native home in 
Central America to Europe in the early part of the 16th century by the Spanish, the 
consumption of cocoa products remained a luxury until the last half of the 19th 
century. Chocolate was manufactured by hand until the first manufacturing machines 
appeared in the first quarter of the 19th century. It was only at the turn of this 
century that the now widely popular milk chocolate, first produced on a commercial 
scale in Switzerland in 1876, began to emerge as an item of mass consumption. This 
transformation of cocoa products from luxuries into mass commodities had a dynamic 
relationship with the emergence of large volumes of cheap peasant produced cocoa 
inainly from West Africa particularly the Gold Coast (Wickizer, 1951,306). According 
to Gunnarson (1976,22) it is arguable that 
"it was the cheap cocoa from the Gold Coast that laid the foundation of the 
rapid increase of consumption of chocolate products during the first decades 
of the 20th century". 
Within the Gold Coast the spread of cocoa cultivation was aided by the prior 
penetration of capital and the integration of aspects of the material reproduction of the 
future pioiieer cocoa farmers into the circuit of capital. The pioneer site of cocoa 
production \\-here Tete Quarshie established his farm, where the Base] Missionaries 
concentrated their activities and was also the locus of the first government agricultural 
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station and the area of the State's campaigns was the most important source of the 
palm products exported from the Gold Coast in the 19th Century. The Krobo district 
and the Akwapim area in the south east were the pioneer site of systematic commercial 
cocoa production in the Gold Coast. By the mid 19th century the areas were 
exporting large quantities of palm oil and buying increasing volumes of imported 
commodities (Reynolds, 1974,39-46,69-72; Hill, 1963,15). In Ashanti and Brong 
Ahafo, to which areas cocoa cultivation spread later capital had been accumulated 
during the turn of century boom in the export of rubber collected from the forest 
(Dummett, 1971; Arhin, 1972). 
Cocoa production was thus a development out of or a continuation of a pre-existing 
pattern. It was initiated by people who before moving into cocoa production had 
developed relatively extensive exchange relations with capital who turned to cocoa 
when the international fortunes of palm oil and sources of rubber declined. From the 
mid 1880s, the international price of palm oil went into steady decline, making 
production increasingly unremunerative (Reynolds, 1974,146; Hill, 1963,167). Prices 
reached their lowest quinquennial level in 1886 - 1890 -a period generally agreed to 
be important in the development of the cocoa industry. The producers of palm oil 
began to seek out more profitable crops (Hill, 1963,174). Coffee had a brief spell of 
atteiition with the encouragement of the Colonial State before cocoa took hold. Polly 
Hill's work (1963) indicates that money accumulated from the palm oil trade was 
important in the land purchases which were important in the early phase of cocoa .1 
cultivation. Persons who had accumulated capital from earlier export agriculture were 
leaders of the land buying groups, usuallly acquiriiiu, the larocst portion of land botiolit 
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by these groups. The falling prices resulted in what has been termed as the simple 
reproduction "squeeze" on palm oil producers. Bernstein (1979.427) defines "simple 
reproduction 'squeeze" as "those effects of commodity relations on the economy of 
peasant households that can be summarised in terms of increasing costs of 
prod ucti on/decreasing returns to labour". It was this rather than the specific effects 
of State campaigns that determined the producers "response to economic opportunities" 
and would seem to have been ultimately most important reason why cocoa spread so 
rapidly. 
The predominance of a peasant produced crop in the political economy of the Gold 
coast had important overall effects on the role of the Gold Coast as a source of 
accumulation by British capital. For local agriculture the rise of cocoa settled the 
essential nature of the agricultural sector. Henceforth the character (i. e peasant 
production) and centrality of the cocoa industry in the political economy of the colony 
constituted both a framework and a backdrop, largely negative, for efforts to sustain 
or develop the production of other crops. From the perspective of industrial capital 
"independent" peasant production of a raw material generated anxiety about cultivation 
methods, quality of product, credit/usury not very different from what had been 
identified in the old oil palm industry. These issues which were central to the 
relationship between the consumer of cocoa, i. e industrial capital, merchant capital 
which by and large mcdiated the relationship betwcen producer and industrial user and 
the colonial state as the ultimate regulator of social relations in the colony are 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Transformation of Land Relations 
Obscurity in regard to the real nature of the rights of Native Chiefs, land 
holders and cultivators leads to all kinds of mischief .. the greatest uncertainty 
exists, the result being endless litigation. Englishmen who reason about land 
tenures as if English theories and practices regarding freehold, leasehold, 
mortgage and conveyances, and the disposal of real property by will were 
common to all the world do not enter readily into Native ideas about 
occupancy founded on tribal rights (Governor Sir W. Maxwell, 1896). 
The forms of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of 
production is confronted does not suit it. It first creates for itself the form 
required by subordinating agriculture to capital. It thus transforms feudal 
landed property, clan property, small peasant property.... no matter how 
divergent their juristic forms may be into the economicform corresponding 
to the requirements of this mode ofproduction... it divorces landedproperty 
ftom the relations of dominion and servitude (emphasis added) 
(Marx, 1959,617). 
At its first meeting in September 1887 the Commission on Economic Agriculture in 
the Gold Coast cited the nature of property rights in land - the apparent impossibility 
of a person acquiring indefeasible individual property in land and the patterns of land 
use, e. g involving shifting cultivation, etc. as some of the factors impeding the 
extension of commodity agriculture in the Gold Coast. It however took another eight 
years before the colonial state made its first attempt to systematically ascertain the 
precise nature of local property rights and 
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interests in land'. In 1895. as part of preparatory Nvork for the Public Lands Bill. 
Governor Maxwell asked District Commissioners (DCs) around the colony to submit 
memoranda on land tenure in their respective areas (HMSO, 1895). 
In the decade and a half preceding the DCs' surveys the nature of indigenous property 
relations in land had become an important political and legal issue in the Gold Coast. 
This was mainly due to two factors. The most inu-nediate spur was an upsurge of 
foreign interest in the country's gold industry, and the frenzied concession hunting 
which it provoked, particularly in the area of the present day Western and Ashanti 
Regions (Illegbune, 1974; Bentsi-Enchill, 1986). Less visible at the time, but predating 
the 'concession scramble', was the process of migration and land acquisition for cash 
crop farming by Krobos and Akwapims in South Eastern Ghana. By the beginning 
of the l9th Century the Krobos were buying land in Akyem Abuakwa for their 
expanding palm oil plantations and this process was to continue for the rest of the 
century (Reynolds, 1974,69). By that decade, the process of migration and land 
acquisition had become serious enough to provoke major contradictions, conflicts and 
qticstions about the nature of property rights in land and constitutional and 
jurisdictional rights within and between local States. The question of what rights and 
ii-Iterests Immigrant Akwapims had IaY at the bottom of a jurisdictional dispute 
betwcen the Akwapirn state and the Akim Abuakwa during the first decade of this 
centurv. 
' Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 (No. 4) provided for the application of indigenous 
law and custom " in causes or matters relating... to the tenure and transfer of real... properv, ". 
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3.1. Precapitalist Land Relations 
To understand the difficulties that confronted the penetration of capital into Gold Coast 
agriculture and understand the dynamics of confrontation and transformation wrought 
by the spread of commodity relations we need to have some appreciation of land 
relations of pre-colonial Gold Coast. An attempt is made here to reconstruct these 
relations on the bases of historical, legal and anthropological sources, with a full 
consciousness of the pitfalls of this approach given the different problernatics of the 
sources. The legal writing is rooted in a positivist jurisprudence, concerned with 
ahistorically expounding the law as it is. The anthropological works suffer the well- 
known limitations of the anthropologist's belief in the possibility of reconstructing the 
"pure" state and dynamics of precapitalist societies. The historical studies have the 
advantage of the contemporaneous eye witness accounts being used in cases and 
therefore provide a useful reference point for testing the legal and anthropological 
accounts. 
In this exposition the nature of land relations in Asante will be treated as the clearest 
and most developed illustration for the whole of southern Ghana. By the beginning 
of' the 19th Century the Asante Empire, incorporated with varying degrees of 
iiite(gration, all of Southern Ghana. The tributary relations of the components of the 
l1nipire with the centre would seem to have required some transformation of land 
rclations within the sub states to a form approximating what prevailed in the Asante 
Kingdom proper. While somc might dispute this particular interpretation, the fact 
remains that land relations throughout Southern Ghana and Asante are markedly 
Similar. Thosc who re' II is . Icct 
an explanation bascd on Asantc domination think that it i 
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due to cultural similarities and borrowing (Bentsi-Enchill, 1964,36). Generally it may 
be said that in the areas which were under direct Asante dominion. the stool had a 
stronger role in land tenure - in all the Akan areas of Ghana - than in those which 
although dominated by Asante cannot be considered provinces and were not directly 
integrated into the Empire. The latter include the Anlo Ewe State and parts of 
Northern and Upper Regions. The position of the family is much more powerful in 
the latter areas. 
According to (Rattray, 1929,76) after the Battle of Feylase (c. 1700) which may be 
said to mark the beginning of the Asante Kingdom, 
a silent and unnoticed revolution took place with regard to 
iand tenure... A kind of multiple proprietorship arose. The 
King becarne the superior owner of all land, i. e. soil. in the 
kingdorn, but this claim coexisted with many grades of 
inferior ownership right down a descending scale until the 
inferior property of the family land-holder was reached. 
In all the literature one finds a recognition of this in the distinction of three basic types 
of "customary law" interests: those of the Stool, Family and the individual cultivator. 
Most writers on precapitalist Ghanaian land relations however flatly characterise the 
basis of land relations as the communal ownership of the land (Sarbah, 1968,66; 
Rattray, 1929,347; Danquah, 1928,260; Busia, 19698,56). In 1917 Governor Sir Hugh 
Clifford dramatically proclaimed that: 
I Hie little States, which taken together compose the Gold Coast were and are 
democracies, in theory at atiy rate, fulfil Abraham Lincoln's conditions, being 
a government of the people, by the people and for the people'. 
13cntsi Fnchill (1964.34-44) %N-lillst in general agreement with the principle embodied 
iii the above quoted statements disagrees with the tendency to use the language of 
"Fnglish equity. jurisprudcilce" urging that "lang II uagc reco(, nising that the title is vested 
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in the community as a whole, as a corporation which functions through a management 
committee that must act in concert would seem to accord better xvith the facts". 
"Communal ownership" of land is found in all precapitalist modes of production, even 
in the early stages of capitalism, in so far as in all such societies which are based 
largely on agricultural production, land relations necessarily allow all members of the 
community access to land. Such ownership does not however determine the mode of 
production in agriculture (Potekhin, 1963,50). It is only in the state of primitive 
communalism that all land is truly communally owned. In fact most of the cited 
writers, except for Rattray, have an erroneous classless conception of the societies they 
claim to describe. 
Rattray (1929,340) astutely distinguished the "land" and from the "right to use" the 
land; the former belongs to the stool while the stool subject exercises the latter. The 
"right to use" land carried with it definite obligations. The expenditure of labour gave 
the family or individual and heirs the exclusive possession of the right to use over the 
specific plot, and the produce, provided 
(1) They or he did in fact continue to use the land. This is an 
important principle, because land use was predominantly one of 
shifting cultivation: 
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(ii) They or (s)he rendered all the customary serv, ces and 
obligations demanded by his/her immediate superior (i. e. Stool, 
Odekuro, Family Head) as recognised by custom. For example, 
every Asante male was under a duty to render military service 
(Busia, 1968,48). 
(Iii) Neglect to observe any of these rules or obligations would have 
been met with ejection, possibly resulting in the ejected tenant 
becoming a slave (Rattray, 1929,362). The nature of the 
precapitalist political economy would seem to render the need 
to evoke this ultimate sanction rare. 
In this political economy there was a close correlation of land relations and the 
political/administrative structure. The household was the unit of production and at the 
lowest group level, control over land was exercised by the Head of the lineage (in 
Akan areas the matrilineage) aided by the lineage elders, heads of household 
(Sarbah, 1968,61). The family head's powers of control touched only land effectively 
occupied by members of the lineage. Groups of these lineages and their land parcels 
constitute a village headed by an Odekuro who ruled and managed land with the 
assistance of a council composed of all lineage heads. The Odekuro was the local 
i-epresentative and functionary of the State and was ultimately responsible through a 
political hierarchy to the King, Tile Odekuro's control over land in his locality was 
sLibordinated to the powers of the subdivisional chief who in turn was responsible to 
flie divisional ruler. All these Nvere subject to the overriding powers of the King,. The 
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structure of the state was brought to bear as channels of tribute exaction be it labour 
or product (Busia, 1968,6; Wilks, 1975,667). 
The notion of an 'alien' qua 'alien' working land was generally unknown. A non- 
subject who sought land got it and thereby became a subject i. e. became placed in the 
same relationship which all subjects occupied vis-a-vis the Stool. The question 
whether the extraction of surplus labour and produce was an aspect of land relations 
or based on a subject's personal allegiance becomes largely irrelevant (Casely- 
Hayford, 1903,55- 66; Bentsi-Enchill,, 1964,115-117; Asante, 1975,6-7). Thus the issue 
of whether the obligations of the subject continue when he settled somewhere hardly 
arose. You were a subject of the State within which you live and farm. Here the 
State stood over the subjects simultaneously as landlord and sovereign. Agricultural 
use value production predominated and it would seem rent and taxes, in the form of 
labour and produce, largely coincided (Marx, 1959,791). The extraction of surplus 
labour/produce was by extra-economic means. 
Ideology played an important mystifying and obscuring and ultimately legitimating 
rolc in the process. Land was regarded as belonging to the ancestors, the unity of 
,, N'hom with the living and unborn was represented by the Stool. The chief as occupant 
ofthe Stool Nvas therefore presented and seen as the link between the past, present and 
tI imire ocneratimis, the living, and the dead hence the custodian of all land of the 
community (Busia, 1968,44, Asante, 1975,3). Every exaction was presented as being 
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made for the ancestors (RattraN,, 1929.350-351)'. As regards products which required 
especial expenditure of labour, e. g. hunting elephants and/or were commodities of 
long distance external trade, like gold and kola nuts, clearly established proportions 
were appropriated by the Stool. The most important commodity in this respect being 
gold, a third of all gold dust produced by a subject was appropriated by the Stool 
while all gold nuggets belonged to the Stool. 
In the conditions of predominantly use value production, relative abundance of land 
and spatial immobility, land was rarely bought or sold (Sarbah, 1968,61). What 
transaction - sale, pledge took place were usually conducted among the highest levels 
of the ruling strata; some transactions involved populated villages (McCaskie, 1980). 
There seems to have been the acceptance that land could be transferred to another 
community by chiefs in settlement of a "communal debt". Among the mass of 
subjects, human beings and valuable chattels were pawned although it would seem 
land with useful permanent trees on was also "pledgeable" - representing a rudimentary 
mortgage but the mortgagee had no right to foreclose (Ollennu, 1962,8 1, 
Asante, 1975,213-214). This was the system of land relations that the colonial state 
attempted to radically change with the abortive 1894 and 1897 land bills. Although 
they were not Passed they are discussed here to provide an indication of the route of 
transformation of land relations envisaged by the colonial authorities. 
3.2. The Abortive Land Bills 
2 The far from unique characterof this ideology is indicated bý what Marx (1965,70) said about surplus 
extraction under "Oriental despotism" under which there appears to be "a legal absence of propert,, ". 
Here "Part of its [community's] surplus labour belongs to the higher communitv, which ultimatek 
appears as a persoii. This surplus labour is rendered both as a tribute and as common labour for the 
glory of the unity. in part that of' the despot, 
iii part that of the ima., Iý 0 gined tribal entity of the god. " 
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The two Land Bills, the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 and the Public Lands Bill of 1897. 
that might have effected radical changes in land relations in the Gold Coast if they had 
been passed were not primarily occasioned by the colonial state's concern to expand 
commodity agriculture. Among several factors the most important was a desire to 
secure conditions for British capital's take over of gold mining in the Gold Coast'. 
It is arguable that others such as a) the raising of revenue to cover the expenses of 
government, and b) a more thorough subordination and incorporation of the local 
states and their ruling groups within the framework of the colonial state, ranked higher 
than a concern with the development of export agriculture. Whilst both the Crown 
Lands Bill, 1894, and the Public Lands Bill,, 1897 were primarily concerned with 
providing the conditions for the operation of mining capital, they embodied different 
emphases as to the extent and speed with which the above outlined objectives were to 
be achieved and the mechanisms for the transformations. 
The general form and content of the Crown Lands Bill evinced a strong and narrow 
concern with securing some of the key conditions for the operation of the mining 
mclustry. The Bill proposed the appropriation of all ýwaste' and 'forest' land together 
with all minerals in the Gold Coast in the name of the Queen for the use of the 
("YoN, crnment of the Colony. 'Wasteland' was defined as land of which "no beneficial 
user had been made for cultivation or inhabitation, or for collecting or storing water. 
or for ariv industrial purpose" in the thirty years before the coming into force of the 
proposed laýN'. 'Forest land' meant 'land which for most part is covered N-,. ith trees, 
Governon'. ", ecretarv of State for Colonies, 25 June 1889, C096/200. 
60 
which have not been planted or sown by man'. All future grants of any lands or 
minerals vested in the Queen were to be made by the Governor at his discretion. 
Despite the sweeping effect of all lands becoming Crown land, the structure of control 
which was erected on this broad basis was very narrow and limited. Whilst vesting 
all land in the Crown the only grants that the Bill clearly sought to regulate were those 
of forest and mineral bearing land. On one hand the Bill aimed to prohibit grants of 
mineral bearing land by chiefs and family heads to all 'strangers' - African/indigenous 
and European. On the other hand, it potentially left the field wide open for chiefs and 
family heads to deal in agricultural land - notwithstanding the limitation of their 
powers of alienation in respect of 'waste' and 'forest' land. In quite a few cases a 
distinction among the various types of land will be impossible given that on land used 
for shifting cultivation, trees are usually not stumped and could speedily regenerate 
within the 30 year non user period which makes land waste land. The effect of a 
rigorous regime being erected in respect of 'forest' and mineral lands would be to oust 
chiefs and local petty bourgeois speculators from the 'concessions industry', depriving 
thcrn of their most important source of revenue since the slave trade 
(Ille(,, bLine, 1974; Bentsi-Enchill, 1986, Chapter 2). 
Although the Crown Lands Bill had attracted protests, especially from chiefs and the 
indiociious professional class (Kimble. 19631-334-340, Howard, 1978,40- 
PhIllips, 1989,61) it Nvas the determination of Sir William Maxwell, who in April 1895 
succeeded Sir William Brandford Griffith. Snr.. to cfl'cct reforms far inore 
tI unclarnental than thosc contained in the Crown Lands Bill which resulted in the law, 
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being shelved. Bentsi-Enchill (1986,92) argues that the coincidence of Maxwell's 
arrival in Accra with Joseph Chamberlain's assumption of the office of Secretary of 
State for the Colonies "resulted in a pervasive acceleration of schemes for more 
intensive control over local politics and economic production 
114 
. When 
he proposed 
the withdrawal of the Crown Lands Bill's Governor Maxwell strongly criticised its 
recognition of 'unknown native law' 
The Public Lands Bill, 1897 introduced by Maxwell represented a more 
comprehensive attempt to create private property rights in land. Various related 
concerns were reflected in the Public Lands Bill. These were: 
I. A far reaching creation of the conditions for the privatisation and 
individualisation of property in land; 
A drastic subordination of what was left of the pre-capitalist States and 
their ruling classes and a consequent dissolution of the mode of 
production they were rooted in. 
The control and disposition of land as a source of State revenue, -1 
The favoured status of mining capital in this scheme of the privatisation 
of landed property. 
Maxwell's views about colonial, especiall) administration and land, policy had been shaped by thirl", 
\cars working in the colonial service in tile Nialay Peninsula from where he came to the Gold Coast. 
Durino his time there he was the expert on land policv. 
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The Bill proposed a hierarchy of rights - superior rights and inferior rights - the 
former comprising: a) Rights exercisable by the Govemor under the Ordinance and b) 
The customary rights of a native chief in respect of land attached to his Stool, subject 
to the limitations contained in the law regarding the exercise of such rights. It sought 
to create five categories of 'inferior rights'. The most important of these being 'Land 
Certificate Rights' The Bill vested the power of administration of all 'public lands' in 
the Colonial State. 'Public Land' broadly meant all land excluding those permanently 
cultivated or inhabited or the subject of a concession at the time of the Bill becoming 
law. It was to be generally unlawful, subject to specific exceptions, for any chief or 
other native authority to create by any instrument in writing, or by any other method, 
any private right in public land without the prior written consent of the Governor. 
Hie Governor was empowered to authorise 'the occupation of public land for any 
purpose by such person(s) and on such terms and conditions for consideration and 
either in perpetuity or for a term of years absolute or conditional or defeasible in his 
absolute discretion'. This power was to be exercised by the issue of a Land 
Certificate. 
Unless and until a Land Certificate expires by the passage of time or becomes 
forfcited for breach of conditions or other valid reason, it shall be good and valid as 
against all persons, including the Government of the Colony and all others claiming 
'adversely thereto' and no action shall lie in any court in respect of any land being the 
suýjcct thereof in favour of a person cialming, by title paramount thereto. Immovable 
' "Public lands" here includes the bed of lagoons and rivers, another indication of the concern with the 
needs of the mining industrv. 
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property derived from a Land Certificate was to devolve and be transmitted in 
accordance with the provisions of the Law of England to the exclusion of any native 
law or custom relating to land in the Colony. 
In his memorandum preceding the transmission of a copy of the Bill to the Colonial 
Office, Governor Maxwell argued the advisability of making 'native tenure' more 
"secure" by declaring that every 'native' who obtains a Government Certificate shall 
hold his land free from the operation of 'native law and custom' "which often makes 
land practically inalienable by the recognition of the right of every member to an 
individual share in the property. "' Thus although the Bill in various parts recognised 
and preserved pre-capitalist tenure, its overall effect was to force all land relations 
onto a path of privatisation and individual i sation. of rights in land independent of the 
pre-colonial States and social relations. The recognised and preserved pre-capitalist 
rights were to be denied the protection of bourgeois 'legality' and 'the rule of law'; 
their enjoyment is subject to the extensive discretionary interference of the Colonial 
State. 
Ncither the Crown Lands Bill nor the Lands Bill was passed. Both Bills provoked 
strong protests from chiefs and indigenous professional and commercial strata. As 
ýflrcady indicated the 1894 Bill was withdrawn because the new Governor wanted a 
more radical law. The local opposition to the 1897 Bill included a deputation to 
I-ondon to directly present the orounds of opposition to the British goverament. These 
protests deepened conflicts and doubts within official circles about the 1897 Bill. 
Bentsi-I'nchill (1986.12-19-162) has argued that contrary to the conventional ý, visdom it 
' Gio\ernor Maxwell to Sec. of State. 28 9'1896, CO 96,290 7147,97. 
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was a combination of the protests from British mining capital and the Colonial 
Officeýs recogntion of the technical limitations of the Public Lands Bill rather than the 
strength of local agitation that resulted in the withdrawal of the Bill (Kimble, 196-33, ch 
IX; Howard, 1979,40-43). The Concessions Ordinance, 1900, the legislation that 
emerged out of the controversies and agitation that the Bills provoked, secured the 
most vital conditions for the development of the mining industry, the central concern 
of both Bills; the impact of the Concessions Ordinance on agriculture has been 
minimal. 
3.3. Transformation 
While the challenges that mining capital posed to pre-capitalist land relations were met 
by the Concessions Ordinance, 1900 the transformations wrought by the 
commoditisation of agricultural land as a result of the spread of cocoa cultivation were 
left to continue emerging from the interstices of existing land relations. The 
fundamental feature of this process was a growing rupture between the old 
superstructure of dominion and servitude that bound landholder to the political 
authority as the economic form of land changed under the impact of the penetration 
of capital. This had two main features: an increasing privatisation of land and an 
accompanying weakening of the political power of the local states. 
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Four broad patterns of privatisation emerged: 
I. The mutation of the stool subject/family member's 'right of 
use'/usufruct into de facto private property through the cultivation of 
perennial crops; 
2. The outright sale of land by chiefs/family heads to "strangers", and 
3. The renting of land to "strangers" by a) chiefs/family heads and b) 
subjects/family members. 
3.3.1. The new usufruct 
The manner in which a cultivator's right of use lends itself to transformation seems 
obvious. Traditionally the cultivator retained land as long as (s)he continued to use 
it. Furthermore the collection and preparation of palm products for the export trade 
over a large part of Southern Ghana strengthened stool subjects' claims over wild 
growing oil palm on land they cultivated or had cultivated in the cycle of shifting 
CLIffivation, even palms on uncultivated land. In a sense these two rights came to be 
united in the cultivation of cash crops. The landmark case of Lokko v Konklofi' 
9, m-cjuridical cloak to the de facto property interests that permanent cultivation gave 
to a cultivator's right of use. The defendant had pledged a farm, on land which lie 
had inherited from his father. In an action to foreclose the mortgage, it was 
interpleaded that the farm could not be seized and sold in execution since title to the 
(1907) Ren. 450. 
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land was vested in the Stool. The court rejected this argument on the basis that 
Konklofi had an attachable usufructuary interest in the land. This would have been 
sufficient for the immediate purposes of the case but the presiding judge, Chief Justice 
Brandford Griffith seized the occasion to lay down general principles on the legal 
implications of the cultivation of permanent cash crops. He argued that: 
As soon as the Court ascertained that he [Konklofij and his family 
had had permanent cultivation on the land, it would decide that lie 
had appropriated that portion of the stool land to himself Nvith the 
tacit consent of the stool and that it was no longer stool property, but 
his own. 
Asante (1975,43) has correctly noted that the bold assertion that a Stool subject could 
acquire exclusive ownership of Stool land through some sort of prescriptive 
occupation violently offended the fundamental traditional principle that the Stool could 
never be divested of its dominion by reason only of the subject's long possession. 
In pre-colonial Asante 
"The conception of the actual soil as belonging to individuals, whether Kings, 
Councillors, sub-chiefs, heads of kindred groups, or finally, the individual 
sinall-holder of a farm plot, was quite unknown and was in fact almost 
inconceivable" (Rattray, 1929,361). 
I'lie Konklofi decision also contained a legal challenge to the old bar on the alienation 
of land by Stool subjects. Although attempts were made subsequently to limit the 
principle in the case, these did not destroy its kernel - that a Stool subject's farm can 
be sold in execution of a judgement debt. The importance of this will be appreciated 
in the following discussion of 'pledging' of farms by the lower peasantry as a way of 
easmo the 'reproduction squeeze 
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3.3.2 The new "stranger" 
The alienation of land to "strangers" constituted the most dramatic instances of the 
emergence of private property in land. We have already referred to the highly 
publicised migration of Krobos and Akwapims to buy cocoa land in Akyem Abuakx\, -a 
at the turn of the century. While the most notorious these cases are by no means the 
first instances of migration and land acquisition. We have already referred the oil 
palm migration which preceded that induced by cocoa. Arhin's research (1985) in the 
Western and Central Region has showed that the migratory process has continued 
down the years, drawing in a much wider range of people. He found the migrant 
cocoa farmers in the areas covered by his survey to be a microcosm of Ghana's 
peoples together with a sprinkling of non-Ghanaians (Arhin, 1985,2)1. 
One possible effect of the Lands Bills could have been to provide the Colonial State 
with a broad legal basis for a rationalisation of the terms on which chiefs granted land 
to strangers. In the absence of such a national framework the control of potential 
cocoa land was fragmented in the hands of chiefs and family heads. This created a 
situation of an absolute abundance of cocoa land on a national scale but a relative 
scarcity for potential cocoa farmers from outside areas suitable for the cultivation of 
the crop. The failure of the Land Bills meant that whilst there may have been an 
absolutc abundance of potential cocoa land in the country, ultimate control over their 
disposition and use were not unified. So for example Krobos, Gas Akuapems. Ewes, 
etc. had to migrate and seek land outside their own States. As the economic form of 
Imided property changed the ultmite title and control vested in chiefs and family more 
' See also Arhm (1970,1972 and 1980). 
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and more became private power. The pre-colonial land boundaries constituted the 
geographical limits of such private control and the private hands were those of chlefs 
and family heads. 
Certain features of pre-capitalist land relations facilitated the emergence of chiefs and 
their elders as de facto private landlords with a new economic power. The traditional 
land control powers of the chiefs, family heads to allow strangers access to land, to 
alienate land to settle 'communal debts', the ideolo6cal presentation of a chief s role 
in land relations and the absence of any mechanism within the pre-capitalist order for 
controlling land dealings by chiefs and family heads, were important in facilitating the 
sale of land. The ruling ideology presented the chief as the custodian of land on 
behalf of the whole community. The increased demand for land for non-subjects 
induced by cash cropping gave a new dimension to these powers of the chief the 
exercise of which hitherto, with a predominance of use value production, occasioned 
no severe contradictions with their ideological garb of being done on behalf of the 
community of the dead, living and future by their individual personification. 
I'lie differential access between locals in and migrants to cocoa growing areas had 
important implications for the process of stratification and class formation in the 
countryside. The traditional right of access/usufruct meant persons, subjects of states 
with land suitable for cocoa cultivation could enter cocoa production without 
cxpcilding -in), capital on land purchase or without having some of the output 
appropriated as rent by the landlord. The obligations owed by the subject as incidents 
of the pre-colonial right of access to land either fell into desuetude as the old social 
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formations dissolved or certain practices were suppressed by the Colonial State. This 
privileged access was particularly important in the early days of cocoa cultivation in 
the areas of secondary development such as Ashanti and Brong Ahafo where cocoa 
production did not develop as a result of large scale immigration so much as an 
i ntensi f-i cation of cultivation by Ashanti and Brongs of their traditional land once a 
market for cocoa was established. As cocoa spread not only did land prices soar but 
chiefs were increasingly reluctant to sell land outright (Woodman, 1978) preferring to 
lease the land instead to tenant farmers. The overwhelming proportion of share- 
cropping tenant farmers are migrants into the cocoa areas. Not only is a higher level 
of prior accumulation necessary to be able to buy land but as we show below pressure 
on land made the terms of tenant farming very exploitative. 
For those whose 'right of access' to cocoa land was rendered meaningless by a 
shortage of land or the alien who could not buy or rent land, participation in the cocoa 
industry was in the main as sellers of labour power. Initially most entertained the 
hope of accumulating sufficient capital to enable them strike out and set up on their 
own as cocoa farmers. By the 1930s the cocoa industry was characterised by complex 
and heterogeneous social relations, manifesting both capitalist and pre-capitalist 
clcmcnts. Stratification of the peasantry was advanced, wage labour was widespread. 
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Thus the Nowell Report (1938,59): 
The original conception of the Gold Coast Farmer still generally held 
except by those with personal experience of the present situation is of 
a peasant cultivator who, with his own labour and the help of his 
family, grows his food and tends an acre or two of cocoa trees. This 
picture is no longer true of more than a small minority of farms and 
these of the smallest size. The employment of labour has become a 
regular feature of cocoa growing, even where the owner resides on 
his farm. Multiple and absentee ownership has also developed, 
involving the complete use of hired labour. In actual fact, very many 
so called farmers neither grow nor market their cocoa. 
The 1912 Report of the Department of Agriculture noted the fact of non household 
labour being employed to harvest cocoa in Ashanti. Given the relative infancy of 
Ashanti cocoa production in 1912, outside labour most certainly must have been 
employed for longer in the older cocoa growing areas such as Akwapim and Akyem 
Abuakwa. The most important general category of these employer-employee relations, 
with pre-capitalist and capitalist elements was the share-cropping labourer of which 
there were two main types: the abusa and nkotokuano labourers. Share-cropping 
arrangements typically arise in situations where both the labourer and farmer lack 
capital, the former thereby unable to buy or rent land, the latter being rendered unable 
to pay for wage tabour. This was a strong element in the development of the systems 
of share-cropping labour and tenancies in the cocoa industry'. 
9 For detailed discussion of share-cropping and other forms of paid labour that cocoa production 
enoctidered scc I fill ( 1956. Chapters 1 -4, Arhin, 198-5.43-5 1). 
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3.4 ... and Contradictions 
The development of the new economic power of chiefs and family heads had the 
corollary of the weakening of the political power of local states and ruling groups. 
This process, which can be regarded as pressure from below which pressed the local 
states against the rock represented by the growing strength of the colonial state had 
two main dimensions. On one side chiefly power was undermined by a loss of 
respectability with subjects as chiefs frantically alienated land. In some communities 
substantial alienation of land created land shortages and thereby posed a threat to the 
livelihood of locals (Danquah, 1929,213). 
Given the novelty of the practice the indigenous political system had no mechanism, 
short of the destoolment of the errant chief, for controlling the practice. There was 
no question of subjects being entitled to a portion of the proceeds from land sales. 
Traditionally they had given to the chief, and whatever came back to them from the 
chiefwas an act of largesse. In the period up to the 1929 Depression, the resentment 
against chiefs generated by land sales was an important element in a spate of 
attempted and successful destoolment of chiefs, including many paramount chiefs. 
'Flus crisis was accentuated by the increasingly contradictory role of the chief as a 
functionary (conduit) of a foreign State - the Colonial State, and the balancing act 
required of him by the system of indirect rule. Interestingly most of these challenges 
to chiefs werc in the Eastern Province. the ,, anguard of the cocoa industry and 
therefore site of the most advanced changes in agrarian relations and stratification 
(Kinible, 1903,469-497). 
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More relevant to our purposes are the contradictions centred directly on the new land 
relations constituted by outright purchase or renting of land by strangers for the 
cultivation of a permanent crop. These instances of privatisation of landed property 
represented much more radical rupturing of the economic form of property from their 
juristic forms and a more stark divorce of "landed property from the relations of 
dominion and servitude". The process of dissociation flowed from two sets of 
contradictions. One of these centred around the contents of the relationship between 
alienor and alienee in both cases of outright sale and renting, Le what was the 
quantum of interests acquired by the buyer or tenant and how do these relate to the 
traditional incidents of dominion and servitude to the chief. The other contradictions 
flowing from the first set were political/jurisdictional disputes between and within 
local States about control of land and therefore entitlement to rent and other economic 
returns from land held by purchasers or tenants. In respect of both nodes of conflict 
the intervention of the central colonial government as arbiter meant a further 
strengthening of the colonial state at the expense of the indigenous political systems. 
The conflicts affected direct production in a number of ways. First of all the 
jui-isdictional disputes meant uncertainty about a grantee's title. and insecurity of 
tenLire has never been knowii to be a spur to increased investment. Also the nature 
of the grantee's interest has implications for the extent of exactions by the landowiler 
the level of which bears directIv on the econornic return a farmer gets and therefore 
the attractiveness of continued cocoa farmino or possibility of indebtedness. As we 
shall claborate this economic dimension rarniflies itself in Icvels of cocoa production 
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and the quality of the crop - the two key issues of concem for international capital. 
3.4.1 Defining the grantee's interest 
We have argued that before the generalised spread of commodity relations in Ghanaian 
agriculture a non-subject of a stool who sought land and got it thereby became placed 
in the same relationship which all subjects occupied vis-a-vis the local political 
authority. In that sense the notion of "stranger" as someone with an economic 
presence rooted in land relations who was not in a relationship of dominion and 
servitude to the local stool was generally unknown. We have further argued that in 
t1iis situation tribute represented a unity of rent, as something deriving from the land, 
and taxes as personal obligations which unity reflected the unity of the state as lord 
and sovereign. 
In one sense the migrant cocoa farmer and the European gold prospector are not 
different from each other. Both of them activated by the internationalisation of capital 
assaulted the pre-capitalist political economy from outside, latching onto what were 
hitherto marginal elements of its production relations. The gold concession hunter 
repi-csci-ited less of a challenge to the political economy because there were relatively 
, ývcll established terms of chiefly control and tributary mechanisms for gold which was 
aiid reinained economically marginal to the total dynamic of the society. The migrant 
cocoa ftumcr was howevcr different, engaged in an economic activity which at first 
sit) IIII 
ght is an offshoot from what is the overwheli-ning, economic act vity n the pre- 
c, ipitalist society. His geographical mobility however epitomised the character of the :: % t, - 
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cocoa, a commodity par excellence with no local use value, capable of escapinc-, the 
geographical and therefore political economic boundaries of its site of production. Its 
circuit of production, symbolised the new freedom open to the producer, his/her 
liberation from the old unity of land and sovereignty and its associated relations of 
dominion and servitude. The fundamentally disruptive challenge cocoa production by 
migrants posed has a number of dimensions, unlike the transformed usufruct of a 
member of the land owning group the interest acquired by a migrant was hydra 
headed. 
As a new crop, a pure cash crop at that, cocoa posed a number of problems. Was it 
just like existing crops, i. e consumption crops and therefore not subject to any especial 
appropriative arrangements between landlord and farmer or being a new commodity 
was it in the same category as established commodities of external trade such as gold 
and kola nuts and therefore subject to the tributary regime that applied to these? The 
practice that emerged underlined the fact that the answer could not be found within 
existing land relations. On one hand cocoa cultivation by members of the landowning 
group was effectively treated like traditional consumption crops while cocoa produced 
by migrant farmers who had not bought their land outright was treated under the 
tribtitary regime traditionally applied to gold and such commodities which involves the 
chief appropriating a fixed proportion of the commodity. In the case of cocoa the 
appropriation xvas in kind or in its money equivalent with wide variations throughout 
flie industry Nvith two types of appropriation of fixed proportions dominant. These 
being the abusa and abunu tenancy with the chief/landlord appropriating one third and 
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half respectively of the produce or its money form. As commodity relations spread 
3J48). rent in kind more and more became converted into its money form (Hill, 196-) 
Marx (1959,795) has noted that: 
Rent in kind in its pure form while it may drag fragments along into highly 
developed modes of production relations, still presuppose for its existence a 
natural economy, i. e. the conditions of the economy are either wholly orfor 
the overwhelmingpart reproduced by the economy itse4f, directly replaced and 
reproduced out of its gross product. It furthermore presupposes the 
combination of rural home industry with agriculture (emphasis added). 
Rent in kind or money rent thus represents a contradiction in a political economy 
dominated by capitalism where the material reproduction of the direct producer is 
largely dependent on commodity exchange as rapidly became the case with cocoa 
production. Here the producer unlike in a natural economy has little control over all 
the conditions of his material reproduction. In such a situation rent in kind or money 
rent may "assume dimensions which seriously imperil reproduction of the conditions 
of labour, the means of production themselves, rendering the expansion of production 
aiid improvement of quality more or less impossible and reducing the direct producers 
to the physical minimum of means of subsistence" (Marx, 1959,796). The truth of this 
assertion becaiiie evident very early in the life of the cocoa industry and remained a 
persistcnt source of conflict between migrant tenants and chiefs/landlords. We discuss 
the implicatimis of this fact for cocoa production and quality in subsequent chapters 
sut't-ice to say that but it was the alleged deterrent impact of this on the creation of 
cocoa farnis that provoked the colonial state to look at the matter for the first time. 
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Early in 1910 the West Aftican Mail reported that "certain avaricious chiefs are 
claiming as tribute from cocoa farmers as much as one third of the cocoa grown or 
sold in certain parts of the Colony, and the result is that the youngmen refrain from 
extending their farms"". Following this, the Secretary for Native Affairs wrote to 
Provincial Commissioners enquiring about the extent of the phenomenon reported by 
the West Aftican Mail. From what we have argued the problem was not a moral one 
of "avarice" or such but an objective problem resulting from the persistence of a pre- 
capitalist mechanism of surplus extraction" 
The result of the first general survey of rent in the cocoa industry showed a 
widespread imposition of rent in various proportions in all cocoa growing areas. 
There was a separate indication from Ashanti that a similar problem existed there. 
Interestingly the Commissioner for the Western Province, the last area to which cocoa 
spread, reported that the abusa rent was generally absent from the Province with the 
exception of its cocoa growing parts. He made the revealing comment that "cocoa 
growing was in its infancy" in the Province". The problem of rent was already a 
matter of intense conflict in some other parts of the Colony, and involved not only 
Iýindlot-d chiefs but private landlords as well. The Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province for example, claimed that the offenders within his jurisdiction were the 
10 Quoted in a circular letter of 24 January 1910 from the Secretary for Native Affairs to Provincial 
Commissioners, Ghana National Archives (GNA), Accra, Adm 11/1 ý84. 
" In an insightful memo E. A Brew a travelling instructor of the Department of Agriculture noted that 
the -ivim, of one third of a crop to a landowner was used in ancient times "when minor crops 
cultivated' and pointed out that "cocoa involves capital out I ay and greater expenditure of I abour". Cited 
in CCP to SNA ', February 1910 in GNA Adm 1 I/l/84. 
12 Commissioner Western Pro% ince to , ccretar\ for Native Affairs, II and 19 %larch 19 10, GNA Adm 
1111 84. 
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private landlords and reported that some "smaller chiefs were talking about migrating 
and asking the Government for land. He added, no doubt tongue in cheek that "there 
was little doubt in my mind that a Crown Lands Bill would have been welcomed by 
the people"" 
Unavoidably the situation represented a challenge to static notions of "customary law" 
as something sanctioned by "ancient usage". The response of the government showed 
both a commitment to the myth of immutable "customary law" and the extent to which 
it was prepared to create new realities if the interest of the colonial project so 
demanded. A request from the Commissioner of the Central Province, which had a 
particularly explosive problem in one district, for a general circular "to the effect that 
the time has come to protect small farmers from the injustices of landowners as 
regards permanent crops, especially cocoa" was largely rejected. The Governor took 
the view that "the ultimate decision as to the respective rights of owners and 
cultivators of land (whether by native custom or under written or verbal agreement) 
in the event of a conflict lies with the Supreme Court of the Colony". The 
government was however not averse to a targeted executive interference in the 
arrangements between landlords and tenants and a circular on rent was issued to chiefs 
in the Central Province. The document is interesting from at least two perspectives: 
what it says about the power relations between chiefs and the central government and 
the manipulation of the myth of customary law. Sigmed by the Secretary for Native 
Affairs, Francis Crowtllcr, on 25 August 1910. it read as follows: 
" (T- P to SNA, 2 Februan 19 10. Adm IIf1 84. 
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"Chief, It has been brouOlit to 
the notice of the Governor that an excessive tribute in respect of cultivated 
land, especially land planted with cocoa, is being exacted by Chiefs in the 
Central Province. 2. While ancient custom may govern 
the proportion of such demands on account of uncultivated or native products, 
no such custom can exist in the case of cocoa; a new form of cultivation, only 
introduced into the Gold coast within the last few years. 
3. Should these excessive rates continue, His Excellency will 
be compelled to consider the adoption of legislative measures very 
considerably to reduce, if not abolish, all payments by tribal land holders in 
respect of their cultivated land. 
I am Chief, your good Friend, 
Francis Crowther. 
In fact even before Crowther's circular Commissioners had asked Chiefs to reduce 
rents. The Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, Mr Fuller told the WALC that "Ex- King 
Prempeh laid down a third [of produce as rent] for rubber and therefore they have kept 
that third for cocoa, but is much too much" and he had accordingly "suggested" to my 
chiefs that a tenth would be quite sufficient". He later told the WALC he took a 
simple administrative decision because he assumed the government controlled the land 
(WALC Minutes, 4673-79). 
3.4.2 Jurisdictional Disputes 
One dimension of the uncertainty about the content of the new land relations 
particularly highlighted the antagonism between landownership and political 
sovereignty. This problem was manifested in jurisdictional disputes between the states 
of'origin of the migrants and those in which they bought land. Are the migrants still ýi I 
sLib. lect to the political jurisdiction of the state from which they migrated. This 
i-epresented a more insidious challenge to the pre-capitalist political order than the 
It was between two completely autonomous vertical disputes discussed below. 
political alithorities, linkcd only by the accident of subjection to a common colonial 
power, It carried within it the possibility of the geographical area of a state decreasing 
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simply because "strangers" have bought land within it and have come to constitute an 
"island" owing allegiance to another political authority. Akim Abuakwa, site of the 
first migrant cocoa farms, provided early cases of this problem. There were separate 
disputes between the Okyenhene and the Paramount chiefs of Akwapim, New Juaben 
and Manya Krobo, all of whose people had settled on Akim land. For the colonial 
government these conflicts posed a fundamental challenge to the basis of indirect rule. 
As early as 1908 Governor Rodgers was constrained to issue guiding principles to aid 
the resolution of such conflicts by Commissioners. The main principle it laid down 
was that 
On the personal and territorial rights of chiefs and the corresponding 
obligations of natives owing personal allegiance to one chief and residing on 
land within another,... natives who settle on land within the division of 
another chief, whether in the Colony or Ashanti, must obey the lawful orders 
and regulations, and conform to any approved bye-laws issued by that 
chief". 
This general principle however did not provide a basis for determining whether in fact 
a piece of land which has been on settled by migrants remains part of the territory of 
the chief who sold it. The murkiness was not helped by the Instructions allowing for 
migrants continuing to "perform certain duties" in the states from which they migrated. L- 
3.5. The Pattern of State Intervention 
The transformation of land relations due to the penetration of capital constituted an 
inherent contradiction within the colonial political economy. This on one side sought 
the expansion of export agriculture but at the same t1ine required a certain minimum 
vitality of the institution of chieftaincy which was being hollowed out by the emergent 
" Quoted in GNA Adm II/l/1453 
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social relations of colonial economy and society. Throughout the colonial period the 
colonial power strove for a delicate balance between the contradictory imperatives of 
colonial economics and politics which was reflected in attitudes to land relations. In 
this regard the colonial period can be divided into two broad phases, each reflecting 
the historically dominant demands of capital or the local class struggle. both phases 
exposing the contradiction at the heart of the Colonial State. The first Phase may be 
said to spread over the period from the beginning of formal colonialism to the 
beginning of the First World War, when cocoa was spreading and this spread was 
being encouraged wholeheartedly by the State. The second phase covers the rest of 
the colonial era till the onset of decolonisation from the last two years of the 1940s, 
during this period the concern was to minimise the extent of dissolution of pre- 
capitalist society induced by the spread of cocoa without arresting this spread. 
Asante (1975,40-41) distinguishes corresponding phases of judicial attitudes 'to the 
impact of economic and social changes on traditional (land) holdings'. 
In the first phase -a brief one - realism prevailed. The new social 
phenomena found concrete expression in the cases, and the efficacy of 
traditional categorisation was overtly challenged in the light of changing 
conditions. This phase was followed by a long spell in which the Superior 
Courts, alarmed at the pace of the erosion of the traditional scheme, reverted 
to 'pure native law. ' The old conception of usufruct and 'communal 
ownership' were emphatically restated and applied with scant regard for the 
social realities. 
Asante's periodisation basicall), coincIdes with Gunnarson's (1976) periodisation of 
the phases of the cocoa industry; it also gives an indication of the changes in law and 
legal forms that Nvere taking place during, the critical period, 1890 - 1911 studied by Z z: I 
Szereszewski (1965). In the first phase the central government gave little 
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encouragement to attempts to stop the alienation of land or to impose vigorous 
controls on the process. On the contrary it was during this period that Crowther 
issued his circular threatening to abolish all rent. The general attitude of the Colonial 
State to land sales is well illustrated by the evidence the same Crowther, who had been 
a District Commissioner in Akim Abuakwa, gave to the West Africa Lands Committee 
(WALC). Talking about land sales in the District when he was in charge Crowther 
told the WALC he did no more than "strongly advice" the Akim Abuakwa chiefs 
against the practice because lie felt the exchange was "advantageous" partly because 
the buyers, the Krobos, "are an increasing and prosperous people and the Akim are the 
reverse". When the Akirn Abuakwa Paramount Stool proposed bye-laws which sought 
to define the terms of grants by sub-stools the Governor refused his approval (WALC 
Minutes, 105022-23). 
By the start of the First World War, with the basic elements of the colonial political 
economy established, the Colonial State manifested clearly its fears of the implications 
of the new social relations emerging, particularly the threat those in the countryside 
posed to the system of indirect rule and ultimately to the whole Colonial State. The 
dominant concern in this period till the era of decolon'sation was the repression of 
these new classes - the new petty bourgeoisie, rural bourgeoisie lower peasantry and 
proletariat whose development and interests were antagonistic to the form of State that 
confronted thein. The central importance of land control in a chiet's authority and the 
threat the transformation of land relations posed to this authority was recognised. A 
central element in this bolstering tip of 'native. instittitions' was to encourage the 
creation of such property rights in land as would maintain some control in the hands 
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of chiefs without impeding the expansion of cocoa farming. The proceedings of the 
West African Lands Committee (1912 - 1916) show this clearly. Its Draft Report 
suggested the non creation and recognition of absolute private property in land. There 
was a desire to impede differentiation in the countryside and curb the quantum of 
private rights enjoyed by cultivators (WALC Draft Report, 1916). 
Of course the less private rights a farmer has in land the more subject he will be to 
control of the landlord,, in the instant case the chief. Increasingly, the courts asserted ltý 
the requirement of the prior consent of the Stool to various land transactions by 
private individuals. There was a marked unwillingness on the part of the courts, 
during this period to uphold the doctrine of the Konklofi case (Asante, 1975,45-50). 
Certainly, this would seem to have coincided with the greater resort to renting rather 
than sale by chiefs as a greater appreciating of the value of land took hold. The 
ideology of land sale as offensive to the spirit of the ancestors was preserved as the 
reason. In Ashanti, where cocoa took hold in this latter phase, there seems to have 
been very little sale of land to strangers, most of the land used by stranger farmers 
being rented. 
Fhc emergence of private iand rights out of the crevices of the pre-capitalist order 
resulted in these land relations being transformed in an incomplete and contradictory 
manner. This reflected the mediated form of capitalism's penetration together , vith 
the class contradiction at the core of the Colonial State. Private interests were 
sufficiemly developed to facilitate the particular form capital's dominance over cocoa 
production took but as \\-c argue in the following chapters the nature of these relations 
posed problems for the extension of capital's control and intensification of the labour 
of the producers to capital's advantage, In the case of cocoa production in the colonial 
period this was significant for the quality of cocoa; in the post colonial period these 
relations shaped the new forms in which international capital involved itself in 
Ghanaian agriculture. 
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Chapter 4 
The Cocoa Marketing System 
Within the space of twenty years the Gold Coast moved from being a non producer 
to the largest exporter of cocoa beans in the world. Exports rose dramatically from 
a mere 80lbs. in 1891 to over 40,000 tons in 1911. By 1925 the Gold Coast supplied 
44% of world cocoa exports. Underlying this dramatic process was a rapid 
development of cocoa production as specialist peasant commodity production involving 
a mass of farmers and labourers on thousands of holdings. In the mid 1930s there 
were an estimated 300,000 cocoa farms covering between 1.25 million and 1.5 million 
acres. About 60% of these farms were under an acre in size (Nowell, 1938,17). On 
the eve of the Second World War the cocoa farmer and the industrial user of his 
product were linked by a process of "vertical concentration" under the aegis of 
merchant capital. "Vertical concentration" refers to the co-ordination, standardisation, 
and (greater or lesser) supervision of the production of numerous individual small 
producers through a central agency. It could represent productive capital directly or 
forms of merchant's capital which thereby actively intervene in the organisation of 
production (Bernstein. 1979,433). 
This chapter discusses aspects of this vertical concentration of cocoa producers 
especially as they relate to the sphere of exchange in the period up to the beginnings 
ot' state mter"vention in the trade in 1938. It begins Nvith a sketch of the international 
imirket, fOllowed by an overview of the structure of the internal marketing svstem as 
it had become on the eve of state intervciition. Mis is followed bv a discussion of the 
actual social relations of the internal trade. These social relations had a number of 
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dimensions. These included 1) the terms and mechanisms of exchange between 
farmers and cocoa buying firms and their network of agents. An important element 
of this was the role of merchant and usurer's capital in the reproduction of the cocoa 
producers not simply in the sphere of exchange but also production. Also discussed 
are 2) the relations between the buying firms and their agents, 3) the contradictions 
among the firms in general and 4) between merchant and industrial capital in 
particular. The role of the state in mediating these sets of relations and their 
accompanying contradictions are also examined. 
4.1. INTER-NATIONAL MARKET 
In the period under discussion, the international market for cocoa was highly 
concentrated in Western Europe and North America. Between the two World Wars 
around four-fifth of the world's imports of cocoa went to five countries: the United 
States,, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France. In 1900 
continental Europe was the world's largest market for cocoa, accounting for 70%, with 
Germany and Austria alone taking a quarter of world imports and Hamburg the centre 
of the world trade. Consumption in the United States expanded strongly in the 1920s 
and 1930s and in 1936-37 it accounted for 45% of world consumption compared with 
20% in 1900. In 1936-37 continental Europe's share of cocoa imports had fallen to 
tinder 42% ofthe world's total. British consumption by comparison increased from 
12% of NN, -orld's total in 1909-13 to just over 14% in 1936 (Wickizer, 1951,273, 
Ciunnarsson, 1976. passiiii; NoNNrejj, 19'38, Appendlx C, Table 11). 
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By 1937 international trade in cocoa was dominated by the New York and London 
Cocoa Exchanges. New York opened in 1925 was the more important of the two. 
Unlike the major British manufacturers who endeavoured to purchase as mucli as 
possible of their requirements directly from source, most of the major manufacturers. 
including the Hershey Chocolate Co. the world's largest manufacturer, bought on the 
New York Exchange. Speculation was rampant. According to the Nowell 
Commission (1938,126) the buying policy of manufacturers was affected at times by 
purely speculative considerations one of which was the desire to "make a competitor 
pay dearly". The London Exchange tended to follow the trends in New York but 
suffered the specific influence of two peculiar factors: direct purchases from West 
Africa by the largest British manufacturers, led by Cadbury's, and the United Africa 
Company (UAQ's control of a significant share of the British West African cocoa 
export trade (Nowell, 1938,126). 
Most cocoa was sold by description under forward contracts. Buying and selling of 
the Gold Coast crop usually began in August, a month or two before harvesting 
acttially started. The fact that cocoa deteriorates very quickly in tropical conditions 
combined with the lack of storage capacity in the producing countries also influenced 
the speed Nvith which the crop had to move from harvesting into the hands of the 
industrial user , vho tended not to hold stocks of more than six months supply because 
of the short life of the beans (NoNvell, 19338.22nd Report of Imperial Economic 
C'otiiniittee. 19')-', GtitinLirson, 1976.2-'i'). N lanufacturers' demand and specu lati ve act i N, i ty 
on the Cocoa exchanges were the t-, vo main influences on the international cocoa price 
which fluctuated widely within the season and between seasons. An additional 
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influence on prices was the absence of reliable intelligence on output of the main 
producing countries, especially the Gold Coast, mainly due to the nature of production 
on numerous smallholding and the resultant marketing system (Gunnarson, 1976,24). 
These fed speculative activity on the international market and as we shall see market 
manipulation on the Gold Coast. 
4.2. THE LOCAL MARKETING SYSTEM 
4.2.1. The Organisation of Capital 
Merchants do not make their profits by revolutionising production but by 
controlling markets, and the greater the control they are able to exercise the 
higher their rate of profit. For this reason merchant capital tends to centralise 
and concentrate itself into monopolies even faster than productive capital 
(Kay, 1975,96). 
For most of the period under discussion both the producer and the industrial user of 
cocoa were confronted by an oligopolistic structure of merchant capital in the Gold 
Coast internal cocoa trade. This had two aspects, a progressive centralisation of 
capital through mergers and take overs and concentration through buying and market 
sharing agreements, locally referred to as "pooling". By 1937 thirteen firms controlled 
98% of the Gold Coast cocoa trade', the four most important exporters handled more 
than 70% of cocoa exports. The majority of these were import-export merchant firms, 
the most miportant being UAC which with its associated firms accounted for 56% of 
Gold coast cocoa exports in 19336-37. Rist over 20% of the crop was bought by 
chocolate ni anti fac turers the most important of' which was Cadbury Brothers Ltd 
(Nowell, 1938.10 and Appendix D). The high micentration and centralisation of 
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capital in 1937 contrasted sharply with what existed in the early years of the cocoa 
industry. Competition was strong in the earliest days of the cocoa industry. In the 
beginning the local market was divided equally among the long established merchant 
firms such as F. & A. Swanzy, Miller & Co., the Basel Mission Trading Co. and 
the German West Africa Trading Co. In the first decade of the 20th century new 
firms, including Cadbury's, entered the trade. In 1915-16 the market shares of the top 
12 exporters ranged between 11.4% and 2.3%. 13 large and 23 smaller foreign firms 
accounted for 89% of exports to the U. K. (Southall, 1975,141,1978,197). 
In the two decades after the First World War this competitive landscape was 
transformed by a combination of mergers and take overs largely caused by crises 
arising from cocoa price movements. In 1919 the four main British merchant firms 
merged to form the African and Eastern Trading Company (A. & E. T. C. ). The end of 
the War and the lifting of shipping restrictions produced a price boom and bust as 
Gold Coast prices followed the international trend. The local price soared from 27/- 
per cwt in 1918 to an average of 47/- in 1919 to 80/6 in 1920, reaching 123/- at one 
point. The 1919-20 boom was followed by a collapse. The number of European 
exporting firms dropped from 98 in 1918 to 44 in 1922 as a "direct consequence of 
the depressed market" (Gunnarson, 1976,118), In 1929 A. & E. T. C. which controlled 
just over a 25% of the trade merged with the Niger Company, a Lever Brothers 
subsidiary NN,, hich controlled 13% of exports to form the United Africa Company 
(U. A. Q. By 193-2 UAC had taken over a number of other smaller firms such as G. B. 
Ollivant, Busi &- Stephenson. W. Bartholomew & Co and the Swiss African Trading 
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Co. which however retained their legal personalities'. Indigenous exporters were 
worst hit by the restructuring of capital. In 1918 there were no less than 292 African 
firms and individuals engaged in exporting cocoa alongside the foreign firms. By the 
1930s only a handful were engaged in exporting negligible quantities. 
Formal mergers were not the only way in which merchant capital tried to strengthen 
itself vis-a-vis those whose relationship it mediated, i. e cocoa producers and chocolate 
manufacturers. Even in the years of more open competition some of the firms entered 
into buying agreements dividing the market and regulating producer prices. The first 
Agreement was signed in 1901 and renewed annually between 1903 and 1906. Similar 
agreements were in force from 1910 till 1917 (Southall, 1975,32; 
Gunnarson, 1976,119). Even before the merger of A. & E. T. C. and the Niger 
Company the two firms had been linked from 1925 in a buying agreement which 
involved two other firms and renewed in successive years till 1928. The pool 
controlled nearly half of the export trade in the mid 1920s, representing a quarter of 
the world' output at the time. This pooling agreement was the basis of an abortive 
and expensive attempt to manipulate the market in 1927/28. The failure of this 
attempt sent the A. & E. T. C. into a tailspin from which it was rescued only by the 
merger with the Niger Company. The pooling agreement was revoked in August 1928 
(See 22nd Report of the Imperial Economic Committee, 63, Southall, 1975,310). 
' Also of consequence tor the Gold Coast trade was the 1919 merger of the chocolate manufacturers 
Cadbury Brothers and J. S. Fry which together with dominated chocolate manufacturing in Britain for 
which purpose Cadbury's had since 1906 bow-ght cocoa direct from the Gold Coast and in later years 
on behalf of the other tNvo. 
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4.2.2. Merchants and Brokers 
The internal cocoa marketing structure evolved out of the system which linked 
European merchant capital with petty commodity producers on the Gold Coast in the 
pre-cocoa era. This involved merchant firms based on the coast buying and exporting 
agricultural commodities through a network of local middlemen and in turn selling, 
again through middlemen, manufactures imported from the metropolitan countries 
(Kimble, 1963,3 5). Many features which were to have an important role in the cocoa 
industry, such as the system of cash advances from middlemen to farmers, were also 
present during the palm oil and rubber trades (Arhin, 1972,36; Grier, 1981,31). The 
middlemen of brokers and sub-brokers were a crucial element of the cocoa trade, 
connecting the direct producer to the international market through the merchant firms. 
I ii legal terms the producer was linked to the exporter via a chain of agency contracts. 
In 1938 there were an estimated 40,000 brokers and sub-brokers in the cocoa trade 
(Nowell, 1938,29). 
This centrality of middlemen was the result of several factors including: 
1. The generally small size and large number of cocoa holdings as indicated 
above. The 1937/38 crop of 300,000 tons, worked out to an average of about 
or slightly less than 2 tons per farm; 
2. Cocoa harvesting and marketing was concentrated in a relatively short 
period - September/October to January/FebruarN, with a small mid crop coming 
four or fivc months later. It meant demand for bLIVing labour was largely 
seasonaliv and iarge numbers were required xvhen neecled, 
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3. The organisation of purchase from the direct producers using full 
employees would have placed the burden of providing the back up fixed capital 
assets such as storage sheds at the lowest level on the firms; 
4. The poor state of the transportation network. Even as this improved 
throughout the colonial period many farms remained relatively inaccessible 
though the smallest sub-brokers disappeared with the growth of the transport 
network. 
According to the Nowell Report, most cocoa travelled the route, shown in Diagram 
4.1, from the producer to the international market. Outside the 'regular chain' in the 
diagram and discussed below a negligible proportion of the annual crop was handled 
by many independent dealers of varying scales of operation, who operated wholly with 
their own capital and sold directly to the firms and whose only contractual relationship 
with the firms was that of buyer and seller. 
Diagram 4.1. Simplified Marketin, ýz Chain 
Produccr, ý 
Brokers/Factors 
................................................... ................................................... ............................. ..................... ................................................... 
Exporters 
Adapted from Appendix G of Nowell Report, 19'38. 
Sub-brokers 
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The Broker: The broker was the nodal point in the local marketing structure. The 
broker bought and delivered conveniently large quantities of cocoa to the firms, 
maintaining a store for which the firm paid the rental and perhaps also granted 
allowances towards the cost of labour employed at these depots. Although a broker 
could be a relatively small operator, mainly collecting and delivering cocoa from his 
own village to the exporting firm (some firms preferred such a broker perhaps because 
of the greater control it allows over the marketing chain) larger brokers predominated, 
with elaborate establishments. By 1937, a standard form contract, setting out the 
terms of the relationship between broker and exporting firm had evolved'. The broker 
was part employee, part agent, being engaged on a removable basis at the discretion 
of the firm on a commission but also frequently receiving a small salary or retainer. 
The broker operated largely but not solely with money advanced by the firm which 
was to be used exclusively for purchasing cocoa. The advance was usually secured 
on some immovable property, with the firms preferring houses to farms. The broker 
undertook during the continuance of the agreement not to buy cocoa for any other 
firm. Most importantly the broker undertook to buy and deliver cocoa of an agreed 
quality at prices fixed by the firm and to render accounts. The specified quality was 
Iiistorically determined by pressure exerted by the international market. In the pre 
First World War phase, wet unfermented cocoa was largely bought and sold. In 1937 
the requisite quality Nvas broadly defined as cocoa of "commercially dry and of fine 
1'ermented quality". 
2 See model contract in Appendix II of Nowell Report, 1938. 
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The firm supplied "service bags, shipping bags and other usual equipment in quantities 
determined from time to time by the company". These were usually scales and 
tarpaulins. The company retained "the right to terminated this Agreement forthwith 
if the Buyer fails to discharge his duties to the satisfaction of the company and/or 
committed any breach of the Agreement and thereafter no ftirther salary or commission 
shall be payable to the Buyer (broker)"'. Either party could terminate the agreement 
on a month's notice. 
The Factor: This agent for all intents and purposes performed all the function of the 
broker plus the processes entailed in making cocoa ready for shipment such as grading 
and re-bagging which the firms normally undertook after receiving cocoa from the 
broker. They generally were large scale operators engaged by the firm at special rates 
of commission and salary/retainer. 
The Sub-Broker: This was the purchaser at the lowest level of the structure of 
exchange, in direct contact with the producer. He usually handled small quantities of, 
at times, as little as one/two tons per year or in very exceptional cases as much as 300 
tons. He made purchases with money advanced by larger middlemen who engaged 
him. The sub-broker operated in a limited local area and as farms became more 
accessible was rendered superfluous/redundant in some localities. 
Scale-Buyer: These , vere salaried employees of the buying firms , N-ho went out directly 
to buy from farmers. This category of buyers Nvas of limited importance. used mainly 
' Clause 10, Nowell Report. Model Agreement. 
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by Cadbury's who as manufacturers wanted more control over the quality of cocoa 
they bought. 
The practical functioning of the marketing chain showed a recognition that no player 
fully controlled the activities of its immediate agent. The relationship between the 
firms and their brokers sought to relate the operation of the local market to the 
international. The international prices were regularly communicated by the European 
headquarters to the local firm, which fixed price limits for its brokers based on it. The 
brokers in turn do the same for their sub agents, based on the price fixed for them 
(brokers) by the firms; each elongation of the chain implying a reduction of what the 
producer gets. Upon a price change, the broker/sub-broker was asked by his principal 
to declare his stock of purchased cocoa before the new price came into effect. In 
practice the broker/sub- broker was allowed a grace period within which to make his 
stock declaration since there was usually a need to ascertain the total purchases made 
to date by sub-agents/sub -brokers. The system lent itself to speculative manipulation 
, it every level. A broker/sub-broker may under/over declare his stock depending on 
which way prices were moving. Over declaration occurred when the market was 
falling and the converse when prices are rising. The firms/brokers sought to counter 
this witli their own manoeuvres such as the 'false drop': calling forth a declaration 
of stock on a trumped up announcement of a falling price and then immediately 
thereafter announcing a price rise. 
At the start of the buying, season hundreds of thousands of pounds were funnelled 
down from firm to broker to sub-broker to farmer. "The remarkable feature of the 
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system in the Gold Coast is the amount of advances issued by the firms" (Nowell 
Report, 1938,98). How long an advance to a broker remained outstanding varied. 
Usually larger brokers had a longer turn around time. Smaller brokers had a shorter 
time since they usually did not provide adequate security for the money they received. 
The length of time advances remain outstanding was also influenced by the problems 
of getting in cocoa. As the broker/sub broker turns in cocoa he gets a fresh advance. 
A large proportion of advances were not employed in direct purchases. Considerable 
sums were also given out to farmers before the harvesting season (my emphasis) who 
thereby effectively forward sold their crops. The Nowell Commission was told that 
in the Koforidua area (then the heart of the cocoa growing region) as much as 50% 
of the crop might be purchased in advance at fixed prices (Nowell Report, 193 8,3 1). 
The advance was usually half the estimated value of the future cocoa crop with the 
prevailing market price used as a basis (Shepherd, 1936,40). The payment of advances 
was powered by two factors: competition among the buying firms and precarious 
material conditions of the vast majority of cocoa farmers. 
4.2.3. Prices, Peasant Indebtedness and Resistance 
The cash advances from brokers together with other forms of credit helped the farmer 
stirvive from season to season. Howard (1980.73) has argued that 
"without the money lenders many producers couid not have survived from one 
season to the next, given that the price which they were paid for their cocoa 
often did not cover their costs; hence the system of peasant production which 
generated mercantile capitalist profits might have broken down completely 
\\ ithout usurer's capital. 
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Debt relations therefore did not only play a central role in the cocoa marketing system 
but by ensuring reproduction of large sections of the cocoa peasantry constituted a 
crucial mechanism of their subsumption to capital. 
Despite the almost continuous expansion in the volume of output throughout the 
colonial period', the income and material conditions of the mass of cocoa producers 
were very precarious. The basic factor was the manner of division of the cocoa social 
product. Merchants and brokers appropriated a portion of the product in their roles 
in the process of circulation and exchange. Linked to this was the portion lost to 
usurer Is capital which is discussed below. From 1916 the State instituted a contested 
cocoa export duty which very rapidly became the main source of State revenue 
(Kay, 1972,348; Nowell, 1938,37-39). Price fluctuations also exacerbated the situation. 
The price of cocoa frequently changed from season to season and from day to day 
during the season for example 1920 recorded both the highest and lowest prices ever 
on the world market. The 1920 price peak was not matched until 1947 
(Southall, 1978,196). Producer prices on the Gold Coast however fluctuated more 
heavily than the international prices pointing to local influences on the price 
(Gunnarson, 1976,75). The main local factor was manipulation by firms so as to 
secure competitive advantage (Nowell, I 936,105; Gunnarson, 1976,73). 
Gunnarson's statistical analysis (1976,80-91) showed that behind the facade of 
continuous expansion in the period under discussion the cocoa producer for most of 
the period faced deteriorating terms of exchange. He isolated four broad phases in the 
-4 See Table 21b in Kav (1972,336). 
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history of the industry in the colonial period. The first period running from the 
introduction of cocoa as a large scale cash crop around 1890 until the outbreak of the 
First World War was a period of rapid expansion with rising income for the producers. 
The second phase, from 1915 to 1921 was a period of deterioration mainly due to the 
War. The shipping problems it occasioned created local difficulties of a production 
glut and severely depressed prices even as international prices were high. This period 
was the first serious setback for the industry. 
1922 to 1927 was a period of some recovery. Expansion of production was 
accompanied by a general rise in prices and farmers' incomes. The fourth phase 
"from 1928 to 1943. ) with a minor upswing 
in 1933-37, was the period of severe 
decline for the Gold coast cocoa industry" (Gunnarson, 1976,91). A rapid expansion 
of output did not counterbalance the deterioration of prices and incomes fell. In 1927 
an output of 210,000 tons brought in EI 1.73 million in 1935,269,000 tons was worth 
L5.2m. Generally, therefore, it can be said that almost as soon as cocoa production 
established its pre-eminence in the Gold Coast political economy short and long term 
cyclical price instability set in. 
Deteriorating terms of trade and falling incomes face commodity producing peasants 
with three choices: accepting the new levels of real income. raise total marketed output 
by increasing the rate of "self-exploitation" by working longer hours or fall into debt 
(Bernstein, 1979.427). What choices are made depend on a number of objective factors 
including the limits to individual productivity, availability of means of production and 
nature of the crop he produces (Goodman & Redclift, 1981,79). Typically anywa\ 
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those farmers who are the first to face a reproduction squeeze are those who have little 
room for manoeuvre either by way of cuts in living standards or raising output. In the 
case of cocoa the long gestation time of cocoa, a tree normally started bearing five 
years after planting reaching a peak two or three years later, increased output is not 
a short term possibility for a farmer faced with falling income. Usually therefore 
deteriorating terms of trade pushes commodity producing peasants into debt as they 
try to make up shortfalls in their cash needs. 
The mortgaging of the crop to merchant or wealthier peasants is a typical response to 
this crisis and a route to peasant indebtedness. Such a response imposes the obligation 
to produce and deliver the mortgaged crop. Thus the "objective effect of the simple 
reproduction squeeze then is to act as one of the mechanisms of intensifying the labour 
of the peasant household to maintain or increase the supply of commodities without 
capital incurring any costs of management or supervision of the production process" 
(Bernstein, 1979,429). This was the case in the cocoa industry and the increasing 
subsumption of the peasantry to capital as a result of the reproduction squeeze was 
through the agency of the two antediluvian forms of circulation capital: merchant and 
usurer's capital (Kay, 1975, chapter 5; Bernstein, 1976; Marx, 1981,728; Goodman and 
Redclift, 1981,82). 
I iidebtedness amono the cocoa peasantry took two main forms: forward selling of the 
crop in exchange for brokers' adv, -mces and the mortgaging of farms or "pledging" in 
ciistoniary law usually for larger sums of moncy than given as advances by brokers. 
Cocoa brokers' advances "enabled buyers and sub-buyers to obtain a strong hold over 
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producers" (Nowell, 1938,109). Most of the advances from brokers went to small 
farmers to finance consumption and farm maintenance during off-harvest season. It 
is arguable that the terms of brokers' advances, indicated above, to farmers made these 
transactions indistinguishable from the operation of usurer's capital. This speculative 
arrangement usually resulted in a profit for the broker though losses were suffered 
occasionally. 
A customary law pledge of a farm involves the delivery of possession and custody of 
a farm by a person to a creditor to hold and use until the debt due is paid. Most 
creditors were not "professional" money lenders being usually either brokers or 
wealthy farmers (Shephard, 1936,40-41). There are two categories of pledges, each 
with variants. Under automatic redemption pledges all or part of the produce from the 
pledged farm goes towards the liquidation of the debt. Under the second, less 
common and more exploitative type of pledging the crop simply goes towards the 
interest on the loan. Unlike a common law mortgage a pledge cannot be foreclosed 
and the pledgor has a perpetual right of redemption. Under all the forms of pledging 
described the debtor may work on the pledged farm as a labourer'. In 1935 at least 
30% of farmers were estimated to have pledged one or more of their farms. 
The various types of usurer's capital, i. e advances and more regular money lending 
were present in the cocoa industry from the earliest years. The scale of the problem 
was indicated in the evidence of W. F. Grey, the Gold Coast representative of the 
5 On the legal incidents ot'pled, -, es see 
Kludze (1988,449-475) and for pledging in the cocoa industrý- 
see Hill (1956,48-84) and Shephard (1936,38-44). 
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merchant firm Swanzy's and Millers, to the West African Lands Committee (NNALC) 
in 1912: 
WALC: And as to the practice of mortgaging is that common? 
Grey: That is very common indeed, especially now owing to the system of 
purchasing cocoa. The system of purchasing cocoa is by advances being 
given to a very large number of small natives (I do not mean physically 
small, but men with little capital) and they give us security usually a inortGage 
on cocoa land - upon farms. 
WALC: Not simply on the produce, but on the land itself? 
Grey: No, on the land itself. There must be thousands and thousands of these 
mortgages spread over the cocoa district at the present moment6. 
Grey was well placed to know; in 1912 Swanzy's and Millers were two of the four 
top cocoa exporting merchants firms on the Gold Coast. 
The indebtedness among the cocoa peasantry increased and the terms of credit got 
more oppressive during periods of severe deterioration in the producer' terms of 
exchange (Gunnarson, 1978,113). During the local cocoa crisis of the First World 
War years, Tudhope (1918) reported that the practice of pledging had extended 
enormously in the Gold Coast but remarked the relatively low level of indebtedness 
in Ashanti. At this time cocoa production although expanding in the Province was of 
secondary importance. By the end of the 1920s cocoa production had increased 
phenomenally in Ashanti, from 4,170 tons in 1912 to 70,000 tons in 1926. The spread 
of cocoa cultivation was accompanied by increasing indebtedness. In his 1928/29 
Annual Report, the Chief Commissioner for Ashanti noted that most of the civil cases 
before the courts were 'principally due to actions for the recovery of debt contracted 
in connection Nvith cocoa transactions'. The remark is repeated in the 19-30. '_3 I Report. 3" 
'Minutes of Evidence, WestAftica Lands Committee(] 916) paragraphs 5415-5416. 
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Throughout the Gold Coast indebtedness among cocoa producers reached new depths 
during the Depression of the 1930s (Shephard, 1936,41-42)'. 
The incident of brokers' advances to farmers also increased during the Depression. 
The fall in cocoa prices which heightened farmers demand for credit also produced a 
complementary competition among the merchant firms to increase their individual 
share of exports so as to combat the reduction in profitability. Thus the farmers' need 
for credit found mutual reinforcement in the firms' increasing use of advances as part 
of the drive to buy more cocoa. According to the Nowell Commission (193 8,109) 
both the amount of advances made by firms and the length of the period over 
which they were permitted to remain outstanding had increased in recent 
years. the representative of one firm of medium size stated that until about 
four years ago their advances had been small, but that in 1936-37 they had 
lost E20,000 on thern. 
Enquiries made throughout the cocoa belt in 1933-34 by agricultural officers revealed 
that an estimated 75% of cocoa farmers pledged at least a portion of their crop 
(Shephard, 1936,41). 
Cocoa producers responded to the linked burden of price instability, domination by 
oligopolistic capital and indebted in a variety of ways. These included reduced 
expenditure of labour on ensuring cocoa for which advances have been received are 
of hi(. lh quality, persistent attempts by rich farmers and middlemen to engage in direct 
exports of cocoa and periodic hold ups of cocoa when prices were low. The most 
pervasive impact of indebtedness Nvas on the quality of cocoa. The farmer had no 
incentive to carry out any but the minimum preparation of cocoa which had been 
' See Correspondence in GNA ADM 81'2/460,333. Cacao Crops - Sale or Mortgaging while on the Trees 
ýmd aiso 1933,34 Report of' Department of Agriculture. 
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mortgaged. Unlike the merchant buyers industrial buyers such as Cadbury were as 
interested in the quality as in the quantity of cocoa that they bought and from its first 
days in the Colony Cadbury's lamented the pernicious effect of indebtedness on cocoa 
quality. The manufacturers' drive for quality improvements in the industry was 
supported by the state. Though not the only factor that affected the quality of cocoa 
indebtedness among cocoa farmers contributed to the frustration of attempts by the 
State and industrial capital to raise quality'. The inverse relationship between the 
indebtedness of farmers and the quality of cocoa was starkly apparent during the 
Depression of the 1930s. Official reports of the period blamed indebtedness for poor 
quality of cocoa and also reduced standards of cultivation'. Shephard (1936,41) 
suggested that "an improved system of finance would remove one of the most 
obstacles in preparing good quality cocoa". 
The most militant and organised form of farmers' resistance to the market sharing and 
price control agreements among the export firms and low prices was recurrent 
hicidents of farmers holding up and refusing to sell their cocoa. Occasions of hold 
ups were also the moments when the issue of direct exports bypassing the merchant 
firms came most strongly to the fore. The 1903 pooling agreement among the main 
merchant firms provoked a brief hold-up. The following year a drop in prices led to 
11 a temporary but complete embargo" on sales (Southall, 1975,38) and again in 1908 
xviien prices dropped after two years of relatively good prices a hold up was attempted. 
' The attempts to improve the quality of cocoa are discussed more fully in the next Chapter. 
"I () ' See for example 1 10 Annual Report for Ashanti and Report of the Department of 
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The inter-War period was punctuated by hold-ups of increasing depth of organisation. 
breadth of participation and length of duration. Throughout the 1920s there were 
indications of sporadic attempts at hold ups to push up cocoa prices and generally in 
protest against merchant firms". The most significant of these occurred in 1921-22 
and 1922-23 seasons and were centred in the pioneer cocoa growing area of Akuapiin. 
The price collapse in 1921-22, following the 1920-21 price boom precipitated a hold- 
up. The event marked the emergence of a national farmers organisation, the Gold 
Coast Farmers Association (G. C. F. A), later the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa 
Federation (G. C & A. C. F), formed in December 1921 under the leadership of farmer- 
traders. The G. C & A. C. F was to play a central role in future hold ups and 
confrontations between farmers and merchants (Southall, 1978,203). Both the 1921-22 
hold-up and one the following season which lasted for two months, failed to achieve 
their main objective of a better price. 
The hostility of the central government to the hold ups was an important reason for 
the collapse of the hold ups of the 1920s. This hostility was dressed up as a concern 
for free trade and the liberty of the citizen. The claim that hold-ups were in restraint 
of trade, first deployed against the attempted hold up of 1908, was a central pillar of 
the government's defence of the interests of the buying firms in not only the 1920s 
hold-ups but the more significant ones of the 1930s. A G. C. F. A. delegation xvhich 
iiiet the Governor, Sir Gordon Guggisberg. in the midst of the 1921-22 hold-up was 
told that the administration would not tolerate the use of force to maintain the protest 
and that 
" See Department of Agriculture Reports. 192 1- 1929. 
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if a fanner wanted to join the Association and refuse to sell cocoa there is no 
law against them, but there is a very serious law against anyone stopping any 
other man who wishes to sell his cocoa". 
At the local level district Commissioners dealt summarily with those identified as 
leaders of the protests". The Director of Agriculture however thought the hold-ups 
had positive aspects. He thought "the attempted combination of farmers is a sign of 
an awareness that may have possibilities in other directions and it will be the aim of 
the Department [of Agriculture] to guide them into proper channels"". 
The goverment was however considerably exercised by the effects of indebtedness 
on cocoa cultivation and crop quality. As is shown in the next chapter the state 
devoted considerable effort to improving cultivation and quality standards. In 
comparison the underlying problem of debt never received serious attention, the 
recurrent official expressions of concern about it notwithstanding. Throughout the 
colonial period, despite numerous committees appointed to investigate the problem of 
indebtedness, the State fostered co-operative movement was seen as the vehicle for 
dealing with the debt problem. The co-operatives are discussed in the next chapter but 
suffice here to say that they did not make an impression on indebtedness. The 1918 
cocoa export and price slump crisis and the great increase in indebtedness provided 
the first occasion for a statement of the colonial government's policy. A petition from 
" GNA/ACC 2601/58. 
12 1921 Annual Reports of the Eastern Province and of the Department of Agriculture. The active 
intervention of the state on the side of the firms through the criminal prosecution of organisers of the 
protest, supposedly in defence of the freedom of contract and during later hold-ups charges of assault 
to prevent sales and through pressure on chiefs cali into question Seidman's thesis (1973-568) about the 
rule of the free market and absence of state intervention in the conflicts between merchants and fan-ners 
in the Gold Coast. 
,3 Annual Report ofthe Department of Agriculture. 192 1. 
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Eastern Region Chiefs called for the setting up of an agricultural bank capitalised by 
the State. This proposal was rejected. The Government expressed the view that no 
credit scheme could be institutional i sed before a co-operative movement had developed 
Hill. 1956,61; Quaidoo, 1957,4). 
No serious effort was ever made at the legal regulation of usurer's capital; where laws 
were passed they either were impossible to enforce or were fatally defective in their 
provisions not being tailored for the debt relationships in the cocoa industry. Take the 
Recovery of Loans Ordinance, 1918. Under Section 3(l) of the Ordinance: 
Where proceedings are taken in court for the recovery of money lent, 
enforcement of any agreement or security... and there is evidence which 
satisfies the court that the interest charged is excessive... and that transaction 
is harsh and unconscionable, or such as will get equitable relief, it may reopen 
the transaction irrespective of agreement between the parties and relieve the 
person sued from payment of the excess of a sum adjudged fair by the court 
in respect of principal, interest and charges; where the excess has been paid 
order repayment, or indemnity by the lender in respect of any security given. 
Fhe legislation is based on the types of petty loan transactions known to English law 
at the time; these did not involve the lender taking possession and enjoyment of the 
borrower's means of production as was the case in the vast majority of cocoa credit 
transactions. The only category of credit transaction in the cocoa industry it could 
apply to was the broker's advance. However since payment normally took the form 
of the farmer/debtor delivering his crop the law was of little practical relevance to this 
most important debt relationship. In a vast majority of cases brokers did not have to 
resort to court proceedings - most farmers fulfilled their obligations. 
Fhe definition of 'money lender' tinder the Moneylenders Ordinance, 1940 which 
sotiodit, anioni, other things. to regulate the rate of interest charged by moneylenders 
106 
deliberately excluded the broker in his capacity as creditor when giving advances. 
'Moneylenders' as defined by section 2 of the Ordinance did not include: a) Co- 
operative Societies; b) any body corporate, incorporated by Special Ordinance; c) anY 
person bona fide carrying on any business, not having as its primary object the 
lending of money, in the course of which he lends money (my emphasis). In the 
internal debates that preceded the passage of the Moneylenders Ordinance, 1940. the 
dominant viewpoint was for the exclusion of brokers' advances from the purview of 
the law. The Attorney General was of the view that since the re-payment of advances 
was in kind legally speaking it was not a credit transaction. The Chief Commissioner 
for Ashanti appealed to "freedom of contract" to reach a similar conclusion. He 
contended that 
with regard to loans to farmers on the security of their cocoa crop, it might 
be argued that such transactions merely amount to forward sales and I do not 
know how farmers can be prevented from selling their crops at low prices. 
The solution lies in the provision of better facilities for farmers to obtain 
advances between seasons". 
The Chief Commissioner's argument reflected one of the three strands in the official 
understanding of the roots of peasant indebtedness: that which recognised that the 
problem flowed from shortfalls in farmers' incomes which ultimately was blameable 
on the price of cocoa. Most proponents of this position however saw the solution to 
indebtedness lying in the farmer accepting a lower standard of li'ving Z, 
(S hephard, 19 
-3 ) 
6,4 
_3 
). A second official perspective confiised debt contracted for 
productive purposes i. e. agricultural credit and non-productive personal debt due to 
shortfalls in income. The solution to the problem vvas therefore the provisloii of 
GNA SNA 25613321. Su, -,, -, ested Licensing of Moneylenders. 
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agricultural credit. This was never a strong current. The dominant explanation. whicli 
is deeply influenced by racist imperial notions of the colonised as economically 
irrational creatures, saw debt as a result of the 'native's lack of thrift' 
(Auchinleck, 1934; Nowell, 1938,23)- If the acquisition of thriftiness was the issue then 
government need not do more than create the conditions for inculcating industry and 
thrift. The government created cooperatives were among other things expected to 
serve as schools for this purpose. As is shown in the next chapter since the diagnosis 
was wrong the cooperatives' remedy did not work. 
4.3. The Great Depression and the Showdown 
From the preceding sections it is possible to identify several layers of contradiction 
in the domestic cocoa marketing system. The basic conflict was between the 
producers and the buying firms". Though not wholly responsible for the level of 
producer prices the firms mediated the farmers link with the world market and the 
tarmers' knowledge of the buying agreements amongst the firms meant they were 
blamed for price fluctuations. Within this basic divide between farmer and firm we 
can isolate relations between firms and brokers, farmers and brokers and merchant and 
industrial buyinp firms as subsidiary layers of conflict. The foregoing analysis does 
not only indicate that under conditions of average profitability these contradictions did 
not threaten the stability and reproduction of the totality of these relations but also hint 
" The simple division between farmers and buying firms is not to deny differentiation and antagonistic 
production relations within the sphere of production. Some aspects of this were dealt with in Chapter 
2 and in the discussion in the present chapter about the role of farmer-tracier-money lender "an ail-round 
agentof the extension of commodity relations" (Bernstein, 1979.43 1). Therelations among those engaged 
in direct production are not a primary issue in the present discussion. 
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at the potential lines of fissure in abnormal conditions. The fall of cocoa prices to an 
all time long term low during the Depression of the 1930s, resulting in a crisis of 
profitability for the exporting firms and dramatic drop in the income of the cocoa 
farming community, provided the abnormal conditions whicli brought the 
contradictions to a head. 
4.3.1. The Merchant's Response 
With the onset of the Depression a wild competitive scramble broke out among the 
merchant firms as each sought to secure its own conditions and maintain Its level of 
profits. UAC was pivotal to both the competition and efforts at cooling it. Soon after 
its creation the UAC put forward a collective buying scheme, to run for ten years, 
which would involve manufacturers who utilised West African cocoa and the merchant 
firms who controlled the local market. The scheme was to cover 65% of the Gold 
Coast and the Nigeria crop (about 35% of the world's output) for 1929. The scheme, 
among other things, was to be controlled by a board constituted of an equal number 
of representatives from the industrial and mercantile firms, with a UAC chairman 
cxci-cising a casting vote. There was to be no parallel purchasing outside this 
framework. The proposal received a rather tepid response and failed to take off as 
most potential participants felt it concentrated too much power in the liaiids of the 
t JAC. 
The merchant firms alone coinpleted a buying agreement in June 1930. Thcv agreed 
to regulate: n) the cxtent of advances- b) buying prices. and c) the commissions paid I- I- clý 
to brokers. This attempt failed after only a year, ý' substantial pcrcentage of cocoa NNas 
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bought and sold outside the agreement since some of the more imPortant firms did not 
participate. Between 1933 and 1937 the buying firms competed aggressi-vely. In the 
1931-32 season, UAC initiated a price war by buying cocoa at I/- per cwt. above the 
ruling Liverpool price. Other firms were driven to follow but the smaller ones Nvere 
severely crippled by the contest. The situation drove Cadbury's who had hitherto 
refused to be part of any Buying Agreement to agree to discuss prices throughout the 
1933-34 season and the rate of commission paid to brokers with UAC. 
As the firms tried to undercut each other their reliance on the brokers correspondingly 
increased. Commissions to brokers shot up and even Cadbury's who generally 
regarded the employment of brokers with a jaundiced eye capitulated and forked out 
higher commissions under threat of losing their own brokers to other firms 
(Southall, 1978,207). This competition among the firms strengthened the relative 
position of the brokers. A similar process went on between broker and sub broker. 
The manipulation of stock declarations by brokers increased; the brokers exploited the 
competition among the firms, on occasion breaching their contractual obligations and 
selling cocoa to the highest bidder, notwithstanding the fact that another firm may 
have advanced money for the purchase (Nowell, 193 8,103 -110). There was nothing 
new in the practice of manipulating stock declarations but in the crisis conditions of 
the 1930s it cut deep into the profits of the firms. This placed them in the 
paradoxical situation. of trying to protect their profits by more tightly controlling the 
iiiiddlemen they ,, vere increasingly reliant on". A desire to assume oreater control, 
" For detailed discussion of the relations between brokers and firms dUring the Depression see Nowell 
(19'18,104-110) and Southall (1978). 
110 
or more correctly radically change the traditional relations between firms and brokers 
and reduce the share of the trading profit taken by the middlemen lay at the heart of 
the 1937 Buying Agreement that precipitated the monumental cocoa hold-up of 193 3 7- 
38. 
4.3.1.1. The 1937 Cocoa Buying Agreement 
The 1937 Buying Agreement 17 was signed by thirteen firms, which together 
purchased 98% of the Ghana crop. In the 1936-37 season there had been heightened 
competition among the buying firms in response to speculation on the American 
market which had driven prices up towards the middle of that season. The fears of 
a short fall in world output which had fuelled the speculation and price rise turned out 
to be false with a resultant fall in prices towards the end of the season which led to 
the exporters making losses. This predisposed them to UAC's proposals for a Buying 
Agreement (Southall, 1978,209). The agreement was to run for four years from 
October 1,1937. It represented the most complete contractual collusion to date by the 
buyiiig firm considering that the previous agreements had not covered more than half 
of exports. It had an additional historic significance: it involved the buying agency 
of the largest British cocoa and chocolate manufacturers, Cadbury Brothers and J. S. 
Fry & Sons. The virulence of competition throughout the 1930s had seen the collapse 
ot'smaller firms and strengthened the position of the UAC ývhich with its associated 
firms had bought more than 55% of the 1936-317 crop. Any firm that did not 
The 19-37 Cocoa Buyin- Agreement, the hold up and goods boycott of 1937-38 that i t, - -I- it provoked are 
extensively discussed liv, among others, Nowell (1938), Milburn (1970), Gunnarson (1976,125-160), 
Howard (1976,1978,207-219), Miles (1977). Southall (1975, chapter 121978). The works also examine 
the outcome of the Nowell Commission and the reform of cocoa marketing from the beginning of the 
Second World War, The following discussion of the Agreement, the hold-up, the No%N ell Commission 
and cocoa marketing reform, which draws on these sources, is essentially schematic. 
participate in a new UAC sponsored agreement therefore ran a real danger of being 
squeezed out. The capitulation of the manufacturers was a statement of both the crisis 
of profitability in the export trade and UAC's domination. 
The Agreement sought to guarantee each participant a proportion of the total crop, 
based on past performance. The firms were to purchase cocoa at a uniform price 
based on ruling international prices. Penalty and handover clauses were inserted to 
discourage any attempt by any firm to exceed its quota or breach any of the other 
terms of the Agreement. The Agreement was explicit about the aim of controlling 
brokers and thereby prices. "The Letter of Instructions" to Gold Coast agents of the 
firms which signed the Agreement (Agreement firms) listed fifteen practices and types 
of payment to brokers "under which [brokers'] abuses can be present". Especially 
singled out were: " I) The over payment of the price justified by the home market 
and the acceptance of (brokers') false declarations 2) The other of ever increasing 
inducements to middlemen and 3) the granting of excessive cash advances". The 
"Letter of Instructions" declared: 
Generally speaking, it can be said that every act which will permit 
brokers, buyers or clerks to exceed the agreed marked scale price for 
the time being in force, is an abuse, and steps should be taken to 
minimise and ultimately stamp out abuses in all forms. It is however, 
imperative to bring them under effective control (Nowell, 1938,215). 
The Agreement contained specific provisions against these "abuses". The declaration 
ot' stocks has been shown to be a crucial element of broker/firm relations. A time 
limit of 48 hours was fixed for declarations by brokers. The Agreement declared that tý 
its loni, term intention was to seek almost immediate declaration by brokers. It sought 
1121 
to render possible manipulations of declarations almost always unprofitable to the 
broker. The time allowed for declarations was very short considering the broker's 
mode of operation with sub buyers/agents some of whom may up to anything up to 
50 miles away out of reach of telephone or telegraph. When this is coupled with the 
restrictions on advances, the brokers' independent operation was rendered vcrv 
difficult. The Agreement provided that as far as possible advances were to be given 
on a day to day basis. However, at the slowest, cash advances should be turned over 
at least once a week, and every four days at the height of the season. The practice of 
overlapping advances - more being given out before a prior advance had been 
adequately accounted for by a broker was to cease. 
An important aspect of the broker's semi autonomy has been his ability to work for 
the highest bidder. No more. Rates of remuneration were to be standardised. Also 
dismissal by one firm blighted a buyer's opportunities. The firms undertook not to 
employ a broker dismissed by another Agreement firm. Though overall the 
Agreement did not remove all the broker's independence it sought to tightly hem his 
operations round with safeguards in favour of the merchant firms. In a sense it sought 
to convert the semi autonomous broker to a status approximating that of a wage 
labourer without the advantages of that status: he was to continue bearing many of the 
risks connected with buying cocoa". 
4.3-2. Farmers' Response 
"Q1-, 8). Sce text of Agreement in Appendix J of 
Nowell Commission Report (19' 
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The 1930-31 cocoa buying season opened with a price drop, 10/- a load in September 
1930 compared with 17/9 the previous September. This was mainly due to a 25% 
drop in American imports in 1930 (Southall, 1975,340). In the Gold Coast the 
international development coincided with news of the UAC initiated buying pool. 
Blaming the price drop on the Agreement farmers responded with the most 
comprehensive hold-up to date. Support for the hold-up was near total in the pioneer 
cocoa heartland of the Eastern Province and was also very strong in the Central and 
Western Provinces. In the three months October through December very little cocoa 
was sold, by the middle of November only 13,000 tons of cocoa had been bought by 
the firms compared with 43,000 tons at the same time the previous year. 
The 1930/31 hold up had important characteristics not present in earlier attempts at 
resistance. These included a) the support of chiefs, including notables such as Nana 
Sir Ofori Atta for the hold up movement and the co-optation and utilisation of some 
of the institutions of indirect rule such as native tribunals, state and provincial councils 
- for a mobilisation of support for and enforcement of the hold up, b) the highlighting 
of the conflict of interests within the anti-merchant movement, particularly between 
brokers and farmers, c) the combination of cocoa hold up with a boycott of imported 
goods, and d) the consolidation of a truly cocoa belt-wide farmers organisation in the 
form of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation (G. C. & A. C. F) in September 
1930. 
Chiefly support made it possible for the protests to be strengthened bý, devices such 
as the suspension of actions for debt against farmers before the 11-"ti"'e tribunals and 
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restraint of potential defectors using physical and ideological instruments of chiefl-,. - 
coercion such as the swearing of oaths and the beating of the chief's gong gong 
announcing the prohibition of cocoa sales. Throughout the cocoa belt chiefs' oaths 
and native tribunal were used to enforce the hold-up. Extracts from district reports 
for the last quarter of 1930 indicated that people were fined before native tribunals for 
attempting to break the hold-up or boycott of imported good". The defection of the 
chiefs, under the pressure from the central government, was one of the factors that 
unravelled the protests. Another factor that undermined the protests was the hostility 
of those brokers whose interests were threatened at three levels. a) it interfered with 
their means of livelihood, b) they had advances out with farmers and stood to lose 
from a price rise, and c) in the long term the drive for direct exports would put them 
out of business altogether. Within the communities the brokers put pressure on small 
farmers who were indebted to them to sell and also confronted the farmer-traders who 
led the movement (Rhodie, 1968; Southall, 1975,340; 1978; Miles, 1977). Thus the hold- 
up failed to achieve its aim of forcing a rise in the price. 
I'lie disclosure of the 1937 Buying Agreement also coincided with a fall in the price 
of cocoa. When news of the Agreement reached the Gold Coast in October 1937, the 
reaction of the peasantry and the cocoa petty bourgeoisie was swift and complete. An 
unprecedented hold up of cocoa and boycott of non-essential imported consumption 
commodities unprecedented in its length, breadth and depth was organised. It lasted 
from October 1937 till April 1938 when the government- appo i nted Nowell 
Commission negotiated a truce. They Nvere sympathy strikes and protests by market 
"'See GNA SNA 1230 3 1: "Abuse of Oath System by Native Rulers". 
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traders, surf-boat workers and lorry drivers. Again the chiefs and their institutions lent 
their support, this time with more determination and for the duration of the protest 
(Miles, 1977,297). More significantly brokers strongly targeted by the Agreement lined 
up alongside the farmers (Howard, 1976; Southall, 1978). The G. C. & A. C. F. played 
an important role in the mobilisation. Initially the call was for a rescission of the 
Agreement and an increase in cocoa prices. Increasingly the movement took on the 
colour of a national movement against foreign domination - the issue of prices 
increasingly became relatively less important than a more fundamental hostility to the 
merchant firms. The ending of the hold up was economically disastrous for most 
farmers as cocoa flooded the market. From 10/- a load in March the cocoa price fell 
to 5/- in June and 3/- in August which meant that after transportation and other costs 
are deducted farmers in remote villages got I shilling per load! (Southall, 1975,453). 
4.3.3. State, Law and the Crises 
In the Gold Coast the central government opposed the 1930 hold up with a 
combination of legal and political instruments which were held together by a 
proclaimed concern with "law and order". The formal position was that the 
Government could not take part in a controversy over what was a "fair price" and its 
main function was to see to it that "law and order" were maintained and liberty of the 
citizen is not interfered with"'. This concern with "law and order" was expressed in 
the form of threatening chiefs who used their institutions to enforce the protest and 
prosecuting those %vho tried to stop sales of cocoa on charges of assault or restraint of 
" 'See speech by Governor Slater to Legislative Council on 4 December 1930, quoted in Seidman 
(I 9731,568)ý 
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trade and offering police protection to brokers vvho sought to defy chiefs' oaths against 
sales. 
The political pressure on chiefs which led to their withdrawing support of the hold up 
was cast in legal terms. In his already mentioned speech to the Legislative Council 
the Governor argued that the native tribunals had no jurisdiction under the Native 
Administrative Ordinance to enforce the protest with fines. The abuse of jurisdiction 
was also "an interference with legitimate trade which no Government in a British 
colony can tolerate". He then warned that 
if despite this remonstrance this interference with the liberty of the subject 
continues, the Government... will feel obliged and will not hesitate to assert 
its supreme authority and legislate so as to make it a punishable offence for 
any chief, whether by way of a claim to make an order under the Native 
Administration Ordinance or in fulfilment of a stool oath or any other ground 
whatsoever, to prohibit any person from buying or selling any article from or 
to any other person on any terms upon which the parties agree. 
Although no change was made in the Native Administrative Ordinance the crimMal 
law was used against smaller chiefs. In February 1931 the Supreme Court, presided 
over by Chief Justice Deane upheld the conviction, by a District Commissioner Court, 
of a village chief Asare Panyin, on a charge of assaulting some cocoa carriers against 
whom he tried to enforce an Omanhene's (head chief) prohibition of cocoa sales. The 
decision was important on a number of grounds, including constitutional ones. Asare 
Panyin's claim that a) all in the community were bound by the chiefs oath not to sell 
and that b) he acted on the superior orders was rejected and the case , vas dealt with 
wholly under the Criminal Code. Applying the reptignancy clause of the Supreme 
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Court Ordinance the Court held that the swearing of a chief s oath was not a lawful 
way of legislating. It also refused to recognise the defence of superior orders" 
The conviction of Asare Panyin was the judicial component of the central 
government's response to the threat chiefly support for the protests posed to the 
coherence of the colonial state. The hold-ups tugged at the tension between the chiefs' 
legitimacy, rooted among protesters, and their political subordination to the colonial 
power. The lamentations of the Birim district commissioner about the failure of 
persons, tried by native courts for breaking the boycott, to appeal against their 
sentences unintentionally underlined the importance of indirect rule as a base of the 
colonial state. He reported that 
fines had been inflicted on some buyers but it has been impossible to take 
action as the complainants have neglected the only form of remedy open to 
them and refused to appeal against the judgement. Fining for both offences 
[selling cocoa or buying imported goods] has now ceased butthepowerof the 
Oath is sufficient to restrain farmersftom bringing in their cocoa (emphasis 
added)". 
In the eyes of the majority of rural people chiefs still retained the full complement of 
state power. The protest therefore did not simply test the legitimacy of chiefs but 
through that the very legitimacy of the colonial state with its precarious base in 
ii1direct rule. This point was starkly underlined by the momentous 1937-39 cocoa hold 
up and goods boycott. 
2' GNA SNA 1230"i 1: Abuse of Oath System by Native Rulers. 
2-' Birim District Quarterly Report. December 1930, in GNA SNA 12'10 ') 1: "Abuse 
ol'Oath System by Native Rulers. 
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The 1937-38 hold-up was marked by differences between the Gold Coast 
administration and the Colonial Office in London about the handling of the crisis. 
The Colonial Office, which had approved the Agreement without seeing it, took an 
obviously pro-Agreement line while the government with a greater sense of the 
unprecedented crisis on its hand was concerned to maintain an appearance of being 
even handed. Early in the protest the Secretary of State for the Colonies instructed 
the Governor to advise the farmers to sell. While appreciating the difficulty of the 
Governor's task he could see no alternative since the buying companies could not "be 
expected to make concessions which would involve them in substantial losses". 
Government sponsored meetings for representatives of the firms to explain the 
Agreement to chiefs and farmers representatives were counter-productive. 
As the crisis deepened the Colonial Office began to talk of "communist agitators" 
being involved. The attitude of the political officers in the colony was surnmarised 
in a memo addressed to the Governor by the Chief Commissioner for Ashanti: 
The theory of our West African Administration is that we are trustees for the 
people; surely we cannot remain passive in a matter which so closely affects 
the welfare of the people... our repeated cry to the Secretary of State should 
be 'The Agreement must go'... if the farmers are defeated by economic 
pressure and the Government remains inactive the results will be far reaching 
and disastrous (quoted in Miles, 1977,279). 
The Nowell Commission, the appointment of which broke the deadlock in the dispute 
also recognised that the conflict went beyond private legal rights of buyers and sellers: 
The firms Nvere acting mthin their legal rights in making the Agreements. 
Fqtiallv the producers were acting within their rights in refusing to sell on tile 
terms laid down and in combining to give effect to their policy. -File clash 
of these incompatible views brought the trade of the Gold Coast almost to a 
standstill, and cut off the main sources of Government re\cnue. 
The question 
then bcc(nne one Qf pubih, policy (emphasis added) (Nowell, 193 8,15 1) 
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The Nowell Commission was set up in February 1938 "in the hope that the producers 
may thereby be induced to resume the marketing of their crop". By April it had 
negotiated a truce based on: a) Suspension of the Agreement till the start of the next 
season, i. e. October 1938; b) Suspension of the boycott and hold up till the same 
date; c) Official regulation of cocoa exports in the truce period, monthly exports being 
limited to 60,000 tons per month, and d) Allocation of buying and export quotas to 
firms based on past performance. The truce became effective on 28th April 1938 with 
the passage of the Cocoa (Control of Exportation) Ordinance (No. 21 1938) which 
created the legal framework for the implementation of the terms of the truce. The 
Export Regulations (Order No. 58,1938) was effectively an implementation by 
legislation of the 1937 Buying Agreement. The firms effectively dictated its contents 
under threat of rejecting the truce proposals; the attempts of Governor Hodson to resist 
some of the more outrageous demands of the firms were sharply rebuked by the 
Colonial Secretary. He felt it would be unwise to resist the companies' wishes, such 
resistance would be prejudicial to their acceptance of the truce. 
4.4. Towards the Cocoa Marketing Board 
Despite the fundamental conflict betvveen farmers and merchants which underlaid the 
1937 hold-tip, both the Agreement and hold-up Nvere rooted in a shared vie'wpoint of 
farmers and buying firms, albeit N--, 'ith differing foundations and objectives, that the 
existing relations of exchange had to be radically transformed. The core of the Nowell 
Commission recommendations was for the establishment of an association of producers 
for the "collective marketing of their produce and for the rept-csentative of their joint 
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interest". All cocoa farmers were to be constituted members of a 'Cocoa Farmers 
Association' under an Ordinance implementing the proposals. "The main functions 
of the Association would be to represent the interests of producers and to assemble and 
sell on their behalf the entire cocoa crop of the Gold Coast". The operation of the 
proposed scheme was to be governed by a Board "Including African representatives, 
officials representatives (one of whom would act as chairman) and possibly one or two 
independent co-opted members" (Nowell, 1938,159-168). The scheme as the 
Commission noted was based on the most advanced form of organisation of capitalist 
farmers in Britain and the Dominions (Nowell, 1938,158). Based on the Report 
committees were set up to put forward proposals for implementing the 
recommendations. These were dominated by merchants and Government officials - 
the Ashanti Committee included the local manager of the UAC. The Gold Coast 
Committee in which the Director of Agriculture was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Nowell recommendations drafted a well argued, detailed scheme. 
The Nowell Commission's recommendations favoured the interests of the cocoa 
Carmers. They met with the disapproval of the merchant firms who considered the 
scheme as intended to create a farmers/sellers' monopoly. The colonial state also 
opposed it, fcarim., that the power to exert speculative pressure on the international 
market would be placed in the hands of organised African farmers. The proposals met 
a mixed response from the social groups who had becri Hivolved in the hold up. The 
buy peasantry were enthusiastic about the recornmendations - it created possibilities for 
their dcvelopmcnt and transformation. The brokcrs felt threatened. The small 
peasantry, dependent on brokers advances, feared the implications of tlicir elimmation 
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and furthermore feared domination by the big peasantry. Some of the farmers saw the 
proposed scheme as a larger version of the disliked co-operatives. 
These contradictory reactions gave the State the chance to drive its own wedge in. 
The Governor made the basic objection of the State clear in a minute on the Report 
of the Gold Coast Committee on the Nowell Report: 
The merchant firms had played an important role in the development 
of the country and I should hesitate take any steps which might result 
in their interests being adversely affected (quoted in Miles, 1977358). 
Hodson suggested as an alternative that things carry on as before and the slo-,,, ý- 
voluntary development of co-operatives being encouraged meanwhile. The outbreak 
of war rendered any involved subterfuge unnecessary. With the war the State evoked 
its emergency powers and continued the system established under the Cocoa (Control 
of Exportation) Ordinance with minor changes. These were the introduction of a very 
low minimum price for the producers and the State guaranteeing firms involved in 
buying cocoa a profit by undertaking to buy all cocoa off their hands and paying them 
a 'commissionl. In defence of the continuation of the quota system it was 
tinconvincingly argued that: 
the (Control) Board has been obliged to set its face against completely new 
entrants into the trade, since once an exception is made it would have been 
virtually impossible to discriminate between the very numerous actual and 
potential claimants. Trade conditions under control are moreover, so radically 
djA'ci-cnt from those of normal times that tile ability to handle a quota under 
control would be no guide to the ability to survive III coillpetitive coilditions 
(Report oil Cocoa Control, para. 24). 
The Control Scheme was transformed into the Cocoa Marketing Board aftcr the War. 
I-Ile SNstcm of minimum prices stabilised the conditions of the producers at a very tow 
level, the Control Board made a profit of ovcr 03 million. It ushcred in the role of 
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the marketing board as a mechanism for the State's appropriation of a large slice of 
A- - 
the value created by the cocoa peasantry, a role that continued into the post-colonial 
period (Beckman, 1976). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
State Regulation of Production 
This chapter discusses the efforts of the colonial state to regulate and control the 
production process of the cocoa peasantry. The discussion will show that the struggles 
and contradictions that existed in the sphere of exchange were mirrored in the sphere 
of production. Here the primary issue was the quality of the crop that the peasant 
brought to the market with industrial capital the most directly interested fraction of 
capital. Unlike the sphere of circulation where there was a direct confrontation 
between capital and the peasantry with the state in a secondary role, here the state has 
a more forward and explicit mediating role. The most important institution of the 
State in this exercise was the Department of Agriculture. 
From its earliest years the Department of Agriculture combined the distribution of 
cocoa seeds and seedlings with 'Instructional and demonstrational work' about the 
minimum conditions for its successful cultivation of the crop. In the period from 1905 
tour themes predominate: production techniques, disease control. the quality of cocoa 
and the degi-ce of specialisation on farms'(Green and Hymer, 1966,3308). From 1911 
a shift of emphasis took place in the Department's Nvork. The stress henceforth was 
on tý, vo thinos - enforcing certain minimum cultivation standards and securing 
improvenici-its in the quality of cocoa (Tudhope, 1918 in Kay, 19722.2242). With the 
onset of international crisis in the late 1920s and in the face of escalating, peasmit 
'Department of Agriculture Report, 1911. 
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resistance to and struggle against capital's domination the strategy of the Department 
changed. A great amount of energy and time was devoted to attempts at fostering and 
controlling producers' co-operatives as the means of achieving the two mentioned aims 
whilst at the same time defusing the struggle between the peasants and capital. 
5.1 PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES AND FARM MAINTENANCE 
Prior to the development of mainland West African, particularly Gold Coast, cocoa 
production, Latin Arnerica accounted for 80% of the world's output. Latin American 
production was plantation-based and employed relatively intensive agricultural 
methods. The intensive cultural techniques were partly due to ecological and climatic 
factors and partly due to the relations of production. Thus Latin American cocoa in 
addition to having a fair proportion of 'fine' cocoa was of a generally high quality 
(Gunnarson, 1978,6; Shepard, 1936). The organisation of production and cultivation 
methods in the Gold Coast and most of mainland West Africa was markedly different. 
In the Gold Coast cultivation methods were an adaptation of traditional cultural 
practices which "economized on labour which was scarce and not on land which was 
plentiful" (Green and Hymer. 1966,308). Cocoa seedlings are planted together with 
food crops sucli as plantain and cocoyams as cover plants, shade being important for 
healthy orowth of young cocoa. In Latin America shade trees are planted instead of 
food crops. The Gold Coast cocoa farmer without waiting for a cocoa farm to come 
into bearing embarked on the cultivation of a new cocoa/food farm, taking several 
I'Ood crop harvests from the farms bcfore leavIng them solely to cocoa. The 
cultivation of food crops however continued alongside cocoa farming. Most of the 
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cocoa grown in the Gold Coast in that period took about 7- 10 years to come into 
bearing. This attitude of the cocoa peasants evoked Department of Agriculture 
criticisms of the farmers for treating cocoa production as a 'secondary occupation' 
and employing "primitive", "unscientific" methods of shifting cultivation'. 
The Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture throughout the first four decades 
of this century are strewn with laments about the peasants' neglect to maintain farms, 
keep them clear of pests and fungal growths, etc. Officials moaned that cocoa 
production was developing without the "necessary" regulation (Tudhope, 1918, in 
Kay, 1972,24 1). The Department of Agriculture was of the view that intensive 
cultivation of the Latin American and Caribbean type were best for cocoa. It also 
thought the farmers cultivated more cocoa than they could care for adequately. To the 
Department it seemed clear that the farmers' use of less careful techniques was due 
to "shortsightedness, ignorance and or single-minded search for the attainment of the 
iiiýiximurn amount of money with the minimum expenditure of energy, however 
titieconomical (sic) the system"'. One would have expected admiration for this 
enimentIv bourgeois ethic! 
Various strategies Nvere brought to bear on the "problem" by the Colonial State. As 
part of its 'instructional and demonstrational' Nvork of the Department of Agriculture, 
trýivclling and locýil instructors toured the cocoa growing areas tryino to impart the 
2 Dcpartment of Agriculture Report, 192 1, Merno on Work and Organisation of the Department ot 
I Iture, I16 1935, pa, -, e 6 
in (INA CS0 '08 35 A-I. cli I- -1- . 
Dep. irtilicnt of Agriculture Report, 19 17. 
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Department's conception of efficient, "scientific" cocoa farming and beans preparation. 
By 1911 over 400 farms scattered throughout the cocoa belt had been designated 
'model farms' by the Department'. These farms, usually owned by the chief. 
headman or a local big peasant were to be the laboratories of the agricultural officers 
and object examples to the local cocoa farmer. Chiefs played an important mobilising 
role assembling their subjects to hear out or watch the agricultural officers' 
demonstrations or instructions. 
This work was backed with penal legislation and until passage of the Pests Ordinance 
in 1923 Chiefs were responsible for enforcing the criminal sanctions. The first 
cultivation penal laws drawn up by the Department of Agriculture were passed in 1910 
as Chiefs' by-laws under the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and were adopted by 
the chiefs of sixteen divisions. Under the by-laws any person who failed to remove 
dead wood, empty or diseased cocoa pods from his farm and destroy them by burying 
or burning, or to report to his chief the existence of any disease on his farm, or who 
abandoned a cocoa farm without notice to his chief was liable to a E5 fine. The same 
penalty was suffered by anyone who "wilfully" destroyed or failed to carry out after 
110tiCC, illStrLlCtions issued by a chief, as advised by an authorised officer of the 
Agricultural Dcpartment, for dealing with diseases among cocoa trees. This was a 
severe penalty considermo that around 1910 farmers in Kwahu , N, cre paid 5s per 601b 
load of cocoa by tile merchants. 
1 Dep. mment of Agriculture Report, 191 
12- 7 
There was a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of the farmers towards the efforts 
of the Department, making the work of the woefully small and inadequate staff of 
agricultural officers even more difficult. Although the chiefs had no problems, 
according to the Department, assembling farmers for *instructions' and 
'demonstrations' that was as far as it went. Once the agricultural officer left a village 
the farmers generally carried on as before. This is not to say that the farmers Nvere 
totally uninterested in new technology; they were for example interested in the control 
of insect pests but a fair bit of the Department's scientific practices conflicted with 
their own practical experiences. The so called 'model farms' were not cultivated by 
their owners in accordance with the Department's guidelines. 
1-he introduction of indigenous instructors in 1913, two persons selected from each 
Native jurisdiction division and trained by the Agricultural Department to be resident 
experts was an attempt to cope with the problem of discontinuous supervision of the 
peasmitry. The local instructors like their intended pupils found the additional labour 
i-equired by the Department's guidelines irrational in terms of their economic 
calculation. They also 'neglected' their farms! The bye-laws were not enforced by 
chiefs. By 1916 the attempts to discipline the cocoa peasantry based on a combination 
of mstruction and demonstration backed by penal legislation were acknowledged to 
have t'Zilled (Department of Agm-iculture Report, 1915). The 1919 Cocoa Industry 
Committce claimed that the Director of Agriculture "was unable to quote a single 
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instance of an effective and forcible application" of the widely adopted cultivation by- 
laws'. 
The slump in cocoa production and prices during the First World War period, 
particularly the severe crisis caused by the shortage of shipping space in 1917-18, 
starkly exposed the severe limitations of the existing strategy for influencing the 
peasant's production process in the interest of capital. Under the operative regime 
agricultural officers did not have formal legal powers to enforce the practices they 
advised or to punish non-compliance with or infraction of their instructions. Through 
the war years the Department sought legislation empowering it, among others, to a) 
require certain standards of maintenance for farms and to fine owners who allowed 
thcIr farms to fall below these standards, and b) halt further planting of cocoa if this 
was deemed necessary. As early as 1916 the general impact of the war induced crisis 
had pushed the Department to ask for powers to be given to "European officers in the 
Agricultural Department to enforce legislation in matters of farm sanitation" 
( I'Lidilope, 1915 in Kay, 1972,23 8). In 1918 with thousands of cocoa farms abandoned 
or unattended, the Director of Agriculture expressed grave doubts about the 
maintenance of farms without some compulsion (Department of Agriculture Report, 
1918). 
Other state officials were more sensitive to the political dangers of a frontal attempt Z: ý 
to discipline the peasantry. In 1915 the Commissioner of the Eastern Province 
'Report ofCommitteeappointedby act I ng Governor on 6 6'1919 to consider the condition of the Cocoa 
Industrv, in ONAIADNVI 111 876. 
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expressed fear that the proposed law would "result not in improving cultivation but in 
bringing the Department of Agriculture into collision with the native population and 
thereby impair its usefulness" (Quoted in Kay, 1972,23 
9)6. Supporting this view the 
Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, described the proposals of the Department of Agriculture 
as "somewhat primitive" and which would not "only fail in their intended effect but 
would prove highly injurious". He pointedly noted that there were political 
considerations without the province of the Director of Agriculture, which the latter 
cannot be expected to take into account, but which the Govermnent cannot to afford 
or neglect". Clifford also thought the practical problems of effective policing and 
enforcement would be immense, given the widespread nature of the practices aimed 
at and the inadequacy of the Department's staff. In the circumstances the Governor 
took the view that it was not possible to pass 
a law which will be of any practical effect, or which, if the attempt is made 
to apply it forthwith to all cocoa farmers, would not be at once capricious and 
oppressive in its operations'. 
The fears of the political officers of the colonial government about the dangers posed 
by the kind of legislation sought by the Department of Agriculture were justified. 
From the producers' view point there was absolutely no reason to continue producing 
cocoa let alone to maintain farms up to the Department's standards. Most cocoa could 
not be sold because of a shipping crisis caused by the ongoing World War. A 
i-egulatory Ordinance drafted in 1916 was dropped in the face of strong indigenous 
opposition in the legislative Council and the Governor's reservations. The Department 
Tile quotations in the following discussion of the internal government debate are all from Kay 
(1972,23 8-246). 
I, c,, 'slat*ve Council Debates, 1916-17, p. 82, quoted in Kay (1972,146). 
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of Agriculture was forced to continue with its old strategy. trying as much as possible 
to increase the coercive political element. It was realised that agricultural officers 
accompanied by a District Commissioner - the most visible symbol of the State's 
power being law maker, judge and executioner in the countryside - were more 
effective. As often as possible this coupling was effected' 
The passage of the Plants (Injurious Pests) Ordinance, 1923 (No. 37 of 1923) secured 
for the Department of Agriculture some of the powers it had sought during the First 
World War period. Under the law, the occupier of a "declared plant" farm (cocoa was 
"declared") was under a duty upon pain of a E25 fine or three months imprisonment 
to apply treatment prescribed by an agricultural officer for the eradication of an 
"injurious pest" i. e. disease, pest, fungus, parasite, insect or animal. The Ordinance 
brought together the threads of "instruction and demonstration" and their coercive 
enforcement into the hands of the Department. The law was passed in the face of 
considerable indigenous opposition. Resolutions against the Bill were passed by 
among others the Gold Coast Farmers Association. The law was opposed by chiefs 
in the Eastern, Western and Central Provinces, though Ashanti chiefs were reported 
to have supported it. In the Legislative Council debate Nana Ofori Atta I and J-E 
Casely Hayford emphasised the link between the price paid the farmer and quality of 
cocoa 9. Interestingly, a counterpart Bill designed to regulate the local cocoa trade 
' Department of Agriculture Report 1921, Appendix D. 
9 Legislative Council Debates, 1923. The Plants (Injurious Pests) Ordinance enacted some of the 
recommendations of the 1919 Cocoa Industry Committee appointed by the Governor. Ofori Atta and 
the other Ghanaian member of the Committee Nvere the only persons who opposed its recommendation 
for leolslation of alom-, the lines of the Ordinance, arguing that peaceful persuasion continue for Z- 
sometime (See Report of Cocoa lndustrý! Committee in GNA, ADM 11/1/'876). 
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which was favoured by farmers' representatives died in the face of opposition from 
the merchant firms (Southall, 1975,262). 
Though the enforcement of the Ordinance aroused some opposition among farmers it 
did not generate great resentment due to the fact that it failed to have any great impact 
mainly because of the practical problems of policing tens of thousands of small, 
scattered inaccessible farms. This problem was exacerbated by the manner in which 
the law was to operate: a farmer must have been given specific individual instructions 
by an agricultural officer before the penal provisions became applicable. The Plant, 
Pest and Disease Ordinance 1937 removed the requirement that a farmer must have 
been specifically instructed to become liable under the law. Whilst replicating many 
provisions of the 1923 Ordinance it considerably widened the powers of the State. 
The Governor could make regulations declaring the application and enforcement of 
specified production techniques and disease control measures in a stated geographical 
area. The only required form of the State's intervention became that of checking 
compliance with the generally applicable regulation. Under the first set of regulations 
issued under the Ordinance - "Cocoa Farm Rejuvenation Regulations" - occupiers of 
cocoa farms in New Juaben, Akim Abuakwa, Yilo Krobo,, Manya Krobo and Akuapim 
(M effect all cocoa farms in the Eastern Province) covering several hundred thousand 
acres, were to adopt and apply treatment prescribed for "Drought Dieback of Cocoa" 
the Director of Agriculture in a Gazette notice. 
Under the 1933 7 Ordinance an ag , ricultural inspector could give an occupier instructions 
in respect of matters not connected to the protection of his farm - something in the 
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nature of abating a nuisance. The inspector could also order the destruction of crops, 
compensation in respect of which lay in the "sole unfettered discretion of the 
Governor". Breach of any provisions of the statute or regulations under it or failure 
to obey the orders of an agricultural inspector carried a penalty of a f25 fine or one 
"' 7 month's jail sentence. The application of the powers created under the 191 
legislation to "ordinary" issues of farm maintenance never became widespread. In fact 
the amendment of the 1924 Ordinance was triggered by the discovery of the deadly 
swollen shoot disease in 1936. The memorandum on the Bill explained that the 
amendment of the 1924 ordinance had "become a matter of urgency owing to the 
spread of swollen shoot"". The disease was to cause widespread devastation, 
resulting in the destruction or cutting out of a couple of hundred million cocoa trees 
resulting in a dramatic change in the topography of cocoa cultivation within the space 
of ten years (Austin, 1970,59-66). 
The impression left by all the above efforts to control the cocoa peasantry is that they 
were only partially successful at best. In 1935 the then Director of Agriculture 
admitted that his Department had never been in a position to "apply any ameliorative 
measures" to the perceived defective cultural practices of the cocoa farmers. 
10 GNA 682/331 sf I. 
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He acknowledged that 
at no time during the growth of the [cocoa] industry has it been possible to 
carry out instructional work on a scale extensive enough to reach each 
individual farmer or even any considerable number of individual farmers''. 
Apart from the inadequacy of staff to undertake the large scale policing necessary for 
success, the cocoa peasantry resisted these intervention. Some of the proposed 
practices conflicted with their own practical experiences; they did not see any benefit 
accruing from the additional labour the adoption of most of the practices would have 
entailed. Studies have shown that some of the practices that the Department of 
Agriculture desired cocoa producers to adopt were misconceived and based on 
inadequate research into local climatic and ecological factors and conditions (Green 
and Hymer, 1966). These specific shortcomings of the Department's policies and its 
refusal to learn from the practical experiences of peasants have been characterised by 
some writers as another instance of the patronising posture of 'experts', in the instant 
case overlaid with the racist ideology of colonialism (Green and Hymer, 1966,312; 
Kay, 1972,238). 
The criticisms made by Green, Hymer and Kay have an important flaw. In seeking 
to show, that it was the "agricultural experts" rather than the peasants who were 
igiiorant they fail to advert to the larger determinants of the colonial state's attempts 
to discipline the cocoa peasantry. Where there is an advertence, the explanation of the 
SII tate s motivation is inadequate. Green and Hymer (1966,319) after examining the 
'' Auchnileck to Colonial Secretary, 1 33 6 '35 - Menio on Work and Organisation of 
Department of Agriculture. GNA CSO'26&35. 
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relationship between the cocoa peasantry and the Department of Agriculture concluded 
that 
in terms of economic rationality and of relevant technical and institutional 
knowledge and adaptability, the Gold Coast cocoa fanners, despite very real 
limitations had significantly better records than the Gold Coast Department of 
Agriculture throughout the period 1890 - 1940. 
Kay on his part accused the Department of Agriculture of starting "a crusade" against 
the cocoa industry from 1910 and the colonial government of "systematic opposition 
to the progress of the cocoa industry over a period of forty years" (Kay, 1972,241). 
Kay's conclusion like Green and Hymer's is premised on a narrow focusing on the 
specific contents of the Department of Agriculture's policies and wrongly assuming 
that the cocoa peasantry and the Department of Agriculture share a common notion 
of "economic rationality". 
Whilst specific elements of the Department of Agriculture's cocoa cultivation 
standards may have been misconceived the Department of Agriculture's concerns 
reflected the anxieties of industrial users of cocoa (See Tudhope, 1918 in 
Kay, 1972,242). It collaborated closely with Cadbury's. The firm was an active 
supporter of government organised farm maintenance competitions, often donating 
prizes. Cadbury's set up a 'model farm' in the heart of the cocoa belt in 1909 to 
serve as an oýject example of proper production. Governor John Rodger personally 
iiiterveiicd to help Cadbury's secure land for the model farm (Southall, 1975,8 1). The 
experiment foldcd up in 1912 the costs of 'scientific farming' being extremely high 
compared to peasant farming. The interests the Department of Agriculture represented 
liclp to explain the apparently irrational political timing of the Department's attempts 
to intensik- the labour of the peasantry in periods when they had the least incentive 
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to maintain or increase production, such as during the First World War. From the 
perspective of industrial capital this is perfectly rational. About this same time cocoa 
manufacturers in Britain were lobbying hard for the introduction of minimum prices 
to ensure continued production by Gold Coast farmers (Southall, 1975,514). 
For the cocoa peasantry the period of deterioration provoked the strongest desire to 
move out of cocoa production. For example during the Depression years the 
Department of Agriculture remarked the increased cultivation of food crops 12 . For 
industrial capital however this is precisely when the greatest pressure must be exerted 
on the producer to remain in cocoa production. The moments of shrillest complaining 
about farmers practices by the Department of Agriculture and its most aggressive 
interventions coincided with the phases of depression or decline in the cocoa industry 
identified by Gunnarson (1978,87-91). These were 1915-22 and 1928-43. It was in 
the first period that the draft Disease Prevention Bill of 1916 was tabled and the 
tightening of the administration of the Pests Ordinance in 1928 and the introduction 
of the Plant Pest and Disease Ordinance in 1937 occurred in the second. The 
contradiction between the peasantry and industrial capital and the local political effects 
of this will explain why the draft 1916 Bill got passed in a truncated form in 1924 
when the relative buoyancy of the cocoa industry created more favourable local 
political conditions. 
12 Department of Agriculture Reporl, 193 162. 
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5.2 STATE AND CROP QUALITY 
Chocolate manufacturers preferred evenly fermented and dried cocoa. Depending on 
its botanical variety and climatic conditions cocoa should be fermented for between 
two and nine days, too short or too long fermentation period is undesirable. The 
manufacturers did not like under fermented cocoa because "it does not roast well. is 
difficult to shell and causes difficulties in grinding and produces a 'mass' with an acid 
and unpleasant flavour" (Shepard, 1936,89). According to the Imperial Economic 
Committee (1932,46) 
Both under fermentation and over fermentation seriously affects the value of 
the product. Adequate fermentation ensures a more thorough drying and also 
has a beneficial effect on the inside of the bean which besides assuming a 
desirable cinnamon colour, is rendered less acrid. Adequately and under 
fermented beans are not clearly distinguishable, constituting a continuous 
rather than distinct series. Preparation of adequately fermented cocoa 
involves a careful time and labour consuming process (22nd Rep, para. 43- 
46). 
Adequate fermentation does not however depend solely on treatment at just the right 
time - insufficiently ripe cocoa produces under fermented beans. 
Gold Coast cocoa was mainly of the varieties known in the industry as "bulk" cocoa, 
which because of its nature gave a generally inferior quality, industrially less desirable 
commodity. In the early years of the Gold Coast cocoa industry, cocoa was generally 
sold 'wet' i. e. unfermented and relatively un-dried by the farmers. Although the 
merchants dried and reconditioned the beans before export the product was generally 
inferior and under- fermented. The Department of Agriculture remarked on the low 
quality of the crop in its 1906 Report. In 1913 a director of Cadbur%"s told the \Vest 
, \t'i'Ican Lands Committee that in 1908 only 5% of Gold Coast cocoa could be 
considered good, 15% was fair with 80% bad. According to William Cadbury 
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standards improved in succeeding years such that in 1912 35% of the cocoa was good, 
50% fair and only 15% was bad 13 . Cadbury's was an active supporter of the 
colonial State's efforts to secure improvements in crop quality. In the period before 
the First World War the firm's employees undertook 'instructional' and 
'demonstration' work among cocoa farmers". The 1908 Department of Agriculture 
Report credited one of these employees with the introduction of fermentation culture 
to Manya Krobo. 
At the domestic level two features of the cocoa trade had a negative effect on the 
quality of cocoa beans. These were the system of advances to farmers and frequent 
price fluctuations within the buying season. The payment of advances meant the 
farmer was paid for cocoa even before he prepared it for "sale" and the advance price 
was usually less than the market price. In this situation there was little incentive to 
make the exertion to produce a high quality product. Brokers who gave out advances 
and were under a duty to deliver a stipulated quality of cocoa to the merchant usually 
tried to protect themselves against possible losses due to poor quality, by short- 
weighing the farmer's crop. It was alleged before the Nowell Commission (1938,35) 
that 20% of cocoa was short-weighed by brokers. As indicated in the preceding 
chapter the system of advances was an important tool in the competitive struggle 
arnong the buying firms. So long as this competition persisted and there was a market 
t'()i- the bulk of Gold Coast cocoa there was little chance of merchant capital acting in 
" Minutes of West Aftican Lands Committee (1916,376). 
14 Department of Agneulture Reports, 1910-1916. 
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a manner that induced or forced the producers to improve the quality of cocoa 
(Nowell, 1938,36). 
The quality of cocoa was also negatively affected by both upward and downward price 
movements. At times of high international prices the quality of cocoa tended to fall 
as the exporting firms scrambled to profit from the rising prices. The producers, also 
under the stimulus of rising prices and under pressure from brokers who had made 
advances to them,, sold inadequately prepared cocoa or picked insufficiently ripe cocoa 
for preparation, both resulting in industrially undesirable under-fermented beans. Price 
depressions on the other hand reduced the farmer's incentive to exert himself in the 
preparation of the crop, ruling prices being inadequate remuneration for more than a 
certain expenditure of labour power (22nd Report). 
5.2.1. Controlling Quali! y: 1910-1927 
The state was in favour of quality improvements but the effectiveness of any political 
and legal intervention on the issue depended on those directly involved in the cocoa 
industry, Le the producers and buyers. Improvements in quality would involve an 
intensification of the labour of the producers, short of being coerced,, they must feel 
the additional labour worth their while - reflected in the prices they receive. The 
crucial link between industrial capital and the dispersed cocoa peasantry Nvas 
constituted by merchant capital. The enforcement of industrial capital's quality 
standards therefore necessarily required support or compliance of the merchant in 
remunerating the producer's additional labour or denving, inferior qualitv cocoa a 
nia rket. 
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For the merchant any cocoa which was marketable was "good" cocoa. On the 
international market cocoa was sold under several quality grades for different uses 
although some types or grades were generally preferable. Despite complaints about 
the general quality of Gold Coast cocoa the vast bulk of it was useful in one way or 
the other. Butter from unfermented cocoa for instance was used in chocolate 
manufacture although the manufacturers generally preferred fermented cocoa. To gain 
the higher prices higher quality cocoa attracted the merchant firms reconditioned and 
re-bagged cocoa before sale. They claimed that the low general quality, with good 
quality cocoa appearing irregularly and sporadically, made the payment of differential 
prices impracticable. This in the face of the counter argument that the absence of 
differential prices impeded a general improvement in quality. The merchant firms 
basically had no compelling reason to exert pressure on or induce producers to 
improve the general quality of cocoa. 
Given the differing and conflicting "economic rationality" of farmer, merchant and 
manufacturer the options for raising the quality involved a choice about who was to 
benefit from or bear the cost of improving quality. Although government officials 
repeatedly inveighed against the merchants' "irresponsible" attitude towards quality 
early as 1910 the state indicated that it was not going to push merchant capital in the 
tI avoured direction. A government report on agriculture declared that 
It is not within the scope of Government to compel the payment of a higher 
price for improved produce, NvIiich the merchant can get at the same figure, 
and however unfair or disastrous, combines, pools, et. c are, direct steps cannot 
be taken to abolish them". 
5th Report on the Aoricultural and Forest Products of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, IL- 1910. 
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This free trade argument was however not extended to the producers. In the same 
year that the above pronouncement was made the colonial government issued by-laws 
under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to compel cocoa farmers to raise the quality 
of their cocoa on pain of a fine. The by-laws prohibited the sale and purchase of "wet 
or badly prepared cocoa or cocoa adulterated with any foreign matter whatever". 
Those found in breach before a native tribunal were liable to fines of up to 5s. per 
601bs load of cocoa. Ghanaian brokers were covered by the law but not Europeans 
traders since they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the native tribunals. This 
sanction backed a strategy of agricultural officers instructing and demonstrating the 
preparation of cocoa to farmers. 
The effectiveness of the by-laws was blunted by the same factors that affected the 
cultivation and farm maintenance by-laws that were discussed earlier in the chapter. 
There was also the additional fact that the merchant firms did not pay a higher price 
for higher quality of cocoa. Again the staff of the Department of Agriculture without 
the support of the most important exporters or the co-operation of chiefs, were totally 
unequal to the task. This abortive attempt to coerce the peasantry into raising quality 
toreshadowed the schemes that the state eventually settled on as the most viable way 
of raising quality. As we show later in this chapter the two methods: the cooperatives 
and compulsory inspection and grading under the Cocoa Industry Regulation 
Ordinance, 1937, sought to intensify the labour of farmers without remuneration. 
Officials of the Dcpartment of Agriculture also invested some hopes in two 
mechanisms of secondary importance. One of these was the establishment of 
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European owned cocoa plantations. There was an admission of the problems ariv such 
venture would face as regards acquiring land, labour and lack of transportation 
infrastructure (5th Report). However officials hoped that such ventures utili ingy s 
"scientific" production methods would turn out high quality cocoa. serving as object 
lessons in more than one way to peasant farmers. Cadbury's disastrous 1909 -12 
model farm was an effort within this fruitless logic. The establishment of Cadbury's 
Buying Agency in 1906 was seen by colonial officials as the other kind of self-help 
in which industrial capital could undertake. By competing directly with the merchant 
firms and offering the economic inducement of higher prices to farmers such direct 
buying would help raise quality standards. 
By 1936 apart from Cadbury's, two other manufacturers, the Co-operative Wholesalers 
Society (CWS) and J. Lyons and Co. Ltd. had also established local buying agencies. 
The industrial firms tried as much as possible to create deep reaching buying 
organisations with their own quality -discerning employees in touch with the producer. 
Their vertical integration enabled them to secure their individual supplies of high 
quality cocoa. Cadbury's tried to encourage quality improvements by introducing a 
diffcrential price system. Cadbury's had come to the Gold Coast full of optimism 
about its ability to undermine the 'pernicious' system of marketing which relying on 
brokers paying out advances and offering the farmer a generally low price threatened 
the maintenance of the Gold Coast as a source of raw material and also resulted in a 
low quality product from the farmer. By 1912 this optimism had quietly faded. The 
firm was forced to adopt some of the prevailing methods to maintain a foothotd e. g. 
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brokers and payments of advances. Given the nature of production - on scattered 
small, partly inaccessible farms some reliance on brokers was unavoidable. 
Despite having the sympathy of the colonial government the industrial buyers were too 
weak to exert a decisive influence on the local trade, particularly after the emergence 
of the UAC bloc in 1929. At the height of their collective strength, in 1936, the 
industrial firms bought 24% of the Gold Coast crop locally. The industrial firms' 
policy of paying more for high quality cocoa proved ineffective as a general 
inducement to improve quality. During price rises the largest merchant firms raised 
their flat prices to the level of the premium prices offered by the industrial firn-is, 
which then became the general price of cocoa. The weakness of industrial capital vis- 
a-vis merchant capital locally was illustrated by the industrial firms, with the exception 
of the CWS, joining the controversial 1937 Buying Agreement, despite professions of 
grave reservations about the aims of Agreement and having condemned such 
arrangements in the past. 
5.2.2. Controlling quality: 1927-1939 
Apart from the ineffective chief s bye-laws and the extension work of the Department 
of Agriculture the State made no offier attempt to intervene on the quality issue until 
1927. The government's 1927 intervention was provoked by developments iii the 
American market which in 1926 consumed 38% of the world's cocoa output. In 1924 
the cocoa quality standards tinder the U. S. Food and Drugs Act, which -were applied 
by the NcxNy York Exchange the most important international cocoa inarket, were 
tightened. In the teeth of opposition frorn the New York Cocoa Exchan, (,,. c the U. ",. L- tl 
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standards were progressively tightened in 1932 and 1933". The tightening of U. S. 
standards had a reactive effect on all international transactions. Orders for cocoa 
usually sought guarantees that the commodity would pass the U. S. standards. The 
1924 measures resulted in the rejection of several shipments of Gold Coast cocoa in 
1925 and 1926. Under new regulations which became effective in October 1933 
45,000 tons of Gold Coast exports in the 1930/31 season and 35,000 tons from the 
1932/33 export would have been prohibited from the U. S. market". 
To comply with the new American standards merchant firms operating in the Gold 
Coast sent cocoa destined for the U. S. market to London for reconditioning, an 
expensive process. The situation led to a heightened concern, on the part of the Gold 
Coast government, about controlling quality and agreement among all the firms 
involved in buying cocoa in the Gold Coast that quality control measures were 
required. The discussions in the 1934 Cocoa Exportation Committee made up 
representatives of government, merchant and industrial firms, brokers and big cocoa 
farmers - reflected the conflicting interests". Underlying the debate was the issue of 
who was to benefit from or be penalised under whatever scheme was introduced. 
16 The decision of the U. S government to tighten the standards on quality of imported cocoa beans "in 
the interest of the consuming public and cocoa and chocolate industries" provoked a debate that was 
marked by divisions that mirrored the split between manufacturers and merchants in the Gold Coast 
over quality control. At a "Conference on Cocoa Beans" called in July 1931 by the U. S. Food and Dr-ua 
Administration W. J. Kibbe, President of the New York Cocoa Exchange, outlined the opposition of the 
cocoa traders to the tightening up. On the other hand the Association of Cocoa and Chocolate 
Manufacturers of the U. S. declaredthat thev heartily supported the proposals" for improving the qualitv 
of cocoa beans while the largest manufacturer, the Hershey Corporation said it "wholeheartedly support 
and endorse the moves to tighten standards". See GNA/161 1/30. 
" The Gold Coast Farmer, September 19331- 
Is ONA 2034. 
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The merchants were opposed to any system of inspection and grading, considering it 
an unnecessary and intolerable interference with trade by the state. They argued that 
the Department of Agriculture should "concentrate its energy on instructing farmers 
in the fermentation and drying of cocoa, and should if necessary acquire legal powers 
to compel farmers to produce good cocoa". On the other hand if any inspection and 
grading scheme was to be introduced, it should be administered at the point of sale i. e. 
up country. For the merchants port inspection would involve the additional expense 
of having to employ specialist buyers something which, in their sympathetic view, 
would not be good for the farmer since this increased expense would be reflected in 
prices. Basically the merchants firms wanted the benefits of improvements without 
having to bear any of the costs or risks if they could help it. The way forward in their 
view would be to make the farmer wholly liable for all the costs and risks of low 
quality without any guarantee of benefits for a higher quality. 
The big peasants/capitalist farmers on the Cocoa Exportation Committee wanted a 
system which would both reward producers of high quality cocoa and at the same time 
actively discourage or penalise the production of low quality cocoa. These farmers 
had been long time critics of the absence of different prices for higher quality cocoa. 
Unlike the small or middle peasantry for whom quality improvements involved an 
imcrisification of household labour and a related reduction on labour for other 
productive activities. the big peasant could improve the quality of his commodity by 
intensifying the labour of' his employees very much in the manner of the plantation 
oxviiers of Latin America. 
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The Department of Agriculture argued that without an economic incentive the farmer 
would not improve his crop. Any system to enforce quality standards therefore should 
make possible the differential rewarding of the farmer's additional labour. The 
Department urged the introduction of a system of compulsory inspection and gradincy 
at the ports of export. The merchant then assumed the risk of being penalised for 
buying low quality cocoa on the assumption that by paying a higher price he would 
induce improvements". Port inspection would be easier and cheaper to administer 
and penalties more easily enforced. The Department's position was broadly supported 
by the industrial firms. They felt that up-country, i. e point of sale, inspection and 
grading favoured by the merchant firms and the big peasantry would have a negative 
effect on the producer. It would enable the buying firm or broker to reject inferior 
quality cocoa. Backed by the law and the coercive weight of the State he need not 
pay a higher price to induce improvements. The industrial firms with their quality 
conscious buying staff and brokers were fairly confident of not finding port inspection 
irksome. The brokers on their part also favoured port inspection because that shifts 
any penalties for buying poor grade cocoa unto the merchant rather than onto the 
broker as would be the case with up country inspection" 
19 Three vears earlier the Director of Agriculture had argued to the West Africa Section of the London 
Chamber of Commerce that the fanners bitterly resented the absence of differential prices for quality 
and tircled the need to look at the fan-ner's side of the story. "So long as buyers adhered to a one price 
systeni irrespective of quality. compulsory action by Government would be equivalent to binding the 
farmer hand and foot and delivering him to the buyers". he pointed out. See GNACSO 1611/30. 
10 Three vcars before the establishment of the Cocoa Exportation Committee there had been aý i-orous 
exchangge of vieNNs between the government and buying companies on the quality issue, a debate 
tri, --ered bv an cxpression ot-concern about the poor quality of West African cocoa the 2nd Conference 
of West Africa Agricultural Officers held in 1929. Scc GNA CSO 1611 '30. 
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After an initial attempt by the state to devise a scheme that balanced these conflicting 
positions the schemes which were implemented from 1927 onwards highlighted the 
powerful local position of merchant capital. In that year after rejecting the State's 
proposals for a system of compulsory port inspection and grading, the exporting firms 
agreed to a scheme of voluntary inspection and certification at the ports. The State 
could not compel submission to inspection or prohibit the export of defective cocoa. 
The system had no effect on the general quality of cocoa. The Department of 
Agriculture however claimed that the scheme was useful to the merchant firms despite 
its practical and technical limitations". Certificates issued by the Department formed 
the basis of insurance policies taken out by international buyers. It obviated the 
expensive process of sending cocoa destined for the U. S. market to London for 
reconditioning. The further tightening of U. S. standards in 1933 however forced the 
government to consider a change in the regime which favoured the merchants without 
bringing about any improvement in quality". This was what led to the setting up of 
the Cocoa Exportation Committee. 
Despite the already indicated differences within the Cocoa Exportation Committee it 
recommended legislation against the export of "highly defective" cocoa and laid down 
applicable standards subject to variation by the Govemor. The Committee's 
recommendations were the basis of the 1934 Cocoa Industry Regulation Ordinance 
(No. 14 of 1934). The Ordinance provided for a system of port inspection and 
2' GNA ACC 250, '60. 
22 I-lie tightening of US standards took place against a background of a world cocoa surplus of 7-5,000 t, ýL_ 
tons so the issue of raising quality became entangled with how quality standards could be used as a 
mechanism for rel-ILIlating, supply. See British Nlemo on Cocoa lndustrý to World Monetarý and 
-'0/' Economic Conference, 193'1 in GNA ADM 54. 
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prohibited the export of any cocoa that was not "commercially dry. with not more than 
50 per cent slaty beans, or with not more than 20 per cent otherwise defective beans, 
or with not more than 10 per cent mouldy beans". This law remained in force for 
only three years before being replaced by the 1937 Cocoa Industry (Regulation) 
Ordinance No. 14 of 1937). The replacement of the 1934 law followed criticism of the 
1934 scheme by Shepard (1936,16-26) and recommendations by another imperial 
agricultural expert Frank Stockdale. 
Shepard's principal criticism was that the 1934 scheme lacked teeth. Also the 
standards which were applied related to the purity and not quality of cocoa; purity and 
quality were not synonymous and the international market was interested in quality. 
According to Shepard the certificates issued under the system "failed to gain the 
confidence of the market because the methods of estimating purity are not identical 
with those employed by merchants, brokers and manufacturers". He considered the 
principal defect of the system to be purity being determined for consignments rather 
than individual bags of cocoa. Whilst this could form the basis of insurance policies 
tI or individual lots it could not enable cocoa to be "dealt with on the leading exchanges 
under recognised contract clauses". Because individual bags in a certified consignment 
mIAt and usually varied in quality and consignments tend to be broken up unless 
specifically destined for an end user, the smooth speedy process of international 
circulation and exchange, involving 35% of the world's cocoa crop, would be 
impeded. 
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Shepard proposed an inspection and grading system applying standards which would 
enable cocoa to be exported in a form which facilitated international trade. He 
proposed a compulsory up country inspection and grading system. This, in his view. 
was less likely to interfere with business than port inspection and grading. The state 
was to have the power to prohibit the export of sub-standard cocoa. In view of this 
port inspection was disadvantageous to exporters since they would have to bear the 
loss resulting from a rejection or prohibition of export of sub-quality cocoa. Up 
country inspection on the other hand would enable the exporter to reject inferior cocoa 
or recondition it before taking it to the port. Quality (not purity) should pertain to the 
bag rather than the consignment of cocoa. Quality grades conforming to those used 
on the London,, Liverpool and New York markets were to be applied. 
The regime introduced under the Cocoa Industry Regulation Ordinance, 1937 was to 
be the operative inspection and grading system for the rest of the colonial period. The 
scheme heavily favoured capital against the cocoa peasantry. The fundamental 
considerations apart from the application and enforcement of international standards 
were the convenience of cocoa merchants and the avoidance of "hardship on shippers", 
with penalties falling on the producer. Despite proclamations in Shepard's Report of 
the importance of price inducements to the farmer in achieving quality improvements, 
the system lie proposed rendered such inducement unnecessary. No differential prices 
ever became instituted. "The price penalty would encourage farmers to exercise 
greater care in curing. If the penalty fell on the farmer it would effectively stop the 
production of low purity cocoa". lie argued. To be able to sell cocoa the producer had 
to collipiv with the official quality standards. The exporting firms had the option of 
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rejecting low quality or offering a very low price for it. Legally such cocoa could not 
be exported but the merchant could mix it with higher quality cocoa , N-hich though 
resulting in the lowering of the general quality would not render the whole unsaleable 
or un-exportable. 
The regime of the 1937 Ordinance has to be understood within the context of the 
correlation of forces among the main contending parties in the quality debate and the 
capabilities of the colonial state. A regular supervision of the cocoa peasantry was 
beyond the administrative capability of the State. The Department of Agriculture's 
extension work backed by sanctions had achieved little for reasons detailed above. 
The levels of the politico-administrative structure with the practical potential to 
facilitate the Department's work , 
i. e the Chiefs felt this supervision to be politically 
dangerous. Once the dominant merchant firms had set their faces against bearing any 
of the costs involved in bringing about quality improvements be it by paying higher 
prices for higher quality cocoa or by risky penalisation for buying defective cocoa, the 
only possibility open to the State became how best to balance the interests of merchant 
and industrial capital; the interests of the peasantry became side-lined. Although the 
system coerced the producer to improve the quality of his commodity, it did not secure 
the total influence of capital's interests on his production process. Peasant resistance 
to the scheme took the form of mixing bad with good cocoa to enable the sale of all 
his output even if it fell within a lower quality grade. This became the Department 
of Agriculture's new cause for complaint. 
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5.3. THE CO-OPERATIVES' STRATEGY 
The preceding discussion has tried to show how various factors, primarily the positions 
of merchant capital, frustrated the state's attempts to influence the peasant's production 
process so as to raise the quality of cocoa for the benefit of industrial capital. We 
have already argued that during the Depression years the state and industrial users of 
cocoa were concerned not only about the quality about also the continued supply of 
cocoa because of the fall in prices. From the late 1920s State organised co-operatives 
were increasingly seen by colonial officials as the most viable form of organisation 
through which the peasantry could be controlled for the attainment of various ends. 
In 1927 a Co-operative Societies Ordinance was drafted although it was not passed till 
193 1. As an institutional form cooperatives could facilitate the encouragement of both 
cocoa production and the improvement of quality. They offered the structural, 
administrative forms and rules which could overcome the specific impediments 
presented by the small, scattered operation of independent peasant producers, the 
inadequacy of administrative staff and the State's reluctance for various reasons to 
incur heavy expenditure in the process of intervening. 
"Cooperation" and "cooperative" have elements which have a broad ideological appeal; 
both capitalist and non-capitalist societies exalt "cooperation" as advancing elements 
of their ideologies (Young, 1981,3). The specific nature, role and operations of co- 
operatiN, es are however determined by the framework of production and class relations 
witlim which they are located. Various studies have shown that cooperatives organised 
by Third World peasants are usually motivated by the desire to strengthen their 
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collective position vis-a-vis dominating classes or groups (Hyden. 1970: Fitzpatrick & 
Southwood, 1976,6; Long & Roberts. 1978). 
In the Gold Coast the first cocoa producers co-operatives, formed in the first decade 
of this century, aimed at escaping local domination by merchant capital by allowing 
members direct access to the international cocoa market. Although largely unable to 
achieve their principal aims, the important point is that these efforts manifested a 
challenge to a specific form of domination of peasant producers by foreign capital. 
The independent organisation of richer elements of the peasantry into a kind of 
'peasant vanguard' had taken an important forward step with the formation of a 
national organisation - the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation (G. C. & A. C. F) 
in 193 1. The organisation had as one of its prime objects the organisation of direct 
sales, by-passing the local merchant firms, on the international market. The following 
discussion will attempt to show how the colonial State under the ideological cloak of 
the 'value of co-operation' sought to control and intensify the labour of cocoa 
producers, primarily for the benefit of industrial capital, and its attempts to balance the 
political and economic contradictions the exercise entailed. 
The scattered, small holder nature of production presented the most formidable 
obstacle to the assertion of the State's influence on the peasant's production process. 
The orouping of the producers into administrat'vel. v controllable unIts would greatl,.,, In, 
cýise the "problem". Under the 1931 Co-operative Societies Ordinance, a modified 
version of the relevant Mauritian law, a registrable society must have at least ten paid 
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up members". The 1937 Co-operative Societies Ordinance, which replaced the 19) 3 
law, elaborated the structure providing for an administrative and coordinating hierarchy 
of primary societies linked through joint marketing committees under District 
Unions". This would rationalise control over the growing movement. 
From the very beginning the stress was on organising producers to produce cocoa of 
a certain quality, marketed in a regulated manner, rather than on the provision of 
credit or any other role. Members were to be "encouraged in the exercise of thrift". 
From 1928 co-operative cocoa, unlike the rest of the crop was subject to a system of 
up country inspection by agricultural officers. A very high level of quality was 
attained, co-operative cocoa averaged a purity of 97% in the 1929-33 period, well 
above the 90% standard of the most stringent international standards. The average 
purity of the Gold Coast crop in the same period was 86% (Shepard, 1936,26; 22nd 
Report, para. 88). From 1937 members were placed under an obligation to sell all 
their cocoa through their societies, a joint store was operated for this purpose, 
facilitating the bulking of the commodity for sale. 
The co-operative movement for various reasons failed to catch on throughout the 
colonial period. The principal reason for the unattractive nature of the co-operatives 
x\'as the fact that despite the surfeit of official supervision, this attention was not aimed 
at marketing and even where there was an attempt the societies were unable to secure 
a sufficient rcmuneration for the members in respect of the additional labour entailed 
'13 sect'oll 4,19" 1 Ordinance, Department of Amculture Report, IQ II Il 
2' Scction 5,1931 Ordinancc, section 6.19-337 Ordinance. 
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in preparing cocoa of a high quality. The industrial firms, particularly Cadbury's Nvere 
enthusiastic supporters of the State's co-operative efforts. Not so the merchant firms 
who were hostile to the whole exercise. The merchant firms defended the loxv 
premium they paid for cooperative cocoa with the argument that the additional labour 
which produced the very high quality of cocoa was unnecessary labour 
(Nowell, 1938,44). 
Colonial officials trumpeted the development of co-operatives as a step in the 
elimination of 'unnecessary stages in the marketing process', i. e the chain of 
middlemen. The bulking of cocoa by the cooperatives reduced the merchants reliance 
on the middlemen thereby saving costs. The industrial buyers also felt the middlemen 
had a pernicious influence on the quality of cocoa. The Department of Agriculture 
calculated a saving of at least f3 per ton resulting from the by-passing or elimination 
of the broker chain (22nd Report, para. 82). But the growth of the co-operative 
movement was a two edged blade for merchant capital. A strong organisation of the 
producers with a well developed marketing system represented a long term threat, the 
State's close attention notwithstanding. The intensified peasant struggle and resistance 
evidenced by the sporadic but increasingly determined hold ups of the 1920s and 
1930s did not augur well. 
Official pronouncements made clear that the co-operatives were not aimed at the small 
or eveii middle peasant. The societies were seen as becoming centres of "progressive 
villaoc thouplit". They were to afford "the industrious, intelligent, thrifty escape the 
bonda, oc imposed on him by NN-cak-er neighbour' (NoNvell. 1938,43'). The desired co- 
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operator was the big peasant. A couple of other factors, even if there was not an 
explicit design to attract richer elements of the peasantry, were bound to produce their 
disproportionate presence in the co-operatives. Although there was a recognition of 
the intimate connection between peasant indebtedness, the system of advances and the 
quality of cocoa, official policy firmly set its face against the provision of outside 
credit to the societies or facilitating their access to it. 
In addition to the alleged lack of thrift mentioned in Chapter Four, colonial officials 
claimed the cocoa farmer "suffered from too facile credit" (Shepard, 1936,47). Within 
this logic to make "additional" credit available through the co-operatives would be to 
encourage "extravagance". Also the hostility of the merchants to the cooperatives 
would have been fuelled by the strengthening and advancement of the peasantry being 
aided by access to less expensive credit. One of their criticisms of the co-operatives 
was the cost of the scheme to the State. 
As late as 1945/46 only slightly over f 11,000 was made available to the societies from 
Outside sources, a little more than fl. per member. Loans to members from the 
societies' own resources were tightly regulated. Loans as distinct from advances on 
cocoa, were required to be backed by cash in the societies' coffers. If a member 
required a loan in excess of his share of the society's capital, it could only be granted 
on the guarantee of two other members who had un-allocated share capital or deposits. 
These loans Nvere usually for only a few, weeks. Co-operative credit was much 
cheaper than the rural money lender's but access to it was that mucli more restricted. 
Given that a fair proportion of the cocoa peasantry relied heavily on loans and 
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advances from money lenders/brokers to maintain their material conditions of 
existence, credit on flexible terms from the co-operatives might have attracted a lot 
more producers despite the net loss incurred in preparing high quality cocoa (Miracle 
and Seidman, 1968). 
Co-operatives were prohibited from indulging in forward sales of cocoa. Members 
were only paid for their cocoa after it had been sold upon tender by interested buyers. 
Although small, very short-term advances might be given by the societies to members 
this was on the basis of cocoa actually delivered to the society's store and awaiting 
sale; this was very different from the widespread practice of "selling" future seasons' 
crops to a broker against an advance. This aspect of co-operative policy was another 
serious disincentive to wider participation in the co-operatives. Many peasants were 
caught in a vicious cycle of dependence on the money lender and broker. Even 
relatively better off members of the societies felt a need for the broker's or money 
lender's services. Until a 1937 bye-law made sale of all his produce through the 
cooperatives obligatory, 22% of members sold no cocoa through them, another 54% 
only part (Nowell, 193 8,46). The 22% represented 1,800 out of 9,000 members. The 
54% sold less than one ton each out of 7,000 tons. 35 societies sold no cocoa at all 
in 1932-33. These statistics lend support to the contention that the co-operatives were 
dominated by big peasants. 
Apart from economic factors and contradictions wei(TIling on the co-operative 
jjjo,,, cjj, cjjt tllcl-c NN-cre political contradictions. In the political struggles in the 
countryside the big peasants represented the biggest threat to the political power of 
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chiefs. In acting as 'centres of progressive village thought' the co-operatives could 
serve as an organisational framework for a challenge on the powers of chiefs. Where 
the Chiefs themselves were big cocoa farmers they supported the co-operatives. others 
were decidedly hostile". This fact reflected the changes in the basis of chieftaincy 
induced by the spread of commodity relations resulting in a heterogeneity of view 
points on some issues among chiefs; the big cocoa farmer chief sought the best of both 
his pre-capitalist and capitalist conditions, the chiefs largely reliant on the increasin1gly 
shaky pre-capitalist foundations of his position tended to be generally more 
reactionary. The desire to defuse whatever dangers the co-operatives might pose to 
the system of indirect rule saw the 1937 Co-operative Societies Ordinance adding 
another layer to the already overbearing state control of the societies. Every 
application for registration of a co-operative society had to be made through the 
relevant Paramount Chief, bye-laws and amendments to them were to be forwarded 
for the Registrar's approval through the Paramount Chief who was to append his 
"comments" 
The co-operatives were subjected to vigorous regulation and control by colonial 
government officials. Under the law a cooperative society required the permission of 
the Registrar (the Director of Agriculture) before engaging in any dealings with 
"Foreigners", effectively putting paid to any manoeuvres by the co-operatives to by 
pass the local merchant firms. The Governor was empowered to make rules which 
would form the basis of co-operative 
bvc-laXN, S26 
- The Co-operatives Ordinances of 
-19. 25 Kimble (1903,473-479), Nati\c Affairs Department Reports 1925-. 
'C' 193 1 Ordinance, s. 433,1937 Ordinance, s. 66, Regulations No. 20,24'7? -', 
7. 
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1931 and 1937 provided for stringent requirements to be fulfilled by all societies in 
matters of finance, keeping of records, etc. Extensive powers were given to the 
Registrar of Co-operatives to ensure compliance. Among others he had po,, N-ers of 
audit and inspection and to approve the banks the societies saved with 27 - The 
detailed bureaucracy was well beyond the ability of or found tiresome by most 
societies who were glad to leave these to the agricultural officers. 
The intervention of these officers, pushing the official conception of the co-operatives 
made the societies less creatures of the members and more things of the state. 
Shepard (1936,27) lamented that "almost the entire efforts of agricultural officers in 
the districts are devoted to co-operation. The energies of officers have been so fully 
absorbed in co-operative organisation as to leave little for the investigation of 
problems of cocoa production". He claimed that the agricultural officers were in 
charge of every aspect of the societies' operations 'except the production and delivery 
of cocoa to the society's store (Shepard, 1936,27). In a 1935 memo on the "Work and 
Organisation of the Department of Agriculture" the incumbent Director Grahame 
Auchinleck, strongly defended the relationship between the cooperatives and the 
Department. Auchinleck argued that 
because of the overwhelming importance of cooperative marketing and 
finance to the type of agriculture which it is the policy of the Government to 
foster in the Gold Coast, [lie] \\as entirely opposed to any arrangement which 
will weaken the connection between the movement and the Department of 
Ap'iculture... both because of the importance to agriculture of work towards 
these ends and because the Agricultural officer can best direct the movement 
in tile interest of agriculture, tile movement should remain under the direction 
and control of thc Department of Agriculture". 
" Scctions 30-34,1931 Ordinai-icc. sections 45-47,19337 Ordinance. 
,' Auclunleck to Colonial Sccrctarý'. 13 June 1935 in GNA CSO 268/35. 
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Fitzpatrick and Southwood (1976) indicated a similar process of suffocating colonial 
state control in Papua New Guinea. 
The cost of official control was high. In 1932/33 the co-operative scheme cost the 
State E26,, 000. The sales of co-operative cocoa in the period totalled f 70,000. This 
represented a minuscule share of cocoa production. In 1932 E5.5m of cocoa was 
exported, with 1933 exports being f4.97m. Although by 1935 there were 414 
societies with a total membership of 8,000 none was registered under Ordinance - 
being considered 'immature'. More than 20 years after their initiation, membership 
was still below 15,000 farmers, less than 10% of all producers and the societies sold 
less than 5% of the total output of cocoa. After a brief period of expansion, the 
movement stagnated and in the immediate post-Second World War period membership 
and numbers of societies declined; in 1945 there were 150 societies with about 6,000 
members selling 4% of the total cocoa output (Miracle and Seidman, 1968. ). As 
instruments of colonial policy for improving the quantity of cocoa of a quality 
considered desirable by the manufacturer the cooperative movement was a failure 
considering their insignificant market share. Although they had some attraction for 
some producers they were not primarily designed to advance the interests of the 
peasantry. The contradictions their existence provoked and the State's attempts to 
ýiccomrnodate and control them produced a strait-jacketed scheme. 
Fhat the principal impediment to the groNN-th of the co-operative movement was its 
muzzling cffect on the advancanent of the peasantry. particularly the richer ones \vas 
cx-idcnccd by the spectacular growth the co-operatives ci *o\-cd after the establishment Cý 13 - 
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of the 'diarchy' nationalist/colonial government in 195 1. Nationalist elements were 
appointed to the Board of the Cocoa Marketing Board. Its practice of discrimination 
in the award of licences in favour of foreign firms was ended. Farmers' co-operatives 
could now operate on a larger scale as marketing board agents. By 1955 membership 
stood at 33,00 and the societies sold 20% of the crop purchased by the Board 
(Beckman, 1976,91-102). Foreign control over the local cocoa trade however was 
ended decisively after independence and control over cocoa earnings has been central 
to the efforts of the post-colonial state to respond to the structural distortions 
bequeathed by colonialism. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Sugar and Oil Palm: 1951-1975 
The chapter charts the history and problems of efforts to develop national sufficiency 
in sugar and oil palm in the period before the initiation of the four case study projects. 
It examines the factors that affected the outcome of the efforts particularly the role of 
the state and international capital. The period covered manifests shifts in the economic 
strategies of the state linked with changes in government. These range from the neo- 
classical liberalism of the first decade (1951-61) of the Nkrumah regime, through the 
years after its "Left Turn" (1961-66) when the public sector was given a central role 
in economic development, to the swing back to a faith in private capital during the 
NLC/Busia years (1966-72) which again swung back towards a compromise between 
the private and public sectors in during the NRC/SMC regime (1972-79) 
(Murray, 1967; Marshall, 1976; Hutchful, 1979; Konings, 1986,14-2 1). 
6.1. The Pattern of Demand for Sugar, Soap and Palm Oil 
The domestic production of sugar and soap and the related modernisation and 
expansion of vegetable oil production were among the industries considered by W. A 
Lewis in his 1953 Report'. He concluded that the local market for sugar could 
support a1), 000 tons a year factory and that prospects for the industry would be 
. 
Mi, ourable provided there was an irrigated nucleus plantation; otherwise conditions 
were unfwwurable. He placed production of vegetable oil in thefai, ourable category. 
'Lewis, W. A (19ý-, ) - Report on Industrial isation and the Gold Coast, Government Printer, Accra. 
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Lewis recognised "ultimate" prospects for "killing several birds Nvith one stone" 
through a vegetable oil industry which serviced a soap factory and produced cake for 
feeding livestock. He however thought a soap factory was a marginal case although 
"the demand for soap could support a large modem factory", moving into the 
favourable category if caustic soda or soda ash could be economically produced 
locally. For both sugar and vegetable oil/soap production, Lewis drew attention to the 
crucial relationship between an adequate agricultural raw material base and a 
successful manufacturing industry (Lewis, 1953, passim). 
On the eve of independence the Gold Coast was a net importer of oils and fats. Palm 
oil exports ceased in 1955 though small quantities palm kernels, averaging 6,748 tons 
a year over the period 1950-59, continued to be exported. After the Second World 
War Gold Coast palm oil exports only once exceeded 500 tons. In 1950 the colony 
imported 83,000 gallons of edible oils and 253,000 lbs of butter substitutes. The post- 
War boom in the price of cocoa and the expanding home market for edible oils were 
the principal causes of the drying up of exports and growth in imports. Although 
there was an old indigenous soap industry based on palm oil and the ash of plantain 
peels, it is almost certain that it was not a factor in the growth of the home market for 
vegetable oils, its trend being one of decline. 
'-)'tigar and soap imports grew sharply during the boom in consumer imports in the 
decadc up to the balance of payments crisis of 1961 which was the most important 
I III pu I se for the "ICftturn" by the CPP government 
(K II lick, 1978,264. Scidman. 1 98710 1). Total 1961 imports, accompanied by the 
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collapse of international cocoa prices, were equivalent to 34% of GDP compared to 
29% in 1955; more than 40% of this comprised non-durable consumer goods (Killick 
in Birmingham, et. al, 1966,359). The f26m cost of food imports in 1961 represented 
a 262% rise on the 1951 amount of E9.9m. In 1960 food alone constituted over 19% 
of the value of imports (Hansen, 1987,3 1). Annual imports of sugar jumped from 
14,000 tons in 1951 to 70,, 000 tons in 1961, a 500 per cent increase. From around 
6,100 tons', valued at f 0.66m in 1950, soap imports climbed to 11,113 tons worth 
fl. 2m in 1953 and topped 20,000 tons in 1959. At E2.74m the cost of 1961 soap 
imports represented a more than 400 per cent increase over 1950. The supply of the 
two commodities were among those affected by the tightening up on imports which 
accompanied the CPP's 1961 "Left Turn". 
The import trade liberalisation policies of the NLC/Busia regimes that succeeded the 
CPP produced a dramatic pick up in the import of soap and sugar, especially under 
the Busia regime which accelerated the policy initiated by the NLC. By July 1971 76 
per cent of imports came in under the Open General Licence (OGL) compared to 27.8 
per cent at the time the NLC left office. High cocoa prices, supplemented by new 
credits, funded an import boom, mainly of consumer goods. The price of cocoa 
peaked in 1970 and thereafter fell sharply (Killick, 1978,307). This downturn 
coincided with a Jump in debt servicing outflows but imports continued to grow. 
Imports for the first half of 1971 were 20 per cent greater than for the corresponding 
period of 1970 (Leith, 1974.148). The bubble however burst in late 1971. 
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Sugar had loomed large in the import boom. The NLC placed the commodity under 
the OGL and from 1966 imports of sugar grew significantly. Between 1966 and 1971 
average annual imports had risen to 76,500 tons compared with around 533.300 tons 
for 1961-65. In 1970 sugar represented 26.2% of the total cost of OGL food imports! 
In the same year 115,000 tons of sugar worth 16m cedis was imported; this was a big 
jump from the 67,000 tons of the previous year and the average annual cost of 7m 
cedis for the preceding eight years. In 1971 the gulf between national consumption 
and production of sugar was considerable; nearly 95,000 tons was consumed compared 
with a combined output of 10,800 tons from Asutsuare and Komenda. At that time 
demand was projected to reach at least 159,000 tons by 1980, more than three and half 
times the installed capacity of the two local factories. Faced with a growing balance 
of payments deficit the government announced austerity measures in its July 1971 
Budget that included an attempt to control imports. Some food items, including sugar, 
were taken off the OGL list. The move helped bring the year's imports of sugar down 
to 50,000 tons but the restriction of food imports contributed to a 12.4% increase in 
food prices that year. This fuelled popular discontent and the creation of the political 
conditions for the coup d'etat of 13 January 1972 which brought the National 
Redemption Council (NRC) to power (Leith, 1974; Chazan, I 983, ch 7). 
Soon after seizing power the NRC announced a policy of "self reliance": it rolled back 
the import liberalisation policy, revalued the cedi, and announced a unilateral 
repudiation of some of the debts from the Nkrumah period. Two agricultural schemes, 
"Operation Fecd Yourself' (OFY), launched in February 1972, and "Operation Feed 
Your Industries", initiated in 1974 provided the framework of the dri%, e for national 
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self reliance was expressed in the two schemes (Hutchful, 1979. Goody, 1980; 
Konings, 1986, passim). Efforts at increased domestic production went hand in hand 
with import controls. Sugar, and soap, were among eleven "essential commodities', 
that the NRC placed under the trading monopoly of an Essential Commodities 
Committee, with their prices subject to state control and subsidy. The cost of these 
subsidies was a not insignificant burden on government finances; in its first six months 
the NRC paid out about 5 million cedis as subsidy on sugar alone, 3m cedis (i. e. 
$2.3m) of this in foreign exchange. From around 1976 when the economy went into 
steep decline, the NRC/SMC's subsidy policy became a political economic "Catch-22": 
the populist allure of retaining it increased as its economic price rose. 
6.2. The Sugar Industry: 1953-73 
The proposals for the sugar industry contained in the Lewis Report underlined the fact 
that the complete dependence of the Gold Coast on imported sugar had nothing to do 
with the impossibility of domestic production. Many parts of the country have 
suitable conditions for the successful cultivation of sugar cane and local varieties of 
the crop had been grown for many years (Wills, 1962,383 
)2. Within the general 
colonial policy of concentrating efforts on the production of export crops. the 
development of an import substituting sugar industry in the Gold Coast was among 
those least likely to be considered. British colonies in the Caribbean were dependent 
2 For the climatic conditions for the production of sugar cane see Courtenay (1980,130) and 
huemtIonal Sugar Council (1963EVol 11.61). 
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on the sugar industry and British firms were heavily involved in the international trade 
in the commodity. 
Sugar production was among the imports substituting industries that the coloniat 
administration experimented with in the face of import constraints during the Second 
World War. In 1943 the Department of Agriculture, using sugar cane crushers 
imported from India, organised demonstrations on simple technology production of 
sugar and molasses in some districts of the Gold Coast (La Anyane, 1963,158). In 
1948 the government commissioned a feasibility study on a local sugar industry. On 
the basis of this study, research on the cultivation of sugar cane was started at Kpong 
on the Lower Volta in 1953. The colonial era however ended with the Gold Coast 
wholly dependent on imported sugar. The Kpong research scheme later served as the 
iiucleus of the Asutsuare sugar project while the Komenda factory built on a Dutch- 
designed pilot cane growing scheme started in 1959. 
The Asutsuare and Komenda sugar schemes were part of the giddy expansion of the 
productive public sector after 1961. A substantial part of investment went into the 
food industry. Within this industry only fishing received more public investment than 
Sugar production (Reusse, 1968,47). The Asutsuare scheme was designed, equipped 
and established by a Polish firm, CEKOP. The Komenda plant was supplied by 
Tec lino-E x port of Czechoslovakia. By the time they started production in 1966 and 
1967 respectively, total capital outlay on them (excluding irrigation works) was about 
$25m. Both plants xvcre expected to reach full capacity production in their third year 
of opermion. The Asutsuare factory ý, vas designed to produce 30,000 tons of sugar 
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annually on the basis of a production run of 150 days a year. It was capable of 
crushing 2,000 tons of sugar cane a day, with a sugar recovery rate of 10%. The 
Komenda plant had a daily crushing capacity of 1.000 tons of cane and annual sugar 
output of 15,000 tons. The combined potential maximum output of the two factories 
was equivalent to 60% of 1961 sugar imports. 
Considering the 7YP's projection of national sugar demand of 200,000 tons in 1975, 
the sugar production schemes it contained were by no means extravagant. Apart from 
the foreign exchange savings that such an industry would make, other arguments were 
made in its favour. The creation of industrial and agricultural employment was one. 
The production of alcohol for beverages, cosmetics and the pharmaceutical industry 
and, combined with petroleum products a base for plastics was another. Also, the by- 
product bagasse could be used for the manufacture of hardboards and wrapping paper. 
From when they commenced production until the 1973 World Bank funded GHASEL 
Rehabilitation Scheme, the factories produced nowhere near full capacity. The 
combined average annual sugar output of the two factories was just over 5,000 tons, 
about 11% of capacity. The highest output was in 1971 when the combined 
production of the two factories was 18,700 tons: but this was primarily from the 
refining of imported raw sugar! Between 1966-71 sugar recovery rate averaged 4.0% 
at Asutsuare and 6.5% at Komenda compared with an industry norm of 9-10% 
(O'Loughlin, 1972,16). The schemes did not only fail to make an appreciable 
contribution to the satisfaction of domestic demand but also run up losses, estimated 
at $6.85ni, bv the end of 1971 (World Bank, 1972,5). 
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The factories persistently suffered from an inadequate and irregular supply of cane. 
There was also a problem with the quality of the cane that was produced especially 
that supplied by outgrowers; field preparation, cane planting and cultivation by both 
the factory's estate and outgrowers at Asutsuare was pronounced "unsatisfactory" by 
the World Bank (1972: 11). With even the limited supply of cane that was available, 
there was poor coordination of harvesting and crushing resulting in cane lying around 
for unsatisfactory lengths of time after being cut. These two factors were the principal 
reasons for the poor sugar recovery rate. At Asutsuare there were problems with the 
machinery for milling and refining (Okyere, 1979, van der Wet, 1973, 
O'Loughlin, 1972). 
These production problems were rooted in the sugar industry's specific experience of 
the consequences of the character of the post-colonial state and policies especially a) 
the inadequate preparation of the schemes; b) the defects in how they were organised 
ýind managed; c) the changes in state policy on the public sector, in the wake of 
changes of regimes; and d) the overall national economic environment. At a general 
level questions have been raised about the particular choice of technology i. e the 
preference for large scale capital intensive production of highly refined sugar. 
Ghana's historical dependence on sugar imported by local branches of British firms 
liad created a household consumer preference for highly refined sugar, granulated or 
cubcd, particularly the latter. The strength of this preference is reflected by the blurb 
in aii advertisement for made-in-Ghana sugar in the house journal of GHASEL which 
Nvent as folloxvs,: "Sugar is sugar. Wiv not start using 'produced in Ghana' granulated 
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sugar ... 
The taste is as good as cube sugar"'. Cubed and granulated sugar accounted 
for 36,539 tons out of total imports of 38,207 tons of sugar and sugar products in 
1963. 
It has been argued that, while some quantity of highly refined sugar would always be 
required, a large part of domestic consumption and industrial use could be satisfied by 
lower grade sugar (O'Loughlin, 1972,14). For example, distillers of the local gin 
akpeteshie usually use granulated sugar though molasses, syrups or wet crystals would 
be adequate replacements if available. The choice of technology also has 
consequences for the political economy of the industry. Lower grade sugar can be 
produced by smaller mills which are technically simpler, do not require large 
plantations as a base and could also be spread among more areas suitable for cane 
production (O'Loughlin, 1972, passim; Okyere, 1979, ch 3)'. 
Although the erection of both factories had been preceded by some feasibility study 
and research Asutsuare and Komenda were the only two out of many potential sites 
where soil analysis was carried out. O'Loughlin (1972,14-15) has claimed that some 
other areas, for example Tsito, are climat1cally better suited for non-irrigated sugar 
cane cultivation. In fact the plant which was erected at Komenda had been meant for 
Tsito where no soil survey had been done. After being kept in a Czech warehouse for 
' GHASEL News 1,1 April 1975. 
For implicit counter arguments see below. I 
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two years, at Ghana's expense, it was sent to Komenda ,, N-here there was a 400 acre 
pilot sugar cane scheme (Miracle & Seidman, 1968,40). 
The decision to site a sugar factory at Komenda was partly due to the CPP's criterion 
of avoiding a geographic concentration of manufacturing and spreading industry 
around the country to serve as poles of growth for relatively undeveloped areas'. 
Some have argued that it would have made more economic sense to have established 
a single larger scheme at Asutsuare, not only because it has better conditions for sugar 
cane but also economies of scale would have lowered production costs and provided 
more scope for the industrial utilisation of the by-products. It has been further argued 
that the idea of concentrating resources on Asutsuare did not appear to have been 
considered (van der Wei, 1973: 7). 
These arguments are however less weighty than they appear to be for a number of 
reasons. At the time construction was started, the planned crushing capacity and 
annual sugar output of both factories were around the world average for sugar plants 
of 1,500 tons of cane per day and about 20,000 tons a year respectively 
(ISC, 1963, passim). Given the novelty of the enterprise the decision to go for average 
sized plants within the chosen technology seems sensible. At Asutsuare a shortage of 
labour for the agricultural side of the industry emerged as a major problem, 
retrospectively weakening the argument for a concentration of production at there. 
The fact that equipment for the factories came from two countries that have traditions 
of sugar beet rather than cane cultivation and processing has been cited as accounting 
Interestinviv Seidman ( 1978, passim) considered the Asutsuare plant as having the potential to be a 
, orowth pole while being severely critical of the 
lack of planning which preceded the Komenda scheme. 
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for some of the technical and management problems that the factories have faced 
(Grayson, 1973,336). This can be seen as a particular kind of poor project preparation. 
The Nkrumah government turned to Eastern Europe for help with the industry only 
after the World Bank withdrew an initial offer to provide funding, through the IFC, 
for the setting up of the industry6. By the World Bank's own account, before setting 
up the industry in the public sector the CPP government had contemplated the 
involvement of private capital and had asked for IFC participation. However, when 
the government settled for public ownership the Bank pulled back since it "considered 
private ownership to be essential" (World Bank, 1981,9). 
Inadequate preparation of the schemes was intertwined with wider shortcomings in 
national economic planning. The sugar industry suffered from problems in the overall 
conception and preparation of the expansion of the public sector, including the general 
failure to integrate the development of raw material production and factory 
construction. The original conception of both Asutsuare and Komenda was based on 
the factories being fed with sugar cane from large scale irrigated farms 
(Ghana, 1964,70). The plan for the factories to be supplied by irrigated plantations was 
significantly modified by the Nkrumah regime when it became clear that the cost 
could not be met from overstretched public resources. 
'For the ten-ns of tile Polish and Czech agreements see WlAfrica, April 23 1966 and July 29 1967. 
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The industrial cultivation of sugar cane was an innovation in Ghanaian agriculture. the 
long history of production of local varieties notwithstanding. Established commercial 
varieties of sugar cane with high sugar content were introduced from the Caribbean. 
and as late as the 1970s tests to establish their performance under Ghanaian conditions 
were still going on. Large scale cultivation of the crop also entailed agricultural 
practices, labour processes, organisation and discipline which had no tradition in the 
country. The dismal performance of the large scale state farms, discussed earlier, was 
due in part to the difficulties of developing and managing a classical plantation labour 
process in an agricultural sector dominated by traditions and practices of small holder 
production. Thus, even if the original idea of an agro-base of large scale irrigated 
cane farms had been fully implemented, the training and orientation of labour to the 
needs of the new crop and its processing would have had to overcome a number of 
obstacles. At Asutsuare some of the initial work of the management included the 
training of field assistants and technicians (Miracle & Seidman, 1968,42). The decision 
to depend primarily on rain-fed sugar cane meant that more than the originally planned 
acreage of cane had to be grown since yields would be lower. 
The turn to rain-fed cane was accompanied by a change in the organisation of 
production: in addition to the large estate farms, the factories were also to be supplied 
by smallholder outgrowers organised into cooperatives under the United Ghana 
Famiers Co-operative Council (UGFCC). The involvement of outgrowers in feeding 
the factories complicated a crucial element of the organisation and management of the 
industry: the business of organising and managing the imparting of new cultural 
practices and enforcing quality standards. In 1968 there werc 60 cooperative societies 
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at Asutsuare and 120 at Komenda (Okyere, 1979,8). Although the cooperatives broke 
up after the dissolution of the UGFCC by the NLC. outgrowers were established as 
a key source of supply for the two sugar factories. In fact. the NLC/Busia period saxv 
new social types becoming outgrowers, a matter discussed in detail below. On the eve 
of the World Bank Rehabilitation Project, outgrower farms constituted 80 % of total 
cane acreage at Asutsuare and 54% at Komenda (World Bank, 1981,2 1). 
Organisational and management problems, reflecting the wider national shortage of 
skilled personnel, were prime reasons for the production difficulties of the sugar 
industry (van der Wel, 1973,2; World Bank; Killick). The agreements for the 
establishment of the sugar industry made provision for the training of technical and 
management personnel, aspects of which have already been mentioned. These 
contracts were disrupted by the 1966 coup. Although the sugar industry came on 
stream in the post Nkrumah period, it bore many important marks of that period 
during which it was established, especially the country's shortage of skilled personnel 
that was acutely highlighted by the pace of public sector expansion. 
The widespread practice of dividing integral tasks among different parastatals saw the 
development of the estate sugar plantations being assigned to the State Farms 
Corporation (SFC), Nvith the factory under the Sugar Products Corporation. Section 
I (Iii) of the law establishing the latter corporation, the Sugar Products Corporation 
Instrument, 196-5 (L. 1 407), did provide for it to "co-operate with the Statc Farms 
Corporation -md other producers of sugar cane and other sources of su(, ar in the tý 
dcvelopment wid improvement of its sources of raxv material". Interestingly t, ý 
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immediately preceding this provision was s. 2(ii) empowering it to "own and operate 
sugar cane plantations for the purposes of assuring regular raw materials for its mills". 
The UGFCC was put in charge of the industry's small holder cane farming 
component, adding yet another entity to those which had to be coordinated to give the 
Sugar Products Corporation the assurance of "regular raw materials for its mills". 
Failure to integrate the development of raw material production and the building of 
processing facilities was a pervasive problem with the agro-based industries set up in 
the last years of the Nkrumah regime. The sugar schemes, together with some fruit 
and vegetable canning projects, exhibited this flaw (Grayson, 1973,335-340; 
Killick,, 1978,232-234). The phenomenon had two dimensions. Firstly failure to see 
the agricultural and industrial sides of agro-industrial schemes as one project. There 
seems to have been greater forward planning and integration of the agricultural and 
industrial sides at Asutsuare than there was at Komenda,, the latter project quickly run 
into difficulties over cane supply. Yields of non-irrigated sugar cane at Komenda 
were estimated at between 20-25 tons an acre, which meant full daily production 
consumed 40 acres of cane. Sugar cane takes between 12-15 months to mature. 
depending on the variety and the climate. The Komenda factory was completed in 
1966. At that time less than 1,000 acres of cane, enough for 25 days of factory 
production, had been cultivated. Having been in production in 1966/67 the factory 
shut for a period in 1967/68 because of insufficient supply of cane. 
Hic pace of expansion of the productive public scctor during the First Republic put 
a great strain on Ghana's administrative and managerial resources. The point was 
174 
acknowledged by the CPP government itself and noted by its friends and critics 
(Ghana, 1964 1 11; BI unt , 19 70 ; 
Berg inFosterand 
Zolberg, 197 1 ; Botchwey, 1973; Grayson, 1973). The inadequate preparation of projects 
was a manifestation of the problem and it carried into execution (Greenstreet, 19 7 -3 3,2 
8). 
The problems arising from personnel shortages were aggravated by organisational 
weaknesses due to a) the excessive centralisation of some powers and functions at the 
same time as the clecentralisation of others, resulting in administrative overlaps, 
conflicts and gaps among state organisations and functionaries; b) the division among 
different organisations, along Civil Service lines, of activities that were integral in a 
manner that created problems of coordination which undermined the objectives of one 
or the other of the organisations, and b) the divergence between formal legal and 
administrative arrangements and practice (Botchwey, 1973; Pozen, 1972). 
Botchwey has made a revealing analysis of the provisions of the Instruments setting 
up enterprises under the Statutory Corporations Act, 1964 (Act 232) and L. 1 457 of 
1964 that set up the State Enterprises Secretariat (SES), the body which was meant to 
oversee the operations of statutory corporations engaged in trade and industry. He 
accepts that the lack of trained personnel contributed to the inability of the SES to 
carrv out its statutory functions but convincingly rejected the argument that inadequate 
legal controls were also a factor. 
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In his view (Botchwey, 1973,71), the problem -,. N-as partly due to: 
"the SES and its subsidiaries ... operating on two distinct jural norms based 
upon two contradictory principles. On one hand was the statute of the SES 
which gave it authority to effectively direct all aspects of the subsidiary's 
activity, and on the other was the set of instruments creating the subsidiaries 
which, while acknowledging responsibility to a number of government 
departments including SES, expressly issues an injunction to all such 
departments against interference in matters of management. 
Problems arising from the dispersal of functions did not go away with the overthrow 
of the CPP regime. One commentator has reported how, at a meeting he attended at 
the Finance Ministry in 1970, the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) 
which run the sugar factories and two sections of the Ministry of Agriculture (the 
mechanisation and irrigation departments) each presented separate and contradictory 
plans for the cultivation of sugar cane. He was pessimistic about the outcome of an 
agreement by the parties to try and reconcile their positions because "the gap between 
intention and performance was so large that there could be little confidence that 
actions were coordinated in actual practice" (Killick, 1978,258). 
I. ack of coordination among different state organisations was not the only problem that 
persi, stcd beyond the CPP period. GIHOC was created in 1968 by the NLC, replacing 
the State L nterprises Secretariat'. Twenty state enterprises, with a total of twenty nine 
factories (left over from the NLC regime's less than successful privatisation drive) 
were made into divisions of GIHOC. The Sugar Products Corporation became the 
'Sugar Products Division ol'GIHOC, which it remained until it mutated into GHASEL 
as part of tile World Bank scheme. GIHOC was central to the attempts of the NI-C 
I Ghana Industrial Holdim-, Corporation Decree, 1967 (NLCD 207). 
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and Busia regimes to build a public sector devoid of the problems and mistakes of the 
Nkrumah period (Pozen, 1972,825-828). However, its divisions. predictably, could not 
avoid organic problems of the country's political economy such as shortages of 
management and technical stafP. For some, GIHOC's difficulties were compounded 
by it being poorly conceived: its objectives were ill-defined and its conglomerate 
character combined some very disparate activities resulting in even more strains on its 
limited technical and management resources (World Bank, 1972: passim)". "Holding" 
in GIHOC's name has been described as a misnomer since management of the 
"divisions" was centralised at the Company's headquarters. This administrative set up 
combined with the geographic dispersal of component units in a situation of poor 
communication facilities added to the management problems. 
The effects of all these on the Sugar Products Division in particular were compounded 
by the basic changes in government policy on the public sector after the overthrow of 
the CPPI'. As part of de-emphasising the role of the sector both the NLC and Busia 
regimes reduced the flow of resources to it. The private sector was given a greater 
allocation of bank credit and import licences (Esseks, 1971,47). Getting some of what 
state funding was available was not easy. Applications to the state for working capital 
Nvas usually granted only after the GIHOC management had repeatedly justified the 
request. Also "each time a GIFIC (sic) enterprise asked for additional funds , it not 
'See Grayson (1973) for a detailed discussion of GIHOC 
9The World Bank's criticism of GIHOC is interesting: according to Grayson (1973,327) GlHOC came 
out of a sti-gestion the self same World Bank made to Nkrumah some months before the 1966 coup. 
" The new emphasis on private enterprise had important consequences for the industry's, agro-base, 
something discussed in the chapter on outgrowers. 
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only had to justify its request ... 
but each time and over and over again, it had to justify 
the very existence of the enterprise itself '(Grayson. 1973,3 26). During the preparation 
of the 1969/70 Budget it took the threat of the GIHOC management to close the two 
plants to save their budgetary allocations from being cut. In 1971/72 Komenda and 
Asutsuare were the only two manufacturing SOEs still included in the national 
development budget. The less than enthusiastic support from the state, combined with 
the general shortage of foreign exchange, meant that additional equipment for the 
factories and cane fields could not be bought. 
Perhaps more damaging for the sugar industry was the managerial instability, loss of 
technical personnel and disruption of the training of Ghanaians that resulted from the 
new policy orientation towards SOEs and the strong anti-communist posture of the 
NLC/Busia regimes. Polish and Czech personnel at the two sugar factories were 
among the numbers of Eastern European personnel who left the country or were 
expelled in the wake of the 1966 coup. Though some remained in a technical 
capacity'' through to 1972, under an arrangement with the government and later 
GIHOC, their small number (in 1972 there were three at each plant) and the post- 
Nkrumah political atmosphere was hardly conducive to their effective involvement in 
the development of what was still an infant industry. Apart from the fact that there 
werc no Ghanaians with the requisite training to fill key positions, there was no proper 
handing over by the departing Czech and Poles. After their departure many vital 
documents could not bc found". 
'' Fasteni Europeans were general managers of the factories before the coup. 
'21merview with NIr Okine, Technical Adviser at GHASEL (29 October 1981). 
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An agreement with Associated Consulting Engineers Ltd (ACE) of Pakistan, under 
which they took over management of Komenda in 1968 and Asutsuare in 1969 till 
June 1972, did little to improve the performance of the industry. Under the agreement 
ACE were,, among other things, to provide a general manager, agronomist and sugar 
technologist for each factory, institute a training programme and provide overall 
guidance for the industry, for a fee of $18,100 a month. According to the World 
Bank, ACE's failure was due to lack of finance and lack of policy direction from 
GlHOC and the shortage of technical staff and labour(World Bank. 1972: 4-5). Others 
have argued that any faith in the contract was misplaced since ACE were not in fact 
qualified to fulfil the terms of their agreement with GIHOCII. ACE had been 
consulting engineers during the construction of the two factories. Mr Okine has 
claimed that the firm had no experience of managing a sugar industry and brought in 
very low grade personnel to fulfil its agreement with GIHOCII. Certainly at the time 
they left there were not more than two or three Ghanaians capable of filling key 
management positions and the losses of the industry had increased (World 
Bank, I 972, Annex 2,, Table 3). 
By June 1972, when ACE's contract formally ended, sugar was of heightened 
economic and political importance. These political and economic factors added to a) 
'' Interview Nvith Mr Okine, ibid. 
" Ghai & Choong (1988) approvingly cite those provisions of the GIHOC-ACE concerned with the 
training of Ghanaians for technical and managerial positions and the division of powers on policy 
between a host institution and a foreign manager (GlHOC retained the basic decision making power 
subject to advice in the form of proposals from ACE). They argue that this kind of arrangement aids 
the host institution to acquire information on aspects of an industry helping its decision making and 
participation (p. 2121). Their own caveat about the 
limited value of legal provisions would be vindicated 
if Okine's claims that ACE did not have the capacit% to fulfil the attractive terms of their contract are 
tnie. 
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the satisfaction of growing demand, b) ending the huge losses. c) saving the jobs of 
the nearly 7,000 persons involved in the sugar industry, and more hopefully d) getting 
some return on the big investment made in the sub-sector as sources of pressure on 
the Ghanaian state to act to solve the industry's problems. This was the situation 
within which the World Bank funded Ghana Sugar Estates Ltd (GHASEL) 
rehabilitation scheme took off in 1973, after a gestation period stretching back to the 
NLC years. 
6.3. Palm Oil and Soap Production: 1951-1975 
6.3.1. Tallow-based Soap in Oil Palm Country 
When President Nkrumah officially opening Unilever's Lever Brothers Ghana Ltd 
(LBG), soap factory in Tema in August 1963 he expansively declared: 
It was with soap that it all began. Now the wheel has turned full circle and 
Lever Brothers, who originally came to Ghana for the raw material, are today 
manufacturing here the finished product". 
At the time of commissioning, the managing director of UAC claimed that the 
equipment of the f2 million factory, capable of producing 24,000 tons of hard soap 
a year, were "the most modern and sophisticated of any soap factory in the world"'. 
By 1972 the company had expanded its capacity to about 40,000 tons of soap and 
detergent powders and was also producing toothpaste, margarine and cooking and 
bakery fats. In 1964 the Ghanaian state became a 49 per cent share holder in LBG. 
'5 West Aftica, August 31 1,1963. 
" West Afirica, Aug ust 3 1.1961 - 
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a share which rose to 55 per cent in 1975 following the Investment Policy Decree. 
An article in a 1972 issue the Investment Journal (1972.3.4: 13) official organ of the 
Capital Investment Board hailed LBG as "a successful joint venture". In truth the size 
of the state's shareholding had little consequence for Unilever's control over the firm 
which was underpinned by a management contract which gave Unilever considerable 
powers (Ghai and Choong, 1988,20). 
Nkrumah's statement was misleading in so far as it gave the impression that a once- 
exported raw material was being used at source to produce a hitherto imported 
commodity. LBG can be considered a classic example of how the ISI drive of post- 
colonial African regimes in many cases served to consolidate the power of some 
TNCs. It was very much a 'branch plant'. Freedom to set up an imported raw- 
material based plant was an important factor in Unilever's decision to set up LBG. 
At the time the factory started production Ghana was a net importer of vegetable oils 
and continued to be so into the 1980s (Okyere, 1980; FAO, 1980; Republic of Ghana, 
1982). Until 1971 when it started using local palm and coconut oils for the production 
of edible fats LBG did not use local vegetable oils in its production. 
I'lle terminal decline of palm oil exports during the 1950s coincided with the acute 
post-war shortage of oils and fats that hit the Western countries and produced the 
abortive British groundnut schemes in Africa, symbolised by the multi-million pound 
East African prQject (Wood, 19-50). The Oilseeds production plan, instigated by 
Unilever, did not leave the Gold Coast untouched. In fact, following the regional tour 
of the British (lovernment's West Africa Oil Seeds Mission of June-July 1947, the 
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Gold Coast was the first of the West African colonies to submit a plan for the 
mechanised production of groundnuts. The Gold Coast version of the "Groundnut 
Affair", the ill-fated Gonja Settlement and Development Scheme of the early fifties, 
was the outcome of this episode (Morgan, 1980, Vol 2, ch 4; Quansah, 1972). 
The 1950s saw the beginning of efforts to move away from a dependence on wild 
natural oil palms and modernise oil palm cultivation. Between 1952-60 the state 
distributed nearly two million seeds of improved varieties imported from the Nigeria- 
based West African Institute for Oil Palm Research (WAIFOR); demand for the new 
seedlings was much greater than supply (Wills, 1962: 363). In this period most 
plantings were small scale. The state made its first move into large scale oil palm 
farming when the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) acquired the 2,483 
acre Prestea oil palm plantation from a bankrupt private owner. This was followed 
in 1961 by the ADC's purchase from Pamol, the Unilever subsidiary, of its 1,300 acre 
oil palm plantation and mill, established in 1914, for f 100,000. In 1964 a national Oil 
Palm Research Centre (OPRC) was set up at Chid in the oil belt of the Eastern 
Region. This was to give an important boost to the growth of the modern oil palm 
industry in later years (World Bank/FAO, 1989). 
Me post 1961 expansion of large scale public sector farming involved significant 
attention to increasing oil palm acreage. The Seven Year Development Plan of 1964 
(7YP) considered the crop as having very attractive prospects "because of the sizeable 
doiiiestic deniand that already exists for cooking purposes and for the manufacture of 
soap" (Ghana. 1964,70). The State Farnis Corporation (SFC) was to be the main 
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vehicle for meeting this demand. In 1965 the Corporation had over 8,600 acres of oil 
palm. In the same year the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) started givinc, 
loans for the cultivation of oil palm, a policy it continued into the post Nkrumah 
period. It was during this period of rapid expansion of large scale oil palm acreage 
that the potentially single largest domestic industrial consumer of vegetable oil, 
Unilever's LBG soap factory, started operations. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s LBG, and soap factories established after it, 
depended on imported tallow and vegetable oils for soap production; indeed LBG, 
with the "the advantageous position as monopolist of the market"" expanded its 
import-dependent production. As late as 1979, foreign inputs accounted for 86 per 
cent of the value of manufactures in "soap cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics 
and toilet preparations" sub-sector. Admittedly this is much wider than soap 
manufacturing but still of some indicative value". The quantity of tallow imports, 
like that of most other commodities, fluctuated with the availability of foreign 
exchange rather than demand . In the 1970s palm oil 
imports while fluctuating, 
showed an upward trend. In 1971 palm oil and kernel oil imports were 2,800 tons. 
This rose to 17,300 tons in 1974, declined to 3,500 in 1975, then shot up to 29,600 
tons in 1977 (FAO, 1980; World Bank, 1982,32). 
I Fhough it came on stream in 1963, LBG was very niticli a product of the CPP's 
immediate post- independence devclopment strategy and reflected how the drive for ISI 
"Investment Joumal (1972), 1,4.1 3, . 
" See Republic of Ghana, Industrial Statistics, 1977-79. 
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overlapped with strategic choices faced by some TNCs in that period. Unilever had 
first seriously considered the possibility of producing soap in the Gold Coast in 1934 
when it had appeared its dominant position (it had 80 per cent of the market for 
imported soap) might be threatened by the newly-established Accra Chemical Works 
(ACW). The threat did not materialise because ACW's production stabilised around 
less than 700 tons. By the 1950s, the factors earlier argued as pushing TNCs to invest 
in ISI in post colonial Africa starkly faced Unilever in respect of its soap trade in 
Ghana. The firm was the primary beneficiary of the growth of soap imports in the 
1950s, ninety seven per cent of the 6,135 tons of hard and toilet soaps imported into 
the Gold Coast in 1950 came from Unilever. Sales rose to over 10,000 tons (out of 
total imports of 11,112 tons) in 1953, worth f 150,000 in pre-tax profits to United 
Exporters Ltd (UEL), Unilever's local import organisation. By 1959 sales were just 
under 20,000 tons. In the words of Fieldhouse (1978,411) "by 1953, Unilever had a 
very much more valuable import trade to protect than before the war" 
The CPP's first steps towards ISI provided the context for the first substantive move 
by Unilever towards the setting up of a local production capacity. In a statement on 
fI oreign investment in March 1953, Nkrumah indicated that new industries would be 
granted relief from duties on imported raw materials. This was soon followed by the 
recommendation of the Lewis Report (para 221-240) that marginal and favourable 
industries be aided in various Nva-ys, including beingý -(-, Iven 
tariff protection. In 
NoN, cmber 1954 Unilever informed the Governor of the Gold Coast that it NVOLIld sct 
tip a soap plant in the Gold Coast provided three conditions were met. It sought a) 
an increase in import duties on soap: from the then Icvel of 5 per cent to 15 per cent 
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or more ad valorem on hard soaps and to 25 per cent on toilet soaps; b) the abolition 
of import duties on raw materials for soap; and c) adequate facilities for a factory at 
Tema. 
The matter was picked up with the Ghana government in 1959. In 1960, with 
indications of a positive response, Unilever started work on a factory at Tema. In 
1962 following a meeting between Nkrumah and the managing director of UAC, LBG 
received assurances of most favoured treatment: tariff protection against imported soap 
either through removal of duties on imported raw materials or an increase in that 
levied on imported soap. In fact, by the time the factory started production all imports 
of hard soap were banned (Fieldhouse, 1978,405-417). The company was also granted 
some of the benefits and exemptions contained in the 1963 Capital Investment Act, 
e. g five-year income tax and property rates exemption, capital allowances and free 
transfer of capital. 
Curiously, in spite of the 7YP's projection about a market in the soap industry for 
palm oil, in the Plan's table of industrial targets for 1969 the production of soap 
(projected at 35,000 tons) was not expected to use any local raw materials". This 
discrepancy could be simply due sloppiness in drafting or an assumption that LBG was 
1'ree to use the cheapest raw materials regardless of source which certainly put local 
palm oil out of the running. Could Unilever's sale of its Sese oil palm plantation 
(ironically to the ADC) in 1961 be taken as signalling a long term intention to base 
"' See Table 5 .2 on p. 
103 of Seven year Development Plan. 
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production at LBG on imports or as merely a recognition of an objective prospect that 
local supplies would be inadequate? 
The restoration of exports could not have been part of the calculation behind the fairly 
modest projections of the 7YP since at the time important changes were afoot in the 
international oilseeds trade. One was the emergence of cheaper South East Asian 
producers of palm oil and kernel, with the advantage of optimal climatic conditions. 
Even today the best attainable yields on well managed plantations under the most 
favourable climatic conditions for the crop in Ghana are no more than II tons of fresh 
fruit bunches (ffb) per hectare (in practice nearer 8 tons) compared with 20-25 týha in 
Malaysia (Ghana National Investment Bank, 1987, Ch 2; FAO, 1989,8; Khera, 1976). 
The other change was the radical shifts in the international demand for and uses of oil 
seeds. Since the Second World War the growing demand for animal feedstocks has 
induced a movement away from seeds with high oil content towards seeds with low 
oil and high protein content (Raikes, 1988,127). Palm kernels have a comparatively 
lower feed value. 
We have already noted the dramatic disruption and curtailment of the CPP's economic 
plans, including the development of local raw material supplies for ISI enterprises, by 
the 1966 coup. SFC oil palm plantations were among farms that were either 
abandoned or suffered neglect under the new regime. The 1970 Sample Census on 
Agriculture estimated that oi I palm acreage was about I 10,000 ha, 93,000 ha of which 
XN'ýis Wild or subsidiary crops on small peasant holdings. xvith the remainder in pure 
staiids or predonnnant on farms of various sizes (Goverriment of Ghana. 1970, Vol 1.67- 
68). Of the estimated 14.500 lia of pure stand oil palm more than half (8,100 ha) was 
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in the Westem Region, the area with the largest stretch of area with climatic 
conditions favourable for the crop. In 1962 it was estimated that the Ahanta area west 
of Takoradi in that Region had highest density of oil palm per acre in the countrý- 
(Wills, 1962,362). Of the pure stands, parastatal organisations accounted for 16,000 
ha, with 11,000 ha under the State Farms Corporation, of which only half was 
estimated to be fruit-bearing (World Bank, 1975, Annex 1,3)10. 
Palm oil production in 1970 was estimated at slightly over 20,000 tons, with all but 
1,000 tons going into direct human consumption. The raw material requirements of 
LBG's soap factory alone indicate the domestic supply shortfall at the time. In fact 
despite LBG's production at the time there was still an unsatisfied market for soap". 
The persistent inadequacy of local palm oil production reflected in the figures on 
imports of palm oil and tallow in the 1970s, was underlined by a 1975 study on oil 
palm". This study projected internal demand to grow to 69,000 tons in 1985, with 
a possible domestic supply shortfall of 29,000 tons. However within a decade of the 
1975 World Bank study, "the production phase (of the oil palm sector) had outpaced 
t1le other phases, resulting in a glut of palm fruit"' (Republic of Ghana, 1987,1). This 
startling situation was the result of the massive investment that went into oil palm 
tI rom the mid 1970s, primarily into three large scale schemes: the Twifo Oil Palm 
'0 The Sample census on the other hand provides figures which are well below this: SFC holdings of 
4,450 Ila out of 6,075 ha. 
2' The 197 1-72 Report of the Capital hivestment Board/Ghana Investment Centre (CIB'GIC) lists six 
of the CIB's main criteria for project identification and preparation. Sugar and soap were the two 
commodities used to illustrate the first of these - the existence of a large unsatisfied home market. It:, 
2, World Bank Appraisal of Oil Palm Project Report No. 173'a-GII (1975,3) lists other reports. 
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Plantation (TOPP), the Benso Oil Palm Plantation (BOPP) and the Ghana Oil Palm 
Development Corporation (GOPDC). 
6.3.2. The Tripartite Oil Palm Projects 
The establishment of TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC cultivated with modern technology 
and possessing modern mills, wrought a qualitative and quantitative revolution in 
Ghana's oil palm sub-sector. The three enterprises, products of an alliance of the 
Ghanaian state and international capital, designed and managed by agribusiness TNCs, 
do not only represent a significant penetration of foreign capital into Ghanaian 
agriculture, they have also changed the character of the oil- palm sub sector and 
introduced the mechanisms and methods of modern agribusiness into one of the oldest 
branches of Ghanaian commodity agriculture. Unlike the neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire 
a major exporter of Palm oil, with a significant presence of international 
capital /agribusiness in the organisational form typified by the four projects (Halfani 
& Barker, 198455 1), the Ghanaian projects were primarily for satisfying the home 
market. 
I Intil the three complexes were set up, the biggest plantation in the country was the 
4,500 ha state-owned National Oil Palm Plantation (NOPL) at Prestea then part of the 
State Farms Corporation. Lying in a marginal oil palm production area, it has a 
potential yicld of 7.5 t/ha and as of the mid 1970s shared the poor state of the 
pýLrastatal farms. According to the NIB (1987,1 it had from an early stage "been 
severely set back by lack- of funds, and consequently has had no opportunity to 
develop efficiency and productivity to tile levcIs which could potentially be reached". 
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Its 9 tons ffb/ha mill, then the largest in the country. was chronically operated below 
capacity. Optimum yield of oil palm in Ghana is around II tons ffb/ha, with a 
maximum of 5.5 tons ffb/ha for traditional smallholdings and a national average of 6.6 
tons ffbiha. Traditional oil extraction averages 10% of the weight of the ffb 
(FAO, 1989, passim). The total cultivated area of the three schemes, sited on possibly 
the best oil palm lands in Ghana, is about 20,250 ha (46,860 acres), " with expected 
average yield of 8-11 tons/ffb per hectare. They have a combined mill capacity of 51 
tons/hr, with an average oil extraction rate of 21% (of total weight of ffb), and 
potential total output of 40,000 tons of palm oil at full production. 
The World Bank funded the Kwae (GOPDC) project in the Eastern Region which was 
started in 1976 and has been developed in phases. As of 1989, when two phases had 
been completed, it had a total planted area of about 7,500 ha (18,500 ha), 4,000 ha 
being the estate plantation and the rest outgrower acreage. Kwae can be described as 
the quintessential nucleus estate-outgrower/smallholder scheme among our four 
projects. Outgrower production was very closely built into the conception of the 
scheme, and implemented with a tightness of control by the estate management over 
the contract farmer not present in the other schemes. 
The Twifo oil palm scheme is located in the Twifo Mampong area of the Central 
1ýis started in 1978. Its design comprises of two linked but legally Region and xN, I 
" Accorclin-' to the NIB ( 1987, passim) the location of BOPP, Adum Banso in the Western region, is 
in area "jud, -, ed to 
be most suitable for oil palm cultivation in Ghana, K\\-ac in the Eastern Region, site 
of GOPDC is "one of the most suitable" and TOPP is in an area of the Central Re"lon Le -1-\\ ifo 
Marnpon- x\, Iiich is "favourable for oil palm cultivation by Ghanaian standards". 
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separate components: a) the nucleus estate with a 4,800 ha (11.860 acres) plantation 
and 20 tons/hr oil mill owned by TOPP Ltd, and b) a 1200 ha small holder project 
under the management of the parastatal Central Regional Development Corporation 
(CEREDEC), majority shareholder in TOPP Ltd. The development of the project was 
to be spread over six years, starting in 1978/79 and completed in 1983/84. The 
projections for its annual output at full maturity were for around 14,000 tons of oil 
and 2,300 tons of kernel from nearly 70,000 tons of ffb. 
Development of the BOPP complex, located between Benso and Adurn Banso in the 
Western Region, was started in 1976. The initial phase was for a 4,070 ha (10,000 
acres) oil palm plantation yielding 60,000 tons of palm fruit for the production of 
12,000 tons of palm oil and 3,000 tons of palm kernel by a 16 tons/hr mill. BOPP, 
in which Unilever is the majority shareholder, is the only one of our projects not to 
have an integral smallholder/outgrower scheme. 
6.4. The Special Agricultural Scheme 
As indicated in Chapter I BOPP and TOPP were established under the Special 
Agricultural Scheme (SAS). The Scheme issued from NRC/SMC's Operation Feed 
Your Industries (OFI) programme and sought to kill three birds with stone: raise 
domestic agriailtural production, ease the pressure on the balance of payments arising 
tI rom unrepatriated earnings of foreign firms and in the process increase foreign 
investment in agriculture and agro-Industry. As part of the OFI the goverrurient 
announced at- ar reaching policy for expanding local production of agro-industrial raw clý - 
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materials. Prospective investors in agro-based industries using raw material that could 
be locally produced had to provide evidence of plans for their production before the 
Ministry of Industries would consider giving approval for their schemes. Existing 
manufacturing industries with potential for domestic backward integration Nvere 
required to show evidence of plans for such a step by 1975. The directive also 
specified time-scales within which industries were to attain self-sufficiency in the local 
supply of agro-raw materials. 
The Capital Investment Board (CIB/GIC) described SAS as "one of the tools which 
the government of Ghana has devised to clear the backlog of dividends accumulated 
over the years" 24 . Foreign 
firms with "blocked funds" were invited to invest in three 
broad areas of agriculture and agro-industry: "Crops", "Livestock" and "Others". 
Rice,, maize, banana, cotton, oil palm, coconut, kenaf, avocado pear, groundnuts, soya 
beans, pineapples, tomatoes, and ginger were specifically listed under Crops but the 
proviso "or any other crops certified by the government" showed the indicative 
character of the list; one participating firm grew flowers for export. There was an 
ýictive demand for many of the listed crops on the home market either as staples 
(maize, rice, tomatoes) or as agro-industrial raw material (palm oil, groundnuts, soya 
beans, kenaf). Others such as avocado pear, ginger, bananas and pineapples had long 
been promoted as "non-traditional exports"(7YP, 1964, passim). The category Others 
was defined as "Back-stopping projects involving the provision of improved seedlings 
[for] crops such as maize, rice, groundnut and vegetables, animal feed and fertilisers, 
etc. " (CIB, 1980,2). 
' The Invcstor, July 1979. p. 5 
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"Blocked funds" for the purposes of SAS were defined as including pre- 1972 180 day 
credits; outstanding profits and dividend remittances; and the proceeds from sale of 
shares to Ghanaians under the Investment Policy Decree, 1975 (NRCD 
329)25 
. The 
cedi equivalent of such income must have been lodged with the Bank of Ghana which 
must have guaranteed transfers at the prevailing exchange rate. Normal transfers of 
accumulated income with the permission of the Bank of Ghana were not to be 
prejudiced by the automatic and priority transfers promised under SAS. Hence if the 
investment produced profits the investor could in principle repatriate both the 
previously blocked funds and profits accruing from the investment under the Scheme. 
Apart from the specific attractions of potential investments in agriculture and agro- 
industry the terms for the repatriation of blocked funds under SAS could be considered 
transfers at a special exchange rate, with the investment in SAS as a kind of fee 
charged by the state as a condition for the repatriation. The backhanded offer to 
foreign owners of capital was trumpeted as showing the government's determination 
"to ensure that the third phase of the OFY programme achieves the targets set for it" 
Interlocking and somewhat involved criteria were set out for repatriation under the 
Scheme. All investors were offered one basic general repatriation "incentive" and five 
conditional ones. These are indicated in the table I below. 
2 -' NRCD 329 Nvas a "Ghanaian isation " law. It defined the sectors of the economy and proportions of 
shareholding foreigners Nvere alloNNed leading to the compulsory outright sale of some foreign owtied 
businesses and part of the shareliolding, of sonic. 
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Table 6.1: SCHEDULE OF SAS TRANSFERS 
ACTIVITY/VENTURE AUTOMATIC TRANSFERS 
All first investments in SAS projects. Equivalent of 20 % of total investment 
from blocked funds. 
Investment in livestock or crop with Equivalent of 5%- of total SAS investment 
maturity period of one year or more. annually for five years from blocked 
funds. 
Any certified additional investment in 
ongoing SAS enterprise. Same as above 
Equivalent of 15t of total SAS investment 
Investment in cattle, oil palm and during gestat ion period, 
coconut. 
Equivalent of 5% of such profit from 
After tax profits of SAS projects. blocked funds and 30% of the profit 
itself. 
Re-invested after tax profits from SAS Equivalent of 
I 
50% of the re-investment 
project. from blocked funds. 
From material in article TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL SUFFICIENCY - The Special 
Agricultural Scheme, The Investor, July 1979, p. 5-6. 
In other words, if blocked funds are invested, the investor should get immediate 
permission to transfer the equivalent of 20 per cent of the blocked funds; where the 
investment is in livestock or crops with gestation periods of more than a year a 
premium transfer of an additional 5 per cent of the investment annually for five years. 
In all cases if the investment produces profits a further 5 per cent of the blocked funds 
and 30 per cent of the profit can be repatriated. In the event of any re-investment of 
after-tax profits from a SAS project the equivalent of half of the additional investment 
qualifies to be transferred from the blocked funds. 
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The listed incentives were in addition to those in Part V of NRCD 141 which were 
standard elements of the Investment Agreements between the CIB and investors" 
These included: 
a) Automatic exemption from payment of import duty and levy on 
"approved" machinery and equipment. 
Automatic income tax holiday fo r five years. 
C) Special import licence for "essential" machinery and equipment, 
imported strictly for a SAS project. 
d) Guaranteed immigration quota for "necessary expatriate 
personnel" 
e) Waiver of Selective Alien Employment Tax for a period of 5 
years. 
f) Accelerated depreciation of plant, building, equipment, dams, 
access and motorable roads and "other capital works". 
Exemption of management staff from income tax relating to 
furnished on-farm accommodation. 
Generally SAS firms were expected to make private arrangements for whatever land 
they might need. They were however assured that where they encountered difficulties 
"the government will be prepared in appropriate cases, to acquire land itself under its 
legal powers". Also it could "endeavour to fix uniform and reasonable rents" for lands 
" Investors' eqjoyment of the types and terms of the incentives contained in Part V of NRCD 14 1 are 
within tile discretion of the CIB "GIC. Tile exercise of this discretion is defined by sections 2133 and -14 
of the Decree. Section 23 gives the power while s. 24 bars its use in manner which "creates privileges I- in the competitive situation of similar irl\ estments" or "tend to the establishment of' monopolies". 
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to be used for the scheme, presumably even in cases -ý. ý-here the land is not 
compulsorily acquired. All commodities produced under SAS were to have officially 
guaranteed minimum prices; which prices would depend on the production cost and 
prevailing international prices (CIB, 1980,3-4). This was the framework within v, -hich 
some of the most important foreign firms in Ghana invested in TOPP and BOPP. 
The boosting of repatriation of earnings was clearly not seen as incompatible Nvith 
another explicit rationale for the Scheme - the conservation of foreign exchange and 
easing of BoP strains. Investment in commodities which hitherto had consumed 
foreign exchange could be doubly valuable: the ploughing back of blocked funds by 
foreign firms would ease, at least in the short term, the political and economic pressure 
generated by these arrears, and successful local production would cut import 
expenditure. On a more optimistic longer term view the government hoped output 
from the Scheme would generate export earnings. 
Despite all the undertakings and incentives the Special Agricultural Scheme had a poor 
response. By the first deadline for submission of investment proposals, June 1976, 
only seven investment proposals with a total value of C49.2m, just over one third of 
the sLim of blocked funds, had been lodged with the CIB. A new deadline for project 
proposals vielded five more applications by the end of 1977. A number of factors 
ýiccount for the less than enthusiastic response from owners of blocked funds. 
I'lic central contradiction was that presumably the main priority for these foreign 
investors was to get their funds out whereas the government's aim was to ti-N, to i-Tet 
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them into new investments. This contradiction could only be resolved if the re- 
investment of blocked funds produced profits, preferably hard currency which would 
ease the foreign exchange shortages. Not long after the SAS was launched the 
CIB/GIC publicly lamented the credibility problem its foreign investment promotion 
efforts faced, despite the many formal incentive provisions and guarantees offered to 
investors. According to the CIB, investor confidence had wom thinnest on the precise 
issue of repatriation of profits and dividends. 
"[T]he Board's .. efforts have been bedeviled by the country's seemingly 
chronic foreign exchange disability.. Our role in this regard, has, especially in 
the recent past, not been an entirely smooth one. The familiar reference to 
the seasoned diplomat, as the person who spends a very long time to say 
nothing, may appear to be a rather cynical verdict. Such is the position, 
however inelegant it may be, in which we have found ourselves in so far as 
our efforts at foreign investment promotion have been concerned"". 
This was the stony soil into which the SAS, with a special regime for the export of 
blocked funds as its central attraction for investors, was planted by the State. On the 
record of the past not all firms would have found the offer of transfers of blocked 
funds an attraction outweighing the problems of diversification into agriculture and 
agro-industry. 
In the nature of agricultural production even the best organised projects are prone to 
tinforeseen natural interferences and therefore uncertainty which heightens the 
importance of expertise and available capital for the success". The listed "back- 
"1976'77 Annual Report p viii 
21 In exchanges with the CIB over what the Board considered its excessively low equivy contribution, 
relative to local loan funding (C400,000'3.65m) in its SAS project, SCOA made the fOllowing remarks 
"it is extreme1v difficuit to find in%, estors prepared to invest in agricultural projects which give no 
immediate return or in anN case on]\ a return below the interest rate paid by deposit banks (71/2%), 
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stopping projects" under the category Others were either of a highly specialised nature 
(e. g provision of improved seedlings) or potentially highly capital intensive (e. (-, 
fertiliser production). For many firms with blocked funds "taking advantage" of SAS 
would mean not only financial costs but a dive into an area where they had no 
experience; a start from scratch in a very basic sense. 
The size of blocked funds held by potential SAS investors ranged from those of TNC 
conglomerates like Unilever, with large scale involvement in the Ghanaian economy 
and expertise in branches of agriculture, to those of small Asian and Arab family 
operations so these disincentive factors were certain to weigh more heavily on some 
potential investors. Apart from Mobil Oil and Glamour (owned by an Indian family) 
the foreign investors in the SAS projects that survived into the 1980s were the familiar 
pillars of the colonial export-import business: the UAC International group (a Unilever 
subsidiary), Paterson Simons and Paterson Zochonis; Barclays Bank and Standard 
Chartered Bank, and the French TNC, SCOA. 
Other mandatory features of SAS constituted additional drawbacks for smaller foreign 
firms. The stipulation in the SAS guidelines that projects create conditions for or 
support outgrowers was likely to exacerbate any hesitancy over drastic diversification 
primarily in response to a special capital repatriation scheme. Though the conception 
of an outgrower scheme was not rigorously defined in the SAS proposals it appears 
not only to assume that SAS projects would be large scale, highly capitalised 
agricultural projects are I ong term in vestments from \\h I ch a good return canon Iý be expected after the 
1-ifth or even ciolith year" [SCOA to CIB 10, '5 76 in CIB A6541. 
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undertakings possessing a fairly high level of technical and managerial expertise to 
guide and service outgrowers. As it turned out those firms, such as BOPP and TOPP. 
who could provide a high level of support for outgrowers were also those strong 
enough to get the state to accept interpretations of the clause which minimised what 
they had to do for outgrowers and left them free to implement precisely what they 
wished 
29 
. 
The obligatory requirement for Ghanaian ownership of not less than 40 Per cent of the 
equity of projects must have been a further impediment for some potential, especially 
smaller, foreign investors in SAS. From the very beginning of the Scheme Ghanaian 
private capital showed scant interest and what little involvement was attracted shrank 
as SAS projects failed. An examination of the shareholding of the eight SAS firms 
still alive in 1980 reveals that private Ghanaian participation was minimal. The Ghana 
government or parastatal organisations were majority shareholders in three and 
substantial minority owners of another four; all seven projects being fairly large-scale 
undertakings. Ghanaian private capital was not involved in the two most important 
of these, BOPP and TOPP but held shares in the more modest Glamour Farms (40 per 
cent) and SCOA Farms (eight per cent)". Of the four SAS firms still alive in 1986 
the foreign shareholders contributed only 19.5 per cent of total equity. Given the 
general economic uncertainties in the country and problems of agriculture in particular 
""The nucleus farms, in appropriate cases, would be expected to provide assistance to the outgrowers. 
such assistance could be in the form of general extension services, provision of loans and marketing 
facilities" was the full statement of policy in a 1980 CIB pamphlet on SAS(CIB, 1980: 2). The point 
made about BOPP and TOPP is fully discussed below. 
"The minutes of the 7/5/76 meeting of the SCOA Farms board records that the firm was findim, it verv 
difficult to get private Ghanaian investors to subscribe to the statutory 40 per cent. 
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it suited the foreign firms very well to have the State bear the larger share of the 
ownership risks in projects which enabled them repatriate blocked funds, which would 
generate more income if successful, while minimising losses if they failed. 
Of related significance is the fact that loans, mainly borrowed from outside the 
country, accounted for nearly three quarters of the total capital invested in the projects, 
BOPP and TOPP benefited from loans contracted by the Ghana government. Those 
procured from outside by the SAS firms themselves were intra-firm transactions such 
as took place between SCOA Farms and SCOA Paris and Unilever and BOPP. Some 
of the blocked funds belonged to non-resident associate or parent companies to which 
the monies were due as dividends. In the case of SCOA Farms, SCOA Paris lent it 
C400,000 from blocked funds due to SCOA Paris as a compromise on the CIB's 
demand that SCOA take up more shares to help raise equity contribution to the initial 
estimated cost of SCOA Farms from barely II per cent to around 50 per cent. By the 
end of 1986 total investment, from all sources in SAS amounted to C4.96 billion 
cedis, more than eighty per cent of which was loans. 
The overwhelming bulk of the 4.1045 billion cedis loan capital was raised by the 
Ghanaian state, which also guaranteed some. Some of the projects - Demco Ltd (for 
mechanisation of rice production in northern Ghana); Ghana Livestock Co Ltd (cattle 
ranching in three parts of the country). BOPP and TOPP - were partly funded by 
izim-national loans contracted by the Government of Ghana. The obligations and 
conditions attached to these loans constituted a crutch for the benefiting firms and a 
source of pressure on the state to ensure the successful implementation of the projects. 
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Only 855 million cedis i. e 17.2 per cent of total investment in SAS came from equity 
contributions. Of this share capital foreign shareholders contributed under 19.5 per 
cent of equity, representing 3.35 per cent of total investment in the projects. On 
account of this equity investment permission was given for the repatriation of 
C124.4m of blocked funds as of 1986. In a memo to the board the of directors, the 
Chief Executive of the GIC acknowledged that foreign firm had not done badly out 
of SAS which had "not contributed much to the overall food sufficiency objective of 
Ghana"". 
SAS offered foreign firms other ways for capital export possibilities apart for approved 
transfers of blocked funds. Efforts in this direction ranged from the predictable, such 
as the supply of inputs at high transfer prices from related firms, to the illegal a point 
illustrated by two cases involving Glamour and SCOA. In 1981 the CIB found that 
only C5,000 (C3,000 foreign and C2,000 local) out of Glamour Farms' authorised 
share capital had been paid up whilst from 1977 Glamour had transferred C150,000 
of blocked funds on the basis of its nominal foreign equity of C600,000. The firm 
was given the options of either paying up the equity or enjoying transfers only up to 
the level of what had been paid. It chose the first". 
SAS firms such as BOPP and SCOA Farms which were linked to TNCs already 
involved in agriculture signed intra-firm. technical consultancy agreements some of the 
3'GIC Memo: Chief Executive to Bard 7,8/87. The Chief Executive's narrow valuation of SAS in terms 
of food production runs counter to the explicifly stated NN''der alms of the Scheme. 
12 Glamour Farnis Ltd (Integrated Poultrý- Project-Shai I-Iii1s) File ClBfA642. 11 
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terms of which drew queries from the CIB" For example in September 1977 the 
CIB/GJC objected to an application to the Bank of Ghana by SCOA Farms for 
permission to transfer 399,067 FF to SCOA Paris in France. The sum broke down 
into 63,856.85 FF for "Know How", 160,211.01 FF for "Technical Expenses" with 
1751000 FF "Annual Charges". The "know how" was described as having been 
provided for "land cultivation and maize marketing". The CIB opposed the applicatioii 
on a number of grounds including not seeing the justification for importing the 
particular "know how" given the local experience in land clearing and maize 
production. It also found that the annual charge being claimed covered a period 
preceding when SCOA Farms came under the SAS! " 
6.4.1. Fate of SAS Proigets 
Those firms which held back from SAS because of doubts about the governments 
ability to deliver on its promises were more than vindicated. Out of the 12 projects 
initiated only four were still operating by 1986 the rest were killed primarily by the 
country's foreign exchange crisis!. The CIB/GIC acknowledges three main reasons 
for the poor outcome of SAS. These are a) shortage of foreign exchange for the 
importation of vital inputs linked to b) the failure of the state to fulfil its contractual 
undertaking to give priority to the foreign exchange requirements of SAS projects and 
c) what the CIB/GIC described as "the cumbersome nature of land acquisition 
procedures" and attendant expensivc litigation. The correspondence between some of 
"The BOPP case is discussed in the Chapter Ten. 
" Capital Investment Board I'lle (CIB/t%054) SCOA Farms Ltd. 
"Ol 
the SAS firms and the CIB/GIC is a recitation of woe and despair about the inability 
of bankers to open letters of credit, the effects of delays in the allocation of licence 
and the inadequacy of foreign exchange support for what was granted. The fate of 
Ghana Industrial Farms Ltd (GIFL) and Ghana Farms (GF) are good examples. 
GIFL was a poultry and crops joint venture involving CFAO (30%), Shell (30%) and 
Ghana Commercial Bank [GCB] (40%) which was "designed to rely heavily on 
mechanisation and irrigation"" making imports crucially important. It started 
operations in 1976. Throughout its life it never got sufficient import licence for vital, 
especially irrigation, equipment. The CIB's appeals to the Commissioner of Finance 
and warnings about the "grave" consequences of abandoning the project especially 
"the erosion of confidence as far as foreign investors are concerned. Confidence 
which the Government of Ghana has been fighting tooth and nail to build and 
maintain" came to nought". GIFL went into liquidation in June 1980. 
The experience of Ghana Farms (GF), one of four SAS projects abandoned between 
1984 and 1986, was similar. The project was a joint venture of Freedom Textiles of 
Hong Kong (55%), and two local firms in which it had interests -Development 
Finance Holding Co. and Juapong Textiles (JTL) with the three holding 55,35 and 
10 per cent respectively of the shares. Freedom Textiles also had an interest in the 
Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company (GTMC) which like JTL consumed cotton lint. 
Ghana Farms was set up to produce 12 n-ifflion lbs. of cotton annually on 2,000 acres. 
It Nvas one of two ISAS projects which represented attempts at vertical integration by 
15 Cjll: L Progress report 31/1/78 
"'Correspondence in CIB'A636 
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firms with blocked funds; BOPP was the other. In October 1980, following previous 
complaints about losses due to a lack of spare parts, chemicals, farm machinery and 
equipment, GF informed the CIB that its operations were grinding to a halt because 
it had not been given an import licence for the year. The 1980 Inspection Report on 
the project recorded that because of the situation no cotton had been planted and 105 
out of 164 pieces of machinery and equipment on the project site were unserviceable. 
Developments around this complaint by GF highlighted a specific major problem with 
the work of the CIB which affected the SAS: the lack of coordination among the 
various state bodies whose work and powers affected the progress of the Scheme. In 
fact this lack of coordination was just another manifestation of the weaknesses of the 
neo-colonial Ghanaian state. 
In February 1981 the CIB wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture in support of GF's 
request for an import licence for the year referring to the project agreement which 
bound the government to provide an import licence. The Ministry seemed unaware 
of the agreement and the CIB furnished it with a copy upon request. The 
organisational chaos in the state machinery is ample surnmarised in the follovving 
section of a subsequent letter from the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the CIB: 
I have noted that tile Agreement was between your Board and the Company 
primarily in connection with the consideration of certain special incentives 
\\11161 VoLir Board offers to foreign investors. This Ministrýý has not been 
involved in the preparation and conclusion of the agreement and you ha ve not 
lintil no\\ brought it to my attention. It' you make a special case tOr tile 
company. I \\ould advise that you present a special memorandum oil the 
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subject to the Technical Committee of the Import Licence and Foreign 'ý 
7 Exchange Allocation Commission which is based in the Ministry of Trade-) 
Interestingly two of the foreign shareholders in TOPP, Pasico and PZ had questioned 
why the shareholders in the projects and the Commissioner for Finance were not direct 
parties to the Investment Agreement between TOPP Ltd and the CIB. This is 
basically a CIB standard form of terms and incentives in the Capital Investment 
Decree, 1973 (NRCD 141) plus the specific undertakings under SAS. They argued 
that the joining of the Commissioner "is desirable to create a single line of authority 
for implementation of the various concessions, and would enable the approval required 
[under NRCD 141] to be given in the same document". The CIB however felt "the 
absence of the investors and the Commissioner for Finance as parties ... 
in no way 
derogated from ... enjoyment of the concessions 
in the agreement Act" 
In fact very early in the life of the SAS the Board had drawn the attention of the 
Government to how the SAS had highlighted the problems it faced in the 
adminstration of fiscal and other investment incentives precisely because of the point 
made by PZ and Pasico. In the CIB's own words: 
"The problem boils down to the inadequate jurisdictional capacity of the CIB 
to administer the incentives spelt out in the Agricultural Scheme and certain 
other enactments. The CIB, is entrusted with the administration of the 
Scheme, and yet the Scheme contains incentives some of which tile Board has 
no legal power to grant in tile forrn of contract". 
It suggested that investment contracts be with the "Government of Ghana" rather than 
the CIB, a formula NvIuch would attach the contract to all the relevant state institutions. 
-" In CIB A, 665. 
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The shareholders in TOPP were therefore not direct signatories to the Investment 
Agreement. 
The gestation period of SAS was during the lowest part of Ghana's economic and 
political crisis which affected the implementation of all the Scheme"s projects. The 
impact of the crisis was however far from uniform, in the main because in some cases 
the state's efforts to minimise it went far beyond the exchange of letters between the 
CIB/GIC and a Principal Secretary in a Ministry. Take BOPP, which unlike say 
Ghana Farms, was an extension of the plantations component of a TNC conglomerate, 
Unilever, with a long and extensive involvement in the production of the chosen crop. 
In addition to the facility offered to BOPP by Unilever's plantation experience and 
establishment the TNC was the most extensive and perhaps most influential foreign 
investor in Ghana. Such experience and clout assumes added significance given the 
crisis conditions in which the SAS projects struggled to take off, and enabled BOPP 
to get priority attention including obtaining international loan finance to surmount the 
problems of hard currency for necessary inputs 38 
Chapters 7,8 and 10 show that the scale and nature of state support and involvement 
in BOPP and TOPP amounted to their being special projects within the Special 
Agricultural Scheme. 
I IC11ce -'s Freedom Textiles' relative lack of political clout and agricu tural exper 
is indirectly brought by a letter from GTNIC to tile Principal Secretarv, 
Ministry of Industries, Science and Tcchnoloigy about tile problems of( Illana 
Farms in the CIB',, Files. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Creation of GHASEL, TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC 
This chapter examines a cluster of legal, and political economic issues centred around 
the alliance of state, agribusiness and the IDFls represented in GHASEL, TOPP, 
GOPDC and BOPP. The discussion covers: a) the negotiation of the contracts which 
defined the projects what one might term "the politics of gestation", and b) the 
relationship between IDFIs and agribusiness firms. This does not however include the 
terms of the management and related contracts. These are examined in Chapters Eight 
and Ten. 
It has already been pointed out that the setting up of BOPP. TOPP and GOPDC 
projects constituted a technological revolution in the oil palm indListry. In addition, 
tile three projects and GHASEL. collectively and each in its own way, represented 
pivotal developments in the relationship between Ghana's agricultural sector and 
international capital. When it was signed in January 1973, the $15.6m World Bank 
(IDA) loan for the GHASEL scheme was the Bank's largest ever loan to Ghana for 
a project not concerned with the development of infrastructure. The GHASEL scheme 
was also the most expensive and concerted attempt at rehabilitating and building up 
an element of the CPP's agro-industrial le(-,, -, icy. 
In the 1970s oil palm was the crop that attracted the most international capital in 
Gliaiia's aoriculturc. Between 1976-85 Ghana receivcd 45m FCU from flic EC for 
, wriculture and rural 
development. The single largest share of thIs. 16.91m FCU or 
tr 
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37.5%. was for the development of oil palm production. Nearly 82% (13.8m ECU) 
of this oil palm funding went to the Twifo scheme. The state-owned NOPL at Prestea 
was the other beneficiary (European Commission, 1986,15). TOPP has also been financed 
by the Dutch and British govermnents, especially the latter through the Conunonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC)'. Britain has also prolided a loan for the 
establishment of BOPP. 
BOPP and TOPP are the most successful of the projects initiated under the Special 
Agricultural Scheme (SAS). The foreign shareholders in the two projects - Unilever 
and Barclays Bank in BOPP, and Mobil Oil, Paterson Zochonis (PZ) and Paterson 
Simons in TOPP - belong to the top layer of private foreign capital in Ghana. All of 
these firms, bar Mobil, had built up their business in Ghana during the hey-day of the 
colonial import/export trade. Their move into agriculture, albeit enforced, represents 
a belated diversification into the sector which, through cocoa, had for so long been the 
source of their profits. Kwae is the biggest agro-industrial establishment in the 
country, with the bulk of the funding coming from the World Bank. It represents the 
Bank's biggest ever commitment to an agricultural project in Ghana. It has put 
$38.6m into the first two phases. The Bank regarded the first phase of the project as 
the most successful instance of its involvement in Ghana's agriculture (World 
Bank, 1984,6). 
' As IDFIs which proclaim a "social conscience" the World Bank and the EDF can be distinguished 
from the CDC which can be described as a hybrid of an IDFI and TNC and therefore has a notion of 
"development" which is more overtly commercially flavoured than that which animates the EDF or the 
World Bank's IDA. A former top official has described the CDC as having a "split personality" 
(Rendell, 1976,123). It is a statutory commercial organisation funded by the British Treasury whose investments are closely informed by British foreign "aid" objectives, including acting as a bridgehead 
for British private capital. In financing projects it acts like an IDFI, in taking its role as shareholder and 
project manager it behaves like a TNC. 
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7.1. POLITICS OF GESTATION 
The range, depth and consequences of the matters that are covered by the lending 
conditional ities of the IDFIs, especially the World Bank, are quite well known 
(Fatouros, 1977). The inability of most underdeveloped countries to withstand the 
steamrollering power of these bodies and giant TNCs such as Unilever during 
negotiations, because of the advantage of the control of vital resources, knowledge and 
experience is just as well documented (Sawyerr, 1977; Graham, 1982). Within this 
basic grid, specific traits of state and national factors exert an important influence on 
the outcome of negotiations. 
An examination of the process and content of the negotiations among the principals 
in our selected projects will not only shed light on how the power relations in the 
various agreements crystallised; it will also provide an indication of which, among the 
myriad issues covered by various agreements, were of particular concern to the parties, 
something that enhances an understanding of the formal provisions of the contracts. 
The data that was obtained on the gestation of our four projects is uneven: it is 
strom, est t, or GI IASEL and TOPP. These two cases highlight particularly: C, 
a) the poxN, cr and influence of the IDFIs and agribusiness TNCs over the 
determination of tlie nature of projects, because of the Ghanaian state's need 
tI or funding. In the case of TOPP the project became a creature of the CDC, 
the EDI-' and private foreign capital rather than what had been envisaged by its 
main mover the parastatal, CEREDEC. With GHASEL a poorlY designed 
pro. ject was rushed to expensive and abortive implementation. 
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b) The near abdication of sovereign responsibility. particularly in the case of 
GHASEL; 
C) How other specific local factors such as conflicting policies and administrative 
lethargy as well as episodic paralysis, aggravated the primary weakness of the 
state and allowed international capital to exert an overwhelming influence on 
the character of these enterprises. 
Subsequent discussion of the terms and operation of the agreements on the four 
projects and elements of the history of GOPDC will show that the TOPP and 
GHASEL gestation histories can be taken as largely representative of the four. 
7.1.1. The GHASEL Project 
The abortive five-year sugar industry rehabilitation project, funded by the World Bank 
and centred around the Ghana Sugar Estates Ltd (GHASEL) was started in 1973. The 
GHASEL scheme was a product of the flurry of Western scavenging in the Ghanaian 
emiorny after the 1966 coup. The sugar industry was one of the public enterprises 
that attracted the interest of a number of IDFls, including the World Bank, and some. 
In 1966 a World Bank mission proposed Komenda and Asutsuare as "potentially 
promising for Bank Group financing" (World Bank, 1981,9). They were included i in 
a 1967 FAO food industry study and were the subject of discussions between the Bank 
arid the British Overseas Development Ministry which was also interested the industry. 
In 1968 'Fate and 1, y1c Technical Services Ltd (TLTS) and Bookers Agricultural and 
'Feclimcal Sci-vices (BATS) carried out an in-depth study. as a basis for rehabilitation 
of the industry. This TI, TS, 'B,, \TS report was to be the basis of the GHASEL scherne 
NvIiich the Bank put in its fivc year Icndino prograrn for Ghana. 
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The implementation of the scheme was during a boom in the establishment of import 
substituting sugar industries across Africa following a sharp rise in world sugar prices 
in 1974 (Halfani & Barker, 1981,52; Dinham & Hines, 1983,77). Trends in world sugar 
supplies and prices were taken into account by the Bank but the conception of the 
project predated the 1974 price movements. The preparatory period of the project was 
during the NLC/Busia regimes over which the Bank and the IMF had tremendous 
influence (Libby, 1976). This clout was reflected in the extensive freedom the Bank 
had to shape the scheme with, it will be argued, significant negative consequences. 
The GHASEL scheme was aimed at making the sugar industry profitable , with 
positive consequences for jobs and conservation of foreign exchange. It was expected 
to achieve a net annual foreign exchange saving of $5.2m, if successful. The project 
was estimated to cost $24.8m. The World Bank's IDA gave a $15.6m credit for the 
project, with the rest of the funding coming from local sources: loans from the state, 
and investment by outgrowers. The project involved the expansion of cane production, 
rehabilitation of field and factory equipment, improving factory utilisation, and 
providing high quality management and training for Ghanaian staff. A feasibility 
study into the expansion of the sugar industry was also to be carried out. Overall cane 
aci-cai, e Nvas expected to rise from 16,050 acres to 23,475 acres. At Asutsuare estate 
ýicrcýige was to go from 4,100 to 6,400 acres and outgrowers' from 5200 to 7575 
acres, wliile at Komenda from 'ý250 to 4500 acres for the estate and from 3500 to 
5000 acres for outgrowers. This was to be accompanied by an increase in cane yields 
per acre from an average of 13.8 tons to an expected 21 .1 tons. Factory improvements 
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were expected to raise the sugar recovery rate and raise sugar output from 10,800 to 
43,000 tons. 
The World Bank included the GHASEL project in its five year lending programme in 
1969. From then till when the project came on stream in 1973, there was a cession 
of sovereign decision making by the Ghanaian state to the World Bank whose 
decisions were heavily influenced by internal World Bank politics and external 
propaganda considerations. The latitude the Bank had over the shaping of the scheme 
is largely attributable to two factors: i) the attitude of the NLC/Busia regimes which 
regarded it as a fount of wisdom, and ii) following the January 1972 coup the pre- 
occupation of the new military rulers with consolidating and stabilising their power. 
This meant there was inadequate state interest in the project at a vital stage of its 
gestation. In the circumstances the World Bank's freedom of initiative was 
accompanied by delays in the settling of important issues. The Bank admits the 
second factor, in the narrow but important context of its failure to update the 
'FLTS\BATS study of 1968 before proceeding with the project, but plays down its 
consequences (World Bank, 198 1). 
The Bank's decision to treat the TLTS/BATS report as an adequate basis for the 
project followed the Ghana government's failure to respond to an offer from the Bank, 
early in 1970, to help update it. By the time in December 1971 when. according to 
the Bank, the pro* It I ject xvas negotiated", the key issues had been settled. These 
iiicluded the abolition of the GIHOC Sugar Products Division and its replacement by 
GHASEL - whose regulations. financial structure and board vvere subject to Bank 
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approval, as was the appointment of the management contractors and the distribution 
of costs between the Ghanaian state and the Bank. The latter was to contribute 
$15.6m made up of a $7.6m loan and an IDA Credit of $8m. 
All the above decisions were apart from a number of 'ýprqposals" made to and 
accepted by the goverm-nent. Two of the more important points agreed at the 
December 1971 negotiations were on shareholding in GHASEL and the funding of 
purchases of vital spare parts from Eastern Europe. The state was to take 95 per cent 
of GHASEL's equity and the management contractors, upon the government's request, 
the remaining 5 per cent. The latter was insulated from GHASEL's fortunes and was 
to be paid back at the end of the management contract. Under the Bank's 
procurement rules, Poland and Czechoslovakia, being non-members were excluded 
from the countries in which Bank funding could be spent. No special funding 
arrangement was however made for the procurement of these spares. It was simply 
agreed that "foreign exchange would be made available ... or other measures taken to 
allow imports of spares promptly as required" (World Bank, 1972,28). A gamble was 
therefore taken by leaving the inputs to compete for scarce national foreign exchange. 
As NNe show in Chapter nine this proved an expensive error. 
On 18th December 1971 the Ghana government, GIHOC and GHASEL signed a 
rnanýioement and subscription agreement with HVA (Handel Verenigning Amsterdam) 
International N. V., a Dutch agribusiness TNC. The loan agreement vvith the World 
Bank was not signed till a year later, just a month before the January 1972 coup. Due 
to delays occasioned by the new regime's political pre-occupations, the Bank engaged 
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in more chopping and changing of the project to ensure the realisation of its five year 
lending program. Among other things it decided that all its funding was to be as an 
IDA Credit. $1.3m that would have been interest on the $7.6m loan was saved to 
cover some of the increased cost of the project. A $15.6 million IDA Development 
Credit Agreement for the project was eventually signed on January 29 1973. 
By the time the rehabilitation scheme started in mid- 1973 what was originally 
conceived as a six-year exercise had been effectively reduced to a five-year one by 
delays. The Bank however retained the targets set at the very outset even as its own 
appraisal reports showed that the industry had deteriorated significantly since the 
TLTS/BATS Report of 1968. The decision of the Bank to base the project on a five 
year old study exemplified the influence of intra-Bank politics on key decisions. As 
much was admitted after the project failed, with a Bank report saying the move "may 
have been" influenced by desires within the Bank to accelerate the processing of some 
projects in order to boost the lending program to Ghana (World Bank, 1981,39). This 
timid acknowledgement must be viewed within the context of the emblematic 
iinportance of the NLC/Busia regimes to Western policy in Africa at the time. 
7.1.2. The Kwae (GOPDC) Scheme 
Like GHASFI,, the oil palm project sited at Kwae in the Eastern Region is a World 
Bank funded venture. The complex was started in 1976 and is centred around the 
nucletis estate and mill of GOPDC. a , N-holly state-owned commercial enterprise. 
established in 1975 under the Statutory Corporations Act, 1964 (Act 232). I-lie project 
has been developed in phases. The eight-year first phase (1975-1982) of the scheme 
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was initially estimated to cost $22.5m, and the World Bank provided $13.6m through 
the IDA. For the five-year second phase (1984-1988) the IDA provided $25m, nearly 
70% of the estimated total cost of $35.9m. The establishment (first) phase included 
the setting up of: 
a) a 10,000 acre (4,000 ha) nucleus plantation; 
b) 3,000 acres (1,200) ha of outgrower farms, with about 240 farmers 
with families and supporting financial services and infrastructural and 
technical facilities; 
c) an oil mill with capacity of 10 tons of fresh palm fruit bunches and 
hour (15 tons ffb/hr); 
d) a system for collecting outgrowers fruit; and 
e) personnel training. 
The enterprise was expected to have an output of 14,000 tons of palm oil (80% of this 
from estate fruit) and nearly 3,000 tons of palm kernel when in full production. The 
World Bank calculated that this would result in annual savings of around $5m in 
foreign exchange while creating jobs and raising incomes of farmers who became 
outgrowers. Overall, it would generate "a gross income of US$l7m annually in a 
poor and relatively undeveloped region of Ghana" (World Barik, 1975,2 
1)2. 
'I'lie feasibility study for the project were conducted in 1972, by the French parastatal 
agribusiness research/management organisation Inslitut de Recherche pour les Huiles 
ct les Oltuglneuv (IRHO), on the request of the World Bank. The project was not 
A 6,000 acre'2 5 grower holdings, expansion of mill capacivy to 25 tons flb'hr , 00 ha expansion of outý II'- 
ýind "consolidation" of the nucleus estate, including the provision of workers' housing, were some of 
the -, oals of the second phase. 
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approved by the Bank until 1975 because of "delays resulting from the then 
prevailing economic situation in Ghana"(World Bank, 1984,8). We have only some 
World Bank documents from which to glean what were the main issues of concern 
between the Ghana Government and the World Bank, and their power relations, during 
the negotiations that produced the Kwae scheme. The issues of focus were highlighted 
by the various "assurances" (i. e undertakings) that the Ghana government gave before 
the start of the IDA Credit and its "conditions of effectiveness". The World Bank set 
six conditions and got the Ghana Goverment to give 18 specific "assurances" on its 
own account and on behalf of GOPDC. The main ones were about the security of title 
land for the project, the overall management of the scheme and its financial 
organisation, and arrangements between the nucleus estate and outgrowers. 
The question of management would seem to have been of greatest interest to the Bank. 
It believed no Ghanaians were available who could manage the project, a position it 
said the Ghana government shared. Before disbursement of the IDA credit, GOPDC 
was required to have: a) a full time managing director acceptable to the Bank; b) 
signed a contract with management consultants acceptable to the Bank; and c) 
employed a plant (oil palm) breeder; "acceptable to the IDA and on terms and 
conditions acceptable to the IDA". The management contractor was expected to set 
up a programme for the training of Ghanaians eventually to take over. GOPDC was 
to lieriodically review the programme for the likely replacement of expatriate staff 
with the IDA. 
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The undertakings that the Ghana government gave. in most cases to seek IDA 
approval for decisions, covered a broad range of issues. These included any changes 
in financial arrangements between the central state and GOPDC, the determination of 
prices paid for outgrower produce, GOPDC's initial prices for palm oil. and periodic 
consultation about its palm oil pricing policy. At least one of these undertakings on 
fertiliser pricing, something of importance well beyond the Kwae project, appears to 
amount to an easy surrender of sovereign discretion. The government undertook to 
inform the IDA of any changes in policy on subsidies for the price of fertiliser, which 
was 40% of the farm gate price in 1975. This undertaking only makes sense if "to 
inform" involves more than being made aware since once decided the policy is a 
matter of public knowledge. 
The land for the nucleus estate had to be compulsorily acquired. The Bank was 
confident there would be no problem with this, presumably assured by Ghanaian state 
officials (World Bank, 1975,6). Nonetheless the Bank got an "assurance" on the 
prompt "acquisition and retention by GOPD (sic) of all land required to establish a 
10,000 ac Plantation prior to June 30,1976". Specifically, state acquisition and 
transfer of "not less than about 3,000 acres of land suitable for oil palm planting in 
the nucleus plantation area" was a condition of effectiveness. In the event a delay in 
the provision of the first 3,000 acres for the nucleus estate became one of the factors 
that held tip Nvork on the prQject till the second half of 19761. There was also a delay 
in the appointment of a management contractor and of a managing director. IRHO 
The coniptilsorý acquisition of the land required for the three oil palm projects encountered strong 
resistance from those threatened with displacement. These disputes are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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returned as the management contractor. with its personnel filling the posts of managing 
director and plant breeder. 
7.1.3. The Twifo (TOPP) Scheme 
The records of the CIB and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) 
offer a fascinating insight into negotiations and disputations that defined the character 
of the Twifo Oil Palm Plantation (TOPP) scheme', fuller than for any of the other 
projects. These covered a range of issues: the design of the project, its financing and 
capital structure, distribution of shareholding, including the terms of participation of 
firms with blocked funds, and the provisions of the investment agreement signed 
between TOPP Ltd and the CIB'. One striking feature of these negotiations deserves 
early mention. In the key debates CEREDEC, the initiator of the project very quickly 
got pushed into a secondary role by the central government. This arose from the fact 
that the IDFIs involved in the project preferred to deal with the government rather 
than a weak state-owned enterprise. CEREDEC was totally financially dependent on 
the govermnent. 
In addition to CEREDEC, TOPP Ltd has five other shareholders: Mobil International. 
Paterson Simons (Pasico), Paterson Zochonis (PZ), the National Investment Bank 
(NIB) and State Insurance Corporation (SIC), the latter two being parastatals. TOPP 
lAd Nvas incorporated in February 1977 by CEREDEC and the NIB. The two were 
' Most of the correspondence cited in the following section are from tile records of the CIB. 
ý The query raised by some of the investors in TOPP about the Investment Ai! reement has been 
discussed in Appendix 11. 
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however to exert little influence on the design of the project or directly contribute 
much funding towards its development. The bulk of the funding for TOPP came from 
the central state directly and three IDFIs (the CDC, EDF and FMO). There was 
international involvement in the project from the earliest steps towards its realisation. 
The Ghana government commissioned Harrisons Flemings Advisory Services (HFAS). 
the agribusiness management TNC, to carry out a preliminary survey in 1975. Late 
in 1975 government officials discussed the possibility of the TOPP scheme with a 
visiting "Project Identification Mission" from the British Overseas DeveloPment 
Ministry (ODM) and requested assistance with a feasibility study. This was the point 
of CDC's entry into TOPP. It was nominated by the ODM to carry out the study, the 
report of which was completed in July 1976. 
The core proposal of the CDC Report was for a 4,800 hectares nucleus estate, with an 
oil mill and an associated 1,200 ha smallholder component. The management of the 
smallholder part was however to be the responsibility of CEREDEC rather than the 
estate management, i. e TOPP Ltd. The site of the scheme was on the "Hemang 
Lands", NN17hich had been compulsorily acquired in 1975'. Ceredec had started a small 
oil palin plantation in the area the previous year. The Report estimated that 10,000 
lia. of land would be required and recommended that before development started there 
should be no delay in assessing and paying compensation for the earmarked land, a 
langle part of\vhich was planted with cocoa. The government formally accepted the 
C Report in December 1976, sx months a er it was completed. The TwIfo 
scheme was approved and a decision taken to form TOPP Ltd. The CDC was 
' liemang Lands (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 33 )2). 
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informed of the government's intention to invite it "to enter into a management and 
consultancy services agreement with TOPP. in order to ensure, from the beginning an 
efficient and effective operation of the company"'. The formal Loan, Management 
and Technical Assistance Agreements between Ghana and the CDC were not signed 
till 2 August 1978. These are examined in the following chapter. 
The discussions that preceded the government invitation to the CDC were dominated 
by two issues - the proposals for the smallholder component and the management of 
the whole scheme. CEREDEC was of the firm view that the management of the 
project should not go to "CDC or any foreign agency. As much as possible it should 
be Ghanaian, but where certain skills cannot be found in Ghana, foreigners will be 
appointed, M which case management will be mixed"'. It argued for a selective use 
of foreign management personnel, with each expatriate having a Ghanaian co-manager 
as part of a programme of speedy indigenisation. The Commissioner for Economic 
Planning had also indicated to CDC that he would favour such an arrangement. The 
records of one meeting of state officials show a recognition of CDC's power and 
associated pessimism about i) CDC agreeing to become part of a "mixed 
management" with Ghanaians, and in the unlikely event of so doing ii) accepting the 
'State Farms Corporation as a partner'. 
' CIB to CDC, 23ý December 1976 (CIB'A652) 
'CEREDLC to Commissioner for Economic Planning, November 12,1976, in ClB, 'W2 Vol 1. 
"NI intites of 2, November 1976 meet Ing of CIB, CEREDEC, Min istry of Economic Planning, &others 
(C III ,\ (I ý --)). 
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7.1.3.1. The Smallholder scheme 
CEREDEC's most detailed comments were on CDC's Report's conception of the 
smallholder scheme. The Corporation disagreed with the Report's fundamental 
proposal that the organisation and management of that part of the project should be 
its responsibility rather than of the TOPP management; it also questioned specific 
proposals for the financing of outgrowers and regulation of their farming. CEREDEC 
made five points in support of its disagreement with the CDC's proposals on 
organisation and management: 
a) Smallholders were expected to produce a vital 20% of the target 
output of fresh palm fruit under the project, which was therefore a 
critically important and integral part of the whole project. 
b) the management of smallholders "represents the main 
organisational bottleneck of the entire project and its organisation 
should not be shifted onto a different organisation from the 
company [TOPPI" (emphasis added). 
c) The coordination of the scheme demanded a high level of technical 
supervision. TOPP will have the best facilities in terms of personnel 
and expertise to bring about the most orderly development of the 
smallholder component. 
d) Considerable effort was needed to sustain the interest of participants 
and deal with problems during gestation; the proximity and facilities of 
the estate made TOPP best suited to manage these. 
e) The estate assumed direct responsibility for ensuring fruit produced 
bv small holders met standards for the estate mill. 
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CEREDEC received less than vigorous support from the government for its stance on 
the issue and the CDC's proposals prevailed. The set of Agreements on TOPP 
retained the separate responsibility of CEREDEC for the smallholder scheme. In all 
of them "The Project" is defined as: 
"the clearing and development ... of the necessary land for and the planting of 
an estate of approximately 4,800 hectares of oil palms and the construction 
and equipping of an oil palm processing factory ... with ancillary buildings, 
equipment, services and facilities, in association with the Smallholder 
Scheme (emphasis added), all generally in accordance with the CDC 
Report. "10 
The Smallholder Scheme also "generally in accordance that proposed in the CDC 
Report" was to comprise: 
"the development under the general control, supervision and management of 
CEREDEC of approximately 1,500 hectares of Smallholder Scheme land in 
the area of the Project by Smallholders each occupying (as tenants of 
fill CEREDEC ... ). 
CEREDEC and TOPP were to have an agreement under which: 
"TOPP's estate will function as a nucleus estate for local smallholder 
development providing on terms, in addition to processing facilities, technical 
guidance ... and assistance with ... training"" 
The power of CDC as potential financier of parts of the project was almost certainly 
a decisive factor in the outcome of the dispute, though the firm's officials offer a 
different explanation. According to them a series of meetings with CEREDEC 
officials had brought them round to see that their objections "reflected 
misunderstanding of CDC nomenclature". Further CEREDEC staff had "come to more 
''' Schedule I of Loan Agreement of 2 August 1978 between The Government of the 
Republic of Ghana and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. 
'' Clause I of Schedule 2 to Loan Agreement of 2 August 1978 between the 
Govemment of the Republic of Ghana and the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation. 
Schedule 2 Cjhan, -i-CDC Loan Agreement of 2 August 1978 1 
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clearly appreciate the various organisational aspects of the smallholder sector and the 
part to be played by Ceredec". CDC assured CEREDEC officials that though the 
smallholder manager would be administratively responsible to CEREDEC there ýN-ould 
be close technical liaison with the estate management". We shall return to the 
dispute about the design of the smallholder scheme in the chapter on contract farming 
since its details fit into the wider issues discussed there. 
7.1.3.2. Funding and private foreign firms 
The distribution of equity in TOPP Ltd went through a number of changes in the 
project's first five years. Table 7.1 below indicates the changes that took place in the 
distribution of shares from November 1976 to April 198 1. 
TABLE 7.1 
Distribution of Top P Ltd shares (1976-1981) 
Firm/Date Nov. 1976 June 1977 April 1978 April 1981 
CEREDEC 40.0% 55.0% 54.0% 81.28% 
Mobil 22.0 10.0 10.00 10.00 
Pasico 8.0 6.0 6.0 0.72 
N. I. B - 6.5 6.5 1.3 
PZ 12.5 12.5 4.5 
S. I. C - - 11.00 2.2 
Texaco 15.0 10.0 - - 
S ell 15.0 - 
B. A. T 15.0 
Compiled from data in CIB/GIC file, CIB/A 652. 
" CDC document of 2 July 1077 in CIBIA 65-2 
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For the Ghanaian government an early disappointment was CDC's unwillingness to 
take up shares in TOPP. The government had expected it to join firms with blocked 
funds to take up a majority (60%) equity holding in TOPP Ltd, the rest to be taken 
by CEREDEC and other local firms. However, in September 1976, soon after the 
publication of its Report, CDC indicated its unwillingness to be an equity investor in 
TOPP. It cited potential problems with the repatriation of dividends and unhappiness 
with the requirements of the Investment Policy Decree whereby Ghanaian capital 
would have to eventually take majority shares as the reasons. The Corporation pointed 
out that even if given assurances on these issues it would take up no more than a 
token shareholding. CDC was however ready, if invited, to give a loan towards the 
I oreign exchange cost of the project". It is unlikely that CDC expected the law to 
be changed so it could take shares in this one project. Its positions were really a 
roundabout way of refusing to invest in the equity of TOPP Ltd while keeping other 
doors open for a profitable involvement with minimal risks. 
I'OPP Ltd was incorporated in February 1977. As Table 7.1 above shows, the 
provisional allocation of shares in November 1976 gave the foreign private companies 
a majority holding in the company. The initial shift to a majority public sector 
oNviiership shareholding was to meet the main condition laid down by the EEC for 
contributing to the financing of the project. As of May 1977 the cost of the TOPP 
scheme was estimated at C49.02m. C18m was expected to come from equity. the rest 
to the met by loans. The Ghana government and parastatal financial institutions, e-g 
'4 Minutes of meeting held on 8 September 1976 by the CDC, the British High Commission, Ministry 
of Fconornic Planing, CIB and CERI'DEC, in ClB, 'A 652. 
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ADB, were expected to provide CI5.64m in local currency loans, while C5.88m (f3m) 
was to come from the British government through CDC. The EEC was approached 
to make up the shortfall of C9.5m through the European Development Fund (EDF). 
The subsequent changes in the relative share of holdings was due to the inability or 
unwillingness of the private firms to contribute to the escalating cost of the project. 
The process leading to the basic change in the ownership structure of TOPP was not 
without ironies. 
All the firms with blocked funds which provisionally held the bulk of TOPP's shares 
were averse to majority public sector shareholding in and management of the project. 
At least two of the private firms, BAT and Mobil, saw a CDC management of the 
project as minimising the risks of failure. They were particularly opposed to any role 
for the SFC. BAT was the most outspoken and laid down conditions for involvement: 
in addition to minority public share holding, it wanted full management authority 
vested in CDC rather than in TOPP's board of directors, based on a consultancy 
agreement of at least 12 years. The aversion to majority public ownership coincided 
with the official conception of SAS as involving majority foreign private ownership 
and investment 
CEREDEC on its part also desired to be the majority shareholder in TOPP Ltd. It was 
concerned about the size of foreign involvement both through equity and loans and 
sti-ove for increased local participation so as to reduce foreign influence. On its ovN7n 
however, CEREDEC lacked the muscle to affect the situation. The funding reqLilred 
I Minister) for for TOPP was vvell bcyond its reach. In a letter to the Commissioner (1 
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Economic Planning requesting financial assistance to pay for its 40% shares in TOPP 
Ltd, CEREDEC admitted that. "considering the rather modest capitalisation of the 
Corporation, resources cannot be mobilised intemally to finance our shares"". It put 
two proposals before the Commissioner. The first was for the compensation money 
paid by the Ministry of Finance to owners of the land compulsorily acquired for TOPP 
to be treated as part of CEREDEC's equity in TOPP and in turn for that amount to 
be added to the State's equity in Ceredec. Alternatively, the Ministry of Finance could 
give the Corporation a "soft loan" to finance its equity in TOPP Ltd. 
When the EEC Commission indicated the organisation's willingness provide EDF 
funding to meet the shortfall in the original estimated cost of TOPP, it put forward a 
number of conditions. Its main demand was for majority public sector ownership of 
TOPP. The Commission considered that: 
"... having regard to the generous nature of EDF assistance, such assistance 
should on principle be reserved for government ventures or at least for 
ventures in which an ACP Government has majority interest. for projects in 
which foreign private firms have majority interest the Commission feels that 
any EEC assistance should come in the form of EIB loans on strict 
cornmercial terms. Accordingly, the Commission proposes that as a condition 
for EDF assistance for the Twifo project, the Ghana government through 
Ceredec and NIB should increase its equity participation in the project to at 
least 51%". " 
Me proposed EDF loan was to be at an interest of one per cent per annum, repayable 
over 40 years with a 10 year grace period. The EEC Commission proposed two 
possible ways of TOPP benefitting from it. The Ghana government could: a) use part 
" CERFDEC to Commissioner for Economic Planning 12 November 1976 in CIB/A652. As of June 
1977 CEREDFC had a share capital of 700,000 cedis. 
" From document dated 12' May 1977 in CIB/A 6-5-1 
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of the amount to acquire, through CEREDEC, the conditional majority shareholdincy. 
or b) after doing so with its own resources take the soft loan and on-lend it to TOPP 
on harder terms, on terms and for purposes to be agreed with the EEC. The EEC 
indicated its own preference for the first of two proposals and the Ghana government 
went along with it. C3.5m of the EDF financing was to be in the form of technical 
assistance to enable the TOPP pay its foreign staff, i. e CDC personnel. 
So ironically the power of an IDFI made CEREDEC the majority shareholder the 
latter sought to be but the consequence of this was precisely the opposite of the 
corporation's aim of reducing foreign influence in the project. The move towards 
majority public sector ownership provoked a negative reaction from the foreign private 
firms. While Pasico grumbled about it, the change prompted the withdrawal of BAT 
and Shell from the project. Thus BAT, the most insistent believer in foreign 
rnanagement, quit because the price of that management turned out to be unacceptable. 
Pasico argued that the foreign firms sought majority shares so as to ensure the success 
of the project hence the security of their investments. Pointing to the poor record of 
that favourite whipping horse, the State Farms Corporation (SFC), it expressed doubt 
whether majority public ownership would provide this. In fact this position carries 
little weight. As we show in the next chapter, TOPP provided another illustration of 
how ownership does not always mean control in a company. Whatever power attached 
to rnzýjoritv public sector ownership paled beside the powers of the EDF and CDC in 
the project contracts. 
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The changes in shareholding in the period after the fundamental shift between public 
and private holdings are primarily due to the unwillingness or inability of the private 
shareholders to subscribe to increases in TOPP's equity triggered by the growing cost 
of the project because of a high rate of inflation caused by the country's growing 
economic problems. The April 1978 distribution of shares reflected the state of things 
at the time TOPP signed an Investment Agreement with the CIB. In 1981 the cost of 
the proj ect was again revised upwards to CI 00m, compared to C20m when the prQj ect 
was conceived. The revision produced another increase in TOPPs capital. The 1981 
distribution of equity in Table 7.1 show shareholders' response to this development. 
7.1.4. The Benso Oil Palm Plantation 
Like TOPP Ltd, BOPP was a private company under the Companies Code but with 
some important differences. Firstly, the latter is a joint venture between foreign firms 
(Unilever and Barclays Bank) and the state without the mediation of public 
corporations Secondly, no IDFl is involved. Thirdly, the agreement under which 
BOPP was set up was completely different from the Investment Agreement covering 
'ropp. The investment agreement (Heads of Agreement) for BOPP was signed 
directly by the Ghana government with UAC International, and covers much more 
than the issues in standard CIB Investment Agreement for SAS projects such as the 
onc signed with TOPP Ltd. It covers the nature of the project , its 
financing, 
incorporation and shareholding of BOPP, CIB incentives, provision of management 
and technical services for BOPP and a range of other issues. Some sections of the 
I leads of Agrcement are examined in this chapter; the rest properly fall into that on 
111anai, ement and related contracts. 
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58.4 per cent of BOPP's shares are owned by the Unilever Group ý(CWA Holdings 
48.7% and Unilever 9.7%), paid from the blocked funds held by its subsidiary, UAC 
International. Under the Heads of Agreement the respective shares of UACI and the 
state, in BOPP, could be issued to any UAC associated firm and any statutory body 
the government nominates. The Ghanaian state has 40 per cent with 1.6 per cent held 
by Barclays Bank. A British loan of f2m financed some of its key foreign expenses. 
Further financing has come from loans from the shareholders, in ratios proportional 
to shareholding. 
Development of the BOPP complex, located on compulsorily acquired land, between 
Benso and Adurn Banso in the Western Region, was started in 1976. The lease of the 
land to BOPP was paid for in the form of shares in the company. The initial phase 
was for a 4,070 ha (10,000 acres) oil palm plantation yielding 60,000 tons of palm 
fruit for the production of 12,000 tons of palm oil and 3,000 tons of palm kernel by 
a 16 tons/hr mill. BOPP is the only one of our projects not to have an integral 
siiiallholder/outgrower scheme. The Heads of Agreement merely requested that BOPP 
encourage outgrowers by providing facilities. 
U-ii1evei's investment in BOPP is the biggest single foreign private investment in 
Glianaian agriculture. Compared with the other three projects, Unilever's majority 
ownership of BOPP's equity is striking. The nature of Unilever's relationship with 
BOPP makes sense once two things are remembered. The Special Agricultural 
Scheme provided for a linear relationship between levels of equity investment and 
- blocked funds that could be repatriated. Given Unilever's extensive lamounts ot II 
7) 1) 
investments in Ghana no new channel for the repatriation of profits could be ignored. 
Unilever has had a close control over BOPP from gestation through development, to 
the phase of managing the finished project. BOPP was designed and built by 
Unilever's Plantations Group (PG). From the very beginning, BOPP has also had 
management and technical services agreement with the Unilever PG. 
Unilever's heavy, multiple involvement in BOPP as designer, majority shareholder, 
creditor, management and technical consultant, which guaranteed both ownership and 
management control is unique among all the foreign firms involved in any of the 
selected projects. This is hardly surprising since in addition to facilitating the 
repatriation of blocked funds, the establishment of BOPP is also a case of backward 
integration by Unilever to stabilise raw material supplies to its soap factory, Lever 
Brothers (Gh) Ltd. As argued in Chapter 6, for the bulk of other firms that plunged 
iiito SAS their agricultural projects were entries into previously unexplored areas, 
induced by the possibility of repatriating some blocked funds. 
7.2. IDFIs AND AGRIBUSINESS TNCS 
It is clear from the preceding presentation that agribusiness TNCs were heavily 
iiivolved in all four projects almost from inception, initially on preparatory work such 
as feasibility studies, project design. etc. and later as administrative and technical 
nianaocnient contractors. In all the oil palm schemes it was the very firms that carried 
out or were in some Nvýiý, involved , vith key preparatory Nvork such as I'Casibilitý, 
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studies that returned as the technical and administrative managers. In the case of 
BOPP, the role of Unilever's Plantation Group (PG) as project designers and technical 
service consultants can be seen as a typical intra-firm transaction between subsidiaries 
of a TNC. In all the other cases funding by IDFIs was a crucial facilitator of TNC 
involvement. 
These cases focus attention on the relationship between IDFIs such as the World Bank 
and TNCs , in this case agribusiness 
firms, which was a matter of great attention and 
debate in the period when our four projects were set up. The scrutiny of the 
relationship between IDFls and agribusiness TNCs was located in a wider examination 
of the factors behind the then new interest of the World Bank and other agencies in 
the agrarian economy and basic needs of the poorest countries of the Third World 
which created increased commercial opportunities for suppliers of goods and services 
in the sector (World Bank, 1975; van de Laar, 1976; Ayres, 1983) 
17 
- 
A similar mix of factors are generally cited by most analysts as accounting for the 
focus though they differ in the weight they give to each. These range from 
humanitarianism, through absorption of the Third World critique of the ideology and 
practices of these institutions, to aiding the cold profit lust of TNCs (Feder, 1976; 
Griffi 11,1977, Stryker, 1979; Wl I tiams, 198 1; Payer, 1982; Barker, 1984; Freeman, 1984). 
Arguing the case for a humanitarian motivation Stryker (1979,329) claims that for the 
\Vorld Bank the Nvorld food crisis of 1972-74 "was worth a thousand books and 
"The claims made b,, the World Bank for example about the intra-sectoral distribution of this increased 
lendin- has been widely challenged as part of the scrutiny that discussed in the followi II ing paragraphs. 
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speeches as an impetus to new rural priorities". The other extreme is represented by 
Feder whose position is graphically summarised. in the title he gave to an article on 
McNamara's famous Nairobi speech of September 1973: "The new World Bank 
programme for the self liquidation of the Third world peasantry" (Feder, 1975). 
Most of the critics are in agreement that agribusiness firms have profited from this 
enhanced interest in Third World rural development and agriculture, with the 
development finance agencies acting as veritable "Trojan horses". For example 
Williams (1981,17) notes that: 
"Rural development is big business, offering contracts and ernployment to 
construction firms, international experts and bankers, fertifiser, chemical and 
seed manufacturers and distributors, officials, extension workers, and even for 
a short time labourers". 
Payer (1982,225) is an ardent proponent of the "Trojan horse" argument. According 
to her the new IDFI interest in the Third World was the product of a conscious 
collaboration between the IDFIs and the TNCs: 
"It is not coincidental that the [World] Bank's new interest in the productive 
potential of the small farmer comes at just the time when large agribusiness 
firms are reallsing that their future lies not in the direct ownership of vast 
tracts of land, but in control over production through contracts with producer 
suppliers (and, at the other end, control over markets". 
That agribusiness firms have had a beneficial involvement with bodies such as the 
World Bank is beyond doubt. This has been in at least two ways. Firstly various 
"policy dialogue" structures and fora enabled agribusiness firms push for the 
dominance of notions of development within the IDFIs that provided a market for their 
goods and services. A notable example was the erstwhile Industry Cooperativc 
Programme (ICP) of the FAO composed of representatives of -about 90 TNCs through 
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which agribusiness promoted ostensibly neutral agrarian projects (Albright. 1977, 
Goldberg, 1977). According to Jacoby (1975,96)) the ICP had a strong influence on 
FAO project planning and its clout extended to bodies such as the World Bank and 
UNDP through Inter-Agency Agreements. Such influence was of globally strategic 
import given the authority of the FAO and World Bank over conceptions of rural 
development. Green (1986,145) has noted that while international development 
agencies world views of rural development are not homogeneous, "in both global and 
national centres (including Third World) there has been an orthodoxy most clearly and 
lucidly associated with the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation". 
The I. CP was disbanded in 1978 amidst criticism from inside the FAO itself, by other 
UN bodies such U`NDP and UNIDO, trade unions and independent analysts. 
Accusations of being a "Trojan horse" was one of the many criticisms made against 
the ICP. It was seen as giving the firms involved in it privileged access to the UN in 
violation of at least the spirit of the UN Charter (Bolton, 1977; Rastoin, 1981,45)" 
The second level of TNC gain from IDFIs is the more obvious one of directly 
negotiated benefit from particular projects in which IDFIs are involved. In the basic 
ncc(ty vears there was a marked increase in the number of joint ventures involving the 
World Bank's IFC and agribusiness. Between 1972-1976 there were 12 such ventures, 
flic same number as in the ten yvw'. Y. 1959-1969 (Payer, 1982,212-213). The more 
is A ccordino to Bolton (1977.2240) the demand of trade unions to be invo I ved in the Pro- ram rne to gyiýe C, 
it the tri-partism ofthe ILO met with opposition from the TNCs who offered to discuss such issues as 
thev deerned fit with the unions ad hoc. 
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pervasive and lucrative means of direct benefit was through contracts for the supply 
of goods and services such as feasibility studies for, design and construction of 
projects funded by these bodies, supplying them with capital goods, raw materials 
together with managerial and technical expertise as exemplified by GHASEL, TOPP 
and GOPDC. 
GHASEL was not the first instance of cooperation between the World Bank and HVA 
International. Previously the IFC had funded a sugar project in Ethiopia in which 
HVA was involved. (Bondestam, 1975; Payer, 1982,219; Dinham & Hines, 1983,29). 
The involvement of IRHO in GOPDC contains indications of how IDFI-funded 
schemes provide opportunities for TNCs to maximise the benefits of economies of 
scale. IRHO has had a long and influential involvement in the oil palm industry of 
iicighbouring Cote d'lvoire. Not only does IRHO still run its own estates but some 
credit IRHO with being the main inspiration for the state owned SODEPALM which 
is the centrepiece of Ivorian oil palm production. IRHO plantations did the research 
into varieties and also provided the seedlings for the Plan Palmier launched in 1963 
which turned Cote d'lvoire into a major world producer (Marcussen & Torp, 1982,80). 
GOPDC shares many features with SODEPALM estates (Jonah and Dadieh, 1987,42). 
Though the critique that opportunities are offered to agribusiness TNCs by fora such 
as the ICP is striking, the type of explanation of the links between the IDFls and 
ýwribusincss offered by a writer such as Payer, which can be considered as be' t, I ing on 
the frinoc or an area of broad consensus, is somewhat simplistic on a number of 
grounds. It is true that some features of IDFI procurement policies, for example the 
World Bank's international competitive bidding and the tying of purchases involving 
funds from bodies such as the EDF, objectively favour TNCs who control various 
sectors and technologies. However if these are conspiracies they are general rather 
than specific mechanisms which pre-date the period of IDFI funding of basic needs 
and such projects. 
Earlier in this chapter we argued that the concern of IDFIs with basic needs in the 
Third World was rooted in a mixture of factors reflecting the spectrum of seemingly 
conflicting reasons given by Feder, Stryker, etc. These positions are not contradictory 
once it is understood that IDFIs serve the interests of capital in general. The scope 
of this function easily covers helping shore up neo-colonies threatened with 
destabilisation by drought and famine, financing infrastructural development which 
improve conditions for the profitability of specific investments in Third World 
countries and also directly aiding the particular ways in which agribusiness TNCs are 
involved in Third World agriculture. 
The alliance of state, TNC and IDFI that projects such as our examples embody is a 
triangular relationship which bundles together determinate relations between state and 
TNC, state and IDFL, and TNC and IDFI. While it is true that the Third World state 
tends to be a relatively weak partiier in the alliance it is incorrect to assume a one- 
sided volwitarist determination of the role of agribusiness TNCs in IDFI funded 
proJects. Such an approach misses out on the possible influence of the other two sets 
of relations. 
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For example Payer's argument, which was referred to earlier. ignores the fact that the 
process of TNC adaptation and adoption of new forms of investment is partly in 
response to the resistance of social classes in the Third World countryside to the old 
patterns of TNC presence, and also the fact that ruling groups in these countries have 
relations of both cooperation and conflict with international business (Oman, 1989. 
Ghai, 1977,27). From another angle Payer's conspiracy theory-type explanation turns 
the many cases of active collaboration between Third World ruling circles and TNCs 
into cases of passive victimisation. It for example implies a denial of the fact that the 
upsurge in IDFI/agribusiness TNC involvement in African agriculture occurred in the 
context of real pressures for increased food production. In fact, in some such cases 
IDFIs come in to support rather than initiate such choices. The cases of BOPP and 
TOPP provide some support for this contention. The two projects were aimed at 
increasing domestic production of a key crop. However the objective pressure to 
increase oil palm output does not logically lead to the particular choice represented by 
the NRC/SMC's Special Agricultural Scheme which hoped to attract TNC investment 
into large scale agriculture. 
An important factor, independent of any IDFI-organised "conspiracy", which impels 
Third World state-TNC cooperation is the control of technology by TNCs. TNC 
domination of sectors of the world economy is something which confronts both IDFI 
and host country in the making of decisions on projects. Take Unilever, CDC and 
IRHO. The three organisations are world leaders in oil palm technology. not only in 
terms ot'dcsion and mamigement of plantation but also of crop technology. They have 
played key roles in definino the parameters for modern oil palm cultivation , ý-orld 
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wide 
Asia. 
The three are all involved in oil palm schemes in Africa, Latin America and 
Unilever has been a world leader in oil palm technology for most of the century 
(Graham & Fleoring, 1983,55). At the start of its involvement in TOPP the CDC was 
involved in oil palm plantations in Asia, Latin America and the Pacific. In 1989 
IRHO oil palm seeds were in use in 41 countries and it claims that over the last forty 
years its genetic improvement programme has resulted in seven-fold increases in oil 
production in places (IRHO, 1989,5). The CDC is considered by some to be the most 
active organisation as far as public sector nucleus estate-outgrower schemes are 
concerned (Glover, 1984,1150; Graham and Floering, 1984,103). By the mid 1980s the 
organisation was involved in nucleus estate- outgrower schemes in no less than 13 
countries. In fact the CDC is credited with pioneering the use of this production form 
in the Third World countries 
Morgan, I 980, Vol. 2, ch. 6). 
in the late 1950s (Rendell, 1976,277; 
A decision by a Third World country to adopt or adapt the technological packages 
created by CDC, IRHO, Unilever or any other agribusiness TNC is influenced by the 
conccption of development that informs policy makers in the particular country. The 
conscious choice of ruling circles in Third World countries has been an important 
elcment of the facile rush to import technologies. Here, the state-TNC link is 
underlaid by a perception of the TNC as an un-problematic bearer of technological 
innovation (Ghai, 1977,28). The alliance of state- I DFIs-TNCs in each project then is 
a unity of convergent and contradictory interests which are also separable into three 
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discrete relationships: between state and IDFIs,. State and TNCs and lastly lDFIs and 
TNCS. 
On this point particularly illuminating is the gestation of TOPP, where the 
convergence/contradiction between the motives of the state and SAS investors, the 
easy assumption by some of these firms of a community of interest with the CDC are 
affected by the dynamics of state-EDF relations. We can also note; a) the convergence 
and contradictions in the government's expectations of the Special Agricultural 
Scheme (SAS) and the motives of the firms which invested blocked funds in SAS 
ventures and b) the World Bank's doggedness in bringing the GHASEL scheme on 
stream in the face of government indifference and foot dragging, and c) the 
controversy about what animated the institution's interest in Third World agriculture 
at the time our projects were created. 
The specific contents of each of the three strands in the state-IDFI-TNC alliance are 
important for the points of similarity and divergence among BOPP, TOPP, GOPDC 
and GHASEL. With the qualified exception of BOPP, the projects share two key 
Icatures of contemporary trends in the internationalisation of agricultural capital, and 
the incorporation and subordination of the direct producers. Apart from BOPP, in 
\vhich Unilever and Barclays were the majority shareholders, the main fori-ris in which 
international capital participated in the four projects was through the provision of 
credit by IDFls with TNCs present as management/technical service contractors. Also 
GOPDC, TOPP and GIIASEL are nucleus-outgrower enterprises. 
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Within their broad conformity to the dominant forms of internationalisation of 
agricultural capital differences in the design details of the projects, especially the 
relationship between the estate plantation and contract farmers and the nature of their 
management contracts, provide summary evidence of the weight of the different 
strands in the relationship among the partners. The differences in the alliances 
concretised in the projects can also be discerned in the distribution of costs, benefits 
and power among the parties in the multipartite schemes. Chapter 8 examines the 
distribution of costs and benefits and power by analysing the terms of the project and 
loan agreements of BOPP, TOPP, GOPDC and GHASEL. Chapter 9 looks at the role 
of contract farmers in the four projects, including design differences that have been 
mentioned while Chapter 10 returns to the issue of costs, benefits and power by 
examining the terms of the management and technical services agreements of the 
projects. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Distribution of Costs, Power and Benefits 
From the preceding chapter it is clear that in each of our projects the integral 
involvement of international capital, and therefore the channels and levers of power. 
were at three levels: i) financier, ii) suppliers of managerial and technological 
knowledge and iii) as shareholders (with the exception of GOPDC which was a 
statutory corporation). This chapter examines the distribution of costs and risks on 
one hand and benefits and power on the other among the state, IDFIs and TNCs as 
crystallised in provisions of the project and loan contracts of BOPP, TOPP, GOPDC 
and GHASEL. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first section deal with 
the economic and other costs and risks related to: a) ownership of and shareholding 
in the enterprises, b) financing of ancillary infrastructure such as roads and other 
utilities without which the projects would not have been economic. The second 
section deals with the political and economic price of land acquisition for the projects. 
8.1. Distribution of Financial Costs and Risks 
Under the terms of the main agreements on GHASEL, TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC the 
state and parastatals have shouldered the bulk of the costs, and the risks of the projects 
have also been borne by the Ghanaian state and parastatals. The direct and related 
costs of all four projects turned out Nvell in excess of original plans because of the 
counti'v's economic crisis and the level of inflation from the mid 1970s, and the higher 
than expected cost of land compensation. The direct cost of GHASEL at the end of 
the project completion period was S45.5rn (C522.5m), 183 per cent of the original 
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estimate of $24.8m. (World Bank, 1981,3 1). The first phase of the Kwae scheme was 
estimated to cost $22-5m but actually cost $47.8m (World Bank. 1984,9). The cost of 
BOPP more than doubled from the projected 30 million cedis in 1975 to C66 million 
in 1980 (UAC, 1980,3). The direct cost of TOPP increased from C24.95 million in 
1976 to C60 million in 1978 and went up steeply as implementation progressed. Due 
to the structure and sources of finance for the projects a disproportionate share of the 
growing costs fell on the state. 
Shareholding was not the dominant form in which international capital was involved 
in multipartite agribusiness projects. Voting control of boards of directors was not the 
mechanism of power nor profits and dividends the main legal forms of hoped for 
benefit. Of the four projects it is only in the case of BOPP that foreign capital has a 
majority shareholding. Except for GOPDC the enterprises were private limited 
liability companies. GOPDC, a state owned enterprise under the Statutory Corporation 
Act 1964 (Act 232), was the only firm wholly owned by the state. GHASEL on the 
other hand was a private limited liability company created out of a statutory 
corporation as part of the legal and institutional changes agreed between the World 
Bank and the government. The state's 95 per cent shares in the company was paid for 
by the transfer of the assets of the GIHOC Sugar Products Division to GHASEL. 
Under section 7 of the Management and Subscription Agreement between HVA 
International and the Ghana Government HVA took the remaining five per cent of 
GHASEL's equity for $500.000. to be called up over a three year period in 
instalments of $200,000. $150,000 and $150,000. 
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The manner in which parastatals, especially Ceredec, became the majoritý, share 
holders in TOPP has already been recounted in the preceding chapter. Here a key 
creditor imposed a condition of majority state ownership contrary to the initial 
assumptions of both the state and the foreign firms that took shares in the company. 
As we shall show, this state ownership did not come with management power and 
control. Ironically some of the EDF credit went to pay for the management services 
of CDC which had refused to risk its capital by taking shares in TOPP. 
HVA only took up shares in GHASEL upon the request of the government. This 
isolated instance of government initiative in the designing of the project was based on 
a hope that such partial ownership of the enterprise would deepen the management 
contractor's commitment to it. The terms of HVA's equity participation, which 
eliminated any risk of a loss, made this expectation somewhat misplaced. Section 9 
of the Management Agreement provided for a refund of HVA's investment in 
GHASEL "In the event of termination of this agreement for whatever cause". It can 
argued that the terms of the Agreement also meant that FIVA's shares were effectively 
paid from what it received as fees for managing GHASEL. The payment of the three 
annual instalments of the subscription was conditional on HVA's receipt of its yearly 
fixcd iiianagement fees in respect of GHASEL. The fixed management fee under 
section 6 amounted to $200,000, $150.000 and $150,000 respectively for the first three 
years of the Management Agreement: exactly the same sums due from HVA as share 
subscriptions. 
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Oman (1989) has argued a distinction between shareholding by a foreign firm where 
the primary concern of that firm is to sell resources to the enterprise in which it has 
shares and the cases where the foreign investor shares with its host country partner "an 
essential interest" of ensuring the project's ability to generate an economic surplus. 
In the latter case: 
"there is a convergence of interests between the foreign company and the 
host country participant in maximising the difference between the value of the 
project's output and the cost of producing that output". Whatever conflicts 
arise between the parties are "within the boundaries of their common interest 
in the project's success as an investment, e. g in its ability to generate over 
time an economic surplus" (Oman, 1989,12). 
Where however the main interest behind a foreign firm's involvement is to sell 
resources: 
"its interest lies primarily in maximising the difference between the pre- 
negotiated price it Is to be paid for supplying a pre-determined set of 
resources, and the costs that it must actually incur to supply those resources. 
Its concern for the future surplus generating capacity of the investment project 
is at best secondary" (Oman, 1989,12). 
Given the fact that HVA's primary interest in GHASEL was as a management 
contractor, and considering the terms of its shareholding in the company, it can be 
considered to have a seller rather than an investor's stake. The controversy that 
erupted over its role in the failure of the rehabilitation scheme lends some support to 
this viewl. 
Unilever's equity in BOPP, \, cry much an investment given the totality of Unilever's 
involvement in the enterprise, does not have the immunity against risk that was 
ciljoyed hy FIVA's shareholding in GHASEL. The risks to the enterprise's viability 
' See Cliapter 10. 
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and profitability were however considerably reduced by the terms of the Heads of 
Agreement under which it was set up. The broad range of incentives, exemptions and 
privileges granted to the enterprise and the foreign partners under SAS and various 
laws, were augmented with a special conditional guarantee of government subsidy 
during a crucial five year period. Section 8 (2) (a) of the Agreement provided that: 
"For a period of five years commencing with the first financial year of BOPP 
in which its output of palm oil exceeds 5,000 tons, Government xvill afford 
BOPP a guarantee of minimum return as follows. If in any year in respect 
of which this guarantee is operative the total net revenues received by BOPP 
are, before tax, less than 4% of capital employed, Government shall make a 
payment to BOPP of such sum as shall be required to render the net revenues 
received by BOPP, before tax, 4% of capital employed for such year. " 
Considering that BOPP had a virtual seller's market for its output because of the gap 
between national consumption and output, especially considering the demand 
represented by the raw material needs of the associated Lever Brothers', this additional 
guarantee amounted to armour plating Unilever's capital against extremely minimal 
risks. This view is supported by the fact that, in BOPP's own words: "the project 
becarne profitable in 1982 - three years earlier that forecast in the project proposals"' 
This was not all. 
The firm also secured favourable terms for some of its lending to BOPP. Under the 
Heads of Agreement Unilever and the Ghana Government were to provide BOPP with 
iwerest free loan finance totalling ClIm divided between them according to their 
2 "Net revenues" was defined in section 8 (2) (a) as "trading profit less commercial 
depreciation and interest as shown in the audited accounts of BOPP for the year in 
question" "Capital employed" is "fixed assets net of commercial depreciation, plus 
current assets less current liabilities, as shown in the audited balance sheet of BOPP 
at tile end of the financial year preceding the financial year in question". 
' Benso Oil Palm Plantation Limited - submission of Phase 2 Extension proposals to the Ghana 
Investment Centre, 8/1 'S8. 
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equity, i. e Unilever was to lend 60 per cent of the amount (C6.6m). While this initial 
sum did not qualify for transfers under SAS any 
"further finance provided or procured by UACI or its associated 
companies ... in respect of which no exchange control permission under the Exchange Control Act 1961 (Act 71) has yet been granted for the remittance 
of the same to the United Kingdom shall be regarded as an overseas 
investment by UACI and shall be afforded full recognition as such and shall 
be an investment qualifying for the benefit of the transfer facilities set out in 
Paragraph 70 of Part I of Chapter IV of the Ghana Budget Proposals for the 
Fiscal Year 1974/75" (emphasis added). 
This provision represents a special extension of the repatriation privileges under SAS 
which on the face of it covered only investments in -projects. 
The significance of this privilege is heightened by the fact that BOPP, unlike the 
contemporaneous TOPP, failed to deliver one of the main official goals of SAS: 
attached contract farmers. Under section 7 BOPP merely undertook to develop and 
maintain facilities for the "encourapement of outgrowers" (emphasis added) totalling 
no more than 3,000 acres. These facilities were: 
(1) provision at cost of suitable seedlings; 
(2) advice on cultivation; 
(3) guaranteed purchase of all fruit grown by outgrowers and delivered 
by them to the mill, at prices determined by BOPP; and (emphasis 
added) 
(4) sufficient capacity in the mill to process fruit purchased from 
outgrowers. 
Predictably BOPP has not developed a contract farmer component. On the experience 
of TOPP and GOPDC the lack of interest from the nucleus estate doorned that part of 
the project. BOPP's intention to do no more than the bare minimum required under 
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the Agreement was manifest very early in the life of the project. Late in 1979 it 
informed the CIB/GIC that an area for potential outgrowers had been earmarked and 
BOPP's nursery had enough seedlings to supply for planting. Remarking the absence 
of any progress on the scheme it drew attention to the fact that "it is the responsibility 
of the government agency concerned to organise and finance farmers on this project. 
A scheme was drawn up by BOPP and sent to the Ministry of Agriculture but nothing 
has been heard of it. Although BOPP has been buying palm fruit from farmers in 
its neighbourhood it is an uncertain relationship. For example in 1982 the firm 
provided transport for carrying fruit from selling villages but withdrew the facility the 
next year resulting in a dramatic drop in its purchases from farmers (Dadieh and 
Jonah, 1987,28). 
Unilever's advantages under the Heads of Agreement were sealed by two other 
provisions of the Heads of Agreements that read like terms in a 19th century 
concession contract. Under section 6 (5) (a) the Government agreed to fetter its 
sovereign discretion and accepted to have the Agreement override any existing 
legislation and also insulate its terms against future legislation. Section 6 (5) (a) 
provided that: 
... In the event of any apparent conflict between the terms of this Agreement 
and any existing legislative provision, the terrns of this Agreement shall 
prevail, and if necessa! y Government shall procure that BOPP shall be 
specifically exempt from any such legislative provision"(emphasis added), 
while section 6 (5) (b) reads as follows: 
GoN, ernrnent hereby guarantee that the value of the concessions and benefits 
to be granted to BOPP in the terms of this Agreement will not be withdra"N'll, 
negatived or reduced by subsequent legislation. In the event of any general 
legislation being introduced after the date of this Agreement which, if applied 1ý -- 
' BOOP to CIR. I November 1979 in BOPP CIB/672. 
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to BOPR, would have the effect of withdrawing, negativing or reducing the 
value of any concessions or benefits to be granted to BOPP in the terms of 
this agreement, the Government will procure that BOPP will be specificall', 
exempt therefrom or from such parts thereof as shall be appropriate. 
This unbalanced contract was sealed by Section 13 on breaches and repudiation of the 
Agreement which makes no distinction between material and minor breaches. flatly 
providing that: 
The provisions of this Agreement are not severable and any material breach 
of such provisions by any party shall entitle the other to repudiate the whole 
of the Agreement without prejudice to any other remedies it may have"'. 
The foreign shareholders in TOPP did not enjoy the minimisation of risks granted to 
Unilever but we can cite at least one instance where a moot point was officially 
resolved in their favour because of anxiety about their continued participation in the 
project. In August 1978 the cedi was devalued from C 1.15 to C2.75 against the US 
dollar. Following the devaluation the Bank of Ghana sought to calculate SAS 
repatriations at the new exchange rate. PZ, Mobil and Pasico objected to what they 
saw a variation of the terms under which they had agreed to invest in TOPP and 
refused to meet a scheduled call to pay up for a tranche of shares. In a plaintive letter 
to the Bank of Ghana, copied to the Commissioner for Finance and Economic 
Planning, the management of TOPP urged a concession to the three firms on the issue. 
The request was acceded to. Among other things TOPP argued that: 
5 Compare this to sections 2.04 and -1.05 of the 
Ghana Government - CDC Loan 
Agreement on TOPP where the grounds for repudiation of the contract not oril". 
distinguish between "material" and "minor" breaches "unllkelý rnaterlallý and 
adversely to affect the progress and viability ofthe Project" 
but also go on to detail 
those breaches which are deemed "material". The Management and ! "'tibscription 
A(yreernent between Ghana and HVA for its part provides in Section 12 (b) (11) for 
a process ot- notification of "matertal" breaches. period 
for rectification before 
repudiation by either party. 
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[It] relies heavily on foreign investors' funds, any delay in or cancellation of 
commitment to subscribe will seriously jeopardise not onlN planned 
development programme but also CDC and EDF Loan Agreements ... The 
credibility of the CIB is very much at stake. Foreign shareholders will only 
participate in schemes like TOPP if they can see some tangible benefit 
accruing to them from their investment'. 
Changes in the value of capital due to shifts in exchange rates are a fact of economic 
life, hanging over investment decisions everywhere though more so where the local 
currency is weak. In that sense TOPP's foreign shareholders did not face a special 
problem; there was nothing in the letter of the Investment Agreement TOPP signed 
with the CIB/GIC about the effect of a devaluation so it would appear the Bank of 
Ghana was following its established practice in this area'. 
On the face of it the claim that TOPP "relies heavily on foreign investors' funds" is 
strange. The strategic shift from a planned majority foreign private ownership of 
TOPP to a majority ownership by SOEs was quickly followed by a decline of the 
shareholding of firms with blocked funds. Even at the time the TOPP Project 
Agreement was signed in August 1978 the expected equity contribution of the foreign 
private firms was no more than 9.5 per cent of the total costs of the project. 
Fxceliting Mobil, which increased its percentage shareholding, these firms were either 
unwilling or unable to subscribe to new shares created to meet the ever Increasing 
costs ol'the project, Nvhich saw the number of ordinary shares increase five fold bý- the 
6TOPP to Bank of Ghana, 19")'79, in CIB/A652. Vol 2.. 
' See hivestment Agreement of 10 April 1978 between the Capital Investment Board and T\%, Ifo Oil 
PArn Plantmion. 
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end of 19801. In fact, as the costs grew whatever contribution the foreign firms made 
became crucial as the government had increasing difficulty in shouldering the 
spiralling costs. 
In July 1980 an internal government report on TOPP said "the assumption of 
government's ability to provide local financing has proved heroic"'. The memo 
suggested two possible ways of spreading the cost of the project: a) re-negotiate it 
with the EEC, or b) sell TOPP shares to private interests, which latter option was not 
seen as very hopeful. The writer of the report felt, "the trouble here is how to get 
people to release hoarded money to acquire shares since by so doing they expose 
themselves to the risk of public scrutiny. "" 
The idea of a possible renegotiation of the project with the EEC has to be understood 
in terms of some features of the financing plan of the project which provided for a 
third of TOPP's 1978 estimated cost of C60m to come from equity and the rest from 
loans. The EDF provided a loan of 6.8m. EUA to the Ghana Government part of 
wliich (C3. I m) went to fund some of Ceredec's shareholding in TOPP, with the rest 
going towards the C40m loan capital. The CDC's 3m loan for the palm oil mill also 
We do not have figures for the amount of blocked funds held by the foreign shareholders in TOPP, 
i. e Mobil, I1Z and Pasico. It is however a fair assumption that Mobil, one of three biggest retailers of 
petroicurn products in Ghana would have built up substantially bigger blocked funds than either PZ or 
Pasico, both medium sized trading houses. 
"Report on visit to TOPP" dated 2617/80 in Ministry of Finance and Econom, I ic Planning Fi es on 
TOPP. 
" This comment must be understood in the context of the national atmosphere fostered by tile three 
nionth rule of the AFRC bet\\ een June 4 and September 24 1979. The AFRC's "house cleaning" anti- 
corruption drive had drawn attention to man\ instances of illegally acquired wealth. See Okeke ( 198 1), 
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formed part of this loan capital. the remainder of which, C28.37m or 71 per cent, Nvas 
to come from the Government or its agencies. Equity therefore was not the most 
burdensome part of TOPP's spiralling demands on the State treasury. As the cost of 
the project grew, the proportionate burden represented by the government's share of 
loan financing increased since the CDC and EDF loans were fixed as one off 
contributions both of which were conditional on majority public sector ownership of 
TOPP. While the EDF's contribution went to cover vital overseas expenditure, the 
ownership condition constrained any possible recourse to increased private 
participation to ease the government's financing difficulties. A renegotiation with the 
EEC might at least result in increased EDF funding". 
8.2. Land and Infrastructure 
The state played a crucial role in ensuring the existence of the social conditions for 
the economic success of the enterprises. In its analysis of the relative failure of SAS 
the CIB/GIC cited "the cumbersome nature of land acquisition procedures" as one of 
the factors for the poor response of firms with blocked funds. "Litigation over 
ownership or title to land is usually expensive and time consuming. It therefore takes 
a long time for investors to make up their minds to venture into large agricultural 
projects" (GIC, 1987,14). The role of the state in the provision of land for TOPP and 
BOPP stands out as a particularly striking aspect of the special status that the two 
'' Section 8.02 (2) of the CDC Loan Agreement provided for majority ownership by tile "Goverriment 
or Government appointed, controlled and financed institutions" during the life of the Agreement. Barring 
termination for breach the loan would be fully repaid in 2000. Meantime the same A-reement, section 
8.01 (2), required that the Government "will at all times make or cause to be made available to TOPP 
all moneys... " needed for the completion of the Project in accordance with the provisions of the CDC 
Project Agreement". The total effect of these provisions amounts to a lot of power in the hands of the 
CDC for lending 10 per cent of the originally estimated cost of the project. 
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enterprises enjoyed relative to other SAS projects. The state's financial difficulties in 
respect of TOPP had two other dimensions: the cost of compensation for the 
compulsorily acquired site of the project and providing communication infrastructure. 
linked to the terms of the CDC Loan. The costs the state bore, the political risks it 
took, including the deployment of its coercive powers against recalcitrant land owners 
to ensure that the two SAS projects and GOPDC got the land they needed, was mainly 
due to the pressure exerted by the international partners in the schemes. 
To meet a condition of the World Bank credit for the Kwae project (World 
Bank, 1975,7) the government acquired a 25,000 acre area and leased the 22,000 acres 
which was deemed suitable to GOPDC for a 50 year term for a total rent of 
C1,396,170". The government also undertook to build a 10 mile road in the vicinity 
of the nucleus plantation and also maintain all roads within a 15 mile radius of the 
plantation to a standard that would enable their use by seven ton lorries at all times. 
The CDC's obligation to advance moneys under its Loan Agreement with the Ghana 
Government was conditional, among others, on: 
the ownership of land required for the Project having been acquired by the 
Government and a lease or leases or a sub-lease or sub-leases having been 
granted to TOPP for a term of not less than 50 years from the date thereof at 
a rent equivalent to not more than C5.00 per hectare per annum when 
averaged throughout the first 25 years". 
12 Hie annual rent, on rising scale till the 22nd year of the lease, was spread as follows: Year 1-7 
C5,5 31 0.8-14 =C 11,060, Year 15-2 1= C22,120 and Year 22-50 = C-I 38,800. 
13 section 2.03 (2). 
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The part of the country where TOPP was located was particularly poorly served by 
roads. The government was also required to provide means of access and 
communication suitable to the Project within 18 months of the Loan Agreement. The 
Financing Contract with the EEC also required the government to "provide evidence 
to the Commission of the issue of a sublease to the Company of the required land" 
14 
. 
The CDC's Feasibility Study for TOPP recommended that 25,000 acres would be 
needed for both the nucleus estate and smallholder components of the project. The 
identified site formed part of the over 190,000 acres of "Hemang Lands" which had 
been compulsorily acquired by the state in 1974, "free from all encumbrances 
whatsoever, as land required in the public interest", with retroactive effect from 21 
February 1973" 
The Heads of Agreement on BOPP imposed a similar obligation on the government 
to "grant or procure the grant to BOPP of a lease" in respect of the piece of land 
earmarked for the plantation. Unlike the case of TOPP, where the state's 
responsibility for compensation and other expenses connected with the land are 
implied the BOPP Agreement spells out the responsibility, providing for the 
Government to: 
"discharge all outgoings of whatever nature in respect of the land and 
premises to be dernised ... and take all such prior steps and be responsible 
for 
all payments of compensation required to ensure that the whole of the land 
is handed over to BOPP ... with full vacant possession and free from all 
encumbrances". 
1.1 section 4.4 of Annex 22 of EC Financing, Contract quoted in MFEP document "Land Access for 
TOPP", n, d. 
" State Lands (Ilemang - Lands Acquisition) Instruments of 1974, E. I. s 61 and 133), replaced in 1975 
hv Heniano Lands Acquisition Decree, 1975 (NRCD 332). 
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The agreement provided for a 50 year lease to BOPP at an annual rent of C 1.50 per 
acre,, to be reviewed after the first 10 years. In addition the state was to provide 
"adequate communications", including a direct telephone connection and local roads 
giving access to the plantation were to be made up and maintained so as to support 
"heavy traffic"". 
The areas acquired for the three oil palm projects are the best oil palm land in the 
country which already had farms and settlements". The World Bank's Appraisai 
Report on GOPDC barely gave a thought to the problem of land acquisition, blithely 
asserting: "There does not seem to be any problem in acquiring the land needed for 
the nucleus plantation" (World Bank, 1975,6). There are however few happy histories 
of compulsory acquisition and displacement of large numbers of farmers and the cases 
or GOPDC, TOPP and BOPP GOPDC followed the pattern of landholders resisting 
displacement and disruption of their established livelihood". In all cases the disputes 
resulted in an increase in the share of project costs the state had to shoulder and delays 
in estate development schedules at GOPDC and TOPP. This was particularly so in the 
case of TOPP where local resistance was particularly intense. The evolution of the 
disputes around land for TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC exposed a number of problems 
and limitations in the conception of the projects and inadequate consideration of 
"' Section 9. 
17 Accordino to the NIB (1987, passim) the location of BOPP, Adum Banso in the Western region, is 
an area "judged to be most suitable for oil palm cultivation in Ghana; TOPP is in an area of the 
ýentral 
Re-Jon i. e Twifo Marnpoiw which is "favourable for oil palm cultivation by Ghanaian standards" \ý hile 
Kwae in the Eastern Region, site of GOPDC is "one of the most suitable". 
"See Konings (1986,270-281) for an account of the contemporaneous traumatic experience of peasant 
households displaced by state acquisition of their ancestral lands for the Vea and Tono Irrigation 
proJects in the Upper Re, -, ion. 
others. These problems were compounded by government administrative inefficiencies 
and confusion. 
In all three cases the resistance of the local people had three main elements: a) 
hostility to the threat of expropriation and displacement, b) disputing the terms of 
compensation they were being offered for their lands and c) suspicion about the 
proclaimed beneficial impact of the projects on their lives. In 1982, with the survival 
of TOPP threatened by peasant resistance to expropriation, the goverment drastically 
reduced the area of the compulsorily acquired Hemang lands from 190,784 acres to 
the essential core required for the project, some 35,000 acres and returned the rest of 
the land to their original owners". In 1986 continuing resistance from landowners 
and the size of the compensation bills forced the government to return more than 
7,000 acres out of the land acquired for GOPDC to the owners. This did not affected 
oil palm plantings, but instead of being an area for smallholders on GOPDC owned 
land as originally intended, the oil palm farmers on the released lands retained title to 
the land and therefore were categorised as outgrowers. 
At the three sites, controversy about the terms of compensation being offered by the 
state quickly became a crux of landholders resistance to expropriation. In all cases the 
official computation of compensation was based on the numbers of "economic trees" 
on the affected lands. mainly cocoa and oil palm in the instant cases. At the existing 
official rates a mature cocoa tree was worth 50 pesewas and an oil palm 25 pesewas. 
A 1976 survey of the TOPP land estImated compensation due to affected farmers at 
I ieniang I ands (Acquisition) (Amendment) Law, 1982 (PNDC Law -19). 
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C3.96 million based on the assessment that the 10,000 ha area had just under 8m 
cocoa trees on it. At Kwae the area earmarked for GOPDC was officially valued at 
C 745,092, while the BOPP land was valued at one million cedis. In all three cases 
these proved to be wild underestimates. As of 1985 the government faced 
compensation claims of C104.3 million in respect of GOPDC, of which nearly C88 
million had been paid. At Twifo a total of C8.8 million had been paid out in 
compensation by mid-1981, releasing 1,700 ha of land compared to the original 
estimate that CI. 3 million would pay for 4,800 ha; as of 1986 C18m had been paid 
but there were still outstanding claims. At BOPP C2.5 million was paid to just two 
claimants for the destruction of their oil palm plantations totalling 380 acres (Dadieh 
and Jonah, 1986,29). 
In the cases of TOPP and BOPP the escalation of compensation payments was doubly 
expensive for the state because under the project agreements the estimated value of the 
land was taken as part of the government's contribution to the equity of the two 
projects and shares accordingly issued against the capitalised values. In the case of 
BOPP the CIm valuation amounted to a mere 15.4 per cent of the value of the 
govemmciit's 40 per cent equity or 6.2 per cent of total equity. At TOPP the 
estimates placed the capitalised value of the land at 3m shares, out of TOPP's 20m 
shares at a cedi per share, to be awarded to Ceredec. The undervaluation of all three 
sites meant that the government's contributions to the capitai of the firms were 
understated and inadequately reflected in shareholding. The effective subsidy to the 
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two projects is particularly noteworthy in the case of BOPP. a TNC dominated 
undertaking, which we have already shown enjoyed many privileges'O. 
The discrepancy between the estimated and actual sums paid in compensation was the 
result of the government having to give in to landholders demands for a higher C! 
valuation of the affected crops, particularly of cocoa and oil palm trees. Farmers 
displaced by GOPDC and BOPP based their demand for a higher valuation primarily 
on economic grounds, the 50p and 25p rates being offered by the government having 
remained unchanged since 1946. Farmers affected by the creation of BOPP demanded 
between C5 and C8 per cocoa and oil palm tree. A letter of November 24,1977 in 
support of their claim pointed out that oil palm and cocoa seedlings were selling at no 
less than one cedi each (in Dadieh and Jonah, 30). At TOPP the economic argument 
for a higher rate of compensation, C8.00 per cocoa tree making a total compensation 
claim of C63.4m, was buttressed with a legal one. A letter sent to the then President, 
Dr I Iffla Limann, by the District Chief Farmer of Twifo and others, graphically 
presents the farmers' argument. It offers a picture of their economic condition and 
mood, particularly the lack of faith in government promises, three years after the 
establishment of TOPP: 
We the undersigned farmers in the Twifo Area have cause to suspect and 
believe that our economic plight is being jeopardised by Government's 
acquisition of our cultivated lands ... on behalf of all displaced 
farmers, [we] 
wish to resolve here and now on the following points: 
1. a) that the current rate of 50p per cocoa tree is quite nleagre and out of 
tune Avith present circumstances, b) that Nve NNant the government to make a 
firm commitment as to the neNý rate payable, since at one meeting with the 
According to Dadieh and Jonah (1986,29) a memo b,, the Attorney General's Department n 
No% ember 1981 noted the Inadequacy of the capItalised value of the BOPP lands "bear, no in mind tile 
cost of acquiring the land". 
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then Regional Minister, we were made to understand that due to the lack of 
adequate funds, government could only afford 50p at that time. Our claim for 
the payment of C8 per tree is supported by L. I. 1231 [Under AFRCD 47] 
gazetted on 22/9/79 which specified C8 per tree; c) that we accepted 50p per 
tree as part payment leaving a balance of C7.50 per tree, due to our financial 
obligations at the time... 
2. We would like to place on record that we are not much impressed with the 
handling of the compensation issue. We have tolerated the frustration for too 
long, which has compelled most of the affected farmers to sell their chits at 
discount, in order to meet their daily mounting financial commitmentS2 1. 
The inevitable delays caused by the dispute over compensation rates and associated 
hardship to displaced persons, such as mentioned by the Twifo farmers were 
compounded by a catalogue of other government failings and bureaucratic confusion, 
bordering on insensitivity to those whose lives had been uprooted to make way for the 
oil palm projects. At all three sites there were delays both in assessing the 
compensation and making the first offers of payments to affected persons. At Kwae 
there was "slowness of Government in compensating and arranging resettlement for 
the [GOPDC] land's original occupants" (World Bank, 1984,9). At TOPP there was 
other bureaucratic bungling in the form of monies being paid to the wrong people, 
tinsystematic payments where some farmers on contiguous plots (which formed a 
single whole for estate development) were paid while others were not resulting in 
work on the whole area being held up. Poor coordination between government 
departments was another dimension of the inefficiencies. On at least one occasion 
after the Ministry of Finance had written to the Ministry of Lands and Mineral 
Resources effectively partly blaming the compensation feud on its inefficiencies, the 
"Chit" a generic word for IOUs derived from a practice in the cocoa industry where tN 
Nl, trketing Board gave farmers IOUs instead of cash. B\ discounting his 'her "chit" a 
displaced farmer sold the expropriated interest in the land, the bu" er then becom MO, 
entitled to collect tile compensation due. 
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latter for its part told TOPP that the failure of the Ministry of Finance in not releasing 
sufficient money for the payment of compensation was fuelling the problem" 
At the height of the land dispute around TOPP some of the farmers complained that 
no one had told them that their lands were being compulsorily acquired for the project 
and sought guarantees of resettlement before giving up their plots. There were similar 
experiences around GOPDC. Dadieh and Jonah (1987,41-42) cite highly revealing 
minutes of a 1981 meeting where no less a person than the Principal Secretary of the 
Ministry of Lands lamented the failure to consult those displaced by GOPDC resulting 
in them being left without land for food farming, and also the fact that the project had 
been "executed without proper consultation with counterpart ministries 
1123 
. The 
Chairman of that meeting lamented the failure to undertake a sociological study ahead 
of "such a large scale project" and the fact that "the interests of the human beings to 
be displaced were put in the background". 
Against this background it is hardly surprising that a senior civil servant, concerned 
about what he identified as "a total lack of commitment of local people" to TOPP 
thought this was because "they have been insufficiently educated about the economic 
I-miefits and other advantages for the area of the project". As "initial step to whip up 
the enthusiasm of the local people and also to improve labour supply for the project", 
" Minutes of meeting between officials of TOPP and Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources 22/7/8 1. 
Apart from indicating yet another instance of poor intra-state coordination the remark is curious 
cornini--, from a senior official of the Ministry which normally deals with land acquisition matters. 
Interest ing ly the World Bank's Staff Appraisal Report (1984,11) for the Second Phase ýof GOPDC 
mentions "tile autonomN and the freedom from constraints of normal civil procedures, which allmNed 
the project to organise efficiently its operations in land cleiring, and development, crop production, 
(emphasis added)... " as mic of two ma . Jor 
factors that contribmed to the success of Phase One. 
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he put his faith in a time worn manoeuvre, proffering "the need to put a local man on 
the Board [of Directors], preferably a chief or an elder who wields considerable 
influence on the people"" 
The official treatment of the rural communities and local farmers affected by the oil 
palm projects contrasts sharply with the government's response to complaints from its 
international allies in TOPP when the land disputes around the project came to a head 
in the middle of 1981. Official documents of the period reveal an attitude of anxious 
obsequiousness towards the EEC and CDC on one hand and a growing intolerance of 
a peasantry bent on obstructing a "development" project. 
The land dispute which had plagued TOPP from the very beginning had been the 
subject of continuous communication and discussions between the TOPP management 
and a number of state institutions, especially the Ministries of Finance and Economic 
Planning and Lands and Mineral Resources, with TOPP regularly informing 
government officials of the difficulties the project faced as a result of the land dispute. 
The exchanges provoked a number of meeting between representatives of the affected 
communities and government officials. Between October 1980 and July 1981 the 
problem became a crisis with TOPP unable to get access to any new land during that 
eight month period because of the resistance of landholders. This was in spite of the 
fact that some compensation was paid out in the period, for example in December 
1980 C3.8m Nvas paid out to claimants. Farmers refused to allow work to continue 
'4 Principal Secrctary, Minism, of Fconornic Plannin-g to Secretary to Cabinet, 15/12'80 in MFEP file 
"TOPP Nov 1980-November 198 1 ". 
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because they were disputing the rate of compensation and also because they claimed 
that in fact a large part of areas already taken over by TOPP had not been paid for. 
At the end of 1980/81 planting season, roughly coinciding with the 17th board 
meeting, planting was 25 per cent behind schedule (see Table 8.1); the smallholder 
component had not been started at all. Meantime the nursery had enough seedlings 
to plant 1450 ha in the 1981/82 season but no land was available for clearing. Faced 
with this situation TOPP's board of directors, at its 17th meeting on June 24,198 1, 
decided to: a) stop further purchases of seeds; b) suspend attempts at clearing more 
land; c) to put area so far cleared (1617 ha) under care and maintenance once planting 
completed and d) initiate a feasibility study into the viability of establishing a factory, 
with a third the capacity of what was originally planned, to process fruit from the 
reduced acreage. 
TABLE 8.1. 
Official Development Programme for TOPP 
YEAR ESTATE 
(ha) 
SMOLDER 
(ha) 
1978/79 100 
1979/80 800 - 
1980/81 1200 100 
1981/82 1200 300 
1982/83 1200 400 
1983/84 300 400 
Total 1 4800 1 1200 
From: Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Limited - Land Access J4 Tivýfo Oil Palm Project (c. 
Septembei- 1980). 
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The decisions of the TOPP board were triggered by expressions of deep dissatisfaction 
with the state of the project by the two main international financiers. the EEC and 
CDC. An EEC official had told the crucial board meeting that his principals were 
extremely concerned about the hold up of progress on the project. He made clear that 
if there was not "immediate and drastic improvement" in the situation the EEC would 
have to re-consider a renegotiation of the existing loan commitment. The CDC 
official at the meeting offered more menacing news. After expressing the CDC's 
disquiet with the project's persisting land problems, "despite many verbal and written 
undertakings and reassurances from Government" he informed the board that CDC had 
decided not to allow any draw down of funds under the Loan Agrement until such a 
time as: a)total nucleus estate area (4800 ha) had been released to TOPP with all 
compensation paid and totally unencumbered; b) satisfactory sub-lease had been 
granted to TOPP"; c) real progress had been made on the smallholder scheme. CDC 
was not going to accept any more verbal assurances from the government. 
The TOPP board also decided to send a delegation to meet the Vice-President to 
inform him that if the various problems, primarily the land controversy, that were 
impeding the establishment of TOPP were not resolved within two months, (I. e by end 
The land problem Nvas complicated by yet another instance of bureaucratic bungling: despite repeated 
reminders the Lands Department had failed to alter some of the tcrms of the Lease under which the area 
of TOPP had been granted to Ceredec, so as to enable Ceredec to sub-lease the land to TOPPý 
According to the construction schedule tendering for the construction of the oil mill was to begin in 
August lQ8 1 but the absence of a valid sub-lease to TOPP contravened the terms of the CDC Loan 
A, _, reement.. 
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of August) "there was a real possibility that foreign investors would withdraw and the 
project would either cease or continue only in a much reduced form 
1126 
. 
The EEC and CDC threats provoked anxiety and generated frantic government 
activity. The underlying concerns of the moves were succinctly put by an internal 
govemment memo: 
The grave consequences of the project with international financing coliapsing 
can hardly be exaggerated. First of all the planned desired economic and 
developmental impact of the project will be missed. Secondly it is bound to 
adversely affect further future investment in the country with serious 
economic and political consequences. Finally a project inaugurated by the 
President of this country can hardly be allowed to suffer such a fate for the 
sake of the image of that high office". 
The contrast between the government's concern to remain on the right side of the EEC 
and CDC while willing to antagonise some of its own people is sharply captured in 
letters written to the two organisations about steps being taken to avert a collapse of 
TOPP. On 20 August 1981 an anxious Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources 
informed the General Manager of the CDC that the "Government has recently taken 
firm measures to ensure that the few hectares of land remaining for the completion of 
the project are made available for entry by the Company". According to the letter 
"valuers of the Lands Department are feverishly working on the enumeration of crops 
of the land to enable the Government pay compensation... " The underlying power 
relationship between the two parties is captured in the concluding paragraph of the 
letter: 
" Extracts from minutes of 17th TOPP board of directors meetim-, attached to letter of 2517/81 from 
General Manaaer, TOPP to National Authorisin- Officer, ACREECTCOWAS Secretariat at MFEP. 
" Notes on I-NN-ifo Oil Palm PrQject in NIFIT files on TOPP. c. September 1981. 
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With this I wish to assure you of my government's serious determination to 
see that the project's aims and objectives materialise within the shortest 
possible time ... 
I sincerely hope your organisation , N, ill continue to show 
sustained interest in the project in spite of the recent problems posed by the 
owners of the land 28 . 
A similar tone can be discerned in a separate letter to the EEC written after the 
enumeration had been completed. The letter also contained indications of other "firm 
measures" to deal with the "problems posed by the owners of the land". After happily 
informing the EEC that "much of the outstanding problems on the land access 
situation ... 
has been resolved", the letter disclosed that "the farmers were given uptil 
(sic) the end of September to come forward to have their crops enumerated for 
compensation. It was also made clear to them that after this date force would be used 
if necessary to remove them from the land. indications so far point out that they are 
heeding the call ""(emphasis added). In fact the problem was not resolved and there 
were two instances of police being used against farmers in 1982". Overall the 
planting schedule fell behind considerably. As of the end of 1988 TOPP had a total 
planted acreage of just over 3,700 ha (FAO, 1989, Annex 2,5). 
The Ghanaian state's greater sensitivity to pressure from international capital over 
those of nationals was not exhibited only around TOPP. Among the farms destroyed 
to make way for BOPP were two locally owned oil palm plantations established v, -ith 
funding frorn the parastatal Agricultural Development Bank. Fadetco and Tranquillity 
28 Ministr), of Lands and Mineral Resources to General Manager, CDC, 22 Juk 198 1. 
Memo TOPP Implementa. tion Difficulties, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) to 
Directorate General for Development Pr jects, Agriculture Commission of EC, September 1981. oj 
Communication from Mr Darko. officer responsible for TOPP at MFEP, M4'89. 
262 
Farms, with 300 acres and 80 acres respectively of oil palm, had been established 
under the government's "Operation Feed Yourself' self reliance drive. These were 
large farms by Ghanaian standards". At the time they were destroyed in 1976, 
Tranquillity had been granted an ADB loan to expand to 200 acres. Ironically in 
1972, very early in the life of the farm, the owners had asked UAC for financial 
support so they could eventually supply LBG with palm oil for its soap production. 
One of the letters that the directors of Tranquillity wrote to the Commissioner for 
Economic Planning and other state officials, in the course of their ultimately doomed 
struggle against the expropriation and destruction of their holding, made an eloquent 
indictment of the terms and consequences on domestic private capital of the state- 
international capital alliance embodied in BOPP (Dadieh and Jonah, 1987,32-33). It 
said in part: 
... In 1972 when the N. R. C. launched the "Operation Feed Yourself Programme" we seized the opportunity to respond quickly to the call to 
Ghanaians to go into farming. At that time rarely did we envisage that 
UAC/International would one day turn back and kick us out from an area 
which they expressed their unwillingness to assist in development. Neither 
did we dream that having developed the area to oil palm out of our own 
struggle and sweat, we could be trampled upon in the long run. If this 
unfortunate situation is allowed to occur where lies the liberty and freedom 
of tile indigenous Ghanaian? 
So while vis-a-vis its partners in BOPP, TOPP and GOPDC, the state bore the 
financial and political cost of the land acquired for the projects the real socio- 
economic price of the land was borne by those who had for years lived and worked 
on the sites of the ne,, N, - enterprises. 
According to the 1970 Sample Census of Agriculture only 1.8 per cent of all holdings in Ghana Nvere 
50 acres or more in size, in the Westem Region the proportion was 0.7 per cent. 
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An important factor in the shabby treatment of those who were being displaced for 
the estates and the related land dispute was conflicting perceptions of development, 
between the state-IDFI-TNC alliance on one side and those threatened with 
displacement, particularly the peasantry. Despite the earlier indicated differences 
among the three oil palm projects, they share the primary feature of defining the 
"beneficial" impact of the enterprises on the local communities in terms of increased 
possibilities for higher incomes through expanded commodity relations, including wage 
labour. 
Without an integral outgrower scheme the benefits of BOPP for the locality were seen 
as incidental to the economics of the enterprise: the creation of plantation work and 
of a market for locally grown food represented by plantation workers (UAC, 1980,3) 
and the purchase of palm fruit by the BOPP mill at its own discretion. A BOPP 
management leaflet consisting of 25 points the company deemed noteworthy, did not 
have a single line about any beneficial impact on the local area beyond employment. 
In fact the leaflet is a statement of the enclave character of the operation with schools, 
clinic, company shop, estate housing and sports facilities for employees, protected 
against any external and internal threats by the company's "own security force of 
around 60 to combat theft of palm fruit", and "a police station and housing on the 
estate for police" built by BOPP". However the "development" perceptions and 
expectation of the local peasantry went beyond this. Thus when President Limann 
visited the BOPP site on February 24,1980 the chief of Adurn Banso appealed to the 
oovernment to tar the road leading through his village to BOPP and also asked for a 
32 Benso Oil Palm Plantation, BOPP in Bri(-J. n. d (c. 1988), in Files on BOPP at GIC. 
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rural housing scheme to cater for the population attracted to the area by the project 
(UAC, 1980,6). 
Reading a TOPP circular of 1979 the integral provision for a smallholder component 
seems only a minor exception in the essential similarity of how the TOPP and BOPP 
management see the beneficial impact of their companies on their localities. The 
TOPP document spoke of the Twifo project offering "opportunities which local 
members of the area are expected to take advantage of .. Three hundred 
local families 
are expected to participate in the smallholder scheme ... The 
developing estate offers 
employment opportunities to 400 members of villages and hamlets, working on land 
clearing, nursery work and planting of oil palms" (TOPP, 1979). 
Despite the World Bank's vaunted concerns with basic needs, around the time GOPDC 
was created, the organisation's Project Appraisal Report offered a traditional line on 
the benefits of the project, in terms of resulting in the generation of "a gross income 
of US$17.0 million annually in a what is now a poor and relatively undeveloped 
i-egion of Ghana" (1975,21-22). The two main points were an increase in the incomes 
of families that become contract farmers and job creation. "At full maturity, the 
project would provide employment for about 250 farmers and 600 staff and labourers 
at GOPD (sic) headquarters and in the plantation". The only examples of the "many 
Linquantifiable benefits" that the report (World Bank, 1975,22) offers are again 
nuro,. vIv commercial: 
In particular it wotild demonstrate the feasibility of the nucleus plantation 
approach to development by establishing an industrial plantation which would 
provide services to small outgrowers, and establish an efficient marketing 
systern for their pahn produce. 
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A list of demands presented in 1985 to the GOPDC management by the chiefs and 
community organisations of four villages in the project area can be described as a 
classic summation of what the dominant strata in those communities saw as the "basic 
needs" that the establishment of GOPDC should help meet (Dadieh and Jonah, 1987,83- 
89). The resolution, distilled into a draft agreement ready for signing with the 
management of GOPDC, listed 16 demands in the following order: 
a) five new palace buildings for the towns of Asuom, Kwae, Maman-Atobiri, 
Anweam,, and the Minta Royal Family on sites to be chosen by the chiefs and 
individual towns; 
b) secondary school scholarships proportionately distributed among deserving 
students from the mentioned towns; 
c) donations of 2 sheep, four bottles schnapps, palm fruit and cash donations 
to each of the five chiefs during their annual Afahye festivals; 
d) four bottles of schnapps, cash donations and palm fruit to each of the five 
chiefs during the annual Akim Abuakwa Ohum festival; 
e)20 acres of GOPDC's already developed plantation to each of the five chiefs, 
on behalf of their stools; 
f) the electrification of Asuom, Kwae, Anweam; 
g) community centres in Anweam; 
h) rehabilitation of schools and related facilities in Maman-Atobiri and 
Anweam; 
i) pipe-borne water for Anwearn and Kwae; 
j) annual royalty payments to each of the five stools; 
k) rental housing units in Marnan-Atobiri; 
1) erect a2 metre wall round the royal cemetery in Kwae; 
in) health post for the Minta royal family; 
n) provide "elaborate and effective transportation facilities" between Anweam 
and the GOPDC plantation; 
o) provide an improved market place and public toilets in Anweam; 
P) "accord due consideration and compassion for the qualified citizens of these 
traditional areas in question of job fillings with the GOPDC. 
Shorn ofthe extravagances of "royal palaces' and a wall for a "royal cemetery" the 
demands are perfectly understandable. The demands for annual payments of money 
palm fruit, sheep and drinks indicate the stools' attempt to draw some benefit from 
their expropriated allodial title in the nationalised lands. The demands for schools, 
scholarships, health and other such facilities cannot be faulted within any conception 
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of "development". So while the initiators of the projects saw them as offering 
enhanced economic opportunities to the locals, the latter expected them to offer the 
opportunity for more rounded socio-economic upliftment including enhanced economic 
opportunities. It is however clear that for the initiators of the projects employment 
opportunities with contract farming the crucial innovations at GOPDC and TOPP. The 
next chapter examines the terms and operations of the outgrower components of 
GHASEL, GOPDC and TOPP. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Sugar and Oil Palm Contract Farming Schemes 
The contract farming components of GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC represented a point 
of agreement and overlap between the responses of post-colonial states to the growing 
domestic food and raw material deficits, the "rural development" concerns of the 
IDFIs and new orientations of agribusiness TNCs which were examined in chapter 7. 
Sugar cane and oil palm are two crops in respect of which considerable experience of 
contract farming has been developed (Glover, 1984,1150). TOPP, GHASEL and 
GOPDC have had very different histories. This chapter analyses the features and 
operations of the contract farming schemes of GHASEL and GOPDC so as to 
highlight the particular characteristics which account for their contrasting outcomes 
and to also compare their features with the relationship between the colonial cocoa 
peasantry and capital'. 
Sorensen and von Bulow (1990,3) have criticised a general trend in the literature 
"towards reducing the complex phenomenon of contract farming into a pro/anti debate" 
wlitle others (Jackson and Cheater, 1989, I) have remarked that the comparative value 
ot' many analyses of contract farming schemes have been limited by "differing 
notions" and "partial or restricted evaluations" of their impact. The analysis in this 
chapter takes account of these criticisms by deploying and examining the two main 
theoretical perspectives on contract farming: a) that which argues that farmers benel-it 
' TOPP is only partially discussed because its smallholder component was delayed b\ land disputes and 
differences between CLREDEC and CDC about design. 
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from contract farming which offers them security; and b) that which sees it as 
tightening the subsumption of the peasantry by capital as part of new forms of 
intemationalisation. 
9.1. Design of Case Study Schemes 
Jackson and Cheater (1989,1) have noted that while variants of contract farming have 
existed for decades contemporary contract farming assumes a "wide variety of unique 
and distinctive forms". Glover (1990,4-5) has a survey of the various forms and their 
features. While the contract farming units of GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC share the 
primary characteristic of the contract farmers being linked to a nucleus 
estate/processing facility they differ in their design details. The three projects involve 
two types of contract farmers: smallholders and outgrowers. Smallholders are tenants 
on land belonging to the estate while outgrowers farm on non-estate land. GHASEL 
had outgrowers while TOPP's farmers are smallholders and GOPDC has both types. 
In all three cases the essential contractual relationship involved the farmer undertaking 
to produce a specified crop of a particular quality according to a time table and 
production techniques laid down and enforced by the nucleus estate which on its part 
provides the farmer with inputs, services and credit and undertakes to buy the produce 
at a price fixed in advance. Payment for the produce is linked to credit recoverý, 
arrangements. 
(31 IASEL's outgrowers had a tripartite contract wIth the firm and the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) which provided the credit to the outgrowers. This 
agreement was backed by one between GI I. A. SEL and ADB. Sugar cane acreage was 
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expected to reach over 2,000 ha. at Komenda and over 3,000 ha. at Asutsuare by the 
end of the five year rehabilitation scheme. These compare with 2592 ha. and 1822 
ha. of estate sugar cane at Asutsuare and Komenda respectively. GOPDC has bilateral 
contracts with its smallholders and outgrowers who together farmed a total of 4870 
ha. of oil palm compared to 3850 ha. of nucleus estate. 202 smallholders account for 
1,051 ha. 
The TOPP scheme provided for 1200 ha. (2964 acres) of smallholder oil palm with 
300 farmers. At peak smallholder production would represent 20% of the total 
production of the TOPP project. The institutional relationship between TOPP and the 
smallholders is however radically different from that between GOPDC and its 
smallholders. The smallholders at TOPP are tenants of Ceredec which has 
responsibility for developing and managing the scheme. TOPPs role is to provide 
technical assistance planting material and processing capacity for the smallholders, for 
which role Ceredec has to enter into agreement with it'. 
Flie differences in the design and prominence of the three contract farming units are 
basically attributable to balance of influence between the state and funding IDFI, 
mixed with history in the case of GHASEL and contingency at GOPDC. For the State 
the three proýjects and BOPP. considerable undertakings in terms of size of investment 
relative to the national economy and planned impact, were more than "commercial" 
enterprises in the narro", sense of the word. GHASEL, TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC 
2 Schedule 2 of TOPP Loan Agreement of 2 August 1978 bem, een Government of Ghana and 
Commonwealth Development Corporation. 
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were rather instances of a "corporate-based agricultural development strategy" xvith the 
enterprises straddling the roles of commercial venture and development agency 
(Mackintosh, 1989,16). The contract farming units come within the concern to 
"modernise" peasant agriculture through the spread of new cultural practices. The 
World Bank which was involved in GHASEL and GOPDC and the EDF and CDC 
which financed TOPP, like the Ghanaian state, proclaimed a concern with 
"development" beyond narrow financial profit and loss in their conception of the 
economic viability of projects. Unlike BOPP a vertically integrated part of an 
agribusiness TNC, both GOPDC and TOPP with their contract farming units are 
concerned to avoid being enclaves. 
The prominence of contract farmers in GHASEL and GOPDC reflect the 
contemporary World Bank interest in small/medium size farmers. At GHASEL this 
coincided with the existing practice. As we pointed out in Chapter 6 outgrowers were 
an established part of the sugar industry from the very beginning and on the eve of 
the GHASEL project they accounted for over half of the factories' cane supply. At 
GOPDC the detail of a combination of smallholders and outgrowers was the product 
of a tactical modification of the project. At conception the project was not intended 
to have any smallholders. However part of the fall out from the land dispute 
discussed in the preceding chapter, was that farmers were initially reluctant to 
participate in the 1,200 ha outgrower scheme which formed part of Phase I of GOPDC 
for fear of losing their lands. This led the project managers to decide on a 
dcnionstration smallholder scheme to break dow-ii the farmers' suspicions (World 
Bank, 1984,10). 
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9.2. Terms of Farmer-Estate contracts' 
9.2.1 Selection criteria and Grower characteristics 
To become a GOPDC outgrower a farmer's plot must be within a 25 km radius of the 
nucleus estate, have suitable soil and be within 400m of a road/track so as to facilitate 
the collection and transportation of palm fruit4. The candidate must have an interest 
of not less than 25 years duration, this period being the economic life span of an oil 
palm. If it is a customary law interest it must be recorded in accordance with section 
4 of the Conveyancing Decree (N. R. C. D. 175) which covers the registration of oral 
grants of land under customary law. 48% of outgrowers own their land while 52% 
of them are abusa tenants (GOPDC, 1988,15). 
Prospective farmers were expected to be of working age (25-50 years) so as to directly 
contribute their labour and in addition must command family labour or "demonstrate 
a financial background, confirmed by his bank' (GOPDC, 1988,62). Because of this 
basic requirement for family labour potential outgrowers had to disclose if any 
member of their "immediate family (father, mother and dependents)" had applied for 
or received financial assistance from GOPDC. The maximum acreage per outgrower 
was limited to 8 ha (20 acres), this being considered "the size of holding manageable 
by the average farmer with his own family and some seasonally hired labour" (World 
' See Appendix I for models of agreements between GHASEL and GOPDC and their contract farmers. 
' Both Phases I and 11 of GOPDC involved the construction of roads within the outgrower zone around 
the estate (World Bank. 197 5,9,1984,14). 
' Preamble to GOPDC-OutgroN%, er Agreement. 
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Bank, 1975,8). In exceptional cases of a man with more than one wife and at least 20 
dependents the outgrower holding can be up to 12 ha (30 acres). 
GHASEL required that the farmer must have no less than five years exclusive 
possession of his land 6; the farms were expected to yield four crops, including three 
ratoons before re-planting7. Because outgrowers were already established the 
outgrower component of the GHASEL project largely involved the rehabilitation of 
existing farms. Though providing for new entrants, the selection process for the 
rehabilitation project therefore mainly involved a re-evaluation of existing outgrowers 
and reform of the terms of their participation. 
The stratification of cane farmers was epitomised in the broad differences outgrowers 
at Komenda and at Asutsuare as regards the sizes of holding, how they were organised 
and funded. Both Asutsuare and Komenda had about 250 outgrowers each. At 
Asutsuare, which is an hour's drive from the national capital Accra, half of the 
otitgrowers were absentee capitalist farmers "mostly businessmen, civil servants and 
politicians" (Okyere, 1979,8) who moved into sugar cane farming as part of the wider 
state encouragement of capitalist farmers by the NLC/Busia regimes between 1968-72. 
In comparison only 6.5% of farmers at Komenda, some 120 miles from Accra were 
absentee. After the January 1972 coup senior military officers also moved into sugar 
Preamble to Agreement between GHASEL, ADB and the Planter. t) 
' The first crop Of SLIgar cane is usually harvested after 14-16 months depending on the season of 
planting. If the cane is not dug up after harvest the next crop -a ratoon sprouts from the roots within 
a tc\\- days and matures within eleven months. The vield from ratoons declines progressively so while 
some growers harvest ratoon for ten years so as to avoid the cost of replanting most sugar producers 
work with a 3-5 year cycle \Nhich give reasonable ratoon NJ ing, (Graham and Floeri 
1984,1 3-5, International Singar Council, 196-31,63). 
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cane and towards the end of the rehabilitation project 85% of the outgrowers at 
Asutsuare were absentees (GHASEL News, 1978). The social mix of sugar cane 
outgrowers hardly changed during the rehabilitation scheme'. 
At the beginning of the GHASEL project outgrower acreage at Asutsuare totalled 
around 3,400 ha. (8,500 acres) while at Komenda it was around 1180 ha. (2910 
acres). The farms at the two sites ranged between 0.8 ha. and over 120 ha. (2-300 
acres) with the average size of holdings at Asutsuare bigger than that at Komenda. 
At the latter place farms of less than 10 ha (25 acres) constituted more than 40% 
compared with 16% at Asutsuare. The ratio of absentee farmers was reflected in how 
the farmers were organised. As of 1975/76 more than half of Komenda farmers 
belonged to cooperatives members of which on average farmed an acre of sugar cane. 
These cooperatives were grouped in the Prah River Cooperative Sugar Cane Farmers 
Union. In comparison 94% of outgrowers at Asutsuare were individual farmers 
(World Bank, 1972,6). 
ADB's lending to the sugar industry reflected the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's use of 
state institutions for private accumulation. As of September 1972 a fifth of ADB's 
lending, totalling C3.29 million, was to sugar cane farmers. There was no limit on the clý 
acreage per farmer and the bank paid for 100% of expenses. The World Bank 
(I 972, Annex 3,6) lamented that ADB's policies had "led to disregarding the needs of 
sinall farmers by lending available funds to already , N-calthy people on generous 
' The outgrowers at Asutsuare included one Colonel Amuzu with 60 acres, Nana Oduro Numapau 11, 
a prominent Ashanti chief and a senior official at the National Investment Bank with 210 acres, Mr I. K. 
Preko. a minister in the Nkrumah regime who had 150 acres. 
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terms". 83% of the amount lent went to Asutsuare outgrowers; nearly a third of 
Komenda's farmers were self financing compared to 16% at Asutsuare. One of the 
concerns of the outgrower component of the GHASEL project was to tighten up on 
what the World Bank considered the easy credit available to inefficient farmers (World 
Bank, 1972,11). ADB lending for new farms was to be limited to 25 acres (10 ha). 
Old outgrowers could get replanting loans for up to 40 ha (100 acres) (World 
Bank, 1972, Annex 3,7). Annual increases in the size of all farms were to be limited 
to no more than 20% of existing acreage or no more than 20 acres. 
The official reason for the imposition of a size limit on new farms was a desire to 
minimise the use of hired labour; the World Bank (1972,7) estimated that 25 acres 
could be adequately managed by a family of four adults. This policy partly reflected 
the Bank's hope of fostering the development of a "relatively stable middle peasantry 
engaged in specialised forms of commodity production in particular relations with 
productive capitals" (Bernstein, 1979,434). It was also a pragmatic response to labour 
supply problems particularly tight at Asutsuare, with a population of 6,000 in 1970, 
which was located in an area with a number of large enterprises paying competitive 
wages (Okyere, 179,24)'. 
GIIASEL recruited and transported migrant labour from North Eastern Ghana usually between I December and April, which is the dry non-farmin- season in that part of the cowitry, to work on the 
stigar estates. I sa\\ scores of these migrant workers housed in appalling conditions in old warehouses II tý 
at Asutsuare in December 1981. 
175 
9.2.2 Farmer's Obligations 
Apart from undertaking to meet the specified conditions for the repayment of the ADB 
loan the sugar cane outgrower agreed to cultivate one new crop and three ratoons of 
sugar cane according to directions from GHASEL. These directions covered planting 
only cane varieties approved by GHASEL, using fertilisers and other chemicals as 
prescribed, implementing recommended fire precautions, sugar cane farms being quick 
to bum. Most important in this regard the first planting must be such that the cane 
reaches maturity during GHASEL's crushing programme". The farmer was 
prohibited from selling cane to anybody but GHASEL and from extending his/her 
acreage without the permission of GHASEL and the ADB. To have cane in the best 
possible condition for milling it was to be harvested according to GHASEL's 
instructions. At harvest time the farmer was to follow GHASEL's crushing 
programme and an agreed daily supply quota including times fixed for burning, cutting 
and loading cane. Where GHASEL did not supply transport the farmer was to follow 
the firm's guidelines for loading cane. 
Apart from the lease between GOPDC and the smallholder, the latter was under the 
saiiie obligations to the estate as the outgrower. The contract bound the farmer to 
cultivate his/her farm according to norms laid down by the estate. This includes 
clearim) the land and planting seedlings, sowing cover crops, applying fertiliser, not 
intercropping, reporting plant diseases, take reasonable steps to prevent and treat 
diseases, etc. The farmer undertook to provide additional labour from his, 'lier 
10 Trushing programme" is defined by clause 2 (d) ofthe outgrower contract as "the programme made 
by Cil lASFL of the sequence of fields to be harvested having regard to the proper age and maturity and, 
therefore the optimal sucrose content of the sugar cane at the time of harvesting". 
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resources to complement that financed out of the GOPDC loan. Also employees of 
the estate were to be allowed access to all parts of the farm for inspection and 
extension purposes. 
The contract also empowered GOPDC to enter a farm to cultivate, maintain or harvest 
crop should the farmer fail to meet the laid down standards in which event the cost 
to GOPDc will be deducted from what is due as purchase price. Most importantly the 
. C-.. farmer undertook to sell the produce of the farm to GOPDC to the exclusion of all 
else. To meet GOPDC's quality standards the farmer agreed to harvest the fruit in a 
manner recommended by GOPDC. Outgrowers under Phase I of GOPDC have to 
repay their loans within 22 years, with a nine year grace period but Phase 11 
outgrowers have a shorter repayment period of 13 years and six year grace. In both 
cases the level of interest is subject to periodic review. 
9.2.3 Responsibilities of the Estate 
The credit provided to the farmer by GOPDC covered the full cost of inputs such as 
fertilisers, seedlings and wire guards (which protect the young oil palm against 
rodents), tools and cover crop. GOPDC also paid a maintenance allowance amounting 
to 80% of the estimated cost of labour (including family labour) for creating and 
maintaining the farm for the initial five years till the oil palm start yielding. This sum 
\vas paid three times a year and was only paid after the work has been done and 
certified by the estate which meant that the farmer had to pre-finance this cost. 
GloN, er (1987,441) has argued that in many cases the provision of credit is the 
principal motivating factor for farmers signing up to be contract farmers. A survey 
277 
found that the maintenance allowance paid by GOPDC was a prImary incentive for 
many who joined the outgrower scheme (GOPDC, 1988,82). 
The contract required the estate to provide a range of technical services. Occasionally, 
as and when necessary and possible, GOPDC supplies workers for various tasks, for 
example to cut down trees with chain saws, to help with the spread of fertiliser and 
prune palms. GOPDC's obligation to purchase the farmers' harvest, except that 
which contains "excessive amounts of stones or other foreign matter", was coupled 
with an undertaking to collect produce from the roadside near the farm. The price 
paid to the farmer is fixed by a committee which involves the Ministry of Agriculture. 
However the World Bank credit for GOPDC specifies the factors to be taken into 
account in arriving at the price so as to ensure an economic return to the 
outgrower/smallholder (World Bank, 1984,34). 
The ADB's credit to GHASEL's outgrowers covered 80% of the cost of preparing the 
land, the cost of planting material and fertiliser, living allowance for new farmers and 
80% of the cost of harvesting tabour. GHASEL undertook to supply and transport 
seed cane to farmers. The company also undertook to provide the farmer fertiliser and 
agro-chemicals as well as technical advice on cultivation and related matters. The firm 
and its personnel, like GOPDC, were empowered to enter outgrower farms either for 
inspection or to enforce cultivation and farm maintenance standards. It was only 
committed to providing transport for harvested cane for those within five miles of the 
factory or designated cane collectioji points. GHASEL Nvas empowered to deduct the .1- 
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cost of inputs and services it provided to a farmer from what is due him for cane 
supplied before paying the balance into the farmer's account with the ADB. 
The price paid by GHASEL for cane was determined by a pricing formula contained 
in the outgrower contract with the rates subject to review by GHASEL with the 
approval of the government. The pricing formula is the clearest instance of the 
imbalance in the relationship between the parties. The price paid for any tonnage of 
sugar cane was directly related to its sucrose content (SQ. The farmer had to accept 
the SC determined by GHASEL's labs as binding. Similarly the farmer had to accept 
the weight of cane as determined by GHASEL's weighbridge. In the event of 
GHASEL considering some cane unfit for milling it can buy it a reduced price 
depending on its quality. While farmers had to rigorously abide by the crushing 
programme and daily supply quota (D. S. Q) GHASEL could in "circumstances beyond 
its control" change the D. S. Q. so long as it gave reasonable notice of not less than 
48 hours to the farmer. While the contract provided that GHASEL shall be liable to 
pay farmers the basic price under the price schedule should it fail to conduct crushing 
operations this was qualified with the exclusion of liability if the failure is due to an 
it act of God and circumstances beyond GHASEL's control provided reasonably 
sufficient notice is given to the planter in advance". In its agreement with ADB, 
GHASIT undertook to give harvesting priority to accidentally burnt fields to minimise 
losses to any farmer so affected since the sucrose content of burnt cane deteriorates 
within 24 hours. 
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9.3. Subsumption versus Benefit 
The contracts very clearly subordinate the farmers' production to the demands of 
GHASEL and GOPDC and give the firms considerable control over the farmers' 
production process. While there is an interdependence and allocation of risks betweeii 
the parties it cannot be claimed that the relationship is an equitable one. The terms 
of interdependence and allocation of risks are very much determined by the processing 
unit; some of the differences in the details of the GHASEL and GOPDC contracts are 
related to the characteristics of oil palm and sugar cane and their cultivation. 
Although both contracts provide for disputes to be settled through arbitration it is tiot 
likely to be worth the economic time of the farmer to drag out a legal dispute with the 
buying firm over key issues such as price and the margin of discretion given the firm 
Linder the contract is such that the farmer is more likely than not to be unsuccessful. 
Critics of the spread of state-IDFI-TNC sponsored contract farming schemes such as 
GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC see them as another phase in the growing subsumption 
ofthe peasantry by international capital, aided by post colonial states (Bernstein, 1979). 
For Sachikoyne (1989,2) "contract farming is a crucial mechanism in the subsumption 
of growers to agribusiness capital which profits from avoiding their reproduction 
costs" (See also William (1981,25). On the basis of the experience of Tanzaniaii tea 
farmers Mbilinyi (1988.569) has characterised contract farming as dispossession 
11 witliout being separated physically from the land". This loss of economic oNviiership 
while retaiiiing legal ownership is also accompanied by "finance Hitensificatioii" vvhich 
refeps to tile inability of the produccr to independently "activate" means of production 
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and growing dependence on the market and finance capital for farm inputs, equipment, 
etc. Mbilinyi's study also drew attention to how contract farming intensifies women's 
work something most studies of the phenomenon fail to examine. In their study of 
gender and contract tea farming in Kericho, Kenya S6rensen and von Bulow 
(1988,1990) showed how contract farming has exacerbated gender inequalities and 
tensions with a negative impact on production. 
Two main arguments are advanced by those who see the growing involvement of 
African peasantries in contract farming, particularly those sponsored by the state and 
IDFIs. as a positive development. The central claim is that contract farming schemes 
have in general resulted in significant improvements in the incomes of participating 
farmers thereby affording them and their families a higher standard of living 
(Goldsmith, 1985; Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1983; Holtham and Hazelwood 
1976,154). This improvement in rural livelihoods is the result of the other main 
beneficial consequence which is claimed for contract farming: higher productivity 
resulting from the farmers' assured access to modern technology, inputs credit and a 
market (Sofranko et al., 1976; Graham and Floering, 1984,100; Gyasi, 1988; 
Glover, 1987,441.1990,9). 
Naturally the project documents for GHASEL, GOPDC and TOPP make strong 
empirically backed arguments about the beneficial effects of the contract farming 
schemes. Some of these were quoted in the previous chapter. At GHASEL the World 
Bank (1972,26) pr jected that within the five year life of the rehabilitation scheme a 03 
10 ha. (25 acres) sugar cane farm should yield an annual per capita income of C310 
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($242) for a family of six persons, which compared favourably with the estimated 
average rural income of C190 ($148) in 1970. At GOPDC, in addition to the specific 
financial returns to contract farmers (World Bank, 1975,6; 1984,34) the project was 
expected to become a pole of development the benefits of which would include the 
"technical experience gained by members of the outgrower sector" serving as a 
"valuable extension factor" in the area. The CDC believes that nucleus estates wIth 
smallholders "offered the most effective method of making a worthwhile contribution 
to raising living standards in Africa and many other developing countries". The 
corporation "liked to think the concept represented a distinctive CDC contribution to 
development techniques" (Rendell, 1976,277)'' 
Increased subordination of the peasant producer to capital is not incompatible with an 
improvement in the producer's material conditions. This compatibility is recognised 
by both proponents and critics of contract farming. For example among backers of 
contract farming Holtharn and Hazelwood (1976,154) noted that the regulation of 
outgrowers in the Murnias sugar project in Kenya is so close that "in effect they rent 
a bit of their land and labour time to the company for an assured payment". Similarly 
Sofranko et. al. (1976,709) describe tobacco contract farming in Ghana as "in many 
respects analogous to the rationalised system of production to which urban factory 
workers are exposed". Glover (1987,442) neatly surnmarises the potential 
" The history of the CDC's development of the nucleus estate concept as "the most effective method" 
of improving rural living standards in the ex-colonies is very interestin-. The concept evolved as part 
of British anti-communist counter- i nsurgency in Malaysia in the 1950s where the "establishment of 
prosperous sniallholders was seen as the main bulwark against Communism". The anti-communist value 
of the concept was one of the grounds on \N'hich the chairman of the CDC recommended it to the then 
President of the World Bank G. D. Woods (See Morgan, ] 980, Vol 4,228-2350). 
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compatibility of the increased subordination of the peasantry and an improvement in 
their living standards, arguing that 
contract fanning combines some of the advantages of the plantation system 
(strict quality control, close coordination of interdependent stages of 
production and marketing) with those of smallholder production (superior 
incentives, equity considerations. 
From this view point the farmer who suffers tight control by the firm has the 
beneficial trade off of material improvement. Within this logic the contract between 
firm and farmer represented a fair distribution of risks 
Contracting is fundamentally a way of allocating the distribution of risk 
between the firm and its growers. The latter assumes most of the risk 
associated with production while the former assumes the risk of marketing the 
final product. In practical terms, however, considerable interdependence 
exists between the parties ... how risks are allocated is specified in the 
contract (Glover, 1990,3). 
The concrete operation of the contract farming arrangements at GHASEL and GOPDC 
and their contrasting outcomes, which are discussed in the following section, 
demonstrate that despite their contractual subordination outgrowers retained some 
independence and were by no means simply "wage labour equivalents". 
Compared to the situation of a contemporary "uncaptured" farmer the terms GHASEL 
and GOPDC offered to farmers -assured access to credit, supplies of inputs and 
cxtension advice, an assured market for produce at relatively predictable prices - were 
vay attractive. Very few farmers had access to institutional credit, and associated 
relatively favourable interest rates and repayment conditions, at the time the two 
pro' I -as estimated that less than 10% of Ghana's jects came on stream. In 1975 it NN 
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farmers had access to institutional credit (IFAD, 1988, Vol 11,128, Bentil, 1988). The 
little institutional credit that was available, as the already cited figures for the pattern 
of ADB sugar cane lending in the pre-GHASEL days shows. went to big and 
influential farmers. The situation with oil palm was even more dramatic. In 1972 the 
ADB gave credit to just over 1,500 farmers nation-wide. In the period up to the end 
of June 1972 ADB had approved 128 loans for oil palm cultivation, totalling C 1.127m, 
of which less than half had been disbursed. 
The problems farmers faced with the supply of inputs and extension services were just 
as acLite. In the 1970s the state supplied inputs and mechanised services to farmers 
at subsidised prices. Outside the cocoa sector the quantities and delivery mechanisms 
were inadequate and the distribution was heavily skewed in favour of larger farmers, 
usually those with influence within the state (Stryker, 1990,112-119). The 
Mechanisation Transport Division of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) offered 
subsidised services, at about 50% of private sector costs in the early 1970s, including 
clearing, tilling and harvesting. These public sector services were woefully limited; 
in 1976 only 3% of wheeled tractors and harvesters in the country were owned by the 
state. 
'rhe situation with the supply of fertilisers, the most sought after input, was indicativc 
of the \vider input supply situation at the inception of GHASEL and GOPDC. In 197-33 
the state stibsidy on compound fertillser was 69% of its cost price and 74% for 
ammonium sulphate. in 1975 these had risen to 86% and 85% respectively. However 
, supplies there xvýis never enough. delivery , vas poor with many 
farmers not gettiril-, 
when nccded and the burcaucratic procedures around sales favoured farmers with 
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influence. The shortages and poor distribution led to a parallel market; in 1977 when 
the official price of fertiliser was C2.00 a bag it was selling in the countryside at 
C9.00. 
The organisation and delivery of extension services was also inadequate and patchy. 
Units under the MoA have the central responsibility for crop extension work outside 
cocoa. However there was and still is extensive uncoordinated overlap of its work and 
that ofa number 0f other public sector organisations 
(IFAD, 19 8 8,117; Stryker, 1990,123). This component of the Ministry's work has long 
been plagued by "the lack of qualified personnel, weak research/extension links, 
dispersed responsibilities and poor logistics" (World Bank, 1991,24). Pre-GHASEL 
cane outgrowers were among the privileged beneficiaries of goverm-nent fertiliser 
supplies and mechanised services. However, in keeping with the general pattern, the 
supply of both were unreliable while Asutsuare farmers were better supplied than 
Komenda farmers (World Bank, 1972,2 I; Okyere, 1979, passim). 
9.4. Operation of the Contracts 
9.4-1- (1 HASEL's failure 
Like the rest of the sugar rehabilitation scheme GHASEUs outgrower scheme vvas a 
failure. When the project ended in June 1978, the total outgrower acreage and crop 
yields per hectare at both Komenda and Asutsuare were well below projections. At 
Asutsuare outgrower cane fell from 8,500 acres in 1973 to 3,900 acres in 1978. A 
Komenda the 1978 acreage of 33.780 acres represented an increase over the 1,800 acres 
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of 1973 but was below the projected 5,000 acres. Compared to projected production 
of 40 tons of cane per hectare the 1978 yields were 22 and 33 tons per hectare at 
Asutsuare and Komenda respectively. To compound this dismal picture large numbers 
of outgrowers particularly at Asutsuare, in blatant violation of a central clause of their 
contracts, were selling their cane to private crushers who offered better prices than 
GHASEL. 
The failure of the outgrower scheme involved a number of factors including poor 
project design partly linked to an underestimation of the work that the rehabilitation 
entailed, poor management, aspects of which are dealt with in the next chapter and the 
wider crisis of the Ghanaian economy and state during the latter period of the 
rehabilitation exercise. In relation to the GHASEL project the last point manifested 
itself in a paralysis of state policy and action. Within the sugar industry itself there 
were mutually reinforcing interplay between the exogenous factors and the industrial 
and agricultural problems that the project faced. Despite this it is possible to isolate 
some issues which were specific to the agricultural side which affected the outcome 
of the contract farming arrangement. As far as outgrowers were concerned the main 
expression of these problems was the failure of GHASEL to meet contractual 
obligations the central aspect of which was the failure to pay farmers a price for cane 
that they regarded as satisfactory. 
Most reviews of the GHASEL project acknowledge that poor producer prices 
contributed significantly to the failure of the outgrower scheme (World Bank, 198 L' W 
GIIASI-'L, 1981.9). Between 1972 and 1979 prices in Ghana rose by 1.635%. By 
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comparison the producer price of sugar cane went up by 866%. from C7.50 to C65.00 
in that period. The World Bank blamed the government' s reluctance to raise sugar 
and cane prices for driving farmers to sell their cane to private crushers. The 
government's holding down of the producer price of cane was linked with the holding 
down what the state paid GHASEL for its sugar. Between 1973 and 1977 the price 
government paid GHASEL remained at the same level before being increased by a 
mere 10%. The holding down of the price paid GHASEL for its sugar meant that the 
increases in cane prices affected its profitability. 
The Government's sugar pricing policy was primarily due to the political nature of the 
commodity and price increases were invariably too little too late (World 
Bank, 1981,35). The impact of the deterioration in the farmers terms of trade were 
worsened by difficulties in procuring inputs, labour and services for cultivation and 
harvesting, uncertainty about GHASEL's purchases because of factory breakdowns and 
problems with transport and field equipment. This situation highlighted flaws in the 
clesign of the contract farming scheme and the weak points of the outgrower contract. 
Contract farming terms tend to vary according to the characteristics of crops including 
the technical demands of cultivation. the perishability and quality requirements of the 
crop. Generally however the assumption of production risks by the farnier is a central 
teature. The specific distribution of tasks and associated risks between the parties 
I imperatives of the crop but also on the however depends not only on the technological i 
socio-econornic context of the particular contracting scheme. The terms of GHASFL's 
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outgrower contract placed key costs and risks on the farmer and with that the relative 
freedom to decide whether to and how to carry out the tasks, This arrangement 
contributed to the eventual breakdown of the relationship between the parties. 
Two key stages of production: land preparation and cane harvesting were left 
completely to the farmer. The farmer was expected to use a combination of family 
and employed labour and machinery hired from the Ministry of Agriculture or private 
contractors to prepare their lands. The outgrower also had responsibility for harvestitig 
the crop 80% of the cost of which was covered by ADB credit. Those farmers who 
were more than five miles from the factories or GHASEL designated carie collection 
points were to organise their own transportation of harvested cane to the factories 
which transportation GHASEL was to pay for. While the funding for the project 
allocated money for the importation of fertiliser by GHASEL it was not to be given 
out to farmers as credit in kind but rather they were given cash by ADB to buy it 
from GHASEL or the Ministry of Agriculture (World Bank, 1972,20-21). 
The GHASEL arrangement contrasts sharply with other experiences around the 
continent such as in Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Kenya of intense contractual relations 
between farmer and estate with the latter responsible for some of the more demanding 
pi-oduction tasks (Graham & Floerincy. 1984,171; Sachikoyne, 1989; Glover, 1990.99). t, 
Estate control over Zimbabwean sugar cane outgrowers he studied is so tight that 
Sachikoyne (1989,9) has argued that it amounted to "real subsumption" as opposed to 
"t-ormal subsumption" of the farmers. In the specific case of Murnias Sugar Scheme 
in Kenva land preparation is divided between farmer and estate, the farmer cleared the 
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land and the estate did the ploughing and harrowing. In addition to seed cane the 
estate also supplied fertiliser. It organised the harvesting which was carried out by 
labour gangs that it recruited. The buying firm also provided transport for hauling the 
cane to the factory. The cost of all these goods and services were deducted from the 
price paid to the farmer. The intensity of the Mumias outgrower contract is cited by 
admirers of that scheme as central to its success (Graham & Floering, 1984,115, 
Floltharn and Hazelwood, I 976,154; Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1983; 
Glover, 1990,99). 
The intervention of the estate has to be understood against the background of the 
demands of land preparation and harvesting. The two operations especially preparing 
land for re-planting are extremely laborious. The harvesting of cane "makes heavy 
demands on labour, probably the heaviest made by any tropical crop grown 
commercially" Courtenay (1980,134). Re-planting makes even greater demands oii 
labour (Glover, 1987,445). Furthermore optimum production of sugar requires that the 
cane be harvested when its sucrose content is highest and if not milled within 24 hours 
of harvesting it very quickly deteriorates. The arrangement at Mumias gave the 
processing firm great control over the production process thereby reducing the risk of 
shortfalls in the quantities and quality of raw material for its plant. It also minimised 
the risks the farmer faced and the costs that had to be borne upfront though it took 
away his freedom to regulate the labour process and hopefully achieve some savings 
t1irotigh higher productivity. On the other hand it may be argued that in having to 
finance thcse operations the estate was sensitised to the costs faced by the farmer and 
289 
therefore more alert to what would constitute an attractive enough cane price to keep 
farmers in the industry. 
The pre-GHASEL history of Ghana's sugar industry offered scant basis for the 
optimism about grower efficiency and motivation and the availability of the requisite 
goods and services which was imPlied by the relative autonomy of outgrowers with 
respect to key aspects of the production process. In fact the World Bank's appraisal 
report (1972, passim) catalogued deficiencies in the land preparation and cultivation 
practices of outgrowers and in the supply of fertiliser and services by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The Report described cane cutting, loading and transport methods as 
"highly inefficient". It expressed particular concern about the labour shortage in the 
Asutsuare area. 
Against this background it is surprising that the design of the project and the 
outgrower contract allocated production tasks and risks in the manner described above. 
A concern to cut costs seemed the main reason for the decision that the estate would 
provide transport for only those farmers within a5 mile radius of the factories or cane 
stations (World Bank, 1972,20). An important consequence of this design was the 
I'ailure to make provision in the financing arrangement of the project for equipping 
GH2\SF I, to carry out the functions that most other sugar estates in Africa carried out 
for their outgrowers. For example even as it was recognised that GHASEL's field 
equipment were old the funding for the project provided for the purchasc of on])- two 
tractors by GUASEL which together could Nvork- 162 Ila (400 acres) vearlv. In 
the event the cýilculations on Nv)-iich the design was based Nvere confounded. 
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As the project progressed farmers faced increasing difficulties in procuring agricultural 
machinery for preparing land at the right time". Until it stopped providing services 
in the middle of the project the subsidised facilities of the Mechanisation Division 
were never enough to go round and tended to be hogged by influential farmers. The 
growing problems of the national economy, especially the worsening foreign exchange 
crisis, meant that existing private contractors found it difficult keeping their machines 
in working order. The problem was particularly acute at Asutsuare dominated by 
capitalist farms 90% of which used machinery because of the size of the farnis and the 
labour shortage in the area. By comparison only 20% of Komenda farms used 
machinery (Okyere, 1979,17). 
Though GHASEL stepped into the breach and provided land preparation services, just 
as done by the Mumias estate, these were never adequate, not having been planned for 
in the design of the project. Furthermore the rates it charged for its tractor services 
were deemed high by farmers, particularly those who had access to the subsidised 
facilities of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1975 farmer resentment was strong enough 
tor them to contemplate a boycott of GHASEL's machinery after the rates were 
mcreased without consultation. 
'2 According to the Intemational Sugar Council(1963,633) 
Ry far the greatest single improvement [in cane cultivation practices] has been 
brought about by tile introduction of the tractor and corresponding equipnicrit 
for soilprelmi-an on. This has madc possible deeper ploughing and subsoiling, 
and has... led to ,, much better seed bed preparation. 
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Outgrowers also faced problems with the supply of inputs. The outgrower contract 
provided for GHASEL to supply the farmers with seed cane. This the estate Nvas 
unable to do consistently. In fact there were occasions when GHASEL bought seed 
cane from outgrowers to use on its plantations (World Bank, 1981.25)! This bizarre 
situation represented a particularly striking instance of the problems that plagued 
GHASEL and the estate's inability to fulfil its side of the contract and with it the basis 
on which to seek to hold the farmers to their side of the bargain. The shortage of 
cane gave rise to a black market in the input and profiteering by GHASEL employees, 
an issue that was the subject of outgrower complaints. 
A different problem arose in the case of fertiliser. Before the project outgrowers got 
subsidised supplies from the Ministry of Agriculture. The project agreement 
earmarked $0.274m for the importation of fertilisers for both estate and outgrower 
farms. Faced with declining producer prices the outgrowers weaned on subsidised 
fertiliser were loath to buy the un-subsidised, higher priced fertiliser offered by 
GHASEL. With the country's foreign exchange crisis subsidised fertiliser was in short 
stipply and farmers had to travel long distances to get supplies resulting in fertiliser 
not being applied on time. At Komenda farmers hardly used fertiliser 
(Okyere, 1979,27). 
Predictably the problems w-ith inputs and services undermined project targets as 
farmers strove to minimise costs and risks. The targeted planting of new cane and re- 
planting of old fields suffered from the shortage of machinery and labour for land 
preparation. 5.200 acres were to be re-planted at Asutsuare and 1,500 acres at 
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Komenda. At both sites farmers were reluctant to carry out expensive new planting 
or re-planting (World Bank, I 981, passim; Abedi, 1978,10). Glover (1987,445) 
succinctly summarises the economic argument against new planting: 
Sugar requires a considerable amount of labour in the first year but will 
produce for the next several years with much less labour; in fact it may take 
more work to uproot canes and till the soil and plant a new crop than to 
harvest the cane. In such a situation even if the [outgrower] contract 
deteriorates after the first season, a grower may be tempted to stick with it 
rather than abandon his investment. 
The low yields were the inevitable product of ageing ratoon cane, cultivated with 
patchy application of fertiliser, on outgrower farms, a situation worsened by poor 
rainfall from 1974 to 1978 at both Asutsuare and Komenda (MDPI, 1980, passim). 
A crucial miscalculation in the design of the project was the expectation that 
outgrowers would mainly use family labour (World Bank, 1981,25). The labour 
shortage particularly at Asutsuare forced GHASEL to extend its unplanned role to 
cover most production tasks and harvesting. In an interview the general manager of 
the Asutsuare estate complained that the company had to do too much for the 
outgrowers". The burden of organising outgrower harvest was never properly 
mastered by GHASEL and the unpredictability of GHASEL's harvesting schedules 
combined with the low producer price drove many farmers out of the industry or into 
the arms of private cane crushers who distilled the cane juice into gin. These crushers 
Nvere cashed in on the shortage of alcohol created by GHASEL's low output and the 
decline in national imports of alcohol due to the foreign exchange crisis. 
" Interview with Mr Arklitirst at Asutsuare, 18 November, 1981. 
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Three factors combined to render GHASEL's harvesting schedules unpredictable. 
These were the already mentioned problem of labour supply, shortages and breakdoNNii 
of field equipment and persistent breakdown of the factories. Because the factory 
equipment and most of the field machinery at the two estates came from Eastern 
European countries which were not members of the World Bank the IDA credit could 
not be used to purchase required spares in those countries (Fatouros, in Ghai, 1987,347). 
The rehabilitation of these equipment was of fundamental importance for the whole 
project. However as noted in Chapter 7 no particular provision was made for 
ensuring that foreign exchange would be available for the procurement of spares apart 
from a government undertaking that money would be made available. This 
commitment was not adequately fulfilled. For example in 1976/77 the Government 
granted 400,000 cedis out of C2.8m worth of imported licence GHASEL applied for. 
111 1977/78 nothing was allocated for C5.6m of licence applied for and approved. A 
government commissioned review of the project was categorical in its condemnation 
of the government's failure to provide import licences. It criticised the giving of 
iinport licences to individuals to import sugar "at the expense of the sugar industry 
into which so much money has already been sunk (MDPI, 1980,49)". 
In the last two years of the GHASEL project outgrower harvesting was seriously 
affected by, among other things, "lack of labour and insufficient transport equipment" 
Nvith "considerable breakdown in field equipment at both estates" (NVorld 
Bank, 1981,21). In 1977 "farm managers were perforced (sic) to lead trictor drivers 
" From a surplus a trade surplus of'$ I 14m in 1973 , the 
Current Account Balance moved into a deficit 
, nificantly to a 
deficit of $26m In 1975 of S286ni in 197-4. recoN ered sip - and thereafter the 
deficit topped 
I 00ni between 1976-71) (See Str, ker, 1990,18). 
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in darkness with the light of their private cars" (Abedi, 1978,14). In the last year 
"large quantities of cane were left unharvested on both estates and outgro,, vers farms 
at Asutsuare for lack of transport equipment". Harvesting problems and factory 
breakdowns became mutually reinforcing: 
It became difficult to maintain factory standards when it was known that 
efficient, continuous operation would result in out of cane stops. Conversely, 
it was difficult to achieve efficient harvesting and transport unless the factory 
was reliable (which it was not) (World Bank, 1981,28). 
It must be pointed out that within the general failure of the outgrower scheme the 
outcome at Komenda was appreciably better than at Asutsuare and the process of 
outgrower exodus either by selling to private crushers or abandoning cane production 
was spread over a longer period. While the number of farmers at Asutsuare declined 
from 350 in 1975 to 148 in 1979 at Komenda, the numbers actually increased from to 
nearly 400 at the end of 1977 before declining to around 150 by 198 1. The different 
pace of breakdown at the two sites was an expression of the heterogeneity of 
outgrowers especially the basic difference between costs of capitalist farmers, 
dependent on hired labour and machinery and peasant producers dependent on 
household and cooperative labour (Okyere, 1979,16-20). 
As already indicated only a fifth of Komenda farmers used machinery or fertiliser. 
Komenda fariners used little hired labour" thouoh it cost less at Komenda than at 
Astitsuare. At the time Okyere (1979) did his survey in May 1976 2222% of Konienda 
farmers, compared with Q00, 'O at Asutsuare had credit from the ADB. This meant that 
` Interview with Nlr Kofie, Komenda Outgrower Manager on 16 December 198 1. 
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in addition to not having to pay for labour, mechanised services and fertiliser the 
majority of Komenda farmers also did not have to worry about servicing a bank debt. I 
The primary element in the different financial costs faced by farmers at the two sites 
was the predominance of unpaid domestic and cooperative labour at Komenda. This 
did not only make up for the absence of machinery and hired labour but also resulted 
in the devalorisation of labour time. Devalorisation of labour time involves peasant 
producers faced with deteriorating terms of exchange attempting to restore their 
previous position by working longer hours and intensifying the use of unpaid family 
labour (Bernstein, 1979,436; Goodman and Redclift, 1981,78). Unlike the absentee 
farmers at Asutsuare for whom cane farming was an additional source of income and 
who abandoned not only cane farming but the farms, the Komenda outgrowers were 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and the majority of those who abandoned 
cane farming turned their lands over to food crops" 
Breaking their contracts by abandoning cane cultivation or selling cane to private 
crushers were the most extreme but by no means the only ways in which outgrowers 
responded to this situation of a combination of low prices and marketing uncertainty. 
Another popular response was for farmers to refuse to keep to GHASEL's harvesting 
schedule. At Asutsuare some farmers deliberately set fire to their farms so as to forcc 
an cýirly harvest. The gamble did not always pay off as GHASEL responded by trying 
to ciiforce its harvesting schedule. For examPle in 1977 about 900 acres of burnt cane 
(8,000 tons) of burnt cane were left unharvested and worthless at Asutsuare. Another 
" Accordin- to Mr Kofie bv 1981 more than two-thirds of Komenda outgrowers had become food 
farmers. 
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farmer ploy, which sought to exploit the unreliable nature of GHASEL .s operations, 
was to delay harvesting cane in the hope of the crop being categorised as left over 
cane and paid for by GHASEL. This way the farmer got some income without aný, 
expense on harvesting". In 1979 the GHASEL management at Komenda was forced 
to warn farmers that cane left over through this ploy would not be paid for. 
Diverting cane to private crushers and the abandoning of farms were however the 
important responses of farmers, especially at Asutsuare. This of course meant that not 
only did the factories not receive cane but the servicing of ADB debts were affected 
since farmers received direct payment from the crushers. In August 1980 the 
Asutsuare branch of the ADB estimated that out of 236 outgrowers to whom a total 
of C4.87m had been lent 146 had abandoned sugar cane farming with outstanding 
liabilities of C3.56m (ADB, 1980). Of the 90 still left In the industry the majority sold 
their cane to private crushers who numbered about 25 in 1980 compared with just 2, 
six years previously. The estates issued ineffectual threats to farmers against the sale 
of cane to the crushers but GHASEL officials at both Komenda and Asutsuare 
admitted to me that given the firm's failure to provide services and guarantee a market 
they could not justify seeking to enforce the provisions against sales to third parties. 
Bv 1981 it was estimated that 60% of the cane farmers still left at Komenda and three 
quarters of those left at Asutsuare sold their cane to private crushers. 
See clause 4 (e) of GHASFL Outgrower Contract in Appendix 2. 
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9.4.2. GOPDC's success story 
The story of GOPDC's smallholder/outgrower scheme is the opposite of what 
happened at GHASEL. Unlike GHASEL the scheme was a completely new project 
and therefore did not carry the baggage of antiquated equipment and entrenched 
agricultural practises. Once the smallholder scheme had helped allay the suspicions 
of farmers GOPDC's outgrower scheme drew an enthusiastic response. When Phase 
I of the project ended, with 202 smallholders and 116 outgrowers, there were more 
than 900 farmers waiting to become GOPDC outgrowers (World Bank, 1984,12). 
Under PHASE 11 around 2,000 more farmers became GOPDC outgrowers with 3,500 
ha of oil palm. As the project unfolded it was found that the projected maximum 
holding of 20 acres was too large to be properly maintained by most farmers. The 
average size of holding is 2.3 ha with 78% of the holdings between 1-3 ha, 9% more 
than 4 ha. and 13% less than I ha. (GOPDC, 1988,4). By comparison the 
smallholders farm an average of 5.8 ha. It is not a requirement that the outgrower 
farm exclusively for GOPDC. The project is located in the heart of the pioneer cocoa 
growing area in Akim Abuakwa and cocoa remains the dominant crop in the area 
though there is also extensive oil palm cultivation outside the GOPDC scheme fed by 
the Oil Palm Research Centre at Kade. 50% of outgrowers also farm cocoa while 
88% grow food. 
I-xisting outgrowers/smallholders give four main reasons for finding the scheme 
ýittractive. These are the financial contribution towards the labour costs of cultivation 
wid maintenance, the supply of inputs. technical assistance from the estate and the 
guarantee of Li sales outlet. An indication has already been pvcn of the scarcity of 
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institutional credit in Ghanaian agriculture which basically meant that the potenti 'al oil 
palm farmer more often than not has to rely on already accumulated capital to finance 
the initial agricultural investment covering labour and inputs. 
Small farmers were the avowed target of GOPDC's outgrower scheme (World 
Bank,, 1975,8; 1984,26). However an independent survey concluded that in fact the 
outgrowers, who constitute 10% of the farmers in the locality, "figure among the most 
favoured farming heads in terms of surface area, manpower and income" 
(GOPDC, 1988,87). The average size of holding by outgrowers is 6.5 ha. This 
compares with a pattern of more than 94% of holdings in the Eastern Region (89% 
nationwide) being less than 6 ha in 1970. In 1984 while 98% of all holdings 
nationwide were less than 6 ha only a negligible number were above this size in the 
Eastern Region (IFAD, 1988, Vol 111, Annex W)". The requirement that outgrowers 
sliow financial means has been held to be mainly responsible for the emergence of 
particular social strata as outgrowers. 
The outgrowers are not a homogenous group being stratified according to a number 
offactors. 13% of the outgrowers are women while 21% have additional income from 
tion-agricultural activity. The amount of cocoa planted by an outgrower seems an 
important socio-economic index. The average size of holding for outgrowers who 
The IFAD figmi-es are taken from the 1970 and 1984 Ghana Census of Agriculture. The World Bank 
on its part, quoting a 1980 survey by the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources gives a picture of 
landholdino in the KNvae area which deviates significantly from the regional figures in the Censuses. 
The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources indicated that the average size of holdings for all crops 
in the outgrower zone was 4.3 ha, 651/6 of these were between 4-6 ha, 20"o Nvere between 2-4 ha and 
140/, o were between 0.4 and 2 ha. On these figures the size outorower holdings are aN erage by the norms 
of the area. 
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have cocoa is 9.3 ha while it is 3.9 ha for those without cocoa. Outgrowers Nvith 
cocoa in general have more oil palm (both private and GOPDQ, more of other cash 
crops and also food crops. Only 38% of those without cocoa compared with 57% of 
those with cocoa own the land on which their GOPDC oil palm are planted. 4/5 of 
all the outgrowers, who are mostly tenants, have holdings of less than 10 ha. vvith 
small areas of cocoa and a little oil palm outside GOPDC and even fewer other cash 
crops. For these people GOPDC contract farming is the main source of income. For 
the remaining 1/5 with "large or even very large" (GOPDC, 1988,87) farms, dominated 
by cocoa the size of GOPDC oil palm is large but comes into only third place 
compared to other types of cultivation. For this group a GOPDC contract was part of 
a strategy of diversification (GOPDC, 1988,87/88). 
Producer price has not been an issue of great conflict between growers and estate. 
Prices have been raised regularly (GOPDC, 1988,91; Dadieh and Jonah, 1987,63). The 
flexibility and responsiveness of GOPDC's pricing policy is mainly due to two factors. 
Firstly palm fruit and palm oil, unlike sugar are not political commodities subject to 
price controls. Palm fruit/palm oil prices have always been determined by the market. 
So at the time the project was being established it was easy for the government and 
the World Bank to agree a pricing formula which was based on the need to ensure the 
continuing economic viability of the project and attractive returns to the producers. 
No doubt the GHASEL debacle represented a model to be avoided. These two factors 
Nvere reinforced by the fact that by the time the oil palms began to bear fruit, 
government economic policy had shifted drastically away from regulation to 
liberalisation (World Bank. 1992). 
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GOPDC-outgrower relations were however not devoid of conflict. Though of fairly 
low intensity it nonetheless represented a struggle over the distribution of costs and 
benefits under the contract and therefore the terms of capital's control over the 
producer's labour process. GOPDC's outgrowers regularly complained that the firni's 
computation of what amounted to 80% of labour costs, calculated on the basis of ývhat 
the estate paid for labour, tended to underestimate the real costs to the farmer. This 
complaint notwithstanding the money made a significant contribution to enabling many 
farmers undertake oil palm cultivation. Compared to cocoa, the main cash crop in the 
area, the process of creating a new oil palm is very labour intensive. Also maintaining 
the young farm requires considerable labour. Though family members and dependents 
constitute the backbone of the labour force, very few growers command the fanifly 
labour force to adequately meet all labour requirements. All GOPDC's smallholders, 
who are on average older than the outgrowers, employed casual wage labour and a full 
80% of them had permanent wage labourers compared to 47% of all outgrowers 
(GOPDC, 1988,23). 
Smallholders and outgrowers told Dadieh and Jonah (1987,46) about breaches of 
contract by GOPDC. The most frequent cited cases were non delivery of seedlings 
resulting in carefully prepared land going unplanted and the estate failing to observe 
fresh fruit collection procedures. The 1988 independent survey commissioned by 
GOPDC confirmed farmer complaints about inefficiencies in seedling delivery system. 
While farmers have been (, eneralk, satisfied with the level of prices they have argued 
for a closer involvement with the price fixing process than simply being consulted 
throuilh their orgaiiisatim. One area where GOPDC appears to have conceded defeat 
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is on the issue of intercropping, a prohibition which is widely disregarded by farmers 
(GOPDC, 1988,77). Many farmers intercrop their oil palms with the two main staple 
crops, maize and cassava. Estate-outgrower conflict has however at no point 
threatened the fundamental relationship between the parties. Not only have more 
farmers in the vicinity of the estate been clamouring to become outgrowers but 
existing outgrowers have been pressing for the outgrower mechanism to be introduced 
for the cultivation of other crops. 
The contrasting outcomes of the GHASEL and GOPDC schemes show that the 
economic returns to the farmer is basic to the stability and viability of the contract is 
the economic return to the farmer. A narrow focus on the formal terms of the contract 
farming agreement could lead to the disregarding of socio-economic and institutional 
factors which determine what the subsumption of the farmer actually means in 
practice. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Terms and Operation of Management Contracts, 
In the chapter 8 we noted that the management contracts (MCs) signed in respect of 
BOPP, TOPP, GOPDC and GHASEL represented an important instance of the unltN, F 
of convergent and contradictory interests and power relations in the state-IDFI-TNC 
alliance that the projects embodied. The four MCs were not the simple products of 
the negotiations between and the relative strength of the parties to the agreement. In 
the cases of GHASEL, GOPDC and TOPP the issue was affected by the fact that the 
MCs form part of the totality of relations with funding organisations who also put 
forward their notions of what should be the terms of the MCs. In the case of BOPP 
the MC was based on clause 5 of the joint venture agreement between UACI and the 
Ghana Government. In this chapter we examine the costs and benefits of the MCs of 
the four case study projects from the standpoint of the contracting local firm and the 
host country. 
hi their nature MCs raise a broad and complex range of legal issues (UNCTC, I 983, iv- 
vii; Ghai & Choong, 1988)1. We discuss the costs and benefits of the MCs of 
' The term "management contract" covers both management contracts and technical service agreements. 
This is because while GHASEL has a "management contract", BOPP's "management contract'' is Z! ) 
described as a "Service A-reement" and in the case of TOPP the "management contract" is contained 
in two complementary agreements -a "Management Agreement" and a "Technical Assistance Contraci". 
The discussions about TOPP generally cover both CDC and its successor, Harrisons Fleming Advisory 
Services Ltd (HFAS) since their contract were the same in their essentials. The two firms operated with 
essentially the same MCs. It was not possible to get a copy of the management agreement in respect 
of GOPDC, therefore the following discussion is based on secondary sources. 
2 The LJNCTC has analysed the legal issues arising from NICs under twelve broad heads, Ghal & 
Choon- on their part mark out six groups of issues. These are a) decision structures and powers; b) the 
transfer ofnianai! eriial and technical skills and the localisation ot'staff, c)remuneration of the managing 
agent, d) monitoring and verification mechanisms in NICs, e) duration and termination of the a-reements 
and f) dispute settlement and applicable law. 
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GHASEL, BOPP, TOPP and GOPDC under five headings: 1) the origins of the 
agreements; their provisions on 2) decision making powers and structures. 3) transfer 
of managerial and technical skills and the localisation of staff, 4) remuneration of the 
managing agent, and 5) monitoring and verification of the implementation of the 
contracts. The origins of the agreements are being examined because they help 
explain the character of the contracts. In addition to the provisions of the MCs and 
how they operated the discussion also takes account of environmental factors that 
influence the operation of management agreements. These include the character of the 
state, its strength and focus at a particular time, the history and influence of the 
management contractor in the country, institutional arrangements for monitoring the 
implementation of the agreement and possible alternatives open to the host country or 
local partner. 
10.1. Origin of management contracts 
The MCs for GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC were conditions for foreign financing of 
the projects. IDFIs see MCs as offering a guarantee of efficient and competent 
running of the projects that they funded. For many a post colonial state agreeing to 
an MC may arise from either a recognition of the absence of domestic capability to 
run a project or conceding to pressure from potential financiers that such an 
arrangement be made (LJNCTC 1983,14). Reflecting its regular practice, the World 
Bank made the appointment of management contractors conditions for its funding of 
GHASEL and GOPDC. In both cases the Bank felt there were no Ghanaians of 
sufficient experience to fill top management positions. and admitted that the cost of 
GHASEL's expatriate staff was "very high" (World Bank, 1972,19,1975.17). 
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According to the Bank the Ghana government agreed with its views on the lack of 
domestic management capability. Even if the Ghana government was minded to resist 
the imposition of these management contracts its position was weakened by the stark 
history of poor management of State-owned enterprises of which the sugar industry 
and oil palm estates owned by the State Farms Corporation (SFC) represented glaring 
examples. 
For the management contractor the preference for this particular form of involvement 
may be due to a number of factors (UNCTC, 1983,1). These include being able to 
reap a number of economic benefits without incurring any of the risks associated with 
investments or loans. We have argued that this was the basis of HVA's involvement 
in GHASEL. The following discussion will offer more material in support of this. 
IRHO also stood to derive economic benefits without financial risks from its 
management of GOPDC. Where a firm has risked its capital in a project a concern 
to control or protect that investment can be a primary reason for contracting to manage 
the enterprise. This consideration partly explains BOPP's management agreement with 
an associated firm, which agreement must also be understood in the context of the 
vertical integration strategy that the project represented. 
The factors behind CDCs appointment as corporate manager of TOPP reflected its 
it split personality" as an I DFI/TNC. CDC sought to make it being appointed manager 
of TOPP or failing that a corporate manager CDC approved of a condition of its 
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lending for the project'. Section 3 of a draft Project Agreement for TOPP tabled bv 
CDC in its negotiations with the Ghana Government provides a particularl, %, striking 
example of an attempt by a funding institution to impose an MC on a borrower. As 
the negotiations progressed the demand for Board representation was watered down 
to "a right to a non-voting representative at all meetings of the Board" and the length 
of the initial management period reduced to 8 years'. CDC's drive to be made 
corporate manager of TOPP also derived from a desire for a beneficial involvement 
in TOPP with minimal risk of which financial involvement through a loan rather than 
equity represented a facet3. It would appear that CDC's caution about investing III 
TOPP fitted in a wider pattern of foreign investor pessimism about Ghana. In its 
1976/77 annual report the CIB/GIC expressed concern about the increasing foreign 
loan, as compared to foreign equity, component of new projects (CIB, I 977, viii). 
1A copy of the draft Project Agreement obtained from the Attorney General's Department had an 
unsigned marginal comment - ""WHY? You are a creditor not a shareholder" against a provision 
(section 2.8) for the appointment of a CDC nominee to TOPP's Board of directors "until the loan... and 
interest are repaid or paid in full". In the negotiations CDC demanded to manage TOPP in its first 10 
vears, It also sought an undertaking that the Ghana Government will not allow the development of 
another oil palm project without consulting CDC and TOPP. 
' (CIB/A 652 'Vol 2). 
' CIB/A652/Vol 2. Late in 1977 CDC wrote to the Ministry of Economic Planning expressing its 
concerns about the potential viability of TOPP in the light of "the current extremely high rate of 
inflation and the reported ly Nvidedisparity betweenthe official and realvalues of the cedi-togetherNNIth 
the problems likely to occur due to the shortage of foreign exchange". 
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10.2. Decision making powers and structures 
It has been argued that "a developing country often views a management contract as 
less than it is; while a transnational corporation views it as more than it is" (Ghai & 
Choong, 13). In the opinion of the two writers this difference flows from the basic 
points of inherent divergence between the motives and expectations of the two parties. 
On its part the developing country tends to see an MC as a technical arrangement 
which enables it retain significant control over the policy and to some extent the 
operations of an enterprise even as a need to acquire technology and skills necessitates 
the engagement of a TNC as manager. The presence of the TNC therefore is transient, 
facilitating disengagement once locals have been trained and skills acquired. TNCs 
on the other hand tend to overestimate the power and control an MC represents. They 
might see it as a device for controlling an area of economic life in the host country, 
a first step in their penetration of a new market'; something that enhances that 
country's integration into their global operations and also as laying a basis for 
continuing influence in the country by means such as co-opting the ruling elite. 
Whether it is the objectives of a host country/local company or that of a TNC 
managing agent which are fulfilled by an MC turns crucially on which of them 
controls the local firm. 
The issue of control is complicated by the fact that invariably the provisions of a 
management contract seriously alter the original power structure within the managed 
firm (Ghai & Choong, 14). The provisions related to decision making structui-es and 
'I IVA saw its MC \\tth GHASEL as a chance to establish a foothold in West Africa Morld 
Bank, 198 1,34). 
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powers in the MCs of the four projects clearly reflected the fact that the dommant 
influence that shaped the agreements was the insistence of the funding IDFIs and 
foreign shareholders that local personnel were incapable of managing the enterprises. 
In the case of GHASEL the World Bank felt a minimum of 42 expatriate personnel 
was required for the successful implementation of the project (World Bank, 1972,19). 
The general provisions on managerial powers in the GHASEL, GOPDC and TOPP 
agreements explicitly vested the management of the firms in the managing agent 
subject to the overall direction of the board of directors'. The further provisions that 
specify and detail the powers and rights of the manager however drastically qualify 
the powers of the shareholders and boards of directors, narrowing the scope for 
exercising "general direction on matters of policy"'. The World Bank (1981,34) 
described GHASEL's MC as having "strong terms" which gave HVA "very broad 
powers with regard to day to day operations" and "full freedom to manage with 
assured cooperation from Government". In all cases except BOPP, a further influence 
on the balance of control over the managed enterprise was the fact that the schemes 
were intensively and extensively detailed in project documents and agreements 
prepared by the IDFIs and accepted by the Ghana government. This severely limited 
the scope for the boards of directors to exercise the power that the MCs vested in them 
to determine the overall policy direction of the projects'. In reality it was more a case 
Section I (c) GHASEL Agreement and Section 2.01 TOPP Management Agreement. I 
2 Sections I and 2 Annex I of GHASEL MC, section 2 TOPP MCs together with articles 2.1 and 3.1 
of Technical Assistance (TA) contracts; clauses 4 and 5 and Schedule to BOPP-PG MC. 
' The extent of this detailing is illustrated by the World Bank's Appraisal Report on GOPDC which 
includes a specification of the "principal functions" of the firm's board of directors (World Bank-, 1975, 
Annex 1). 
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of the board of directors having overall responsibility to ensure the implementation of 
what had been pre-determined. 
The case of BOPP provides the most dramatic illustration of how detailed provisions 
drastically qualify the broad powers reserved for a board of directors. Clause I of 
BOPP's agreement with Unilever PG provides that the latter "shall assist the Board of 
Directors of BOPP to establish and maintain an organisation capable of conducting the 
management of BOPP in an efficient manner ...... Upon examination of the specific 
powers vested in Unilever PG, the phrase "Plantations Group shall assist the Board of 
Directors of BOPP" borders on a misleading representation of the relationship between 
the parties. The real picture of the relationship is yielded by reading Clauses I and 
2 together with Regulations 67 and 72 of BOPP's Regulations. From such a reading 
it becomes clear that the structure of decision making under the MC marginallses the 
board of directors and effects a transnationalisation of BOPP's management function 
by integrating it into PG's global framework. 
Clause 2 of the MC provides for a nominee of PG's to be appointed as BOPP's 
managing director whose terms of reference are laid out in Regulation 72 of BOPP's 
Regulations. Under that regulation the powers of the board of directors are effectively 
transferred to the managing director and by extension to PG. Regulation 72, among 
other provisions, specifies the responsibilities of the managing director and also 
provides that he "... shall have collaterally with the board of directors, all the powers 
of the board of directors under regulation 67 ...... The central provision of the latter 
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Regulation vested the board with "all the powers of the company", including to power 
to borrow money and mortgage the company's assets. 
The terms of Clause 5 of the BOPP-PG agreement, which provides for PG to provide 
"as and when required by BOPP... technical and specialist services and advice" in 
agricultural and agronomic research, engineering in relation to the oil mill. financial 
and personnel matters, are so broadly cast as to enable PG take charge of all aspects 
of BOPP's operations. Global integration was buttressed by clause 6 which grants a" 
most favoured" status to local members of the Unilever group in the provision of 
services to BOPP. So beneath the general provision "... to assist the Board of 
Directors of BOPP... " PG, through the managing director it nominates, is vested with 
powers which could render the board of directors redundant thereby facilitating 
BOPP's direct subordination to Unilever's centrally determined operational principles 
L*.. 
for all its plantations. This point is particularly significant considering the fact that 
the state was a substantial minority shareholder in the project with three out of the 
seven directors'. 
Unlike BOPP's MC, the agreements for GHASEL and TOPP explicitly reserve some 
powers for the boards of directors. These include the power to encumber company 
assets. Their consent is also required for the borrowing of money and the investment 
of company funds'. During the negotiation of TOPP's MC the Ghanaian side 
objected to formulations, in the draft tabled by CDC, which they felt gave CDC too I 
' Clause S, BOPP Heads of Agreement. Z:, 
2 Section 4.02 of TOPP's MC; section I (d) GHASEL MC. 
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much power. The margins of a copy of the draft agreement obtained from the 
Attorney- General's is littered with such objections. The essence of the comments is 
captured by one to the effect that 
"The project will be managed and operated by TOPP with a Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors will delegate to TOPP as management 
consultant such powers as are required for the proper development of tile 
project. Management is vested in TOPP. What we require of CDC is 
management consultancy. " 
Section 2.01 of the CDC draft which gave CDC "subject to the directions of the Board 
on matters of policy", "general control and management of the Company's business" 
was among the provisions that drew comment. The agreed version of section 2.01 was 
cast in the language of agency with "overall responsibility for management and 
operation of the Company remaining with the Board". This however did not change 
the essence of the power relations in the MC. 
Of the four MCs BOPP's was the most summary as regards the enumeration of the 
powers and responsibilities of the managing agent. The detailed provisions in the 
GHASEL, GOPDC and TOPP MCs did not only cover the broad responsibilities of 
the managing agent but also deal with the qualifications and duties of officers ývhich 
are to be appointed under the agreements'. These lists on one hand capture the wide 
powers of the managing agent. On the other hand the specification of the manager's 
duties both helps lessen the vagueness in some of the provisions of a many sided 
contract and also facilitates the evaluation of performance (UNCTC, 1983,17). The 
extent to which these formal provisions were used to supervise the managing aiyents I 
Section 2.1.3 TOPP Technical Assistance Contract- Anne, \ III GHASEL NIC. BOPP's MC had no 
specifications about tile posts expatriate staff Nvere to occupy or the required qualifications. 
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performance are analysed in a following discussion of the monitorinu and verification 
mechanisms of the agreements. 
10.3. Transfer of technology and training of local staff 
The objective underlying the transfer of technology, the training of local staff and the 
transfer of skills touches at the very foundation of a management contract; the sooner 
locals develop the ability to completely take over the running of the managed 
enterprise the sooner an MC will come to an end with the resultant loss to the 
managing agent of the benefits that the agreement brings (UNCTC, 1983,40; Ghai & 
Choong, 26). Studies have shown that because of the nodal importance of this issue 
for the fate of MCs, training and the transfer of technology have not received priority 
in situations where managing agents have had full powers to make organisational 
decisions for enterprises they run (Landis, 1979,415). Examination of the terms and 
experiences with management contracts in a number of countries have highlighted 
contractual terms, operational factors and practices which facilitate or hamper the 
transfer of technology and the localisation of staff (UNCTC, 198'1,26-67; Ghai and 
Choong, 26-30). 
How clearly the MC provides for the transfer of technology is a general factor of 
I'Llndamcntal importance. The owner/host country cannot assume this is covered by 
, oeiieral contractual provisions on 
hiring and training of local staff or as likeIv to 
enicrge as a by-product of the presence of the managincy agent (UNCTC, 1983,40). On I -- 
the specific issue of training of local staff it is also important that the MC make clear 
provisions. This point has a number of dimensions. Foremost among these are 
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whether the MC clearly provides that training is an important task within the totality 
of the managing agent's responsibilities and whether the local partner made any input 
into the design of the training programme. Also relevant are what provisions are made 
on the nature of the training programme, in terms of types and levels of skill Oob 
positions), type and level of training, combination of different types of training (formal 
or on-job). Another relevant factor is whether the agreement contains a time table for 
the localisation of staff and if so whether it gives priority to the indigenisation of any 
particular positions. Underpinning all this are what powers of supervision or review 
are vested in the local firm's board of directors or public institutions. How far the 
four MCs took account of these principles is examined in the following sub-section. 
10.3.1. Training provisions of MCs 
All four management contracts made provision' for the training of Ghanaians as part 
of a process of transferring skills and replacing expatriate staff brought in under the 
MCs'. In addition to the terms of the MCs TOPP and BOPP, as entities established 
under Capital Investment Decree, 1973 (NRCD 141), were under a statutory duty 
imposed by sections 8 (2) (f) and 9 of NRCD 141 to set up programmes for training 
Ghanaians in administrative, technical. managerial and other skills. The training 
provisions of the BOPP-PG agreement are consistent with the general cast of the 
' Clause 4 of BOPP-PG agreement; section I (o) GHASEL-HVA Agrement, section 2.03 (c) of both 
TOPP-CDC and TOPP-HFA management agreements. The GOPDC Appraisal Report indicatesthe terms I 
of training responsibility of managing agent (World Bank, 1972,17). 
' The five key personnel "required to assure efficient project implementation" (World Bank, 1975.17) 
at GOPDC, i. e managing director, finance manager, nucleus plantation manager, mill enizineer and 
senior assistant plantation managerwere provided by IRHO. At TOPP CDC provided seven top officials 
including the general manager, financial controller and estate manager. GI IASEL had forty expatriates, 
a number the World Bank justified as "dictated by the high degree of managerial and technical skills 
needed in a sugar inclustry" (World Bank, 1972,19). 
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contract, providing in clause 4 that PG "shall assist BOPP in the traininLi of suitable 
Ghanaians employed by BOPP ...... In eontrast the terms of the GHASEL. TOPP and 
GOPDC MCs are imperative. An obligation to "train or ensure that the Company 
affords facilities for training suitable Ghanaians at all levels of employment" was one 
of the five principal responsibilities undertaken by TOPP's managing agent. HVA 
similarly was to prepare and implement a training programme for "suitable local 
personnel in all aspects of GHASEL's business". 
All the agreements made explicit provisions for the preparation of training schemes, 
varying in the time frames stipulated for the submission of the programmes to the 
various boards of directors and also in the clarity with which they provide for local 
input into the design of the programmes. In all cases except GOPDC there was no 
explicit provision for a local input into the design of the training programmes beyond 
the board's power to approve. GOPDC's MC provided that the training programme 
was to be prepared by IRHO in consultation with Government. In TOPP's MCs the 
training programmes were subject to the general direction of the board who also had 
a power to approve reviews. In addition to a broad power to approve the programme 
submitted by HVA GHASEL's board was explicitly vested with a power to annually 
review and if necessary modify the programme "bearing in mind results so far 
achieved". As regards time frame for the submission of training programmes by the I Zýl 
managing agents, HVA was placed under a vague duty to "promptly prepare" and 
submit a programme. PG was to submit a "detailed programme" to BOPP's board 
within a rather lengthy two years from the date of cffectiveness of the MC compared 
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with HFA and IRHO who were expected to submit their programmes within six 
months to TOPP and GOPDC respectively. 
It is for only the GHASEL and GOPDC training programmes that Nve have some 
details (World Bank, 1972,19; 1 975, Annex 3,4). Both were expected to cover specific 
types of skills using different types of training. The World Bank expected GHASEL's 
training programme to have "staff' and "non-staff' components. The former covering 
personnel with university degrees and comprised of on-job training followed by study 
assignments abroad including periods of work with sugar industries for periods of up 
to nine months. Non-staff training was to be conducted at a company Training Centre 
and was to include "upgrading courses for artisans; practical courses for school 
graduates; training courses to provide qualified foremen; and advanced training courses 
for promotion to staff. " (World Bank, 1972,19). 
Of the four MCs GHASEL's agreement had the clearest provisions on the role of the 
board of directors in the supervision of training programmes. Under section I (o) the 
managing agent was under an obligation to make half yearly reports to the board of 
directors who were to review the programme annually. The GHASEL contract though 
it spoke of "replacing" expatriate personnel, like all the other MCs, did not have a 
definite time-table for the localisation of posts. The GOPDC MC also envisaged the 
"replacement" of foreign personnel; the BOPP and TOPP MCs however talked about 
it reducing" reliance on rather than "replacing" forcigners. In all the four cases the 
MC's contained the standard provision that processes of "reducing" or " Feplacing" 
foreigners must be "consistent with the continued and efficiem coi-iduct" of the 
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enterprise's operations. At GHASEL the replacement was to be "in the shortest 
possible time" while in the case of GOPDC the Bank was of the view that "though 
broad timing targets should be set, the replacement of key expatriates should not be 
tied to a fixed period but be based on the assessment of the capacities of the Ghanaian 
ct 
staff available" (World Bank, 1975, Annex 3,4). 
While the predicating of localisation of staff on continued efficiency is 
commonsensical it meant that ultimate power over the process lies with whoever 
determines the capabilities of relevant Ghanaian personnel. None of the four 
agreements had clear provisions on whether this power was vested in the managing Cý 
agent or the board of directors but clearly provided that the day to day management 
powers of the agent included the hiring, promotion and firing of staff'. The combined 
effect of the preceding points and the absence of clear time tables was to effectively 
leave the process of indigenisation in the hands of the very entity that stood to lose 
from such an exercise. This notwithstanding the fact that the boards of directors 
retained overall authority over company policy including the training and localisation 
programme. This is because the ability of a board of directors to review the progress 
of implementation is circumscribed by the fact of having to rely on the same managing 
agent for information on the goings on in the enterprise and the fact that even where 
the board is not comfortable with the performance of the agent independent attempts 
at getting information on the operations are unlikely to yield more than is in the 
possession of the agent. 
' Section I (f) (i) of GHASEL MC, section 4.01 TOPP MC; BOPP Regulation 72 (d). The powers of 
GOPDC"s managing director, a nominee of IRHO, included the "recruiting and controlling of staff, 
(World Bank, 1975, Annex 3,3). 
16 
The relative weakness of the staff training and localisation provisions of the MCs are 
due to the fact that the agreements were primarily shaped by the concern of fundmo 
IDFIs about efficient management of projects they were Investing in. the "self 
re iance" proclamations of the NRC/SMC which was in power when the BOPP. TOPP 
and GOPDC MCs were signed notwithstanding. For example the recital at the 
beginning of the GHASEL-HVA agreement justifies the MC in terms of the conditions 
to be fulfilled for IDA funding of the rehabilitation scheme. It ý, vlll also be recalled 
from Chapter Seven that the Ghana Government iiivited CDC to manage TOPP "in 
order to ensure, from the beginning an efficient and effective operation of the 
company". In the case of BOPP the MC was mainly an instrument for the integration 
of the firm into Unilever's world-wide plantation organisation. 
Although some training of local staff was carried out at all the four firms, the 
management of TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC remained in the hands of expatriate 
managing agents more than ten years after the projects were initiated. A World 
Bank/FAO study (I 989, Annex 13) obliquely sought to justify this state of affairs by 
arguing that "it often happens that withdrawal of management consultants results 
sooiier or later in the deterioration of the enterprise". This argument is an unintended 
adverse cornment on the legacy of managing agents in respect of transfer of skills to 
locals. In this regard it is nowworthy that the quality of training provided bly I-IVA 
has been part of the controversy about the factors that led to the dismal failure of the 
GHASEL rehabilitation scheme (World Bank, 198 1,29-30, MDPI, 1980. passim). 
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A government commissioned assessment of GHASELI, carried out in the last days of 
HVA's management, noted that "some kind of training had taken place" but concluded 
that "having regard to the fact that the contract with HVA was to be terminated at a 
specified period, the method of training was not enough to equip the subordinates xvith 
the standard of competence required to enable them take over from the HVA staff at 
the end of the contract period" (Abedi, 1978,16). A post-project audit commissioned 
by the GHASEL board claimed that "with regard to training of Ghanaian staff, the 
general feeling among the Ghanaian staff is that not much was gained from the Dutch 
in terms of training" ((MDPI, 1980,99). The report argued that the lack of trained 
Ghanaian personnel contributed to the poor outcome of the project. The problems 
created by GHASEL's difficulty in recruiting qualified Ghanaians was compounded 
by the fact of those who were employed feeling frustrated by the attitude of FIVA's 
personnel, "more importantly the general feeling that the Dutch were not prepared or 
willing to train the Ghanaian staff' (MDPI, 1980,44). 
The World Bank however took a contrary view. Its Project Performance Audit Report 
on GHASEL (1981,29-30) argued that "while there are reports that insufficient training 
was undertaken by HVA, it is considered that the training facilities provided were 
good" (p. 29). This assertion is however significantly qualified by other information 
m the Report. For example it accepted that HVA contributed to the acknowledged 
ineffectiveness of trainim, of seasonal staff by not quickly defining the objectivcs of 
' The enqtjl'rN, was instituted by the Ministry of Economic Planning in April 1978 following a meeting 
between the Commissioners for Economic Planning, Industries and their top ci\ il servants and the 
chairman of the board of directors of GHASEL. It submitted its findings: Report of the Committee ()/ 
blivsh 
, izatl'on mto 
the. -Iffairs of the Ghana Sugar Estutcs Litnitcci, to the Commissioner for I. conomic 
Planning in May 1978. The Report is hereafter referred to as the "Abedi Report", after its chairperson. 
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such training. It also pointed to what appears to be undue delay by HVA in initiating 
training. 
Despite the fact that HVA was involved with the GHASEL project from the appraisal 
stage it took two years, from when it took charge, to meet the contractual requirement 
to present a training programme in the "shortest possible time". The first training 
officer was appointed in January 1975 and training started later that year. The Audit 
also implied that the training programme, particularly at Asutsuare, was affected by 
the "overriding need to operate and maintain the factories". This impeded the release 
of some technical employees for training, also HVA training engineers "spent most of 
their time attending to essential factory work". Most significantly the World Bank 
talks of "acknowledged difficulties in implementing a comprehensive training 
programme in a deteriorating situation" leading to "increased friction between FIVA 
staff and Ghanaians at Asutsuare" (World Bank, 1981,30). As of March 1978, three 
months before HVA's contract ended, HVA personnel dominated GHASEL's top 
management positions, especially at Asutsuare; accounting was the only department 
wlicre Ghanaians took full control in the course of the project (MDPI, 1980,100, World 
Bank, 1981,32). 
The shortcomings of HVA's training regime were located within a wider failure of the 
MC to specifically define the transfer of technology as a principal goal of the 
arrangement The aoreements for BOPP. TOPP and GOPDC were similarly CIN 
The opening recital of the GHASEL MC located the aureement as the product of IDA conditionality 17, for funding the prQject. 
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deficient'. This flaw was not corrected by the provision in the four MCs epitomised 
by section I (e) of the GHASEL-HVA contract whereby HVA undertook to make "all 
necessary technical, agricultural, commercial, management skills... for the successful 
operation of the business" available to GHASEL. In the cases of GHASEL and BOPP 
the failure to locate training of local staff within a broad concept of technology 
transfer meant that the training programmes did not cover the skills possessed by 
employees of the managing agent who came down periodically as part of the back up 
specialist services to the managed enterprise. This function was provided for by all 
the MCs'. The GHASEL MC made detailed provisions for types of officers to visit 
and the minimum numbers and duration of such visits, this however being subject 
review by the parties. The BOPP agreement on the other hand generally provided for 
PG to provide BOPP with specialist services and advice in specified areas "as and 
when required" while under the TOPP MC the managing agent was to use "its best 
endeavour to arrange such visits by specialist advisers" as the Board after consulting 
the agent may require or the agent after consulting the Board may consider advisable. 
Generally while yielding immediate benefits to the managed enterprise by providing 
expert knowledge for the solution of current problems such visits have the potential 
to deepen the managed firm's dependence on the managing agent in the absence of a 
clearly defined programme to localise those skills and can be consciously so used by 
' See clauses I and 5 of BOPP's MC and Section 2.03 (a) and (e) of TOPP's MCs, 
' Sections 1 (11) and 6 (a) (1) of GHASEL MC-. clause 5 and 8 (2) of BOPP MC; sections 2.04 and 2.05 
TOPP MCs. 
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the managing agent so as to spin out a lucrative relationship with the managed 
enterprise (Ghai& Choong, 1988,57). Such dependence also involves its own specific 
financial cost to the managed firm in addition to the usual obligation to pay the travel, 
accommodation and daily subsistence costs of the visiting expert. These points are 
illustrated by the cases of BOPP and GHASEL. They also give credence to the 
argument that the "transfer of technology by osmosis has yet to be established as a 
practical solution for developing countries" (UNCTC, 1983,40) and that contractual 
provisions for the training of local employees are not enough to ensure the transfer of 
technology and skills under an MC thereby ensuring an end to reliance on foreign 
experts. 
In a document forwarded to the CIB/GIC in 1988 the management of BOPP proudly 
proclaimed that one of the benefits of the firms' MC with PG was the indigenisation 
of ten of the eleven top management positions within the firm's first 12 years 
(BOPP, 1988, I). Presumably the only expatriate left being the all powerful, PG- 
appointed managing director. It is logical to expect that such progress will bring with 
it a reduction in BOPP's dependence on PG and associated financial cost. Not so. 
The BOPP-PG MC initially provided for the payment of an annual service fee of 
f 17,000 by BOPP to PG. Twelve years later, i. e 1988, the fee had risen to E98,000. 
Iii a memo to the CIB/GIC about BOPP's expansion plans over the period 1988-1994, 
the firm's management indicated that the service fee would rise progressively to 
fl-38,000 by 1994. This was on account of greater support from PG and "an increase 
in specialist short term visits" (BOPP, 1988,2). 
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An examination of the documentation that BOPP regularly forwarded to the CIB/GIC 
and the Bank of Ghana over the years in support of its applications for the transfer of 
service payments to PG show that throughout the 12 years (1976-1988) BOPP's 
requests were essentially in the nature of filling out a standard form, the only changes 
being the increasing sums paid to PG. The services supposedly rendered by PG in 
1988 were exactly the same as those of 1976: the same six heads of claims, the same 
statement of claim word for word. BOPP's defence of the escalating cost of PG's 
services buttress our argument that the relationship between BOPP and PG was part 
of the integration of the former into Unilever's world wide plantation organisation and 
that there was no intention to effect a transfer of technology such as would end the 
link between BOPP and PG. A document submitted to the CIB/GIC by BOPP' 
argued that: 
Schedule 4. letter of 8 January 1988 from managing director, BOPP to Chief Executive, GIC in GIC 
TT. 10 (BOPP and Unilever PG). 
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International research and development is constantly creating new 
opportunities to improve performance. BOPP must continue to progress by 
obtaining the benefit of international experience if it is to remain in the lead 
a an efficient palm oil producer... The company is too small and is not 
sufficiently wealthy to develop its own research, specialist engineering, 
agricultural and training resources nor the very scarce computer development 
skills all of which are required if it is to maintain its recent progress. It is 
Plantation Group's objective to recover the total cost of providing these 
services ftom the fees it recovers ftom its worldwide Plantations activities. 
At present the BOPP fee is approximately in line with the apportioned share 
of the cost. (italics added). 
The last two sentences are an almost open admission that the "fee" charged by PG was 
based more on a central corporate decision than the real cost of the services PG 
rendered to BOPP, thereby allowing Unilever to regularly take an increasing amount 
of money out of a foreign exchange starved economy with a tight exchange control 
regime (Plasschaert, Murray, 1981). 
The case of GHASEL shows how expensive dependence on back-up services from a 
managing agent can be and underline the imperative for management contracts to 
make clear provisions for a comprehensive transfer of technology and not merely for 
the training of local employees. Under section I (h) of GHASEL's MC HVA was to 
"provide back-up facilities and advice from its organisation outside Ghana" including 
arranging for "periodic visits to Ghana of its MD, top management staff and specialists 
as and when deemed necessary by GHASEL for such periods and assignments as may 
be agreed upon by HT'A except that in an emergency HVA shall arrange such visits 
andjustý& thein to the Board' (italics added). 
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Considering HVA's control of day to day management at GHASEL it was certain in 
the normal course of things to have an important influence on decisions about the 
appropriate time for back-up visits. Combined with the emergency powers it gave "I- 
to HVA to by-pass the Board, the MC effectively vested ultimate power to decide on 
such visits in HVA. The agreement assumed a heavy flow of traffic under this head 
laying down minimum numbers of and duration of visits by five categories of HVA 
officials. In the projections for the disbursement of the IDA credit for GHASEL 
$1.773m out of the $15.6m was allocated for the cost of such visits, slightly more than 
the $1.68m that was to cover direct management fees. The MC explicitly indicated 
that this management fee covered HVA's provision of training for locals and no 
separate remuneration was due in that regard. The project completion report showed 
a considerable cost overrun,, 230 per cent,, in respect of back-up visits and services 
provided by HVA, with the actual cost standing at $4.075m. In the controversy that 
followed the failure of the GHASEL scheme the issue of how much the managing 
agent benefited the project was very much to the fore. This issue is discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
10.4. Remuneration of the Managing Agents 
Payments to a managing agent are the most obvious cost of a management contract 
to a firm/host country and benefit to the managing agent. Payments to the managing 
agent under all four contracts included i) a basic fixed management fee, ii) salaries and 
related expenses of seconded management staff, iii) payment/reimbursement of 
specified costs related to the project such as the travel, boarding and subsistence 
expenses of visiting back-up staff. BOPP and GHASEL had additional payments to 
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make to their managers. In the case of GHASEL there were four additional categories 
of payments to HVA. These were incentive fees based on production and net profit, 
and a 4% commission payments to HVA for specified procurement on behalf of 
GHASEL and payment for a sugar industry expansion study. Under clause 8 (1) (a) 
of its MC BOPP was to pay PG "recognised professional scale fees for all project 
design work undertaken by Plantation Group Engineering Department". 
Many a time however it takes a spectacular incident, such as the failure of GHASEL, 
for attention to turn to whether or not a management contract has been worth its 
financial costs. This question is not easily answered for a number of reasons. Even 
in cases of poor project results such as GHASEL, the cause and effect relationship 
among contributory factors, including poor management, may be nigh impossible to 
completely disentangle. More fundamentally determining what is a "fair and 
equitable" payment to a managing agent is not easy, partly because of the difficulty 
of settling a market price for the package of services to be provided and skills 
transferred under the contract. 
The earlier discussion of the escalation of PG's annual fee and the cost of HVA's 
personnel is enough indication that expatriate management was a significant cost for 
the projects. CDC's seven year management of TOPP cost at least fl. 2m, made up 
f. o ibout E350,000 total basic management fee for the period and over E850,000 in 
salai-ies and related payment for seconded staff and expenses of visiting specialist 
staff. HFA's 18 month management cost E310,878, covering basic fee and personnel 
, -N -) 
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salaries and expenses'. The World Bank allocated $430,000 of its credit for GOPDC 
for the salaries of IRHO personnel and another $80,000 for "technical assistance and 
training". For a perennially foreign exchange starved country such as Ghana all this 
represents a lot of money. This is no less so because the costs of management in all 
cases, except BOPP, did not constitute immediate charges on Ghana's foreign I 
exchange resources, being covered from the project financing provided by the World 
Bank in the case of GHASEL and GOPDC and for TOPP by the EDF. 
The costs to a firm/host country and benefit to a managing agent can be considerably 
affected by the formulae that governs payment to the agent (UNCTC, 1983,71; Ghai 
& Choong, 3 1). In the case of BOPP, Unilever's export of capital via an upward 
review of the basic fee paid to PG, which drew on the national stock of foreign 
exchange, was made possible by clause 8 (1) (b) of the MC which provided that after 
a fixed fee of E17,000 in the initial four year contract period the fee was to be 
"reviewed... in the light of the then cost to Plantation Group of providing such 
services". 
While the terms of the other three MCs offer no scope for the manipulation of the 
basic management fee by associated companies the experience of GHASEL shows that 
the other heads of payment to the managing agent were by no means devoid of 
opportunities for him to increase his financial returns. Of the seven sources of income 
' Remuneration and I-Apenses of TOPP's managers are covered by section 6 and Chapter 5 respectl\ el) 
of TOPP's MCs and TACs respectively. CDC received a basic fee of E50,000 in the first ý car, with 
increases in the subsequent years of the seven year contract linked to the UK Index of General Retail 
Prices. 
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for the managing agent contained in the GHASEL MC no less than four potentially 
favour the manager. As a general rule separate fees for specified services, outside the 
basic management tend to increase the total amount paid to a managing agent. Also 
in the absence of supervision and monitoring by the owner reimbursable expenses by 
a managing agent on services such as visiting supporting staff can be substantial 
(UNCTC, 1983,75). The experience of GHASEL confirmed the weight of the above 
stated caution. 
Under the project an estimated $4.3m was to be spent as fees for management and 
payment for other services to be provided by HVA, with $1.68m earmarked for the 
management fee. The annual basic fee under the five year management contract was 
estimated at a maximum of $300,000 in the first three years with no ceiling for the 
remaining years, on the assumption that the company would then be profitable. This 
basic fee had three components. The first being an annual fixed fee, starting with 
$200,000 in the first year and progressively falling to $100,000 in the final year. The 
second component was a production fee amounting to 3% of sugar output in the first 
and second years, 2 in the third and 2% in the fourth and fifth years based a price of 
$190 per metric tonne of sugar. Finally, from the third year of the MC HVA was to 
receive 2% of GHASEL's net profits, as defined by section 6 (a) of the GHASEL- 
HVA contract, as part of its management fee. 
Because of the poor outcome of the project HVA's total take as basic management fee 
was just over $776.000, less than half the $1.68m earmarked by the IDA under the 
Developmcrit Credit Agreement (World Bank, 1981, Annex 12). Despite this shortfall 
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the total amount of the project funding that HVA received as payment for its services 
exceeded the original projection by more than $1.5m. Actual expenditure on HVA 
visiting personnel, cost of HVA conducted industry expansion study exceeded 
projections by significant margins. In percentage terms the most startling overrun was 
the 437% increase in the cost of the industry expansion study from a projected 
$45,000 to $197,000. The increase in personnel costs which we have already 
mentioned represented a 230% overrun on estimates. 
While it is possible to argue that the phenomenal difference in personnel expenses was 
due to the management demands of project the fact remains that HVA lost nothing but 
rather made more money as the scheme run deeper into trouble. The World Bank's 
project audit report (1981,35) strongly criticised. HVA for failing to periodically and 
realistically review and assess the risks of failure, already high at the start, which were 
increasing with every year's lack of success. It argued that HVA could have taken a 
strong stand with regard to continued participation in a project which lacked the 
resources to be successfully implemented. What this criticism seems to have forgotten 
is that FIVA incurred no losses as a result of the failure of the project. The report 
(Ibid) offers the smallest hints about the economic calculation that made HVA persist 
witli a project which offered no returns to its owners: 
"even as there were ominous signs that the project would not be achieved as 
intended, they [HVA] pinned their hopes and sights on the new projects which 
they had been commissioned to prepare. 
It was not in HVA's interest to take a strongly pessimistic view about the project, not 
only would nianagemcnt fee payments have come to and end but also the other income 
328 
from personnel expenses and preparing never to be projects would have been lost. It 
is however arguable that serious shortcomings in the monitoring of the 
implementations of GHASEL MC contributed to huge cost overruns incurred by 
GHASEL in respect of HVA services. 
10.5. Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms 
We can identify two main categories of instruments and mechanisms for monitoring 
and ensuring the compliance by the managing agents with the terms of the four MCs. 
The first group are the general and specific duties of reporting and accounting which 
the contracts imposed on the managers and the related general powers of the boards 
of directors over the affairs of the firms and the specific right to demand compliance 
with explicit terms of the MCs. The second line of control is represented by the 
statutory powers and responsibilities of public bodies such as the CIB/GIC and the 
project supervision activities of participating IDFIs. Because of state shareholding in 
the projects and the presence of its nominees on their boards the two levels of 
monitoring and supervision overlapped'. 
10.5.1. Enterprise level monitoring and supervision 
' The TOPP board was dominated by representatives of the parastatals that were the majority 
shareholders. Three out of BOPP's seven directors were government nominees. GOPDC's seven-person 
board had four direct state nominees alongside the IRHO nominated managing director, a representative 
of the outgrowers and also from the government appointed Kade District Council. The representation 
of the outgrowers and local council on GOPDC's board was a marked improvement on the other World 
Bank project, GHASEL, where they were not represented. The six member GHASEL board was chaired 
by the Commissioner for Trade and Industries and included the executive chairman of the CIB, the 
managim, director of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), the Chief Executives of the Central 
and Eastern Regions and the HVA appointed managing director of GHASEL. 
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It has already been argued that the more detailed the spelling out of the managing 
agent's functions and responsibilities, the greater the possibility for effective 
supervision by the board of directors. We have also noted some of the specific duties 
imposed on managing agents to prepare and present reports to the boards of directors 
on various goals set by or elements of the MCs. There were other such requirements. 
For example TOPP's managers had to present quarterly progress reports to the board 
and Government and submit annual technical and financial reports and accompanied 
by a work plan for the following year to the board, the goverru-nent and the 
Commission of the EC. The approval of the reports by the Government and EC was 
a condition for the release of funds for the succeeding year'. HVA's duty to report 
to the GHASEL board on the progress of its training programme was just one of many 
such obligations. More generally it was to submit monthly progress reports, annual 
accounts and balance sheet to the board three months after the end of each financial 
year'. Unlike TOPP's MCs under which the managing agent had to present and have 
a final report accepted before final payment, GHASEL's agreement did not require 
HVA to prepare a final report on its stewardship'. 
In principle the general proviso in all the management contracts subjecting the work 
of flic managing agent to the general direction of the companies' boards of directors 
' S"ection 33.3.1.1 - 33.1.4 of CDC-TOPP TAC and section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of HFA-TOPP TAC. 
Section I (m) and (n) of GHASEL-HVA Agreement. I 
' Ailicle 10.3.3 TOPP-HFA TAC. 
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offered a versatile too] for controlling over the activities of the agent. Experience 
elsewhere has however shown that in practice this "catch-all" clause is a rather blunt 
instrument, not very effective for policing a manager. The limitations of the 
provision flow from the very bases of the MC. The arrangement implies a recognition 
on the part of the owners of an enterprise that the managing agent has superior 
knowledge and ability for the tasks for which it is contracted. As our cases show, this 
fundamental inequality usually results in the manager being given wide powers from 
the very beginning. This combination of the owners relative lack of expertise and the 
powers vested in the manager make the evaluation of performance difficult 
(UNCTC, 1983,14-15; Ghai and Choong, 42). 
The board of GHASEL took the wide powers vested in HVA as the defining context 
for the exercise of its supervision and monitoring of the MC. HVA regularly reported 
to the board as required under the agreement. The board however abdicated its 
responsibility to look beyond these reports and their predictions and proposals and 
relinquished its broader role of assessing the project's core issues and problems. 
Throughout the project they never queried HVA's consistently over-optimistic 
assessment and projections (World Bank, 1981,34-35). It was only after HVA's 
departure that the board set up an enquiry into the operations of the industry 
(MDPI, 1980). The first initiative for an independent assessment of HVA's 
pert'ormance came in the fifth year of its management, not from the board of directors 
or atiý, of the state institutions represented on it, but from the Ministry of Economic 
I'lannim, l (Abedi, 1978). 
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The Abedi probe, among other things. found HVA personnel failed to create fruitful 
working relationship with Ghanaian staff. It hints at racist behaviour by HVA 
personnel. Dissension, suspicion and antagonism among employees as a result of this, 
permeated the whole organisation. Workers considered agitators by the HVA 
management were victimised through denial of promotion. An " unsatisfactory" 
method of employment, dismissal and promotion "created warring groups in the 
company". The situation was so bad that "a Ghanaian worker who found reason to 
be on good terms with the expatriate staff was considered a betrayer (sic) by his 
fellow Ghanaian workers". The Committee was of the opinion that "the personnel 
state of affairs has adversely affected the overall performance of the company" 
(Abedi, 1978,15). 
One of the reasons why the GHASEL board woefully failed to fulfil its general and 
specific supervisory mandate was because the state representation which looked so 
strong on paper was in practice a weak one. The named directors were very high and 
busy officials with wide responsibilities. In practice therefore their positions were ex 
officio, active responsibility for which fell to civil servants. Just as has been 
experienced elsewhere the devolution of such responsibility to civil servants weakened 
the state's ability to effectively use the board's monitoring and supervisory powers 
(Ghai and Choong, 1.5-16). Apart from lacking the commercial and technical expertise 
to evaluate the work and proposals of the managing agent there tends to be a regular 
turn-over of representation since the position attaches to a job schedule in the relevant 
state institution so responsible officials may not have enough time to matter the brief 
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even if they were interested and could fit it in with their many other responsibilities'. 
The World Bank's project audit hints at both lack of expertise and turn-over of 
directors as factors in the lethargic role of the GHASEL board. The report (p. 34) 
notes that 
"As part explanation of the Board's lack of active participation, its 
membership consisted mostly of senior officials (or their alternates) of 
various ministries or government-controlled agencies, fon-ning a Board that 
lacked the vitality and motivation to carry out its assigned oversight 
functions. "(italics added) 
In contrast with the case of GHASEL the role of the BOPP board in the operation of 
the firm's MC was more a case of actively facilitating the realisation of Unilever's 
corporate strategy than of failing to exercise supervisory responsibility. Unlike the 
case of GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC where the relationship between the owners and 
the managing agent was inherently antagonistic, the majority shareholders in BOPP 
and the managing agent were associated companies. As we have noted this was 
reflected in the way the MC structured their relationship. Unilever's majority on the 
BOPP board was buttressed by the already discussed company regulations which 
sidelined the board of directors. Realistically it was only through the use of 
monitoring and supervisory powers vested in public bodies such as the CIB/GIC that 
the state could police the BOPP MC. 
10.5.2. Monitoring by public bodies 
In an interview on 29 October 1981, Mr Okine, Technical Adviser at the GIIA', F-, L head off-ice 
complained about the quality of the board of directors of rnainlý- Civil Servants. fie was also highly 
critical of the "i-norance" of officials in the Ministries who he described as "havino no understanding, 
ol'thc nature of the stigar industr-y". 
333 
It is not only local state/public bodies that had a role in the monitoring of the 
implementation of the MCs under discussion. In the cases of GHASEL, TOPP and 
GOPDC funding IDFIs, who provided the money for the payment of management 
fees, represented an additional layer of extra-firm monitoring. We have already 
indicated that TOPT's MCs required the EC Commission's approval of the manager's 
reports for the periodic release of EC funding for the project. It is in respect of only 
the BOPP and GHASEL MCs that we have data on monitoring by local and 
international public bodies. The following discussion looks at the BOPP experience 
of monitoring by the CIB/GIC and the World Bank's monitoring of HVA's 
performance at GHASEL. 
Until the passage of the Investment Code, 1985 (PNDC Law 116) no public body had 
specific powers to oversee the terms and implementation of management/technology 
transfer contracts. Despite this gap in the law the broad terms of section 7 of the 
Capital Investment Decree, 1973, which lay out the criteria which should guide the 
CIB/GIC in granting approval for investments and section 10 of the same Decree 
which gives the Board power to request information or any other evidence on how an 
investment is meeting the conditions imposed on it offered a legal basis for the CIB 
to develop a policy and practice of monitoring management contracts. Such a policy 
would havc covered GHASEL, BOPP and TOPP, approved investments under NRCD 
141. 
The indications are that no such practice was developed. Strong evidence in support 
of this view is off-ered by the fact that it was only in 1986, ten years after it came into 
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force, that the CIB/GIC for the first time took a critical look at the BOPP-PG contract 
and raised substantial objections to many key provisions. The CIB/GIC query 
followed BOPP's submission of a copy of its agreement with PG to the CIB/GIC, in 
compliance with section 29 of the Investment Code, 1985'. 
The objections of the GIC's Technical Committee on Technology Transfer (TCTT) to 
the BOPP-PG agreement fell under eight main heads'. These related to 1) the 
provisions on duration and termination of the MC, 2) the inadequacy of the training 
provisions, 3) the breadth of the provisions on the supply of technical and specialist 
services by PG, linked to this 4) the specific services PG rendered to BOPP and 5) 
the computation of fees paid to PG, 6) the details of the Schedule which lists the 
services to be performed by PG. The Committee also objected to 7) exclusive right 
given to local Unilever companies to supply services to BOPP and 8) the period for 
notices under the agreement. It was on only the last point that the Committee 
recommended a liberalisation, that the period of notices under clause 10 should be 
changed from 7 to 28 days "in view of the problems with the country's postal system". 
' Part V of the Investment Code, 1985 deals with technology transfer agreements. Section 27 requires 
tile CIBIGIC to keep a record of all such agreements, evaluate them and monitor compliance with their I terms. Section 29 required that copies of agreements in force before the coming into force of the Code zn 
should be lodged with tile GIC within 6 months of the Code coming into force. Section '30 empowers 
the GIC to make repulations to govern technology transfer agreements and lays out the principles on 
which such regulations should be based. 
2 Memo of 14 April 1987 from chairman TTCTT to chief executive, GIC in GIOTT. 10. 
The BOPP MC. fell foul of the requirements of section 30 of the Investment Code on 
1) reasonableness of duration of technology transfer agreements, 2) restrictive business 
practices, and 3) transfer and absorption of technology. The TCTT's objected to the 
provision that after its initial stipulated duration of four years, which expired on 21 
January 1980, the MC was to run indefinitely until terminated by either party upon six 
months notice'. It made the rather vague and puzzling proposal that Unilever "should 
initiate steps to reduce BOPP's dependence on Unilever Limited". A number of other 
recommendations were located within this general objection to an indefinite 
relationship between BOPP and PG. 
The TCTT "was not happy that BOPP was always relying on Unilever Limited for all 
their technical and specialist services" and recommended that clause 5 of the MC 
which covered the provision of such services be amended to cater for the use of local 
engineering and research companies. In this connection it specifically disallowed 
clause 6 which limits the provision of local services to BOPP to only associated firms. 
The TCTT also asked that Unilever should prepare a detailed programme for training 
Ghanaians to take over the functions performed by visiting PG personnel and also 
proposed that the schedule to the agrement be amended to reflect PG's "intention to 
assist BOPP to have its own, research,, engineering, financial and personnel services". 
When asked to justifý- why the agreement was still in force, 10 years on BOPP, in a letter of 23 
October 1986, gave the opaque and banal answer that "it is in existence because it governs the ongoing 
relationship between the partners and deals with a variety of matters including commercial and financial 
matters". 
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The TCTT's close examination of the breakdown that BOPP provided of the E98.125 
fee paid to PG, for the period July 1985 to June 1986, led it to challenge the very core 
of the agreement. BOPP broke down the fee paid to PG as follows: 
1. Obtaining information and quotations, and giving advice on 
agricultural, factory, machinery and spares. 
= E20,03 8 
2. (a) Technical advice on factory, housing, transport, water supplies, etc. 
(b) Perusal and comment on monthly technical reports submitted by site. 
= E29,972 
3. Agricultural and Agricultural Research advice including the knowledge 
of experimental work in plant breeding and the most modem 
principles of plantation development and management. 
=f31,827 
4. Commercial advice including financial policy, procedures and 
accounting systems together with costing information in relation to 
other countries when applicable. 
= E5,736 
5. Personnel advice including management recruitment for overseas, 
secondment, guidance on salary policies and training programme for 
management and staff. 
E5,960 
6. Specialist services including advice on taxation, secretarial, legal and 
insurance matters as may arise from time to time. 
= E4,592 
'Flie Committee recommended that only items 2 (b) and 3 should be maintained. In 
its opinion the services under items 1,2 (a), 4,5 and 6 "could be efficiently provided 
by Ghanaian personnel or companies. This would mean a substantial reduction in the 
fees being charged by Plantations Group". The Committee recommended that in 
future fees paid to PG should not exceed 2 per cent of BOPP's net sales. 
The recorrimendations of the Technical Committee formed the bases of negotiations 
between the CIB/GIC resultmo in a new aoreement between BOPP and PG inAuoust 
1990, valid for five years. Key provisions of the new agreement however diverged 
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from the recommendations of the Committee. Significantly the concern to effect a 
"substantial reduction in the fees being charged by Plantations Group" was not 
reflected in the new contract which provided for the fees paid by BOPP to rise each 
year, from E98,125 in 1989 to E138,000 in 1994. The GIC's acceptance of thls 
particular element of the new agreement was illogical considering the amendments to 
the MC that implied a progressive reduction of PG's services to BOPP. Thus the 
outcome of the CIB/GIC's questioning of BOPP's MC proved to be something of an 
anti-climax, leaving a sense that Unilever's lobbying had prevailed over the 
recommendations of the TCTT. 
The considerable freedom the World Bank had over the shaping the GHASEL scheme 
was retained throughout the life of the project'. Article V of the Development Credit 
Agreement for the project gave the Bank wide powers for the supervision and 
monitoring of the project. On its own admission the Bank's contribution to the 
disastrous outcome of the project included its poor monitoring of the managing agent 
and verification of the implementation of the terms of the MC (World Bank, 1981,40). 
During the life of the GHASEL scheme it was listed "a problem project" by the 
World Bank on three separate occasions: at the very beginning in 1973,1974-1975 and 
its very last year, 1978 (World Bank, 1981,2). This characterisation was not 
A striking example of this is provided by the Bank's role in the preparation of a sugar industry 
expansion study (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning File no. MEA/EAD/413.1). A letter of 18 
June 197S, from the Bank to the Ministry of Industries, commenting extensively on a proposal from 
IlVA concluded that 
"As the Government has selected, with IDA agreement, HVA to undertake the 
teasibility study, N\e would like to suggest that IDA be authorised to draft in 
consultation N\ ith FIVA. revised temis of refierence for the proposed study for 
Government's coils iderat ion. " 
-'I 
reflected in the Bank's supervision of the project. Between October 1974 and May 
1978 the Bank sent only three supervision missions to the project, compared with eight 
in the 18 months from March 1973 to October 1974. None of the these missions had 
specialists on sugar cane cultivation or factory operations! (World Bank. 1981,40). 
Like GHASEL's board of directors, the World Bank was seduced by the reports HVA 
regularly submitted. According to the project audit (p. 40) "considerable reliance" was 
given these reports the short term forecasts of which the Bank's project auditors 
belatedly found to be "invariably optimistic, thus building false expectations" which 
affected the Bank's view of the project. Barely a year before the end of HVA's 
contract Bank officials were still making positive comments about the firm's 
management of GHASELI. The audit report concluded that 
"With hindsight, a stronger supervision effort using specialist consultants 
might have produced a more balanced view... it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the project should have been the object of a serious in-depth 
review at sometime during implementation" (p. 40). 
The financial costs of the failure of GHASEL were substantial. Total projects costs 
at $41.3 million were way above the original estimate of $24.8 million. The company 
ruii losses in every year of the project. As of September 1978 accumulated losses 
amounted to C26.3 million most of it covered by short term loans from the 
Government, amounting to C19.0 million (GHASEL, 1981,5). So a project which %%as 
cxpected to meet a large part of home demand and yield substantial foreign exchange 
savings ended Lip a major drain on the resources of the Ghanaian state. 
NI inutes of nicet Inc, of 24 March 1977 bet ween off icialsot'the World Bank and Mini stry of I ýc on ornic 
Planning in NIFFP file no. NilEA'EAD'41 33.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
This work has examined the role of law and state in the intemationalisation of 
agricultural capital in colonial and post colonial Ghana. The discussion has been 
based on the premise that the nature and role of law and state cannot be understood 
outside concrete historical conditions and social relations. Consequently the analysis 
has centred around the involvement of merchant and industrial capitals in cocoa 
production in the colonial period and the involvement of state, international finance 
and industrial capitals in post colonial sugar and oil palm production. The main focus 
of the analysis was on: 
a) the changes that took place in the form of landed property and 
"customary land law" as a result of the character of agrarian transition 
that followed formal colonisation, a transition which took the form of 
a deepening subsumption of the peasantry by capital rather than their 
expropriation and transformation into formal wage labourers; 
b) the role of the new forms of landed property and contract in the 
subsumption of peasant producers by capital; 
c) the overt and mediating role of the state in the relationship between 
capital and the direct producers; 
d) changes in the nature of b) and c) as a result of post Second World 
War changes in the internationalisation of capital and the post colonial 
shift of the state's emphasis from export agriculture to production for 
the honic market. 
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The defining characteristic of agricultural production in colonial and post colonial 
Ghana is the dominance of smallholder peasant production. This is due to the nature 
of the agrarian transition that followed formal colonisation. This took the form of the 
deepening subsumption of hitherto pre-capitalist producers in the circuit of capital 
through the further commoditifi cation of elements of their reproduction instead of the 
expropriation of their lands and their conversion into wage labourers. This outcome 
was not the pre-determined policy of the colonial state. The conscious attempt of the 
colonial state to effect changes in indigenous land relations through the 1894 Crown 
Lands Bill and the Public Lands Bill of 1897 failed. The transformation that produced 
the dominance of smallholder property in agriculture was the result of changes in 
nature of pre-capitalist tenure effected by the spread of agricultural commodity, 
especially cocoa, production. 
The colonial state, as shown in Chapter 2, was interventionist from the very beginning 
as it sought to extend and consolidate its political power at the expense of indigenous 
rulers and create the conditions for the more systematic penetration of capital and the 
spread of commodity relations including export agriculture. Forced labour, mobilised 
through the structures of traditional authority and justified by a spurious reference to 
customary law, made a major contribution to the opening up of the country, especially 
the cocoa producing areas. The abortive Crown Lands Bill of 1894 and the Public 
Lands Bill of 1897 discussed in Chapter 3 formed part of the efforts of the colonial 
statc to create the conditions for the penetration of capital into the Gold Coast 
CCOIIOMN'. 
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Although the main concern of the Bills was to facilitate the operations of British 
mining capital the laws would have had far reaching consequences for agriculture. 
The colonial state's retreat, in the face of local protests, from the far reaching aims of 
the 1897 Bill and the passage of the circumscribed Concessions Ordinance in 1900 did 
not affect the core objective of aiding British mining capital. The retreat from the 
policy embodied in the 1897 Lands Bill represented an early illustration of the inherent 
fragility and an unstable equilibrium of the colonial state, based as it was on indirect 
rule. As the discussions in Chapters 3,4 and 5 show this political character of being 
simultaneously rooted in the metropolitan bourgeoisie and local ruling strata remained 
a constraint on its activity throughout the colonial period. The failure to pass the 1897 
Bill meant that the transformation of land relations in agriculture emerged from the 
interstices of existing pre-colonial tenure. 
The transformation of land relations that accompanied the spread of cocoa production 
wrought important changes in "customary law". The discussion in Chapter 3 shows 
how new forms of "customary law" private property in land, especially the interests 
of the new usufructuary and the new "stranger" emerged out of pre-capitalist land 
relations. The incidents of these new interests and the contradictions that the 
development bred, offer evidence to support the contention made in Chapter I that 
cocoa production resulted in a) uneven changes in pre-capitalist legal forms, b) the 
partial altering of the appearance of these forms, e-g the usufruct, the abusa tributary 
relationship into a form of tenancy based on contract, and c) the radical transformation 
of some concrete concepts, e-g, the transformation of the subject's usufruct into a 
virtual freehold interest. 
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While the overt and mediating role of the colonial state and its institutions - courts, 
administrators in the transformation of landed property relations , vas related to the 
deepening subsumption of the cocoa peasantry by capital and contributed to that 
process, the changes cannot be explained simply in terms of a "functionality" for 
capital or colonialism. The analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the process of 
transformation was deeply contradictory and the role of the state inconsistent. 
"Solutions", such as the Judicial recognition of the practical transformation of the 
"customary law" usufruct into a form of private property spawned new problems, in 
the instant case a challenge to the system of indirect rule. The persistence of old 
legal forms and appearances with radically new content, expressing the new political 
and economic relations created by commodity production, lay at the root of the 
conflicts between usufructuaries and tenants on one side and chiefs on the other about 
the precise terms of the interests of the occupier and also in jurisdictional disputes 
between chiefs. The problems with land acquisition for the GOPDC, TOPP and BOPP 
and the substantial investment these enterprises had to make into providing housing 
for plantation labour so as to attract and keep a stable labour force underline the 
enduring effect of the transformation of landed property relations that occurred in the 
early years of colonial rule. 
The developmem of cocoa production was in keeping with the colonial state's 
overriding aim of promoting export agriculture. However the character of the agrarian 
transition with which it was bound up meant that capital did not directly control and 
organise the production of the crop to ensure the output of cocoa in quantities and of 
the qLiality desired by the industrial capitalist user of the raw material. Unlike the 
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capital-wage labourer situation where the relationship and struggles bet-ween the parties 
centre around the conditions of labour in the production sphere, that between the cocoa 
producer and capital pertained to both the sphere of production and also of circulation 
and attendant conflict over the realisation of the value of the peasant's product. In 
formal legal terms while the relationship between capital and wage labour is mediated 
by the labour contract, that with the peasant producer was expressed in a contract for 
the sale of goods. 
Chapter 4 discussed the organisation. of the cocoa marketing system and the 
mechanisms by which merchant and industrial capital, especially the former, exerted 
control over the cocoa production process even though it did not undertake the 
organisation of the immediate labour process which remained in the hands of the 
farmers. Debt relations played a central role in the cocoa industry, not only by 
ensuring the merchant firms a share of the market but in ensuring the reproduction of 
a substantial section of the cocoa peasantry constituted an important mechanism of 
their subsumption to capital. The analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated how the growing 
real subsumption of the peasant by capital was directly linked to both his formal 
independence from capital and increasing dependence on commodity production which 
therefore made him vulnerable to cyclical price movements. An important 
consequence of this dependence and adverse price movements was shortfalls in income 
creating scope for the operation of usurer's capital described by Marx (1981,728) as 
"tN, 6n brother" to merchant capital, as usurious activity by merchant capital through 
nioney adN,,, uices against ftiture deliveries of cocoa by needy farmers. Linked xvith the 
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usurious operations of merchant capital was the transformation of important customary 
law forms of mortgaging. 
The legal categorisation of brokers' advances as pre-payment under contracts for the 
sale of goods rather than as money lending transactions made it easy for colonial 
officials to persist with a policy of blaming the problem on the natives' lack of 
economic rationality and to continually bemoaning the debilitating effect of usury and 
peasant indebtedness on the production and quality of cocoa while failing to devise 
any concrete measures to deal with the problem. The tendency of colonial officials 
to blame indebtedness on the farmers' lack of thrift also neatly side stepped an 
examination of the fundamental role played by merchant's credit in ensuring the 
merchant's control over the producers. 
The double standards in the colonial state's tolerance of economic and legal 
arrangements that facilitated the operations of international capital in the narne of 
freedom of contract was starkly highlighted by the response to the cocoa hold-ups. 
Both the hold-ups and the buying agreements among the buying firms represented 
collective action by capital and labour in the struggle in the sphere of exchange over 
the realisation of the farmers' product. While the use of the courts and political 
officers to ensure "freedom of contract" and prevent acts in restraint of trade was 
formally defended as protecting the liberty of all citizens the failure of the colonial 
state to act against the cocoa buying firms whose buyMg and market sharing 
agreements meant that the state was actually acting to ensure that the collective 1-nighl 
of capital would not be confronted by the collective might of the producers but rather 
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atomised and weak individual sellers. Behind the proclamations about a concern for 
the rule of law and non- interference in commercial relations in the cocoa trade the 
policy of the colonial state objectively underlined its nature as representing the 
interests of British capital. 
The colonial state's promotion of the interests of capital were even more evident in 
the long running and varied efforts to regulate cocoa cultivation and crop preparation 
standards discussed in Chapter 5. If the hold-ups indicated the limits of how much 
control capital could exert in the sphere of exchange the difficulties that all the 
schemes for regulating quality run into showed the even greater difficulty of 
controlling the labour process of peasant producers. While the peasant's indebtedness 
to the broker creates a contractual obligation to deliver cocoa and therefore provides 
a legal basis for capital's control over the producer, the efforts of capital and the state 
to extract extra labour from the producer by way of improvements in farm 
maintenance and crop quality could not be located within a framework of mutual 
obligations. The tactic of the colonial state of seeking to achieve its cultivation and 
quality objectives through the use of the institutions of indirect rule and farmers' 
cooperatives, was based on a recognition of the coercive nature of the campaigns. As 
the hold-ups showed, the indigenous political system retained significant legitimacý' 
despite the co-optation and subordination of chiefs by the colonial state. 
The cocoa hold-ups during the 1930s Depression represented a sharpening of the 
conflict between the cocoa peasantry and capital. The accompanyiiigg hei(, htening of z: 7 
the contradictions between the institutions of indirect rule and the central government 
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did not only underline the fragility of the colonial political order but also undermined 
its legitimacy. While the colonial government could invoke the rule of law and the 
liberty of the citizen to justify the repression of localised cocoa hold-ups such as took 
place prior to that of 1937-38, it could not do so with the hold-up of 1937-38. The 
quotations on page 118 clearly show that colonial officials recognised it as a strategic 
confrontation with implications well beyond the price of cocoa. Thus in 1948, ten 
years after the momentous hold-up, an urban led protest against the same merchant 
firms turned the fissure opened up in the colonial order by the rural led 1937-38 
protests into an unbridgeable chasm between coloniser and colonised. The 1937-38 
hold-up and the 1948 riots were two sides of the same coin which called into question 
both legs of the import-export activity of merchant capital. The hold-up of 1937-38 
was triggered by discontent over their operation as buyers and exporters while the 
1948 riots that sparked off the process of decolonisation, and in the process 
highlighted unfulfilled demand in the home market, targeted their activity as sellers 
of imported goods. 
As indicated in Chapter 6 the interventionism of the post-colonial state to meet home 
demand of sugar, vegetable oil and soap was partly a continuation of belated efforts 
in this direction in the twilight of the colonial era. The greater attention the post- 
colonial state has given to the meeting of domestic demand and the approaches 
adopted for doim, so have to be understood not only in terms of the political dangers 
posed by shortages of food and non-durable consumer goods but also in terms of the 
strategies of accumulation by the rulino classes and their relationships vvith 
international capital. On pages 12-19 attention was drawn to the shifting emphases 
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of successive Ghanaian regimes on accumulation on the basis of private or state 
property and the international context within which these shifts occurred. The 
discussion in Chapter 6 of the genesis of Unilever's soap factory in Ghana provides 
a good illustration of how the new forms of internationalisation of capital dove-tailed 
with the policy orientations of the post-colonial state. As is demonstrated in Chapters 
65 7 and the Appendix on the Special Agricultural Scheme (SAS), while there was 
domestic economic justification for expanding oil palm production and rehabilitating 
the sugar industry the specific responses embodied in GHASEL, BOPP, TOPP and 
GOPDC were moulded by contemporary forms of internationalisation of capital. 
The discussion in Chapters 7,8 and 10 of the role of the post colonial state in the 
establishment of GHASEL, BOPP, TOPP and GOPDC, and its relationship with 
international capital demonstrates both a continuity with the colonial state and marked 
differences. The colonial state, an obvious instrument of foreign domination, 
conscious of its own fragility, sought to legitimise its facilitation of the activities of 
international capital behind proclamations of a civilising mission and a concern for the 
rule of law and the liberty of the citizen. It hardly undertook direct productive 
economic activity until the period after the Second World War. The post Second 
World War colonial policy mirrored state interventionism in Britain itself In contrast 
the post colonial state, proclaiming a concern for national "independence" 
"development" and "self reliance" actively facilitated the operation of international 
capital. Chapters 7,8 and 10 demonstrate the forms this facilitation took in the cases 
of OHASEL, TOPP. BOPP and GOPDC. 
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As the analysis of the relationships between the state and the various types of 
international capital involved in the projects show, contract was the main legal 
mechanism through which state policy was subordinated to the interests of 
international capital. It has however been pointed out and demonstrated in the 
discussion of the post colonial projects that the alliance of state-IDFIs-TNCs in each 
of the projects represented a unity of convergent and contradictory interests. For the 
post-colonial state domestic shortage of capital, technology and managerial know how 
represent real constraints which impel a resort to international capital in the form of 
loans from IDFIs,, or joint ventures and/or management and technical assistance 
contracts with TNCs. 
However as the discussion of gestation of the projects and of the terms of BOPP's 
I-leads of Agreement, Chapters 7 and 8 respectively show, the terms which are 
negotiated with IDFIs or TNCs are not simply the unavoidable result of the economic 
weakness of the post-colonial state but also how the ruling regime perceived the role 
of international capital. In the case of GHASEL the NLC-Busia regimes, for whom 
"anything that outside powers or foreign capital proposed was gospel" (First, 1970,3 87) 
left the World Bank to determine the shape of the ultimately disastrous project. The 
absence until 1986 of a mechanism for monitoring the terms and implementation of 
technology transfer agreements, an important instrument for the transnationalisation 
of capital, huJiliolits the institutional wealuiesses of the post colonial state and Z- 
flierefore the possible limits on the value ot' formal contractual terms in a, (. 1, reements 
Nvith TNCs. The analysis of m-miagement contracts in Chapter 10 shows that not onlv 
are inmagement and technical services expensive but because they have become a 
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relatively risk free instrument for the extension of the influence of TNCs accompanied 
by a healthy economic return monitoring of contract implementation is as important 
as the formal terms of agreements. 
The contract farming schemes under GHASEL, TOPP and GOPDC constituted specific 
instances of a convergence between the "rural development" and agricultural "self 
reliance" concerns of the post colonial state, new orientations of agribusiness TNCs 
and the role of IDFIs in the extension of commodity relations in the agrarian sectors 
of underdeveloped countries. There are striking points of similarity as well as 
important differences in the situation of the contract farmer and the colonial cocoa 
farmer. Applying the wide definition of contract farming offered by Roy (quoted in 
Glover, 1990,4) as 
those contractual arrangements between farmers and firms, whether oral or 
written, specifying one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of 
and agricultural product 
the cocoa farmer who took an advance from a broker was no less a contract farmer 
than a GHASEL or GOPDC outgrower. In both cases debt relations represent an 
important mechanism of subsumption to capital. However while this relationship is 
formalised and recognised as a loan transaction in the case of the outgrower this was 
not the case with the cocoa farmer tied to the merchant by a broker's advance. 
The credit nexus in contract farming schemes discussed Chapter 9 however differs in 
important ways from that of the cocoa industry. The broker/money lender's advance 
basically fed on the reproduction squeeze on the producer and while such credit 
ensured his continued reproduction as a cocoa farmer it did so with negative 
implications for quality. The advances to the contract farmer on the other hand 
distinguished between productive capital and money for private consumption and the 
arrangement is formally sensitive to crop quality standards. This difference is not 
surprising. Like the case of Cadbury's and other industrial users of cocoa the 
outgrowers crop was a raw material for the mill of the nucleus estate which was 
therefore as concerned about quality as it was about the quantity delivered by the 
outgrower. This is reflected in the terms of the outgrower contract under which the 
estate, units of productive capital created by the union of state and international 
finance capitals, unite the roles of buyer, creditor and enforcer of cultivation and 
quality standards. By contrast in the case of the cocoa farmer these roles were 
respectively dispersed among the merchant and industrial buying firms, brokers and 
moneylenders and the state. 
Unlike the situation of the cocoa farmer where crop cultivation and quality standards 
are the subject of state coercion they form part of the contractual relationship between 
contract farmer and estate. Some of the issues of conflict and dispute between farmers 
and estate, such as prices and cultivation standards are similar to those that occurred 
in the relationship between the cocoa peasantry, capital and the colonial state. In 
situations of acute conflict such as developed between GHASEL and its outgrowers, 
the forms of farmers protest and resistance are also similar such as cutting back on 
production and seekino alternative buyers for the crop. This is so notwithstanding the Z: ý 
contractual provision which empowers both GHASEL and GOPDC to enter the farms 
of delaulting outgrowers to carry out cultivation or harvest. 
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The last point underlines the difference between the contract farmer and flie cocoa 
farmer in the extent of control capital has over the farmer's production process. The 
outgrower contract in integrating credit, price and input supplies offers the farmer 
freedom from the uncertainties about an economic return on his labour carries the 
price of a spelled out circumscription of his freedom in the labour process. In theory 
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the contract farming arrangement with its guarantee of inputs, credit and market at 
predictable prices should reduce the precariousness and uncertainty about output and 
income which were the near permanent clouds that hung over numerous cocoa farmers. 
Despite the higher degree of subsumption by capital the contract farmer still shared 
the basic characteristic with the cocoa farmer of being in immediate control of his 
farm. 
The contract farming schemes represented a compromise between the reality of 
predominantly smallholder production and capital's need for efficient but cheap labour. 
A recognition of the fact of this compromise is reflected in the emerging perspectives 
of the World Bank and FAO about future tree crop, including oil palm, projects in 
Ghana. In a 1989 Confidential Report on Tree Crops in Ghana the FAO and World 
Bank proposed an abando=ent of public sector large scale nucleus estate approach 
to tree crop development and a focus on smallholder production. The Report cited the 
high cost of expatriate management that the projects require, the problems of land 
acquisition of the type experienced in respect of TOPP, BOPP and GOPDC due to the 
counti-y's "complex land tenure", and greater ability of smallholder production to 
titilise existing labour resources and labour supply problems around the oil paini 
-3 
52 
estates and more equitable distribution of the benefits as some of the factors favouring 
smallholder production (FAO, 1989,25)1. 
The emerging FAO/World Bank perspective on tree crop cultivation implies both a 
recognition of the possibilities of smallholder production as shown by the contract 
farming component of GOPDC and a questioning of the strategy of state-IDFI-TNC 
alliance on which TOPP and GOPDC were based. There are strong grounds for 
believing that the disavowal of the TOPP and GOPDC models has more to do wIth 
a shift in the model of accumulation favoured by Ghana's ruling regime and in the 
policy orientations of the IDFIs which funded the projects. Firstly and most 
significantly the turn away from large public sector agricultural schemes is being 
proposed in the context of a swing by both the Ghanaian state and international 
finance capital against state involvement in productive activity and the encouragement 
of private accumulation. Despite its success GOPDC is being privatised. It and TOPP 
belong to the long abandoned "basic needs" era of the IDFIs and public sector led "self 
reliance" phase of Ghanaian state policy. 
The point about the determining influence of a new model of accumulation is given 
added weight when it is considered that the grounds cited to support the argument 
against plantatioii culture are not new. Furthermore the definition of "smallholder" 
that the FAO and World Bank are working with - up to 200 ha - does not foreclose 
' The view on the obstacles posed by difficulties with land acquisition confirmed the conclusion the 
N, Vorld Bank (1984.10) drexv in the middle of the GOPDC project that the "problems of land acquisition 
faced bv this and the Twifo project are likely to discourage the large scale plantation approach to the 
development of oil palm in Ghana in the future''. 
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the development of plantations. In Ghana a 200 oil palm, estate considering the 
figures given in Chapter 9 about the average sizes of holdings, constitutes a plantation. 
Farms near the top of the size scale would face some of the obstacles faced by larger 
plantations; such difficulty with land acquisition and labour supply. A 200 ha oil palm 
plantation would be a handy size for a Ghanaian capitalist farmer. Thus as the 1990s 
unfold yet another shift is emerging in the role of law and state in the 
internationalisation of agricultural capital in Ghana. 
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Appendix I 
Model Outgrower Contracts 
Model GHASEL Outgrower Agreement 
Agreement For The Cultivation and Supply Of Sugar Cane To GHASEL 
This Agreement is made on the ------- day of --- 19 ---- between GHASEL of the I st part 
and the ADB of the 2nd part ----- and ---- hereinafter called the Planter of the 3rd part. 
Whereas the Planter is the Freeholder/Leaseholder/in customary law possession for a 
period of not less than 5 years from I st date hereof --- hereinafter called 'the farm'). 
1. ADB with the consent of GHASEL agrees 
a) to make loan to the Planter of a sum which shall(subject to review by ADB 
and GHASEL) in the I st year of sugar cane cultivation cover 80% of the cost of 
clearing of the farm including ploughing, harrowing, farrowing and ridging, 100% of 
the cost of planting material and fertilizers and, in the case of a loan for new planting 
of a new farm a living allowance of not more than C300 payable in two equal 
instalmeiits, the first after clearing and the second after weeding, and second through 
to the 5th year to provide 100% of the cost of fertilizers and other inputs and 80% of 
the manpower required for harvesting based on a productivity of a minimum of . 70 
ton cut and loaded (green cane) per man day. 
To provide the Planter all necessary administrative assistance in the 
management of the farm. 
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2. The Planter hereby agrees- 
a)to pay interest on the principal amount of the loan granted to him by ADB 
from time to time outstanding at the rate of 9% per annum or such other higher rate 
as ADB, in consultation with GHASEL's hall determine from time to time; 
b) to repay the said loan together with interest thereon in four successive 
annual instalments respectively of 35%, 35%, 20% and 10% of the principal amount 
thereof, thee first such repayment to be made immediately following the harvesting of 
the plant crop; 
c) to plant, cultivate and harvest at least 3 ratoons subsequently all of them 
being in accordance with the agricultural and technical advise of GHASEL; 
d) to prepare the first crop and to plant at such a time as to ensure the proper 
length of vegetation period and full maturity at the period of harvesting stipulated in 
the crushing programme as made by GHASEL. 
'Crushing Programme' is defined in the context of the Agreement as the programme 
made by GHASEL of the square of the fields to be harvested having regard to the 
proper age and maturity, and, therefore, the optional sucrose content of the sugar cane 
at the time of the harvesting. GHASEL shall issue at regular intervals a schedule of 
daily supply quota based on the crushing programme. This schedule of daily supply 
quota based on the crushing programme may be subject to reasonable changes with 
regard to the circumstances beyond GHASEL's control, provided that sufficient motive 
not less than 48 hours shall be given to the Planter; 
e) to obtain the prior approval of GHASEL and ADB before extending the 
average of his cane plantation. 
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f) not to plant at the farm or elsewhere any variety of sugar cane except that 
approved by GHASEL, 
g) to plant the seed cane immediately on delivery in case such seed cane is 
supplied by GHASEL 
h) to allow the employees, servants or agents of GHASEL proper access to 
all parts of the farm for the purpose of field control, estimating, checking on 
harvesting and sample taking, in matters related thereto, provided that GHASEL's 
employees, servants or agents shall exercise due care to avoid damage to the crop or 
the crops thereon, 
i) to construct and maintain in consultation with GHASEL proper access roads 
and drains along such roads into the farm; 
to harvest and prepare the sugar cane properly by cutting at soil level, 
clearing of trash and topping of the cane according to GHASEL's instructions before 
loading it into transport vehicles for delivery to GHASEL's factory. 
However, if the cane is unfit for milling, GHASEL will buy at a reduced price 
depending on the quality. In case burning of cane prior to harvesting will be 
introduced, the Planter should not burn more cane than will be needed the following 
day for harvesting in accordance with the daily supply quota; 
k) not to sell or crush or transfer any sugar cane plant under this Agreement 
to any other party without the written consent of GHASEL and ADB,, 
1) to follow the crushing programme and daily supply quota as made by 
GHASEL in consultation with the Planter, and in case no GHASEL transport is used 
to adhere to the loading guidelines to be stipulated by GHASEL. 
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A schedule of daily supply quota will be made and issued by GHASEL at regular 
intervals and the Planter shall adhere strictly to this schedule of daily supply quota 
including the time schedule fixed for burning, cutting and loading. The schedule of 
daily supply quota will also be valid for Sundays and Public and Statutory holidays 
if the factory happens not to continue operations during such days. 
Furthermore, the weight, as determined on the GHASEL factory weighbridges, is to 
be accepted as the correct weight of the cane; 
m) to absolve GHASEL from any responsibility or financial obligation for any 
sugar cane left standing on the farm at the end of the crushing season as the result of 
the Planter's failure to following the schedule of daily supply quota based on the 
crushing programme. The Planter will be informed immediately when said failure 
occurs during the harvesting season; 
n) to use fertilizers, insecticides and chemicals according to the advice and 
prescriptions of GHASEL and as delivered by GHASEL charged at the cost price at 
the GHASEL factory store plus 10% to cover the cost of financing and overheads; 
o) to implement all fire precautions and to hold GHASEL responsible for any 
damage caused by fire; 
p) that in case of failure by the Planter to implement all fire precautions ADB 
has the right to implement than and charge the cost of such implementations against 
the Plmiter. 
GHASEL hereby agrees 
a) to purchase all the sugar cane produced by the Planter in accordance with 
the terms of this Agreement, 
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b) to pay the Planter per ton of sugar cane delivered at the factory an amount 
as determined by the schedules attached hereto as Annex i& ii. The Planter will 
accept the analysis as determined in GHASEL's laboratories as building; 
c) to provide transportation for the Planter for seed cane, if this seed cane if 
this seed cane is supplied by GHASEL, from GHASEL's estate/nursery to the 
Planter's farm at the rate of CO. I Op t/m. Transport of harvested cane from the farm 
to the factory will be provided at the rate CO. 1 Op t/m. Provided that if GHASEL shall 
fail to provide transport according to the schedule D. S. Q. GHASEL shall be 
responsible for the loss which the Planter shall sustain as a result of GHASEL 
consents to charge only 50% of the above mentioned transport rate; 
d) to supply seed cane, if GHASEL deems this necessary to ensure a proper 
sugar cane crop, to the Planter at the cost of C10.00 per ton ex GHASEL's 
estate/nursery. 
e) to advise the Planter on all matters dealing with all problem of cane 
cultivation and all matters related thereto; 
f) to provide to the Planter all agricultural and technical advice necessary for 
the efficient cultivation of sugar cane; 
g) to inform ADB promptly where a farmer neglects to observe proper fire 
precautionary measures. 
4. The Parties Hereto Further Agrees as follows: 
a) If the Planter fails to cultivates the farm, propose the S. C properly or harvest 
the S. C. ADB shall have the right to hire labour to do cultivation and/or harvesting and 
chartic the Planter accordingly Nvith the cost; 
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b) If GHASEL finds it necessary to treat the S. C against diseases or pests vvitli 
chemicals, or such other means as until be deemed appropriate by GHASEL for the 
containment and/or the combating of the diseases pests, the Planter shall pay the cost 
of such treatment. 
c) If ADB shall finance the Planter in the cultivation and maintenance of the 
farm, GHASEL shall pay the e proceeds of S. C bought from the Planter to ADB for 
the a/c of the P and ADB shall have the owner to enforce against GHASEL payments 
of the proceeds. However, GHASEL has the to deduct from the proceeds, before 
payments is made, the costs incurred by GHASEL for or on behalf of the Planter, 
including but not limited to, costs of fertilizers, insecticides and often chemicals, seed 
cane (if seed cane is supplied by GHASEL), passport of such seed cane, and transport 
of commercial cane. Details of such deductions shall be made available to ADB in 
respect of each of each Planter financed by ADB. 
Payment of the proceeds by GHASEL to ADB shall continue until any loan granted 
by ADB together with interest thereon has been fully repaid by the Planter within 30 
days after such full repayment ADB shall notify GHASEL and thereafter payments 
will made directly to the Planter. 
d) GHASEL shall pay to ADB for the a/c of the Planter for sugar cane bought 
by it from the P within 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. So, however, 
that where GHASEL shall, at its discretion, decide to buy sugar cane not burnt in 
accordance with the d. s. q/c. p., payment therefore may be made within 30 days frot-i-i 
the end of the month the cane was to be delivered pursuant to the sand d. s. q/c. p. If 
GHASEL shall fail repay for the S. C. so bought within the stipulated period, 
GHASEL shall be liable to pay interest on the amount outstanding at the current rate, 
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e) If GHASEL shall fail to conduct a crushing operation when one is normally 
due it shall pay the basic price as per the schedule under Article 3(b) appropriate for 
the year in which the failure occurs for all the matured S. C. which the Planter -ývould 
have harvested if a crushing operation had taken place GHASEL shall, however, not 
be liable if the failure to conduct a crushing operation is due to Acts of God and to 
circumstances beyond GHASEL's control provided reasonably sufficient notice would 
have been given to the Planter in advance. Also GHASEL shall not be liable for 
reasonable charges in the schedule of d. s. q. based on the crushing programme; 
provided the Planter has received sufficient notice thereof not being less than 48 hours. 
5. All disputes, differences and questions which may at any time arise between the 
parties hereto or their respective representatives or assigns touching or arising out or 
in respect of this Agreement shall be reformed to a single Arbitration in accordance 
with the provision of the Arbitration Act 1981 (Act 38) or any statutory modification 
or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. 
6. This Agreement shall remain in full force until it is terminated by either GHASEL 
or the Planter with the written consent of ADB after twelve(12) months notice in 
writing to the other parties. The termination of the contract shall in this context mean 
that the Planter will not be allowed thereafter to plant cane for first crop, but he will 
allowed to cultivate and harvest the final ratoon from the farm in Agreement between 
Ghasel & the Planter. 
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Annex: Schedule for Payment of cane 
with a lower yield then 9% 
(Based on standard cane yield of 9%) 
Yield C per Ton Yield C per Ton 
6.0 6.67 11.9 12.11 
6.1 6.78 12.0 12.22 
6.2 6.89 12.1 12.33 
6.3 7.00 12.2 12.44 
6.4 
... 
7.11 
.... 
12.3 
.... 
12.56 
..... 
8.5 .... 9.44 ... 13.1 
..... 14.11 
8.6 9.56 13.2 14.22 
8.7 9.67 13.3 14.33 
8.8 9.78 13.4 14.44 
8.9 
... 
9.89 
.... 
13.5 
.... 
14.56 
..... 
9.0 10.00 14.0 15.00 
9.1 10.11 14.1 15.11 
9.2 10.22 14.2 15.22 
9.3 10.33 14.3 15.33 
9.4 10.44 14.4 15.44 
Agreement between GHASEL and ADB dated 4th May 1993 
This agreement made the fourth day of May 1993 between the GHASEL sugar Estate 
Ltd, a Ltd liability Co in ways under the laws of Ghasel and the ADB. 
Whereas 
1) This Agreement is being made in accordance with the provisions of the La,, ý, 
Credit Agreement dated 2-9/1/73 between IDA & the Republic of Ghana the Project 
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Agreement dated 29/1/73 between IDA and ADB and the Project Agreement dated 
27/1/73 between IDA & GHASEL. 
2) GHASEL carries on business (i. a) as manufacturers of sugar & holds titles 
to the sugar factories, S. C plantations & other lands comprising 18.730 acres at 
Asutsuare, approx 40 miles worth of Acre, and 5,705 acres at Komenda approx 120 
west of Accra. 
3) The qualities of sugar cane produced by GHASELS factories at optimum 
capacity. 
4) GHASEL agrees to have the supplementary quantity of sugar cane necessary 
to feed the factories at optimum capacity supplied by Planters 
5) ADB intends to grant loans in accordance with the obligations under Point 
B of the Law Credit Agreement for the planting of approximately 2,375 acres of 
formers cane at Asutsuare and 1,500 acres at Komenda & replanting of farmers' cane 
of approx 5,200 acres at Asutsuare & 3,500 acres and Komenda and Fertilisation and 
thereof and related activities. 
6) The parties are desirous to ensure the regular and efficient supply of suitable 
sugar cane to feed GHASEL'S factories. 
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Ghasel hereby agrees 
a) to provide the agricultural & technical advice to the Planters with 
whorn a separate contract has been concluded and to have in its service adequate 
personnel for this purpose; to undertake to marrv out technical appraisal of potential 
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Planters, in accordance with the farms of 5.3.05 of the GHASEL Project Agreement 
with a view to locating sufficient planters within the terms of Schedule I of the ADB 
Project Agreement to enable Point B of the Project to be carried our 
b) at the expense of the Planters with whom GHASEL has included and 
separate contract to supply the said planters with healthy and sufficient seed cane in 
case this is necessary by GHASEL and fertilisers insecticides and other chemicals, 
according to Part B of the Project, requisite for the efficient cultivation of S. C. and 
the representation of the S. C crop, all in accordance with GHASEL'S agricultural and 
technical advice 
c) at the expense of the Planters with whom GHASEL has been 
concluded a separate contract, to provide these Planters transport facilities for the 
transportation of seed cane (in case this is deemed necessary by GHASEL) from 
GHASEL'S estate/nurseries to the Planters farms at the rate of CO. 04 per ton/mile and 
for the transportation of harvested cane, cut according to the schedule of daily supply 
quota based on the crushing programme, from the Planters' farms to its factories at the 
rate of CO. 04 per ton/mile the charge so stated shall be computed under a formula set 
by GHASEL and agreed by ADB and shall be subject to review and on revision form 
time to time as may be deemed necessary in the light of any charges in costs, brought 
about by economic under the agreed formula. Crushing programme is defined in the 
context of this Agreement as the Program made by GHASEL of the sequence of the 
fields to be harvested having regard to the proper age and maturity and therefore the 
opthnal sucrose content of the sugar cane at the time of harvesting. GHASEL shall 
make and issue at regular intervals a schedule of daily supply quota based on the 
crushino program. This schedule of daily supply quota based on the crushing 
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programme may be subject to reasonable charges in case of circumstances beyond 
GHASEL'S control, provided that sufficient notice is given to the Planters, such notice 
shall not be less than 24 hours 
d) that priority should be given in so far as practicable to Planters' 
whose cane is accidentally burned. The Schedule of daily supply quota will then be 
charged in such a way that Planter will suffer the least possible loss 
e) to purchase good quality sugar cane from by the Planters on terms 
and conditions as GHASEL, ADB Planter shall agree upon 
f) to pay, within 30 days of delivery of the cane, the proceeds of suggar 
cane bought from the Planter financed by the ADB to ADB for a/cs of the said 
planters after GHASEL has first deducted from these proceeds the costs of transporting I-) 
the cane and such other costs as GHASEL shall have incurred for or on behalf of the 
farmer, including but not limited to the supply of fertilisers, In insecticides and other 
chemicals. After deducting the Planter's repayment instalments, ADB shall pay to the 
Planter the balance of the proceeds of sale. ADB will give GHASEL notice in writing 
within 30 days after the end of the period of financing by ADB of a Planter of such 
ending of the financing period. Thereafter payments will be made directly to the 
Planter concerned. 
2. ADB hereby agrees: 
a) to grant loans to the Planters on terms and conditions agreed upon 
by GI IASELADB and Planter to cultivate S. C to supply to GHASEL'S own 
plantation 
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b) to provide the Planters administrative services and facilities as 
necessary for the efficient functioning of Planters operation 
I The partners hereto further Agree as follows: 
a) That they will enter into a tripartite agreement with each Planter 
b) That this Agreement may be determined by one party giving to in 
other 12 months notice in writing but without prejudice to any rights or liabilities of 
the parties which accrued before the date of termination. 
G. O. P. D. C Smallholder Lease 
THIS LEASE is made the ---- day of ---- 19- between GHANA OIL PALM 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (GOPD) acting by its Managing Director 
(hereinafter called the "LANDLORD"' which expression shall where the context so 
admits include the person or body for the time being entitled to the reversioii 
immediately expectant on the determination of the term hereby granted) of the one 
part and 
(hereinafter called the "TENANT" which expression shall were the context so admits 
include his successors in title) of the other part. 
WITNESSETH as follows: 
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1. The Landlord hereby demises to the tenant ALL THAT PIECE OF LAND 
containing an approximate areas of -- acres situate at Kwae in the West Akim 
Abuakwa District in the Eastern Region of the Republic of Ghana and more 
particularly described as Plot No. ---- 
and delineated on Plan No. --- attached hereto and thereon shown edged pink whicli 
together with other lands adjoining are held by the landlord under lease dated 30th 
March,, 1976 and made between the Government of the Republic of Ghana of the one 
part and landlord of the other part. TO HOLD the same unto the tenant for the term 
of 25 years from the --- day of -- PAYING therefore the yearly rent of --- payable on 
the --without deduction. 
2. The tenant hereby convenants with the landlord: 
i) To pay the reserved rent on the day aforesaid. 
ii) To defray all existing and future rates, charges, taxes, duties, assessments, 
impositions and outgoings payable by law in respect to the demised premises by the 
other or occupier thereof 
iiijo use the clemised premises or any building or buildings thereon only for 
Agricultural purposes and purposes ancillary thereto. 
iv) Not to do or permit to be upon the demised premises any act or thing which 
shall cause or become a nuisance annoyance or inconvenience to the landlord or to the 
occupier of any of the adjoining premises. 
v) To keep any buildings on the dernised premises and all additions thereto and 
road, drains, compound and appurtenances thereof clean and in good and substantial 
state and condition. 
367 
vi) To permit the Landlord or his agent with or without workmen and others 
at all reasonable times to enter upon the dernised premises to view the same and for 
any purpose whatever and forthwith to remedy and defect arising from breach or iion- 
observance of any of the Tenant's stipulations herein contained of which written notice 
shall be to him. 
vii) To farm, cultivate and manage the demises premises in a good and husbandlike 
manner according to the methods of husbandry approved by the Landlord so as to 
keep the whole at all times in good heart and condition and not to allow any part to 
become impoverished or injured or deteriorated by exhausting crops or otherwise. 
viii) To reside with his family permanently on the demised premises and not without 
the Landlord's previous written consent to part with the possession of or assign or 
underlet or otherwise alienate(except by will or any other lawful testamentary 
disposition in favour of some member of his family) the demised premises or any part 
thereof except labourer's cottages with their appurtenances and as those mily to 
labourers employed on the dernised premises. 
ix) Not to commit or to permit or suffer spoil or waste on any part of the demised 
premises. 
3. The Landlord hereby covenants with the Tenants as follows: 
i) To permit the Tenant on his paying the rents hereby reserved and observing 
and performing the several covenants and stipulations herein on his part contained 
shall peaceably hold and enjoy the demised premiscs during the said term without any 
interruption by the Landlord or any person laNNfuliy claiming under or in trust for him. 
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4. If the rent hereiribefore reserved or any part thereof shall be unpaid for the space 
of 3 months next after the said days of payment (whether formally demanded or not) 
or if there shall be any breach or non-observance of any of the stipulations 
hereinbefore contained on the tenant's part to be observed and performed then it shall 
be lawful for the Landlord to re-enter upon the premises or any part thereof in the 
name of the whole and to have the same again as in his former estate and from 
thenceforth the tenancy hereby created shall cease and determine with out prejudice 
to the Landlord's right and remedies for any rent or breach of stipulations on the 
Tenants's part under this agreement. 
5. This demise shall be determined by either party giving to the other six calender 
months previous notice in writing to expire on ------ and on the expiration of such 
notice the demise shall cease and determine but without prejudice to any accrued right 
of action in respect of an y antecedent breach. 
6. At the expiration or sooner determination of this demise or within three calendar 
moths thereafter the Tenant shall remove, carry away and dispose of implements and 
articles and things whatsoever below belonging to or used or employed in or about the 
said land by the Tenant. 
7. If the Tenant shall during the term granted have erected an), building, dwelling 
houses, sheds and erections of similar nature and if at the expiration or earlier 
determination of the lease the Landlord shall be desirous of taking over any of the 
sanie and shall give notice in N), Titing to the Tenant of such desire at least three 
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calendar months before the expiration of the term or three months after an earlier 
determination then the buildings specified in such notice shall be taken over by the 
Landlord at a price to be agreed upon between the Landlord and the Tenant. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the party hereto of the first part has hereunto set his hand 
and affixed the seal of the GHANA OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
and the party hereto of the second part has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and 
year first above written. 
SIGNED SEALED with the Seal 
of the GHANA OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION AND DELIVERED by the 
said Managing Director 
In the presence of : 
SIGNED SEALED AND DELIVERED 
by the said 
in the presence of : 
G. O. P. D. C. Outgrower Contract 
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AGREEMENT Between GHANA OiL PALM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
and OUTGROWER 
Date: ------------- 19 
THIS AGREEMENT is made on the ----- day of ----- 19 
between GHANA OIL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. a public corporation 
established under the laws of Ghana whose registered office is in ------ in the 
Region of Ghana (hereinafter called "GOPD, " which expression shall where the 
context so admits or requires include its successor and assigns) and 
------------------------------------------ whose address is ------------ in the ------- Region 
(hereinafter called the "Outgrower" which expression shall where the context so admits 
or requires include his personal representatives, successors and assigns). 
WHEREAS the Outgrower has provided to GOPD evidence satisfactory to GOPD that 
the Outgrower has exclusive rights to farm for a period of not less than 20 years from 
the date hereto to 
acres (to be not less than --------- acres) of land suitable for ---- located at 
(describe land) (hereinafter called the Tarm"); 
WHERE AS the rights of the Outgrower in respect of the farm have been recorded 
with the District Administrative Office-Kade 
WHEREAS the 
Outgrowcr 
presently has under cultivation on the Farm ------- acres of oil palm (of' the 
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approximate average age of ---- years) of which ---- acres , if any. have been planted 
with financial assistance from GOPD, and the Outgrower now plans to plant ------ acres 
of oil palm with assistance of the Loan provided for in this Agreement (the total of 
the latter two figures not to exceed 20); 
WHEREAS NO member of the Outgrower's immediate family (father, mother and 
dependents) has received or applied for financial assistance from GOPD, except as has 
been disclosed in writing to GOPD; and 
WHEREAS the plot(s) to be planted with the assistance of such loan are no more than 
yards from the road known as 
IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. GOPD agrees: 
a) to make a loan (hereinafter the "Loan") to the Outgrower for the purposes 
indicated below (estimated to represent 100% of the cost except for labour). 
PURPOSE PERCENTAGE OF COST 
Planting material 100% 
Fertilizer 100% 
Wire Collars 100% 
Other Supplies 100% 
Labour 80% 
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Provided that: 
i) such amounts shall be made available to the Outgrower as they are required 
to finance the goods and services covered 
ii) all planting material shall be supplied by GOPD at reasonable prices: 
iii)no planting material shall be made available to the Outgrower until the 
Outgrower has provided evidence satisfactory to GOPD that Outgrower has made 
adequate preparation for the planting thereof 
b) to collect from the road referred to in the Preamble hereto at reasonable 
intervals, and to purchase at reasonable prices to be established from time to time by 
GOPD, all oil palm fruit produced by the Outgrower from plant material supplied by 
GOPD (provided GOPD shall not be required to purchase oil palm fruit bunches 
containing excessive amounts of stones or other foreign material) 
c) to pay the Outgrower for such fruit not later than seven days after collection 
and 
d) to deliver suitable planting material to the Farm and to provide the 
Outgrower administrative, extension and other technical advice and assistance in the 
management of the Farm. 
The Outgrower agrees: 
a) to pay interest on the principal amount of the Loan from time to time 
outstanding at the rate of 8% per annum 
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b) to repay the principal and interest of the 144 successive monthly 
instalments of equal amount on the day of each month, the first such repayment to be 
made on ------ --------- (approximately nine years from the date of this Agreement): 
c) that GOPD may collect such instalments by way of deductions from the 
purchase price of the Outgrower's palm fruit in accordance with Section 3(c) of this 
Agreement 
d) to provide out his own resources sufficient labour in addition to that 
financed out of the proceeds of the loan to care for the oil palm to be planted with 
assistance of GOPD 
e) to plant promptly on delivery, and cultivate all seedlings supplied by GOPD 
in so doing to ensure that satisfactory oil palm planting standards in accordance wifli 
the advice of GOPD are followed at all times on the Farm 
f) to take all reasonable measure to prevent and treat oil palm disease 
g) to allow the employees, servants or agents of GOPD access to all parts of 
the Farm for the purpose of inspecting oil palm and advising on all problems of oil 
palm planting and all matters related thereto, provided GOPD shall be liable to the 
Outgrower for any damage caused to the Outgrower's property as the result of the 
negligence of GOPD's employees, servants or agents. 
h) to harvest oil palm fruit bunches at a stage of ripeness, and with a length 
of bunch stalk, recommended by GOPD-, 
i) not to sell oil palm fruit from trees planted xxith the assistance of the loan 
to am, person other that GOPD, and 
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not to dispose of, or to suffer to be transferred, any interest the Outgrower 
has in the Farm (excluding transfers resulting from the Outgrower's death) without the 
prior written consent of GOPD. 
3. The parties hereto further agree as follows: 
a) If a default occurs in the payment of principal or interest hereunder. or if 
the Outgrower fails in any material way to satisfy the obligations undertaken in this 
Agreement and such failure continues for a period of 60 days after notice thereof has 
been given to the Outgrower by GOPD, then GOPD may, at its option, so long as 
such failure or default continues, by writteii notice to the Outgrow, er, declare the 
principal of the loan provided hereunder then outstanding to be due and payable 
immediately. 
b) If the Outgrower fails to manage the Farm in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement, or to harvest oil palm fruit when necessary, GOPD shall 
have the right to hire to do the same and charge the Outgrower accordingly with the 
cost. 
c) If GOPD finds it necessary, to treat the Outgrower's oil palms for diseases 
or pests with chemicals, or such other means as deemed appropriate by GOPD for the 
containment and/or the combatting of the diseases or pests, the Outgrower shall permit 
GOPD to do so and shall pay the treatment. 
d) Amounts of the loan withdrawn hereunder shall be recorded in the Schedule 
annexed hereto. 
e) In respect of each payment to be made by GOPD to the Outgrower for 
palm fruit, GOPD shall deduct and pay to itself such amount as shall be required 'to 
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meet payments of principal of and interest on, the loan at the time due from the 
Outgrower to GOPD, if any. 
f) GOPD may, at its option, assign its rights hereunder to the Agricultural 
Development Bank or any other responsible institution, provided that anv such 
assignment shall have no effect on GOPD's obligations to the Outgrower under this 
Agreement. 
g) The Outgrower shall not, directly or indirectly, assign this Agreement 
without the written consent of GOPD. 
h) The Outgrower shall have the right to prepay all or any portion of the loan 
provided for herein without penalty or premium. 
4. All disputes, differences and questions which may at any time arise between the 
parties hereto or their respective representatives or assign touching or arising our or 
in respect of this Agreement shall be referred to a single Arbitrator in accordance with 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1961 (Act 38) or any Statutory modification or 
reenactment thereof for the time being in force. 
5. This Agreement shall terminate when all principal of, and interest on the Loan has 
been paid to GOPD. 
AS WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto or their duly authorised representatives 
on the date first above written. 
SIGNED for and on behalf of the 
7 
GHANA OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
IN THE PRESENCE OF 
SIGNED by ----------- 
in the presence of 
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